Relational models theory is simple: People relate to each other in just four ways. Interaction can be structured with respect to (1) what people have in common, (2) ordered differences, (3) additive imbalances, or (4) ratios. When people focus on what they have in common, they are using a model we call Communal Sharing. When people construct some aspect of an interaction in terms of ordered differences, the model is Authority Ranking. When people attend to additive imbalances, they are framing the interaction in terms of the Equality Matching model. When they coordinate their actions according to proportions or rates, the model is Market Pricing. Everyone uses this repertoire of relational capacities to plan and to generate their own action; to understand, remember, and anticipate others; to coordinate the joint production of collective action and institutions; and to evaluate their own and others’ action. In different cultures, people use these four relational models in different ways, in different contexts, and in differing degrees. In short, four innate, open-ended relational structures, completed by congruent socially transmitted complements, structure most social action, thought, and motivation. That’s the theory.

These are the four fundamental, innate, human relational proclivities. To signify that they are cognitively modular but modifiable modes of interacting, I call them “mods.” However, these open-ended generative potentials are insufficient in themselves to determine action or evaluation, or permit
coordination. In order to use these mods to act or to interpret others’ action, people need socially transmitted prototypes, precedents, and principles that complete the mods, specifying how and when and with respect to whom the mods apply. I use the term "pro" to signify the class of paradigms, parameters, precepts, prescriptions, propositions, and proscriptions that can be conjured with mods. A mod must be conjured with a pro to complement it to generate a specific cultural coordination device.

This theory was first set out in primitive form in a 1990 article, and they developed fully in my 1991 book, Structures of Social Life, and an article that summarized the core ideas (Fiske, 1992). I expected then that the theory might have to be revised considerably once others had the opportunity to analyze it, and certainly once it was empirically tested. Surprisingly, discussions and extensive tests of the theory have not indicated any need for substantial revision (yet). However, they have facilitated the development of a somewhat clearer, perhaps more cogent formulation of the theory, which this chapter presents.

THE FOUR ELEMENTARY RELATIONAL STRUCTURES

The Communal Sharing (CS) mod bases sociality on the perception that a set of persons has something in common—something that makes them socially equivalent in some respect. (Typically, people are aware that the set is composed of individuals and subsets who are different in other respects.) The set may include the self, or may be a set of others who are treated as functionally equivalent for certain purposes. To organize any given aspect of a relationship in any given context, people must complete this mod with a pro that defines what who has in common with whom: “blood” kinship defined by descent through the mother, father, or both; blood consumed in an act of ritual brotherhood; a home economic or parental responsibilities; religion; employment by a corporation; attendance at a school or college; membership on the same team or being fans of one; being followers of the same leader; nationality, birthplace, or culturally defined “ethnicity”; joint responsibility for a decision; a shared resource such as a home, granary, commons, park, or road system; collective moral responsibility either for each other’s acts or for each other’s welfare; a type of misfortune or a problem (breast cancer, alcoholism, an earthquake, epidemic, or a terrorist strike); membership in a secret society; an age-set defined by initiation; or simply the sentiment of belonging together, with a shared past and future. The mod may structure the interaction of a dyad, a group, or an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983) who never all assemble together and do not know the identities of all the others. People may be motivated by what they see themselves as having in common with living humans, deceased persons, ancestors, spirits, gods, pets, domestic animals, or other social beings. Everyone has Communal Sharing relations with and when and with respect to primary or reference groups, as well as CS relationships that are less intense and more restricted in significance. Some of the equivalence sets to which a person belongs are wholly included subsets of broader CS groups; others merely intersect.

The Authority Ranking (AR) mod bases sociality on asymmetrical difference, typically transitive and hence linearly ordered. This mod itself does not define how people are ordered with respect to specific social practices or values. Hence people using this mod must complete it with socially transmitted pros which define how to rank people: by age, gender, caste, seniority, promotion system, achievement on a task or test, contact or combat passage through a ritual, possession of symbolic paraphernalia (yet). However, they’ve facilitated the development of a position determined by divination or revelation, charismatic performance, religious devotion, election, delegation or appointment by higher authority. In most cultures, each person participates in a variety of ARrelations with all kinds of tangible and intangible beings. But there is a tendency to assimilate the pros used to rank any given set of persons, creating a single ordering across contexts. However, in some instances people use distinct pros, ranking the same set of persons differently in different contexts or with respect to different issues: for example, by age or seniority for some purposes, but by office for other purposes.

The Equality Matching (EM) mod constructs relations according to addi
tional interval differences, with even balance as the reference point. Examples include turn-taking; lottery or coin-flip; voting; eye-for-an-eye, tooth-for-
tooth vengeance; rotating credit associations; baby-sitting coops; balanced in-kind reciprocity such as exchange of favors or dinner invitations; match-
ing contributions; distributions divided into equal shares; symmetrical play-
ing fields and even numbers of players in sports; and equal starting points and resources in games and contests. The EM defines unit differences as additive and subtractive, but does not specify what constitutes a unit, or, for example, what delay should occur between events. Cultural coordina-
tion devices differ as a function of pros that indicate, for example, what constitutes a turn, a favor, a dinner, an episode for a task-sitting, the number of castles on a chess board or the number of minutes available to each player for making moves. Coordination requires socially transmitted pros determining the length of a half in a sport, the procedure for assign-
ing teams to ends of the field, and who calls the coin flip. How long should a person wait before offering a return invitation? Is the offer of a below-sufficient restitution for the life taken in a homicide? If a kin group gives a bride to another group, who is entitled to the bride given in return? What sort of bride should they expect, and when? May they state their
IMPLEMENTATIONS AND COMBINATIONS OF THE FOUR BONDS

Preus indicate how to apply a mod, and they also specify which mod operates among which people with respect to which entities in which domains. Hence the relational mods represent alternative ways of doing anything social. However, the innumerable particular implementations varying across culture, history, and domains reflect just four generative structures. For example, there are four basic ways of making a collective decision: People can decide how to respond to a terrorist attack by consensus, by following a chain of command, by voting, or by cost-benefit analysis. Likewise, there are four basic ways of organizing work: People can clean the beaches by encouraging everyone to take responsibility as a community (perhaps voluntarily showing up for the annual cleanup), by assigning the task to subordinates, by dividing the coast into equal strips for each person to clean, or by soliciting bids from waste management companies. Similarly, there are four basic ways of using land to mediate social relations: A lot can be a common held by all for all to use. It can be a fee granted by the king that constitutes the holder as lord over all vassals resident in it. It can be a homestead of fixed size granted to each citizen who farms it and establishes residence. Or it can be an investment to be rented or developed for profit. Again, there are four basic ways for a culture to organize the temporal aspect of a social interaction: People may take turns, alternating temporal intervals. Alternatively, time may mark precedence: In West African villages, you must offer a libation to the ancestors before drinking, and pass the calabash of beer along according to status, from senior to junior. Time can also be a denominator for consumption: interest at 5% per annum, rent at $1,200 a month. In CS relationships, people may think of their relationship as timeless—they feel they have "always" been together and should be together forever.

Obviously there are great cultural differences in the prevalence and ideological valuation of the four relational models, so what is natural in one community, historical epoch, or domain is abhorrent in another. There have been many societies where the sale of land was not conceivable, only the sale of the sun or the ocean, and there were societies in which it was routine to sell sex or slaves.

The indeterminacy of the mods gives them a generative potential to combine with innumerable cultural proses to coordinate social activity in any domain of human life: labor, exchange, contribution, distribution, consumption, collective decision making, political ideology, moral judgment, religion, the interpretation of misfortune, aggression, sports and games, marriage, or the social meaning of time, place, and objects. This means that, for effective, mutually comprehensible social coordination of innumerable types of activities, humans need only the four social mods, along with mechanisms for discerning the cultural proses necessary for implementing the mods as specific cultural coordination devices. Because there are innumerable proses, people generate varied cultures. But because all humans have the same relational mods, children, immigrants, and social scientists are capable of apprehending and participating in any culture.

The core of the theory is this idea that people use the same set of four implicit cognitive schemas to organize all of the diverse domains of sociality most of the time. For example, as the term Authority Ranking indicates, relational model theory posits that prestige/value/status hierarchies have the same cognitive basis as legitimate power/control/command. These are obviously distinct implementations of AR, since having greater prestige does not confer the authority to command another. In the one
case, there is a linear ordering of social value, in the other a linear ordering of social control. But analytically, they have relational structures that are formally homologous, and people rely on the same implicit cognitive tools to construct them.

There are four basic forces in the physical universe, structuring interaction among a small set of elementary particles. The complexity and variability of the physical universe result from diverse manifestations and combinations of these few fundamental forces and particles. If relational models theory is correct, the social universe may also be based on just four basic relational bonds. The diversity and complexity of human societies, institutions, and relationships results from diverse manifestations and combinations of the four modes. Indeed, most dyadic relationships, and all stable groups and institutions, are formed out of combinations of models, concatenated or nested. For example, survivors of an attack may seek vengeance in an EM mode, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. At the same time, the CS model structures group responsibility for wreaking vengeance and the conflating of persons targeted as collectively responsible: The CS model operates when people feel that “we” have to get revenge against “them”—it does not particularly matter who among “us” carries out the counterattack, or which of “them” suffer. Everyone in the in-group is equivalent as victims and agents, so the group is the unit of suffering, justice, and retaliatory action; meanwhile “they” are a relational unit in which all persons are equivalent targets. MP may govern another phase of the event if leaders consider the costs and benefits of alternative means of wreaking vengeance. At the same time, AR may operate in leadership of the strategic decisions and among the military units who carry out the attacks—or in mediating a peaceful settlement.

Likewise, consider a diplomatic or military dinner party. At formal functions where rank is marked, guests should arrive in inverse order of rank (subordinates arriving earlier and awaiting superiors) and leave in order of rank (no one leaving before anyone superior to them). Seating at the table also marks rank. However, the food was purchased and the staff paid in an MP framework. But guests share what they eat and drink—the food and drink is theirs collectively to freely consume. Indeed, eating and drinking together marks and constitutes a bond of solidarity among those who partake. At the same time, participants exchange toasts with one another, matching one-to-one, and may feel obligated to reciprocate the hospitality by later inviting their host to a corresponding dinner. So all four models may operate at the same time or in succession, organizing distinct aspects of the social event. Different implementations, combinations, and sequences of the four elementary models thus generate a complex world full of unique interactions.

"RELATIONSHIPS"

As these examples illustrate, the term "relationship" is confusing in this theoretical context because, for example, it is not exact to state that people are "in" or "have" a CS relationship. This terminology reifies the models as if they were places that enclose persons, or kinds of objects that a set of people can possess, which are misleading metaphors. People may use a single model to coordinate the simplest, most transparent interactions. But generally the various aspects of interactions among a dyad or group are governed by more than one relational model; different aspects of an interaction may be simultaneously construed in terms of different models. Even if a set of people consistently use a single mode, they may have to implement it with somewhat different pros on different occasions. In other words, relational models are cognitive-affective-motivational models of and for aspects of interaction, not necessarily comprehensive or stable properties of sets of people. Nevertheless, if we keep this in mind, it may suffice and it simplifies expression to write or speak of "people in a CS relationship" rather than the more precise "people using the CS mod with certain pros to coordinate a particular aspect of their interaction in one domain at a certain point in time."

Relational models theory posits that people are inherently sociable, by nature. Homo sapiens evolved these relational propensities because of the benefits all parties tend to reap from participation in coordinated social action. Consequently, the relational models are not merely cognitive capacities: they are intrinsically motivating. People need and seek each of these kinds of relationship, although it seems that the four needs are not equally strong when they emerge in childhood. Furthermore, during development, cultural practices doubtless amplify or attenuate, redirect, and transform relational needs. Moreover, sociomoral emotions guide people to seek, create, sustain, sanction, transform, or terminate relationships (Fiske, 2002). Sociomoral emotions are proxies for the long-term expected adaptive value of relationships. That is, these emotions are motivational representations of the systemic state of relationships, directing people to act in ways likely to promote valuable relationships. For example, people who lack important or adequate relationships of a particular kind experience specific "appetites" for that type of relationship. Certain emotions reflect the positive value of good relationships, such as love in some CS relationships, awe/res-
erence in AR (looking up), comradeship in E.M., and sense of satisfaction from good MP transactions ("got a good price on that")! A person who has transgressed an important relationship experiences emotions motivating them to readdress that relationship, and so on. Emotions are essential for sustaining social relationships because optimistic and misleading cognitive biases and heuristics, hyperbolic discounting, and the coven nature of many social sanctions would make it virtually impossible for people to reliably learn, or consistently make reflective decisions to act in accord with, their long-term relational interests (Fiske, 2002).

Using the term, relationships in the colloquial sense, people often suppose that MP is not a relationship, but MP is, of course, a model—a structure or implicit schema, a syntax—for generating, coordinating, and evaluating interaction. However, it does seem to be true that MP relationships typically have less intrinsic motivational value for participants. And, compared to the other three models, when MP relationships do arise strong emotions, it appears that, on average, much of the emotional intensity is linked to the extrinsic consequences of people's actions, rather than being intrinsic to the MP relationships for its own sake. People more often engage in MP relationships largely as means to extrinsic ends; this is much less common in EM and AR, and relatively rare in CS relationships. Economists, of course, generally assume that people interact solely in order to pursue individual self-interest. Nonetheless, it is notable that economists who focus on the advantages and problems of close coordination have discovered three basic types of institutions: markets and hierarchies (Simon, 1981; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996), and "clans" (Ouchi, 1980). The institutional approach argues that the form of organization used is the one which minimizes "transaction costs." Williamson assumes that markets are the default system, and people only adopt other structures when explicit contracts fail to control costly uncertainties. In contrast, Simon analyzes how markets and hierarchies correspond to different ways of using information to make decisions. (Note, however, that by "hierarchy" neither author means a simple linear ordering; they mean a dendritic pyramid kind of vertical integration that involves the inclusion of multiple lower level units under and within each higher level unit.)

I was unaware of the transaction-cost approach to institutions when I developed relational models theory. Furthermore, the transaction-cost economists developed their ideas without being aware of Udy's (1959, 1970) discovery, based on analysis of a huge sample of ethnographies, of four basic forms of organizing labor in traditional societies. Indeed, my perception of the principal contribution of relational models theory is that it shows researchers in many fields that the systems of coordination they are studying are not limited to any particular domain—and therefore cannot be products of causes specific to any one domain.

The proximity of a set of persons, or their perception of one another, do not, ipso facto, constitute a "social relationship." Humans who are present in the same space or otherwise aware of another's physical existence are not necessarily coordinating their interaction with reference to relational models. Desperate to reach her train, a woman running along a sidewalk dodges parking meters, fire hydrants, signs, manholes left on the pavement, dogs, and humans—taking into account the expected trajectories of these obstacles but without necessarily coordinating her movement with reference to an implicitly shared model such as "keep to the right." This is a "null" relationship. The people are aware of each other's physical existence, but lack any joint, motivated schema to coordinate and evaluate each other's actions. Consider another hypothetical example: Two hungry men, strangers from different cultures, discover a troop of gorillas eating fruit from a tall tree on the other side of a river—and they all see each other. The men may establish a relationship, cooperating to cross the river, drive away the gorillas, and then harvest and consume the fruit. Or they may treat each other as mere obstacles to satisfying their own hunger, like the river and the gorillas. In the latter case, they have a null relationship.

Relational models theory claims that there are only four universal, motivated relational models that people are disposed to use for virtually all aspects of every domain of social interaction. People use combinations of relational models to coordinate nearly all social activities. In that sense the relational models are fundamental and basic. However, they are not exhaustive, because people do invent specialized, culture-specific schemas for coordinating particular types of interaction. There are models for coordination in specific situations that do not seem to derive from any relational model: "Drive on the right," "discard high to signal your partner to lead the suit again," "wave a white flag to signal desire for a truce," or "only chiefs may build rectangular houses and place ostrich eggs at the roof corners." Special coordination devices such as these probably were invented once and diffused to certain other cultures but remain limited to one domain. In contrast, coordination devices that are derived from the four relational models are pervasive.

Mads have certain characteristic features that distinguish them from special-purpose cultural coordination devices (adapted and shortened from Fiske, 2000):

- They are extremely widespread across cultures and pervasive within them; that is, a distinctive, consistent structure occurs very widely, gen-

\[\text{Such models can be linked to relational models, for example, if a person claims damages in an MP framework from a person who owed to the left across the median. Or a father playing bridge might treat his son's failure to discard high as an impertinence, violating their AR relationship.}\]
erating indefinitely many specific cultural coordination devices (e.g., many ways of taking turns or reciprocating in-kind).

- They are closely associated with highly structured learning mechanisms that result in reliable development of specific competences, despite highly variable and imperfect cultural input.
- Virtually all adults are capable of using them, despite vast differences in individual experience and general intelligence.
- They are each constituted, communicated, and culturally completed in a semantically distinct medium corresponding to an homologous mode of cognitive representation (see Fiske, chap. 3, this volume).
- Children characteristically search actively for and take the initiative to engage in these forms of interaction. Children experiment and innovate in ways not readily induced from the input stimuli and make constructive mistakes that could not result from simple associative inducements.
- People have focused, oriented motives for forming these types of relationship, along with emotions oriented to sustaining and sanctioning them.
- These types of relationship have significant adaptive advantages and result from plausible processes of natural selection.
- These relationships have neurological substrates characterized by a significant degree of functional modularity.

The four relational modes are the only ones with these features that structure social coordination in all domains of human activity. However, there seem to be other modes that generate ritual (Dulany & Fiske, 1994; Fiske & Haslam, 1997), language, and taboos concerning sex and food. These modes crosscut or intersect with the four relational modes and with each other: Language is an important medium for the conduct of relationships, while rituals are important in constituting and transforming relationships.

There are also modes that shape how people construct, evaluate, motivate, and cognize combinations of relationships. These meta-relational modes constitute a distinct level of psychology and social relations, not yet adequately characterized by a general theory. Since the 1970s the principal locus of social psychology has been in how people perceive, categorize, and make inferences about other individuals. This research on person perception, stereotyping, and identity investigates how people process a particular important kind of stimulus: humans (including the self). Relational models theory describes another level of social cognition: how people coordinate interaction. A third level of social cognition and evaluation involves "syntactical" models of how relationships combine with each other. Some sets of relationships imply or constitute other relationships, whereas other

sets of good relationships are mutually incompatible with each other. This is meta-relational cognition.

**INNATENESS, AND HOW RELATIONAL MODS MIGHT HAVE EVOLVED**

Are these four systems of coordination "in the mind, or are they emergent arrangements that result from logical or systemic constraints on the possibilities for organizing any social interaction? Would any intelligent agent with sophisticated communicative abilities quickly discover and adopt these four forms of sociality? The universality and pervasiveness of these four forms of relationship does not imply that they are innate. Suppose these models were not prepared cognitive propensities built in to our neural architecture as it emerges during development. We might still observe these structures in every domain of sociality in every culture because of their functional advantages or because they represent some other kind of stable equilibrium such as an evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973).

These four relational structures do seem to have special functional advantages, so people who invent or imitate these forms of organization may benefit from doing so. Under some conditions, insight into these advantages, or cultural group selection, may result in the cultural reproduction and diffusion of forms of organization beneficial to the group (Boyd & Richardson, 2002). Consider, however, how natural selection probably shaped human cognition and motivation to fit advantageous forms of sociality (Fiske, 2000). A system of social coordination that is typologically advantageous to all participants is an adaptive niche, an opportunity for enhancing fitness. Natural selection will favor individuals who have heritable tendencies to learn to set up such systems, engage others in them, and participate advantageously. (This kind of evolution is often called "Baldwinian selection" for the assimilation of learned behaviors; for an overview, see Fiske, 2000). Every time humans invent or stumble into such an arrangement in any domain where it confers benefits, individuals who readily learn and effectively engage in the coordination system will have greater fitness than those who are less capable or less disposed to do so. That is, it will be adaptive to structure and orient general imitative skills, selectively tuning them so people become adept at reproducing adaptive coordination systems observed among others—and inventing new adaptive systems. Moreover, once humans launch a jointly beneficial coordination system in one specific domain, it will be tremendously advantageous for individuals to learn to generalize their acquired capacities to other domains where they will also function advantageously. We would thus expect natural selection
to yield cognitive-emotional proclivities structured enough to facilitate their easy, reliable, sophisticated use, yet flexible enough to permit them to be used in an indefinite variety of domains. People should evolve capacities and motives that are effectively organized but open-ended so they can be readily used to solve novel or locally variable adaptive problems. Indeed, this kind of structured cognitive flexibility permits humans to take advantage of the maximum range of social opportunities and thereby exploit many novel ecological niches. In short, because the same four relational systems work well to coordinate most aspects of social action in immemorable domains of joint activity, it is extremely advantageous to be able to apply them adaptively and flexibly.

Thus asking whether the relational modes are emergent or innate is somewhat like asking whether color is "in" the environment or "in" the perceptual system. Relational modes are mental adaptations to fundamental affordances of social coordination—adaptations to relational niches. Baldwinian theory and the approach of Tooby and Cosmides (1990) explain how and why specialized domain-specific cognitive capacities would evolve. But neurons are metabolically expensive and the birth canal limits the size of the human brain as well, so there are strong costs and constraints to evolving immemorable specialized modules rigidly dedicated to narrow tasks. Rigidity domain-specific modules would impede construction of adaptively flexible social systems and adaptive functioning in them, and would block rapid adaptation to new conditions. Whenever possible, natural selection should thus produce a small number of structured yet flexible, open-ended, generative proclivities that facilitate adaptive social coordination across diverse domains in diverse environments.

However, we know little about the phylogeny of the relational models. (For useful reviews, see Hasham, 1997 on primates and Dugatkin, 1997 on cooperation among animals.) Yet many social birds and mammals and some reptiles form dominance hierarchies: Is the human propensity for AR a direct evolutionary homolog of these social dispositions and cognitions? That is, did phylogenetically deep psychological proclivities to create dominance hierarchies evolve directly into human AR? Or is AR a novel, distinct, analogical adaptation that evolved independently of other cognitive capacities? Nonhuman dominance hierarchies are constituted by threat-defense asymmetries related to priority of access to desirable resources such as scarce food, nest sites, or (for males) sexually receptive females. Primate dominance consists largely of the subordinate animal conceding defeat when attacked by a dominant individual or coalition, and either ceding a resource when threatened by a superior, or offering an appeasement-defense signal. Human hierarchies sometimes involve this sort of aggressive confrontation resolved by threat, submission, and appeasement.
The interests that I developed in graduate school became defined by the intersection of two goals: first, understanding how the psyche that all humans share at birth develops into culture-specific commitments and practices; second, understanding how natural selection, cognition motivation, development, socialization, and other processes result in sociable, generally moral adults. I was skeptical of the socialization theories I encountered. The descriptions of moral thinking in Jean Piaget's The Moral Judgment of the Child captured my interest, although his rationalist-individualist theory did not. Years earlier, I had struggled with Max Weber in an undergraduate political history class, so I was somewhat resistant when Donald Levine (a sociologist on my PhD committee) pointed me toward Weber's massive unfinished Economy and Society; he told me no one could be a social scientists without reading it. Don knew it in the original, but I bought the excellent English translation and spent months working through it, coming to Don occasionally to get help and discuss it. At some point I perceived a congruence between three of Piaget's stages of moral development and Weber's typology of forms of legitimation of authority. I was very intrigued by this apparent correspondence between forms of ideology and stages of moral justification. To simplify somewhat, Piaget's immanent justice, heteronomy, and mutual respect and cooperation seemed to correspond respectively to Weber's traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal legitimation (although eventually I came to see that traditional legitimation conflated what I later called CS and AR).

A little later, someone (I think a fellow student) recommended to me a book by Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, which dissected the history of Christian theology. Ricoeur describes early conceptions of evil as delusion (dread of the impure, supplanted later by sin (rebellion against God)), and finally a rationalized etablissement. I was astonished to discover what I perceived as a third congruent typology in this new domain. Ricoeur was at Chicago, but I failed to avail myself of the opportunity to meet or work with him. The nature of the congruence among these three theoretical taxonomies is discussed more fully in Flase, 1991, pp. 25–30.)

Bob LeVine told me that I couldn't be an anthropologist without doing fieldwork, and cheerfully rejected my pleas that I didn't need to do fieldwork because I had just returned from 4 years in Africa as a Peace Corps Volunteer. So I decided my dissertation fieldwork should explore the ethnographic validity and utility of the tripartite theoretical framework that resulted from synthesizing Piaget, Weber, and my own dissertation proposal and totally rewrote it a score of times. I wanted to study foragers, partly as a change from the farmers I had worked with in the Peace Corps, and partly because my interests in evolution suggested that understanding foragers was far more important than understanding farmers or
pastorals. But my reading and inquiries indicated that there were no Afri-
can foragers with intact cultures living independently of farmers and pas-
torals (I didn’t know of the Hadza). So I decided to study the Samburu,
cattle people of northern Kenya. The Social Science Research Council gave
me a dissertation grant to do this, but before I left I was unexpectedly of-
fered a chance to be a Peace Corps country director. Excited by the pro-
pect of international development policy formulation and programming,
I accepted the offer, chose Upper Volta as the most challenging and reward-
ing of the openings, abandoned the Samburu, postponed my fieldwork, and
went to Ouagadougou. My plan was to study the largest culture in Upper
Volta, the Moore (“Moss”) after my term as country director. So in Ouaga-
dougou I studied the Moore language and, in 1979, went with my wife and in-
fant daughter to live and conduct my fieldwork in a village for 2 years. Once
I picked a field site, I lived and worked without an interpreter or assistant,
trying to immerse myself in everyday village life: It was the most confusing,
overwhelming, exciting, and rewarding intellectual experience of my life.
Working among the Moore, I found not just the three relational structures I
was looking for, but important social practices that just did not match any
of those three. When I returned to write my dissertation, I formulated the
concept of Equally Matching to encompass these observations.

To my surprise, I was hired by the University of Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Psychology, so I quickly finished my dissertation and then began to
think about a book. Despite my fieldwork, I lacked confidence in my quadri-
form theory. I could readily see how to incorporate Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft
and Gesellschaft and Durkheim’s mechanical and organic solidarity, but I
still wondered whether I was just projecting into all these theories, and into
Moore life, what I wanted to see. So, to test my inferences, I started reading
about other domains of social life, deductively testing my emerging theory
on the literature: If indeed people had four fundamental ways of organizing
social relations, the four structures should be evident in any well-studied
domain. So I turned to Karl Polanyi’s 1944 The Great Transformation of
exchange: householding (clearly CS), reinsertion (by chiefs, AR), recipro-
city (EM), and markets (MP). Then I found Udy’s two comprehensive
surveys of how people recruit labor and organize production: familial (CS),
custodial (AR), reciprocative (EM), and voluntary (null). I be-
gan to be less skeptical about my synthetic theory. I had the eerie feeling
that these congruencies could only be the result of four fundamental forms
of human social cognition. Influenced by Geertz’s extension of Byles’ theory
of culture as “models of and for” action, and by Roy D’Andrade’s emerging
theory of cognitive models and schemas with directive force, I named these
entities “relational models.”

I was so excited about my animatistic synthesis that I wrote much of the
book before it even occurred to me that this theory had to explain the differ-
ences in the manifestations of the four elementary models across different
domains: How could the same models be used to organize such disparate
practices? This led to my formulation of the concept of implementation rules
or, as the idea developed, precs. I am still thinking about this problem,
focusing on three issues: First, how do children (and adult outsiders)
discover how to implement their models in ways that permit them to coordi-
nate in locally appropriate and meaningful ways; second, what is the con-
structive form in which each relational model is represented in the human mind?
Third, what are the relative advantages of specialized domains-specific mod-
els versus flexible generative capacities that are effective in diverse vary-
ing, and novel domains? My book recent conceptualization of the first two
issues is in the third chapter in this book; the third issue is explored in

I wrote The Elementary Structures of Social Life (Fiske, 1991) for my own in-
tellectual pleasure, and of course for a general social science audience. But
I also had in mind my colleagues in the University of Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Psychology—a group of smart people that I expected to be cogni-
tively skeptical of such broad claims. The book was also implicitly an argument
with the relativistic cultural constructionists who were dominant in the De-
partment of Anthropology when I was a graduate student in Human Devel-
opment. I had many challenging University of Chicago-type arguments with
Anthropology faculty and graduate students there, most of whom regarded
psychological and biological explanations as anathema. I hoped (futilely, no
doubt) to convince them that it was possible for universal evoluted mecha-
nisms to generate cultural diversity and uniqueness—and to show why.

A theory is intellectual poetry, and a good theory has a beautiful esthetic
purity. I didn’t want to pollute my theory by bringing it into contact with
dirty data. Yet I knew psychologists would never take this synthetic-actor
theoretical framework seriously without deductive hypothesis-testing. I didn’t re-
ally want to test the theory—there are so many good reasons why data
might fail to support a valid theory that I would not have published if I
had experienced the moments occasionally calling me “Mom,” I launched a se-
ries of studies of naturally occurring social errors, working with Kathryn
Mason (the “Mom” whom the kids sometimes called “Dad”), and hiring an
unbelievably brilliant student, Nick Has, reciprocative (EM). Nick was very skeptical, but
he took the job and went to work on the study. We were all somewhat surpris-
when the data came in clearly supporting the theory—in study after study.
Nick then thought up the idea (entirely on his own, while I was
spending a quarter at UCSB) of testing the book’s even more implausible claim
that the four models were discrete cognitive categories, rather than being
encoded in a continuous dimensional space. This was such a funda-
mental tenet of the theory that if I had known what Nick was up to, 2,800
miles away, I wouldn’t have let him get away with seriously jeopardizing the
already-supported theory. But he did it, ingeniously adopting Meehl’s taxonomic methods to this new domain, with clear results that surprised us all again in their support of the theory.

When I gave job talk and then other colloquia on the theory, I did so with trepidation. Surely someone would raise a hand at the end and suggest an obvious fifth relational model; perhaps the audience would come up with dozens! They never did. The core of the talk was the claim that the same four structures were evident in many different social domains, so I always wondered if someone would show that the structures in different domains were, in fact, basically different. So far, no one has.

**ISSUES AND CONFUSIONS**

My conceptions of the relational models have developed somewhat since the early 1990s. My approach in the 1991 book was very assimilative, as I attempted to find connections across diverse theories and research. However, as the book neared completion I realized that I had been somewhat indiscriminate, or at least theoretically vague, in my enthusiasm to find homologies among the many theories I was attempting to integrate. I realized that I should try to discuss the defining features of each model, distinguishing these universal mods (as I have come to call them more recently) from the infinitely diverse cultural coordination devices that grow out of them. Hence I suggested that the core of MP is the use of ratios to coordinate interaction. Other authors define similar constructs in terms of selfishness, individualism, maximization, competitiveness, contractualism, and other attributes. I argued that these features, though perhaps correlated with using ratios to coordinate interaction, were nonessential implementations that vary across domains and cultures.

Similar questions arise with regard to CS. The most parsimonious definition is that it is an equivalence relationship—a relationship organized with respect to something that people perceive they have in common that makes them collectively distinctive. This means that positive feeling and mutual altruism, although typically strongly associated with CS, are not essential features of the underlying mod. Similarly, the orientation of action and affect toward “need” is not a defining feature. If people treat a resource as a jointly held commons, they do not necessarily utilize it according to need: One person’s use of the resource is, in principle, equivalent to any other person’s use of it.

Reviewing the original statement of relational models theory, Turner (1992) and Whitehead (1980) cogently characterized its principal deficiency, the limited account of conflict, aggression, coercion, exploitation, and dysfunction. The theory was developed partly as an antidote to the associational, selfish economic/behavioralist or Machiavellian views of human sociality. So, despite some discussion of how the models organize aggression and conflict (see the master table in Fiske, 1991 and 1992), it did indeed present an overly rosy account of harmonious sociality. Whitehead’s lengthy review essay provided some of what was missing, pointing out especially that people may impose the use of a relational model on others. To this I would add that people are disposed to get angry and punish those who violate the models that they themselves are using, but the targets of such sanctions often do not acknowledge that that particular model applies, or that their acts were transgressions, so they perceive the intended sanctions as illegitimate aggression. This may launch rounds of mutual recrimination or violence.

Furthermore, from a theory of the basic forms of social relationships it is possible to make inferences about potential sources of social dysfunction; Nick Haslam and I have, in fact, developed several implications of the theory for psychopathology. Social problems are likely to arise when participants in an interaction use different models, implement the models with different parts, or apply the models too strictly and inflexibly. If a person uses a model excessively, underuses a model, or consistently uses a model in ways that are discrepant with the cultural norms that others around them are using, that person will experience persistent relational difficulties that are likely to be diagnosed by a clinician as personality disorders (Haslam, chap. 12, this volume).

**THE NEXT STEPS**

Relational models are structures for constructing and construing social action. Beyond relational models, there is another major level of social cognition, evaluation, and motivation: People use meta-relational models to combine models or keep them separate. That is, people have strongly motivated models to understand, coordinate, and evaluate combinations of relationships. These meta-relational models are powerful constraints on when, where, how, and with whom people use the relational models.

At the level of relationships, developmental studies and cultural comparison will eventually identify the universal modules and distinguish these from the pros that inform variable cultural implementations. Theoretical questions remain, however, about whether there is a hard, clear line between models and pros. Clearly some cultural implementations of a given mod are much, much more common than others. This suggests that different mods lend themselves most readily to different implementations and are prone to be used in particular domains, perhaps because mods are selected for their advantages in those typical implementa-
tions. That is, although each relational model can be used in indefinitely many ways to structure any domain, there may be psychological propensi-
ties, functional advantages, or systemic factors that make some implement-
tations more prevalent than others. There are some obvious patterns:

CS among close co-resident kin (the "household") is virtually universal, while more distant kinship involves lesser degrees of CS. Furthermore, the consumption of cooked food, drink, and other comestibles tends to be communally organized everyday, and commensalism may be more in-
clusive at rituals, although other models come into play to lesser extents. These patterns may reflect the links between CS and inclusive fitness of individuals sharing a high proportion of genes.

AR is pervasively organized according to age, gender, and descent cate-
gories such as "race" and caste. In traditional societies, at least, men tend to be more actively involved than women in AR activities outside the household.

EM typically involves people of roughly corresponding age and social role. Also, it seems that violence is most likely to be structured in terms of EM as vengeful retaliation.

MP becomes more prevalent the greater the number of parties and kinds of entities involved, the more transient the transactions, and the less the certainty of sustained interactions across any particular dyad.

In its current form, relational models theory is a descriptive theory, characterizing how people think about society. But the theory would be much more powerful (and interesting) if we could deduce why and how people implement particular models. Ideally, these deductions should be based on the characteristics of the relational models themselves and the differences between them. In the immediate encounter, clearly people are obliged to use the models pretty much as their predecessors and associates use them, by virtue of the social transmission that results in local cultures. Otherwise, people could not coordinate. In novel situations, people probably use analogies from other important domains. But what affects the selection of models in the long term? Presumably there are functional constraints and potentials that affect the prevalence of the models in different social domains—each model has weaknesses and strengths for organizing a given domain, if we can define appropriate performance criteria. These "capacities" of the models also should be evident in the consequences (e.g., the kinds of problems) that are typical of implementations in particular domains. Certain combinations of the models may be more functional and stable than others because those sets of models perform complimentary functions. If we understood where and how different relational models "work" and the nature of the problems they produce, the theory could be applied prescriptively. However, if we aim to explain when and why people use particular models, determining the con-
sequences of using each model is not sufficient. For an explanatory theory, we need to analyze when and how functional effects of the models become causes of processes that select among them.

The relative functional advantages of each relational model are probably related to the differential costs of collecting and storing the information necessary to use each model, the differential costs of making the calcula-
tions necessary to use each model, and the differing degrees of specificity of the pros that have to be negotiated in order to achieve smooth coordi-
nation with different models. For example, to utilize a resource in the CS mode, people merely need a pro that defines who has access to that re-
source. The University of California gives faculty, staff, and students unlimited access to athletic facilities; others are excluded. They just have to make sure each person seeking access is in the user group. However, if peo-
ple allocate a resource according to AR, they must have a pro that speci-
fies the ranking of each person, they must track the rank of the ranks of users who seek access to the resource, and they must agree about whether the precedence accorded does correspond to personal rank. For example, if faculty had priority of access to the gym according to seniority, and faculty had precedence before students, then whenever a person sought access to, say, a tennis court, someone would have to determine if a court was free, and if not, whether any current user had a lower rank than the person seek-
ing the court. This requires collection of more information, more process-
ing of that information, and possibly more negotiation.

Access structured according to EM would require pros determining what counted as a unit of use, and how long people could delay taking a turn before losing their priority. There would have to be a mechanism to re-
cord and compare everyone's utilization and make that information avail-
able so people would know when they were entitled to use the facility. And people would have to agree that these pros were properly implemented and the mechanisms correctly applied. The use of MP would require defini-
tion of an auction mechanism or price scheme, along with bookkeeping and billing. Then, with MP, people would have to agree about what had been used and what payments were owed and had been made. With each succes-
se model, things get more complicated. More access registers, more calcula-
tions to make, more details to be negotiated. As the terms of interaction become more quantitatively specific, the negotiations are likely to become more arduous.

Balanced against these information and transaction costs are the advan-
tages—and disadvantages—of exactly structured coordination. At one end, these benefits may be greatest toward the end of the series, when the coordination is most precisely structured. But there are countervailing ad-
vantages of the wider latitude or indeterminacy toward the CS end. CS per-
mits more latitude but less precise coordination than AR, which is less structured than EM. MP provides the most precisely specified coordination, but offers less flexibility. So, if we are building a school in an MP framework, we can specify precisely how much each person has to do, and what they get in return. That has considerable advantages in terms of predictability and precision of coordination, but it imposes strict constraints. If someone is ill and can’t work, they don’t get paid through the MP mechanism in this domain—though their illness may make their need very desperate. If someone has free time and is motivated to volunteer to help build the school, then paying the volunteer increases the costs of school building compared to a CS framework in which everyone would simply pitch in until they all got the job done together.

In short, from CS to AR to EM to MP, use of the models imposes an increasing burden of information collection, storage, and processing, along with greater specificity of the terms that must be agreed upon in order to coordinate. Likewise, the determinism of the interaction increases step by step, while flexibility decreases. Over the long run, the functional trade-offs may select for models that, in given domains, offer the greatest difference between coordinative opportunities and information-processing burdens.

In general, more tightly structured coordination is likely to provide the greatest advantages to participants. However, in some cases, looser, less restricted forms of coordination may permit beneficial flexibility. Cross-cultural and developmental research will permit us to test this approach and better understand the apparent patterns in the implementation of the models.

REFERENCES


