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The Force of Prejudice

On Racism and Its Doubles

Pierre-André Taguieff

Translated and Edited by Hassan Melehy

Contradictions, Volume 13

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Translator's Preface

The work of translating Pierre-André Taguieff's \textit{The Force of Prejudice} has involved not only rendering its meaning into English but also translation in the etymological sense of carrying across, in this case from one social and intellectual setting to another, transporting it from the French context in which it was executed to the anglophone one in which it will now be read. One would hope that Taguieff's overarching purpose, to strengthen the position of the active antiracist intellectual, is not lost in the translation. The subtitle of Taguieff's work, \textit{On Racism and Its Doubles}, suggests the problem involved in this broader task of translation: whereas Taguieff's object is primarily the French discourses of racism and antiracism and the ways in which they mirror and implicate each other, the translation must to the greatest degree possible address the "doubles" of these discourses in the anglophone world. And it must speak to a community of readers whose disciplinary backgrounds and dispositions may be quite different from those of French readers.

One is struck by the sheer range of racist and antiracist discourses, both scholarly and popular, that Taguieff analyzes. In his "Critique of Antiracist Reason" (part I), he shows the ways in which antiracism has tended to conflate the many forms racist discourse may take, which he sees as having two major logical bases: an "inegalitarianist" logic,
which is linked to the series "inequality, domination, exploitation" (the kind of racism practiced in colonization); and a "differentialist" (logic, linked to the series "difference, purification, extermination") (emphatically by Nazis). In each case, but in very different ways, the Other is "racialized"—discursively made into a racial grouping and discursively separated from the dominant group. In all cases, racialization is the effect of an exclusionary discourse. Far from complicating the work of translation, the scope of the book facilitates it, in that Tagutost plays a role that in France is quite different from its U.S. equivalent, that of public intellectual—the intellectual whose work constitutes an effective intervention in public debate and policy making. Tagutost declares his task that of strengthening the antiracist camp by pointing out what he sees as a serious problem, a tendency to engage in discursive strategies of condemning the racist Other that all too often resemble the latter's exclusionary discourses, the very reason for the condemnation. Hence, in his treatment, antiracism can become a "double" of the racism it opposes.

According to the traditions of intellectual activity in France, Tagutost seeks the underpinnings for contemporary attitudes, positions, and ideologies through a hermeneutic relation with philosophical works of the past. It is here that his book may seem quite different from its analogues from the Anglo-American social sciences, whose basis remains predominantly empiricist. And it is here that the work of translating The Force of Prejudice was also a work of editing: the French original is more than one-third longer than this translation, and I omitted certain sections because I judged them to belong primarily to French intellectual traditions. For example, I chose not to include a section in which Tagutost lucidly identifies the methodological doubts of René Descartes (1593–1650) as the source of the intellectual attitude of finding oneself of prejudice, and another in which he presents Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) as founder of modern demystifying critique. Such exercises might seem, in the anglophone world, to be tasks for specialists of French literature or the history of European ideas. Of course, Tagutost's linking of present discursive practices with intellectual predecessors runs throughout his work, and his thoroughness in the portions of the book that appear here offers sufficient explanation for such linking. I made the decision to include especially those sections relevant to the U.S. context and to provide notes where parallels could be made (such as in the case of the career of the English word racist).

It is worth noting that there have been phenomena in the anglophone world quite similar to the racisms and the antiracisms that Tagutost addresses. The United States and the United Kingdom both saw, in the 1980s, the rise of various "new rights," both populist and elitist. Although there has not been as cohesive an antiracist movement in the United States as S.O.S. Racisme, the largest populist antiracist organization in France in the 1980s, the progressivist reactions to
the resurgent conservatism of the 1980s and 1990s are still a vivid memory. There was much talk, around the turn of the past decade, of "political correctness," although its unity was largely fictional, a figment of various polemical imaginations, the restrictive measures associated with it, ostensibly designed to combat a wide array of discriminatory discourses, were and still are quite real. Such progressiveist discourses have their own precursors in the various strands of American liberalism, a history that Tocqueville's analysis touches on in places, and which his book may hence be seen as addressing in the context into which it is being translated.

Introduction

Doubts about Antiracism

The Metamorphoses of the Ideological Field

"Action without is a call that resounds on many sides, but is uttered most loudly by those who cannot get ahead with knowledge." Friedrich W. J. Schelling

Our objective may be defined, according to an allegory that Rudolf Carnap was fond of, as the attempt to repair a ship that can never be brought into dry dock and so that must be worked on while afloat in the ocean. Let us add that the ocean is rough from a storm and that the ship is showing a few troubling signs of instability. Indeed, today the ship of antiracism is fragile; it is drifting as well as can be expected since the defeat of National Socialism. Since the robust vessel of the 1950s has become a lightweight raft inflated by media spectacle and political rhetoric, some are advocating a scuttling. This is moving too quickly and applying a treatment of the Cartesian type—destroying everything to its very foundations in order to rebuild it—to an evolving reality that it would be better to redirect. It is time once again to hear Schelling's counterappraisal: finally to suspend the obligation to act at any price, even it in a great hurry, as long as one acts.
In the seething of contemporary activism, we propose a moment of pause: by voluntarily failing to obey the imperatives of the emergency, we will discard from the Manichaeans norms brought on by ideology. For the end of ideologies is not the death of ideology: the pseudoethical terrorism of action first and foremost is what has come to fill the void left by the defection of the great doctrines.

1. The debates surrounding racism define a situation of ideological exaggeration due to a breakdown of consensus on the very terms of the problem, as well as to the newness, the object of a more and more acute perception, of the stakes. The ideological appeasement of the 1970s was linked to the concentration (even the confinement) and stabilization of the debates in the realm of the biological sciences, in which authoritative argument (what does science say, and through which of its authorized representatives?) could decide and institute a thought majority (governed by the antiracism of the geneti- cists: Albert Jacquard, André Lwoff, François Jacob, Jacques Raffli). This period of relative ideological appeasement has given way, since 1983–84, to a symmetrical rise in the extremes. The rhetorical heat has greatly increased, at the same time that actors in the debate have been transforming: the committed politicians and journalists tend to substitute for the interventionist scientists. The dominant problematic of the 1970s may be summed up by the question of its qualifications of scientificity, asked of what is perceived as "racism." The antiracist conclusion was then simple racism, as an ideological parasitism of the bioanthropological sciences (the "hard" sciences), has no scientific validity. At that point the debate could only stop, for want of a theoretical legitimacy for the positions termed "racist": antiracists placed itself before racism as the authority of science in the face of perverse and archaic deliria. But the assumption and claims of "racism" (as self-designation) had at the same time become rare and marginal things. Antiracism, a component of the basic democratic consensus inherited from the Enlightenment, could claim to spread over the grounds of living Reason, consigning to the darkness of the irrational or of ir- rationalism its troubling subject, its clearly designated enemy. The fundamental presupposition of such an ideological optimism resides in the belief that racism is essentially a theory of races, the latter dis- tinct and unequal, defined in biological terms and in eternal conflict for the domination of the earth—a conception as publicly inadmis- sible as it is refuted by science. Now, the serene evidence transmitted by such an ordinary definition has been shaken by the recent offensives of national populism, setting in motion, after the fashion of the New Right (the GRECE),2 arguments that do not respond to the expec- tations of the ordinary antiracist, based on the received model of "racism" since the 1930s.

2. The first flaws appeared when the scientific community made public its internal divisions: the partisans of hereditary determinism, recognized Nobel Prize-winning scientists, regrouped and formed a pressure group rivaling that of the declared antiracist scientists. The nonscientific public was much troubled by this, at least at the begin- ning; if scholars could not agree among themselves, how could members of the public form a clear and distinct idea of the ques- tion? The period of hegemonic antiracism after 1945 hence seemed to come to an end. This breakdown of scientific consensus could itself be variously interpreted:

- The problem might be more complex than one thought, so not yet concluded.

- Perhaps the problem was scientifically poorly framed, whence the clear- ance in the heart of the community.

- The problem did not really exist, was only a false problem, stemming from the ideologically-political parasitism of some scientific research. This interpretation enabled the choice of a third way, a neutral position, be- yond ideological oppositions, and a return to the ideological convolutions from before the crisis settlement within true science. Little by little the ideological majority has stood on such a terrain, not without conserving a few traces of its past disturbances: choosing the camp of the good scien- tists was choosing the party of true science, and it was also satisfying the humanitarian requirements (which cost nothing and involved nothing: "I, sir, am an antiracist," and so on).

In this way the debate over the New Right (1979–86) ended. The New Right was itself the principal vector in France of the hereditarian thesis, through an exclusion of what was likened to the diabolical tradition pur excellence, Nazism (therefore racism). But the damage was done: the uncertainties and disturbances had to persist.

3. The appearance of previously unseen forms of "racism" oc- curred in two time periods, and on two different registers of discourse, in French ideological space.
Introduction

The formation and diffusion of differentialist ideology by the GRECE and the Club de l’Herlaie in the metaphysical field during the 1960s. This was a source of confusion, the latter due to the fact that the New Right had simultaneously produced a doctrine of (interindividual) inequality, elaborated an elitist theory, and taken the side of the hereditarian psychologists in the controversy over heredity and environment. Under pressure, the observers therefore believed that the former, a matter of a new version of biologism racism, based on a biological scientism, whereas something quite different was being constituted, a differentialist racism, on culturalist bases.

The formation and diffusion in the political field, since 1985, of an ideol- ogy of identity by national populism, around the National Front (le Front National — FN). Here again, the confusion and the mixture of ideas masked the novelty of the modes of racialization: it was no longer, in the national racism of the FN, only a matter of reactivating colonial racism, which was authoritarian and paternalistic, but rather of increas- ing into a popular discourse the thematic, hitherto reserved for scholarly (New Right) discourses, of the defense of people’s rights to identity (see chapter 7).

To simplify the question, one may distinguish three fundamental op- erations, three great shifts of basic concepts, arguments, or dominant attitudes in racism ideology since the early 1970s:

- race → ethnicity/culture,
- inequality → difference,
- heterophobia → heterophilia.

These three ideological and rhetorical operations, which have characterized the novelty of racist discourses in the French language (although the phenomenon has a European dimension) for almost two decades, have important consequences for the shaping of the controversies around racism and antiracism.

1. The "racialization" of the lexicon of culture, religion, traditions, and mentalities, even specific imaginaries, has produced a reversion of this concept of reracializations of racism that are not expressably biologizing. The racist discourse has, to speak, been "culturalized" or "mentalized" by abandoning (in a sometimes ostentatious fashion) the explicit vocabulary of "race" and "blood" and therefore by leaving behind the ritual biological and zoological metaphors. But, in being substituted for the zoological notion of "race," the notion of "culture" implies a shift of problematic and a complete refashioning of the antiracism argument. Cultural anthropology and / or ethnology are thus called on to legitimate the neoracist prescriptions of avoidance of intercultural contact, of separate development (in full "equality in difference," of course), of spurious rejection of any "crossing of cultures." Most often, a "classical" antiracist subject, trained in the struggle against the bioculturalist variant of racism (on the Nazi model), remains speechless in the face of the "culturalist" reformulations of racism. Not only does such a subject resist not recognizing the latter as "racist" (in the absence of biologizing indicators), but his argument from the "antifascist" tradition (that is, the antiracist tradition that targets Nazi ideology), out of touch with the ethnophallicist problematic, is also completely irresponsible. From then on commemorative antiracism plays the role of screen and obstacle in the face of "culturalists" neoracism.

2. The reformulation of "racism" in the vocabulary of difference, which tends to do away with that of inequality and hierarchy, and the correlative shift, on the rhetorical plane, from the egalitarian argument (the classic indicator of "racism" in the antiracist vogue) to the differentialist argument — that is, the exclusive affirmation of "differences" — have brought about a reconceptualization of the racism imag- inary onto the fear of the specter of mélanges (interethic crossing and "cultural métissager") and brought to the forefront the norm of an unconditional preservation of the community entities as they are (or as they should have remained, and should once again be) with all their particular characteristics, a norm whose other side is an anguish centered on the vision of a final destruction of collective identities. It is the return of the catastrophological imaginary that the neoracist discourses are fed by the common representation of an effacement of the divers- ity of the human world, of an imperceptible and irreversible passage from good cultural and ethnic heterogeneity to the crepuscular homogeneity of individuals and cultures. A culturalist and differentialist vision of the "end of the world." We propose the name métophobia, an anesthetizing fear of the specter of mixture (see chapter 8), henceforth the dominant form of racism integrated into nationalism, in all its contemporary variants corresponding to the following three levels: that of the intrastate (ethnocentrism: regionalism, movements for auton- omy and independence), that of the state (nationalism in the strict sense), that of the suprastate (Europeanism, for example). A kind of
division of the labor of formulation and diffusion is discernible, in
France in particular: the vulgare of such a national racism is pro-
gated by the national populist discourse of the National Front; 4 while
its scholarly legitimation is furnished by the differentialist doctrine
that the hard core of “racism,” or rather the presupposition of any act
of racialization, persists in its new formulations: the absolutization of
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The systematic use of the strategy of "retortion" with respect to
the words and values of antiracism, whose ideology was fixed on the
morality of the praise of difference, has contributed to making the
new racism of difference unrecognizable and hence ungraspable. We
define the rhetorical operation of retortion as a triple procedure of
reprise-reappropriation, of misdirecting and redirecting an adverse
argument (not in motion by an adversary), an operation likely to
engender a twofold effect of self-legitimation and of the delegitima-
tion of the adversary — the latter being dispossessed especially of
her own arguments, deterritorialized from her problematic and her ordi-
nary lexicon. The racialization of the "right to difference" and of the
ethnopluralist thematic will represent the first important ideological
achievement of the strategy of retortion set in motion by the "New
Rights" in France. Two modes of formulating racism then appear in
competition, these modes likely to change places with each other:
praise of difference (heterophilia) and rejection of difference
(hetero-
phobia). Racializing statements shift indissolubly to the interior of
the genre of discourse that Aristotle called epideictic (that which bears
on praise and blame); they oscillate from one pole to the other, from
exaltation to abasement, from the celebration to the exclusion of dif-
ference — the latter understood either as the different term or as the
pure differential relation (see chapter 7).

The debates and controversies are therefore recentered on the in-
tersecting questions of collective identities and of their defense, of
the rights of peoples (the right to be oneself as the very first), of the mixture
and/or crossing of cultures, of the intercultural and the transcultural.
Discourses of racist invention and militant antiracist discourses meet in
using the same language games, in taking recourse to the same foun-
dational evidence, and in aiming for the realization of the same values.
This is an eminently paradoxical situation, where dialogues of the deaf
arose (and still arise) from a singular agreement on words, from a
strange consensus on values and norms (around "equality in differ-
ence"), from a sharing of the same differentialist problematic. Then
there appears, in the antiracist camp, a fundamental contradiction in
the setup of requirements and prescriptions: the antiracists demand
both absolute respect of collective differences, therefore claiming the
right to difference, and passage to the act of tasting the interethnic
and intercultural mixture, hence calling for the right to community
indifference and sometimes affirming the imperative duty to efface
differences, the supposed sources of racism. One will note that since
the mid-1980s, the ideological imperative of métissage tends to make
minor that of "difference": with the new praise of métissage (quickly
inscribed in the fashionable "young" discourse) retuns the require-
ment of equality, in the form of the equality of rights — supplied by
"Beauvoir" militants. Strangely, the heterogeneity and even the logical
contradiction of the two series of requirements were unnoticed in the
antiracist community, completely immersed as it was in its exaltation
of the plural, the diverse, the multiple, married to the praise of mixture,
of confusion, of crossing, of métissage (see chapter 9). A hegemonic
confusion between confusion and distinction, perhaps too crude to be
visible. 10
This fundamental antinomy of contemporary antiracism comes
from the clash, the shock, of two antiracist logics whose incommensurability we assume, logics founded respectively on two distinct
anthropologies and apparently irreconcilable in their systems of val-
ues. I will call the first individual-universalism, illustrated by the claim
of the rights of man, the denunciation of values belonging to communi-
ties "closed" as racist, the idea of abolishing community identities and
"particularist" traditions as obstacles to "progress," the prescription
of the universal mixture of individuals beyond national and ethno-
cultural borders. I will call the second traditio-communitarianism,
illustrated by the right to difference (cultural, ethnic, even racial:
"Negritude," "Judaism," and so on); the rights of peoples to persevere
in their own traditions; the idea of preserving group identities (up to
and including the duty of peoples to remain themselves); the denunci-
aton of "racism" as being confused with universalism, exterminator
of differences, ethnocide, genocidal. It will be understood that if
there are two distinct racisms (universal-egalitarian racism and
communitarian-differentialist racism), then there are, symmetrically,
two antiracisms with contradictory values and norms — individual-
universalist antiracism and traditio-communitarian antiracism (see
chapter 10).
A large portion of the contemporary difficulties with antiracism
stems from the misrecognition of one's own argumentative hetero-
genrety, linked to the fact that only a discourse of foundation and
denunciation is constituted in the course of a historical struggle against
an advancing adversary whose face is relatively uncovered — Na-
tional Socialism — and that professes an explicit ideological racism
(a "doctrine" or a "conception of the world"), deriving from "mys-
tical" biological materialism. Today it must be recognized that this
antiracist setup has undergone an arrested development: in being in-
istitutionalized (antiracist leagues), in being integrated into common
sense, and in being diluted by consensual values and norms.

The adaptation of antiracism to the new forms of racialization,
recasted on the twofold thematic of identity and difference, and
proceeding from indirect discourse, from oblique reference, and from
generalized implicitness, is not yet complete. There is a lag in the anta-
racist setups with respect to the new practices of racialization, doubled
by that of the modes of theoretical analysis in the face of previously un-
seen procedures of legitimation. But the preliminary task is to provide
a philosophical foundation for the unconditional rejection of racism,
of all racisms (see chapters 11, 12, and 13).

Polemics and Functional Obscurity

Two simple pieces of evidence run through this book, which strives to
elucidate their ideological conditions of appearance and functions.

These pieces of evidence are neither a point of departure nor a
conclusion, but line by line they have imposed themselves on the
sequence of sometimes laborious analyses. They are the following:
antiracism is above all and essentially a tear machine in the everyday
sky of ideologies; racism is an obscure notion, a poorly constructed
term for schematizing without precision an indeterminate reality.

Now, the polemical machine of antiracism functions insofar as it
allows one to believe that racism is something well defined, or at least
quite definable. Thus racism can only avoid and mask the questions
provoked by the obscurity of the notion it functionally presupposes.

An attempt at elucidating what one names "racism" fatally runs up
against the locked gate put in place almost a century ago in Europe
by the antiracist vanguard.

In Europe, but by way of France, the Dreyfus Affair 11 constitutes
the first crystallization of "antiracist" ideas, even before the appear-
ance of a camp, a trust of political parties and gathering of ideological
families. At that moment the antiracist idea takes shape, is institution-
ized, even professionalized. Since the end of the nineteenth century,
the French intellectual class has tended to recognize itself here as
though in its ideal image.
It is the case that French intelligence has historically been educated on the basis of the great Cartesian rationalism, the militant and “progressive” rationalism of the Enlightenment, the ideology of the “classical” rationalism, the ideologically formed ideals, and finally the Republican St-Simonian and Comtean positivists, and finally the Republican synthesis. The French mind, if it is not welded with it, ideally identifies with critical rationalism, that destroyer of idols, breaker of prejudices, eradicator of illusions. Antiracism derives its permanence and its power, its force of evidence as much as its inescapable vigor, from the fact that it is rooted in this rationalist tradition, lives by this paradoxical tradition of antiracism: the spirit of unlimited free examination, the reign of immediate critical reason. But it has made of the latter the setting of a new dogmatism with hegemonic claims, the spiritual alibi of a doctrine as closed as it is summary: a new obscurantism.

That is why, as this obscurantism has only been able to smash us against the “inferno of antiracism,”[2] we have had to begin analyzing it. This is only a beginning. For it would also be in order to consider the surprising powerlessness of antiracism, its ideological omnipresence, and its resilience in the media, which areavored to be socially and politically crippled, and to analyze the conditions in which this takes place, even the reasons for it. Between the enemy camps, racism and antiracism, one may once again see what Lucien-Antoine Prévert-Paradís described concerning the singular relations of hostility between the Restoration and the Revolution: the former “preferred to declare an important war on the Revolution, a war of words, for it was not in its power to return to things, and it could only alarm and irritate its enemies without destroying them.”[3] Dominant antiracism has also declared war on an unknown (because undefined) racism, a war as absolute as it is powerless, for it lives only to assume the existence of its designated enemy; having no interest in the latter’s disappearance, it can only avoid acting on the real causes of what it claims to combat. A simulacrum of a war decorated with the prestige of the “combat for man.”[4]

This book does not escape the shadow cast by modernity: it was born from an exercise in critical reason. Nothing is more densely than the latest contemporary claim to being situated beyond the principle of critical examination, which is one with thought, even if the latter cannot be reduced to it. Our postcritics are never anything but ex-critics turned hypercritical of their past roles, past because out of fashion. We pay no heed whatsoever to fashion, as some will perhaps see. The critical reason at work is the engagement in a struggle against what the classical thinkers called “prejudices.” With respect to the latter, our position is at once inside and outside, comprehensive as much as critical. For, if we assuredly propose to flush out and reduce certain sets of prejudices called “racist,” we no less analyze the programmatic idea of a world without prejudice as a fiction engendering harmful utopias.

The idea of “prejudice” therefore appears both indispensable for approaching the question of “racism” and sufficiently obscure so as to be itself submitted to a critical interrogation. Thus we have allowed ourselves certain exploratory detours through the great modern rationalist tradition, whose objective has been to struggle against prejudices until they are destroyed, by means of critical analysis, which alone enables one to know them (see chapters 4 and 6).

Racism-as-Ideology

One of the singularities of racism, as an ideology prone to appearing in various doctrinal forms, is related to its seeming rivalry with the great ideologies, such as socialism, liberalism, anarchism, and nationalism, without for all that being graspable on the same plane as they are. The great mother ideologies are first of all doctrinal identifications and partial to themselves: their names designate conceptions of the world and programs of social reconstruction assumed by more or less isolated social groups or actors—such as “archaic.” To the contrary, racism designates, from the moment the word first appears in the French language (1954), a stigmatized doctrinal ensemble, a sum of positions and propositions presumed to be blameworthy, attributed solely to the hereditary enemy, the German (see chapter 3). Racism is one of the names of what is commonly and violently rejected, in the inventory of possible ideologies. The word racism designates the ideology of the adversary, of an adversary, in any case of an individual or collective actor opposed to the subject who, as speaker, uses it. Racism, it will be objected, is formally well defined—as dictionaries bear witness—in the manner of a great ideology: on the one hand, it is supposed to be a system of explanation or interpretation of the historic-social world (the “theory of race”); on the other hand, it is described, to borrow Durkheim’s formulas on socialism, as a “plan for the reconstruction of societies, a program for a collective life which
does not exist as yet or in the way it is dreamed of, and which is proposed to men as worthy of their preference."  

Racism-as-ideology may essentially be broken down into two aspects. In the first place, given as a conception of the world or a metaphysics of history claiming to state the truth of what is (or of what is important to man), it may be defined as a "racial theory." In the second place, posed as an ideal, oriented toward the future, a prospect of social reconstitutions on a racial basis, racism is a system of values, norms, and imperatives; it is then blended with a morality and a politics. But it is at this point that the parallel with the great matrix-forming ideologies ceases. For, besides the fact that racism is a categorizing characterization of the positions of an adversary— it is therefore a polemical notion— not all of its assumed doctrinal variants present the second aspect, the axiological, normative, and prescriptive one that we have brought out. The racial metaphysics of history, as incarnated in Arthur de Gobineau's *Inequality of Human Races* (1853–55), for example, is concerned not in the least with what must be, but rather with what was (the golden age of Aryanism) and with what is (irreversible decline): there is literally nothing to be done, because there is no longer anything to hope for, in the space opened and closed by Gobineau's narrative of the progressive disappearance of the creative elements of civilization. Gobineau's positivist and nostalgic "racism" may certainly be deemed, following the example of socialism, a "cry of grief, sometimes of anger, uttered by men who feel most keenly our collective malaise." 11 But, pushed by the aristocratic despair of the old romantic, the cry of grief is not accompanied by a method of salvation or a prescription of remedies: there is nothing beyond the meanings of the sick person but resignation in the face of the inevitable end. Neither the constructivist stance, nor the programmatic disposition, nor social and political demur or surgery may be found in the "racist" conceptions of nostalgic romanticism. Now, "racism" is most often illustrated by Gobineau's theory, 12 a retrospective utopia of the racial sublimity that is forever lost, precisely deprived of the projective and prescriptive component accorded to racism in general. The classical theory of races, which is supposed to incarnate the ideal type of racism, therefore does not usher in imperative statements: it neither recommends nor prescribes any "racist" conduct; rather, it is content to diagnose evil, to describe its infallible genesis and universal extension, and to preach a wait for death. But this ultimate version of amor fati is not in the least joyful, and even less Dionysian; here resignation is only the sobered accompaniment of absolute sadness. The dominant passion of Gobineau's system is unlimited sadness, foundational of an inaction troubled by nostalgia: we are at the antipodes of the activism of "racist" militants, doctrinarians, or politicians who propose to change life or to transform the world in their own way, even in their own image. But it will be objected that racism, like the other matrix-forming ideologies, is "above all a ferment which affirms itself, although it may eventually ask Reason for the reasons with which to justify itself." 13 The pairing of passion and rationalization is effective here, as everywhere in the social imagination. And one of the polemical instruments common to all antiracisms consists precisely of denouncing racism as a pseudoscientific system, of delegitimizing it by exhibiting the (negative) passion that would inspire it, that would surround itself with arguments appearing to be scientific so as better to perch its authority on opinion— this passion is assumed to be sensitive to scientific decoy. Antiracist polemic concentrates on the unveiling of the strictly polemical function of the scientific apparatus possibly set in motion by "racist" authors. Combative antiracism postulates that "racist" theorists, when they appeal to apparently scientific facts, observations, or laws, hence do nothing but "establish a doctrine that they had previously conceived," 14 the latter deriving from an affective base often presented as pathological. Such is the dominant refutational method of the antiracist crusade: demystifying criticism essentially affects a reduction of racism to a rationalization of negative passions (hatred, contempt, envy, resentment, and so on), which would have "real" social and economic origins, a body of symptoms willingly donning, in its public formulations, the decent mask of a scientific theory. Reason could therefore intervene in the vicinity of "racism" only as the legitimating façade of an "irrational" threat or blase. These combat characterizations are misunderstood because they are "well known," interiorized so well that they are not known for themselves and resist objectifying analysis. Antiracism derives its symbolic effectiveness essentially from the presentation and treatment of its adversary, "racism," as a social and ideological fact, endowed with the nature of a symptom: it objectifies its adversary by characterizing it as pathological. In this way it excepts itself from the field of objects it claims to describe and analyze, even explain, and in so doing it mo-
Introduction

nopolizes the legitimate function of the neutral gaze par excellence, distanced from the phenomena. Hence antiracism fills a function of absolute exclusion in the form and through the effect of an absolute denunciation attributed to racism. That is why it must reserve its nature, protect from criticism the reasons for its own critical position, hence keep itself out of the analytic gaze, which would risk taking it as an object in turn. The most effective way of protecting oneself from criticism is to monopolize the critical function.

These considerations lead us to an unimpeachable piece of evidence: it is antiracism that most presents structural and functional similarities with the mother ideologies — liberal or anarchist anti-statism, socialist anticapitalism, nationalist anticolonialism. Like all the great ideologies, antiracism is a twofold setup: it is a system of representing the world, even of explaining its being and becoming, and it is a system of norms and imperatives. Henceforth, antiracism falls, better than racism — its continual invention and its condition of existence — under the general definition it gives to its designated enemy. For antiracism, contrary to unassailable, unchallengeable “racism,” declares itself, assumes itself, claims itself, holds itself up as the legitimate exclusive conception of the world and as the universal method of salvation, in the face of the other ideologically-political final solutions of salvation, in the face of the other ideologically-political final solutions of salvation, in the face of the other ideologically-political final solutions of salvation, that hitherto enter into competition with it (liberalism, socialism, nationalism, anarchism). Thus do the great mother ideologies strive to assimilate antiracism, this newcomer that upsets the transideological system, to incorporate its dominant passions and typical arguments, to integrate its most strongly “rallying” motives. A struggle for the exclusive appropriation of antiracist exclusivism has been unleashed in the political field, a struggle whose stakes is the monopoly on the right to the antiracist denunciation of the adversary. Let us give just one example: the rhetoric in use in socialist and communist milieus involves the denunciation of a kindship or complicity (“objective” or conscious), even of a profound identity, between racism and nationalism, on the one hand (essentially by the mediation of the anti-individualism and the antinominalism they would have in common, as well as by the tendency to “biologize” their conceptions of the collective), and between racism and liberalism, on the other hand (essentially by the mediation of “social Darwinism”). It is well known that liberal theoreticians have hardly any trouble resorting that the “clashism” (centered on class hatreds) inherent in socialism presents troubling likenesses to “racism” (centered on the struggle and hatred of races among themselves) and that socialism can in many ways be considered a communitarianist (or “holistic”) reaction symmetrical to racism in the space of modern ideology, which is at heart individualist and egalitarian. For their part, intelligent nationalist doctrinarians can always denounce in return the “racist” will to destroy “natural” (or naturalized by history, secondary) national identities, shared equally by “liberal” and “socialist” imperialisms, the twin enemies of ethnic universalism.

Since 1945, the struggle for the monopoly on the antiracist denunciation of the adversary has extended over the planet as it has intensified. In extending and diversifying, through mimicry and reversal, antiracism has become a complex field of themes and arguments, in which most of the great ideologies and doctrinal traditions have crossed paths and run up against each other. For the political actors, such an effective method of delegitimizing the adversary could not be abandoned to the free-for-all of organized (and most often politico-instrumentalized) antiracist militancy, and even less to potential adversaries or possible competitors. Antiracism has hence become a stake of importance in ideologically-political struggles.

The hypothesis whose statement we have been trying to justify is quite simple: antiracism is a great ideology in formation, which postulates the existence of an absolute enemy named racism; but antiracism is also, in the current conjunction, a transideological stake, involving conflicts of legitimacy. So that, far from provoking any appeasement of the cultural and ideological wars, antiracism reanimates and stirs them up, hence giving the lie to its declarations of intention with its real effects.
Part I

Critique of Antiracist Reason
Heterophobia, Heterophilia: The Definitional Antinomy

The Fundamental Antinomy

Let us go to the heart of the matter. Our object is "racism" as it is defined, or rather as it may be defined, on the basis of the postulates incorporated in the spirit of the time, which envelopes something like a basic antiracism.1 The fundamental antinomy of racism, as conceived by antiracism, arises from the shock of two positions, both held and defended by the authorized spokespersons, the militants, and the sympathizers. These contrary positions equally attributed to "racism" characterize without distinction (or in succession) attitudes or dispositions, representations, and evaluations, no less than behaviors. It is sufficiently suggested that the flowing and undefined alternation between heterophobia and heterophilia presents an obstacle to any attempt at cold and careful analysis. Such holistic characterizations of "racism" are neither true nor false; the "rejection of difference/praise of difference" pair, if it has little recognition value, has an ideologically determining face. It engenders the conceptual indeterminacy necessi-
individuals from the social body and keeping them temporarily or permanently in isolation, away from all contact with their fellows, in establishments specially intended for this purpose. Most of the societies which we call primitive would regard this custom with profound horror; it would make us, in their eyes, guilty of that same barbarity of which we are inclined to accuse them because of their symmetrically opposite behaviour.

Applied to racism, the schematization allows one to distinguish between imperialist/colonialist racism, or the racism of assimilation ("anthropophobia"), and differentialist/misophobe racism, or the racism of exclusion ("anthropophagy"). In the first, one aims to make someone similar to oneself, in the second to preserve the fact of difference by the rejection of that which differs—two distinct strategies of resolving the conflicts termed ethnic or racial. A distinction whose physiological basis is susceptible to infinite variations in the collective imaginations: absorb/eliminate, ingest-digest/subject — a formal distinction between including and excluding. We must reconsider the double correlation between the operation of assimilation/exclusion and the cult of universal power, imperial mythology, on the one hand, and between the operation of elimination/exclusion and the sacralization of roots, philholic mythology, on the other hand.

A philosophical modelization of the distinction may be found in the classical opposition between dialectical logic (in the Hegelian sense of the reconciliation of contraries) and formal logic, the latter founded on the principle of the excluded third term, the former on the principle of the third term included by the synthetic operation of "sublation" (according to the double meaning of Aufhebung, tolerance and consensus). From these two irreconcilable logics, one may deduce the two modes of racialization that we have schematized: racism of exclusion, analytic and formalist (exclusive disjunction: "either one or the other"); and racism of inclusion, synthetic and dialectical (positive conjunction, even fusion of opposites: "both one and the other").

2. Racism is absolute affirmation of difference; it is defined by the absolutization of difference, the naturalization or the essentialization of differences, either perceived or imagined. As these attempts at philosophical conceptualizations do not, with just a few exceptions (Raymond Aron figures as the most notable among them), come from philosophers, they generally resort to terms used without rigor. "Essentialist thought" appears as a mode of perception and categorization...
of human groups that is at once summary and eternalizing: it condenses and congeals attributed characteristics; it externalizes the latter by fixing them as stereotypes ("race characteristics").

Racism, as essentialism, would arise with the intervention of the vocabulary of race borrowed from zoology through the mediation of physical anthropology: "races" are so many distinct "essences" allowing human groups to be classified, in agreement with practical classifications, and increasing the evidence of spontaneous social perception. This essentialism implies a "naturalist" disposition, in that the idea of nature synthesizes the attributes of "race": the latter concern the given, the involuntary, the fixed, the eternal, the insurmountable.

In the field of the social sciences, "essentialism" is therefore the scholarly characterization of racism that, for two decades, has seemed self-evident; it defines racism's first definitional evidence as the common and perhaps only conceptual trait of all the particular approaches. Hence the ethnologist Michel Adam believes he can grasp "the properly ontological" unit of racism," in contrast to its phenomenal diversity. But, the author recognizes, "if racism... may be generally understood as an 'essentialism,' if everywhere it bears witness to a behavior of exclusion and objectification of a collective 'other,' its manifestations are so diverse that they each seem to derive from a particular order.

Indeed this is the basic difficulty: there are hardly any satisfying conceptual mediations between the too broad outfit of the general heading of "essentialism" and the many social practices (attitudes, behaviors) that may be termed "racist." To state it briefly, it may be that the determination of racism by the trait of "essentialism" itself derives from said "essentialism"; "racism" would run the risk of being conceived as an eternal ideological and behavioral essence, attributed to an invariable human type, incarnating an immutable specific nature. One should not then be surprised that such a substantial type never enters the realm of the observable and seems forever to glide above empirical variety.

In order to go deeper into the "essentialist" theory of racism, let us proceed to a detour through several recent texts by sociologists. In his "Essay on the Controversy between Max Weber and Werner Sombart," in Judasism and capitalism, Freddy Raphaël applies the critical model of "essentialism" to the sociological theory of Sombart: "The approach of Werner Sombart is strictly 'essentialist,' since it encloses human groupings in a specificity that no member may avoid, thus legitimating their alienation." Now, essentialism conceived as the first method of racialization, in the form of an exclusive (or dominant) appeal to the essence of an affinity group with pseudoexplanatory aims, absolutizes alterity: "It may henceforth no longer be eliminated, for it is constituted as an irreducible core." If racism is the ideological system that makes race, according to Colette Guillaumin, "an intellectual and perceptive category of priority," it presents the functional peculiarity of allowing the foundation in nature of the total inclusion of individuals in biological classes that are at once closed and irreducible, no less than of the domination and exploitation of the supposedly inferior races. Essentialism, when it appeals to a kind of scientific legitimation, becomes a naturalism or an integral biologist: human groups are assigned the status of natural groups.

We should nonetheless note that, in racing arguments, "naturalization" itself has no value except as a means to an end, which is the "naturalization," so to speak, of the psychosomatic characteristics of race: everything happens as if the racist possessed (or presupposed) several distinct human natures, hence abolishing the nature/culture split (there is only the natural) at the same time as he would suppress common human nature (whether it is interpreted as a universal anthropological substance, an ethical requirement, or a regulatory idea). A link has often been perceived between the operation of naturalization/naturalization of factual social groups and the legitimation of the social division as it is. Jean-Claude Passeron notes:

It is surely the notion of human nature, with all its ideological effects, that they [the psychological and biological concepts introduced without examination into sociological analysis] reintroduce into the arguments, since, in coupling social differences, even if by way of multiple mediations, with a foundation other than social, they re-create the legitimizing power of the established order that is always concealed by a forgetting of the social arbitrariness in favor of the "nature of things" and, corollarily, the transmutation of historical necessity into a destiny that escapes the history of human beings.

This brief detour through sociological discourse confirms our hypothesis on the present structuration of what may conveniently be called the scholarly antiracist vulgate by the guiding idea of "essentialism," a central cursive-demystifying category. What racist theories ("biological sociologies" in general, especially the anthroposociology
of Georges Vacher de Lapouge and Otto Ammon) are therefore currently reproached for, by the dominant sociological tradition (as a scholarly tradition, whether obedient to Durkheim or individualist-metaphilosophical), in effecting at once a naturalization of the cultural and/or the social, treated as biological realities, and a fatalization of the course of human history, with contingency travestied/converted into necessity and necessity transformed into destiny.

We again find the critical concept of essentialism in Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological analysis of racism in general. Essentialism appears here as a fundamental characteristic of racism, the latter approached on the basis of class positions and strategies of legitimation. Essentialism plays the theoretical role of a model that is both descriptive and functional. “Every racism is an essentialism,” postulates Bourdieu. Essentialism henceforth defines the ideological core common to all racism, if it is true that there are “as many racism as there are groups who need to justify themselves in existing as they exist.” But essentialism characterizes only an invariable mode of legitimation of a dominant position; it is inseparable from the legitimating function it fulfills: essentialism, in any form of racism, is the “metaphysical” foundation of the sociology that a class domination of any kind would be unable to do without. Hence essentialism may appear at the foundation of a rhetoric centered on the positive self-stylization of various fractions of the dominant class (“We are the best”) and possibly carried into the scholarly language of psychometric tests (the elite made up of those with an IQ of more than 120): “The racism of intelligence...is what causes the dominant class to feel justified in being dominant: they feel themselves to be essentially superior.”

One may go further and, rather than remaining at the static category of essentialism, state the hypothesis of an eternalizing essentialization as an act accompanying any designation of a scapegoated victim. A discernible set of humans incarnates the essentialized victim, treated by self-legitimizing inversion as the aggressor-subject onto which may be concentrated all the hate of the group in whose name one speaks and that one claims to be defending. In certain cases pure hate appears, without practical reason and without pragmatic interests, a hate targeting the essence of the raced, bearing on what the latter is supposed to be. The invention of an absolutely bad collective entity defines the object to which a pure or ontological, nonpragmatic hate may be applied. Vladimir Jankélévitch presented such a model in a text published in 1942, in which he clearly showed the specificity of anti-Semitism:

Among all the fascist impositions, anti-Semitism is not the one that reaches the greatest number of victims [this was written in 1941], but it is the most monstrous. Perhaps for the first time men are officially tracked down not for what they do, but for what they are. They expiate their “being” and not their “having”: not acts, a political opinion, or a profession of faith like the Catholics, the Freemasons, or the Nihilists, but the fate of birth. This gives all its meaning to the immortal myth of the cursed people, the scapegoated people, condemned to wander through the nations and bear the latter’s sins on their backs.”

The anti-Jewish hate of the Nazis (“fascists”) aims at the very being of the Jews, whatever they might do, whether as a people or as individuals. What the anti-Jewish subject here brings to light is his absolute rejection of any possible similitude of his own being with the being of the Jew. Pure hate is best deployed in relation to rivalry, that is, in a space representable as egalitarian and competitive: the anti-Jewish subject assumes as his imperative task the destruction of this rival but intrinsically bad being, this inverted double that threatens his own identity. At issue is making any resemblance impossible—a resemblance whose possibility is always implied by competitive egalitarianism, the supreme threat of nondifferentiation from the corrupt and corrupting element.

Affective ambivalence is not to be neglected here the mimetic rivalry that follows egalitarianismlessness can be abolished only by the suppression of the adversary, precisely because the latter tends to be recognized as a partner in the interaction. Only the externalization of the rival-Other can put an end to the struggle, for in this case there is no possible stabilization in defined places on the scale of values. The destruction of the rival-Self is the general price to pay in the polemical space of the egalitarian type, by its very principle prohibiting any hierarchization considered to be legitimate and hence indefinitely reinstating mimetic rivalry and hate. Jankélévitch noted, “The relations between the ‘Jew’ and the ‘Aryan’ are ambivalent relations of passion that would require a very painstaking description: we believe that, without this description, the extraordinary sodomy of anti-Jewish persecution, its unforeseen refinements, and its disabolical inventiveness could not be understood.”
Pure racialization targets the raced individual as any representative at all of a group that is supposed to confer on her his substantial being, its "essential" identity. This deregulation of the individual as such assumes the existence of a sociopolitical space in which the modern individual, as a subject endowed with rights and responsibilities in a legitimate state, and individualist ideology have emerged: for racial deregulation applies to the legitimate subject (the person, the citizen) and to her ideological foundation. Particular persons (this Jew, that Arab, and so on) are raced as incarnating their respective collective types: this Jew as the Jew, that Arab as the Arab, and so on. The operation may be observed with regard to other types of collective entities. "Kill the Jews!"—this explicit imperative is made implicit and is open to variations, for example in crimes termed "sexist." In a text that develops the analogy, "Sexisme et racisme," Étienne de LaÉtienne de Laureys commented on the murder of a woman following her rape and torture. "This woman was killed because she was a woman, died for belonging to a specific human group. . . . And many are not murdered any less often than women, but they are not murdered for no reason (as is said for a woman), that is, as males. Their maleness does not bring them into any danger." 2 It remains that onological murder, in this case, is mixed with a pragmatic murder, linked to the erotic interest of rape. Any woman is certainly killed as a woman, but the murder follows and finishes, or "signs," the rape, bearing on the object of desire. The analogy is valid only between the feminized woman (according to the norm of an erotic interest) who is "sexized" and the racialized group (according to the norm of an economic interest) that is "raced." In the framework defined by such a restrictive clause, every representative of a category of "victimizees"—Blacks, Jews, Arabs, women—may be deemed destorable as such.

But let us come back to the unconditional and hyperbolic praise of difference, as a rhetorical pivot common to a certain antiracism and a certain racism.

Heterophiles presupposes that differences are as such positive. Racism is henceforth based on the racialization of difference; it implies a "second religiosity" of difference. The disturbing element here is the absence of difference, the threat of nondifferentiation. Heterophobe racism is fundamentally antuniversalist: the universal is reduced to only a homogenizing, unifying, standardizing machine. And it is denounced as an imposture consisting of raising a particularism to a universal norm:23 travestied ethnocentrism, imperialism with a humanist face. The requirement of universality is condemned as a privileged instrument (because masked by its sobriety) of an enterprise of eradicating the good differences, those that symbolize life itself. Henceforth, leveling antiracism is stigmatized as cultural mass murder, as ethnocide that would proceed from an ethnocentrism that is dangerous inasmuch as it is touted as universal. Universalist antiracism would then be the true racism, the only racism. The denunciation of ethnocide and of the imposition of universalism in general spontaneously grafts itself onto a catastrophist vision of evolution toward the homogeneous. Let us borrow a description of such a picture of a gray world, conceived as a perverse effect of the ideal of assimilation, from the ethnologist Irenais Étienne de Laureys, itself as the conclusion of a study of five so-called primitive tribes:

In most cases one observes an assimilation in which all that emerges is a caricature of the model. The loss of outside civilization is rapidly succeeded by mental civilization, and all those who unscrupulously favor this evolution are guilty of ethnocide, even if they act with good intentions. The argument is often advanced that only a unitary worldwide civilization, involving the total mix of all races, would resolve the tensions and conflicts among groups. That does not seem to me either necessary or desirable. If one teaches man to be tolerant—that is, to be ready to understand and accept other styles of life as much within specific civilizations as among different peoples—then ethnocentrism will find itself forestalled, without it being necessary for the groups to abandon their cultural particularities and the pride in their civilization. The pacification of humanity should not leave in its wake the corpus of civilizations and races. 23

The differentialist formula of antiracism is simple: the right to the difference of community and active tolerance between cultures (mutual familiarity, reciprocal interest, dialogue). Here the two basic principles of the "spontaneous" professional ethic of ethnologists will be recognized.

The antiracism that follows the trace of heterophobic racism is therefore defined by what it believes it most essentially denounces and combat, that is, the imperial universism that aims for the assimilation of all others to the selfsame. The antiracism that postulates heterophobic racism as its enemy can only reaffirm the value of the requirement of universality, by denouncing this deceptive substitution of transcen-
dence that in difference raised to the absolute. There is, on the one hand, an antinomialist and differentialist antiracism and, on the other hand, a universalist and antidifferentialist antiracism — an interlacing of antiracisms that echoes the chaosm of their respective racisms. At issue here is an anarchy, an insurmountable contradiction that necessarily reproduces itself, on the basis of the same presuppositions, on two levels: that of racism as it is defined, that of antiracism as it defines itself, as it is sketched on the horizon of primary pieces of evidence concerning “racism,” which are its own.

![Diagram of antiracisms](image)

**Principles and Hypotheses**

- Each antiracism (AR) has its own racism (R): AR1 → R1; AR2 → R2. Each racism has an antiracist double.
- The positions are determined by the double play of oppositions of the antiracism and the phobias/aphobias.
- The dominant antiracist discourse is a formation of compromise (unstable, even “explosive”) between antiracism 2 and antiracism 1, which may be considered ideal types (illustrated nonetheless by positions perceived as “extremes”).

**Axioms and Definitions**

1. If racism is defined by heterophobia, then antiracism is defined by heterophobia. The founding theme of antiracist slogans is that difference signifies richness: the ethnic and cultural diversity of humanity is presented as the natural capital of the entire species, an inalienable treasure that must be defended at any price. Difference is humanity, and its most precious capital. The praise of difference has been the first element of the dominant and majoritarian antiracist discourse since the 1960s. Type 1 antiracism is based on the conviction that differences are good, the gift of nature or God. This is the differentialist option in general.
2. If racism is defined by heterophobia, then antiracism is defined by heterophobia, which ordinarily presents itself through an affirmation of the universalist requirement. This heterophobia, a basic distrust in the face of differences, presupposes by an assumed derivation two mixtures of ideas, which are found at the basis of type 2 antiracist slogans: differences engender inequalities, which institute injustices; differences engender hostility, which feeds the drive to aggression, which manifests itself in wars. The two themes tend to appear together in the militant commonplaces: the struggle against inequalities and injustices — egalitarianist themes; the struggle against war and the "arms race" — a pacifist theme. Certain authors, often scientific types endowed with bad conscience, let it be known that differentiation leads to discrimination. Other authors, radicalizing the antiscientific inspiration that they have retained from the Christian vulgare, advise us not to judge, as judging is differentiating, and so evaluating, and so hierarchizing according to value. Radical egalitarianism and total pacifism are the prerogative of majoritarian groups, either sects of millenarian ideology or front organizations manipulated for political ends (they constitute ideological reserve armies and instruments of provocation). Pacifist egalitarianism constitutes the second element of the dominant antiracist discourse, in spite of the fact that, taken in the isolated and "pure" state, it derives from the dominant and minoritarian antiracist discourse.
3. The antiracist vulgate is produced by the synthesis of the differentialist thematic and the egalitarian/pacifist thematic: its ideal typical slogan is "equality in difference." Pacifism here appears as something presupposed: for there to be equality among different groups, one (the antiracist) says that it is enough that difference is simply observed, before being the object of praise, an occasion for mutual enrichment, a source of appeasing dialogue, a foundation of solid friendships, a provocation to beneficial exchanges. It being content
with observing differences even possible? The question comes down to
wondering if one is able not to judge, able to abstain from evaluating
by differentiating, absolutely to keep oneself from referring to some
scale of values. The ideal sketched in such prescriptions is the very
one indicated by the impossible synthesis of equality and difference,
which at once demands that one recognize or welcome differences and
that one carefully blur them, that one celebrate them, but all of them
at the same time and just as easily; in short, that one distinguish with¬
out judging the distinctions. This linking of phobias — of the vertical,
of degree, of conflict, and of the undifferentiated — defines the core of
the antiracist vulgate. The typical slogan must therefore be rewritten
in the developed state: “Equality in difference, to achieve universal
peace: friendship among peoples, dialogue among cultures, exchanges
among nations.” Here we may recognize the basic formulas of the
rhetoric of international civil servants: the dominant ideological form
is also a professional jargon. But the latter is no less a political storage
language and instrument of propaganda, of adverse propaganda. Its
instrumental value in ideological warfare partially explains the aston¬
ishing blindness of the antiracist intelligentsia in the face of such a
paradoxical requirement, one that is impossible to satisfy: appreciate
without preference. It is understood that it must engender a specific
bad conscience, that of the fatally unhappy antiracist.

Two

“Racism”:
Ordinary Uses and Scholarly Uses,
from the Word to the Notion

A vocabulary is words, but it is also thoughts, a logic, a philosophy,
indeed a metaphysics; the one who accepts it, even to fight against
the latter, is already occupied, attacked from inside. Henri Massis

What does one think of “racism” when one stands outside and against
the supposed field of racism? What are the elements of the antiracist
representation of “racism”? Do they enable one adequately to know
the phenomenon of this name and to combat it with the desired ef¬
ectiveness? It is for both theoretical aims and practical objects of
ideological struggle that we may take a detour through the explo¬
arion of the antiracist representations of “racism.” The latter are to
be reconstructed from the words, language games, and strategic uses
of discourse, and they refer to a first agency, which is a principle of
legitimation and a matrix of evidence, we will propose to call this
agency antiracist reason. Our hypothesis is simple: the knowledge of
antiracism, as a system of representations and reserve of precon¬
tituted arguments, is one of the conditions of the knowledge of racism,
if such a thing, categorizable as such, is endowed with a determinable
mode of existence. Self-knowledge of antiracism, as well and as task,
is the good faith in action of the humanist doing his best to be an ef¬
ective, and positive, antiracist. For struggling against racism assumes
Seven

On Racism: Models, Ideal Types, Variations, Paradoxes

If one defines as racist those opinions that proclaim the superiority of one race over another and claim particular rights for the superior at the cost of the inferior, then the value of a legal interdiction would be trivial, for the really definitive forms of racism in societies with racial conflicts are only seldom expressed in this manner; in the United States, the first victim of such a law would be the Black Muslim movement. Leszek Kolakowski

A Theoretical Model of Racism

In order to clarify as much as possible what is conveniently named “racism,” it is not poor method to venture to construct its ideal type through a systematic inventory of its definitional traits. Let us emphasize the conventional aspect of the use of the word racism: this word will be maintained only for reasons of language convention, founded of course on the historical conditions of appearance of the modern theory of “race,” which today hardly intervenes except in court or under erudite or militant scrutiny. Let us recall one of the results of the preceding analyses: “racism,” as it operates socially, in no way assumes an explicit theory of “race”; there are even forms of “racism” that expressly reject any conception of “human races.” Henceforth, speaking of “racism” will facilitate communication while
resenting a set of received ideas of which we should be rid—not in order to deny the phenomena poorly designated and conceptualized by the term racism, but rather in view of extracting the latter from the ordinary polemical field by constituting it as a conceptual instrument. This operation involves neutralizing the connotative burdens accompanying the ordinary uses of the term and consequently suspending its affective-imaginary effects.

At issue, therefore, is constructing the concept of "racism." By insisting on the necessity of a construction, we are trying to place in evidence our refusal of any substantialist, or metaphysical, conception of what we will call "racism." A good model of such a conventional, axiologically neutral construction is furnished by Vilfredo Pareto's presentation of the concept of an elite. In his Mind and Society, Pareto thus sums up the constitution of his sociological concept of an elite: "So let us make a class of the people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity, and to that class give the name...of elite." We propose, in analogous fashion, to form a class of individuals whose indices are the highest in the realm of the following relational behaviors: distance (avoidance of contact), rejection or exclusion, abasement (contempt), domination and exploitation, indeed extermination, targeting individuals insofar as they belong (or are supposed to belong) to groups perceived as different from the proper group of the "racist" subject; this difference is represented as a difference in nature (itself susceptible to a multiplicity of interpretations) that has precisely taken the historical form of a racial difference. The latter is made twofold according to the perspectives of the racism and the racized: on the one hand, there is a self-perception of one's own group of affiliation as racial, self-racialization; on the other hand, there is a perception of the other's group of affiliation as racial, heteroracialization. In this asymmetrical relationship, the very opposite of a dialogue, self-racialization is effected in the manner of praise, whereas heteroracialization is necessarily incurred in a discourse of blame. We will therefore give to the class of individuals presenting such attitudes the name racists.

"Racism" may then be defined as the set of typical (implicit or explicit) attitudes manifested by the individuals said to be "racist." It follows that racism is never completely incarnated, incorporated, or realized, in an individual or a group. One assigns the name racist to a concept, a formal/abstract object, a class term that subsumes dissimilar individuals. The racism attributable to these individuals varies in intensity, manner, depth of assumption, cognitive level, and so on. One may thus define an ideological core of racism that is analytically presentable as a series of statements ordered according to the rule of nonreciprocal presuppositions (where trait 5 is presupposed by traits 3, 4, 5, and 5, but does not presuppose them).

In addition, we have proposed to place in parentheses, explicitly, the pejorative connotations of the word racism. More generally, the epoche of axiological, normative, and deontological presuppositions to us seems required by the project of avoiding any risk of reproduction, by way of a translation into a scholarly lexicon, of the dominant ideological representations associated with "racism" in ordinary language. It is again the conventionalist or algebraic model advocated by Pareto that indicates our direction: "Any other name [than that of élite], and even a mere letter of the alphabet, would be just as appropriate to the end we propose to ourselves." In the same way, what we denominate as "racism" might just as well be denominated "ethnocentrism," "culturalism," or "nationalism," according to the case—and indeed, according to the three possible axes: identification, differentiation, and otherism.

And the suppression of the habitual connotations must be accompanied by a neutralization of the historicometaphysical and scientific memory of the term at issue, race. Here, Vigo Brondal shows us the method in action, on the old question of the parts of speech. Reworking the four universally recognized categories of "substance, quality, quantity, and relation" in the framework of his philosophy of language, Brondal specifies the two conditions that these classical transcendental categories must satisfy in order to become effective: "First, they must be stripped of any metaphysical or absolute character... Then, the fundamental concepts must... be defined in a strict interdependency." It is the first condition that interests us here: the theory of racism must "remain entirely neutral or agnosic," as much as the philosophy of language, according to Brondal, which is nonetheless elaborated by means of tool-terms endowed with old memory.

We must therefore begin by constructing an ideal type of racism-as-ideology, which we will approach less as a definitive doctrine (as Orthodoxy, for example) than as a set of representations, values, and norms presupposed by the "theories," "doctrines," or "philosophies" that are historically attested and consensually judged to be "racist."
Our analyses will here be able to take as their object only the question of racism-as-ideology.

We will understand by "racism" the ideology, incorporated in practice or incanted in behaviors, made implicit in "prejudices" or made explicit in speech acts, the cores of which, susceptible as they are to variable focalizations (from the antiuniversalism of strict differentialist racism to the universalism of egalitarian racism), may be described by a series of positions or mental acts, according to an order that proceeds from that which is presupposed to that which presupposes:

1. the rejection of the universal;
2. the set categorization of individuals;
3. the absolutization of collective differences;
4. the naturalization of differences, either by scientific biologization or by victimization or "culturalist" fixing;
5. the inegalitarian interpretation of differences, projected onto a universal scale of values.

1. The rejection of the universal is manifested, in the attested discourses, according to two modalities that may be linked but not likened to each other: the rejection of the unity of the human race or the rejection of the regulating idea of a human community that forms the beyond of all collective differences. The antiuniversalist position comes down to taking the exclusive side of what is — the concrete of collective identities (racial, ethnic, cultural, national) and their irreducible plurality — against what is not and what would be expressed by the abstraction implied by any universal form of ethics. Multiplicity opposed to unity, the concrete to the abstract, the real to fiction: these are the three polemical acts presupposed by the impugnment of any nonreligious "Catholicity." The latter characterizes modern ideology, engendered by the secularization of the Catholic idea: the laicization and humanization of Christian universalism. Thus must be noticed the antimodern meaning taken by the first manifestations of the rejection of universalism, the latter conflated with the project of an "emancipation" of all human beings, beyond their affiliations and whatever their identities may be (heritages, traditional mental forms). But antiuniversalism appears with just as much force in the neobaroque currents that occupy a not negligible place in what is conveniently named the "postmodern condition": the celebration of difference, of the plural, of singularities, and of dissemination is committed to the abandonment of the "unitary myth" of universalism. These two strategies of antiuniversalism, though fundamentally different, can approach each other at the heart of certain doctrines: they thus represent the two intellectual poles of the New Right. Antiuniversalism is stated in at least two senses.

The rejection of a horizon of universality or of a universal norm especially leads to the denunciation of "human rights" as useless, even harmful, fictions — for every declaration of human rights is universal. But the impugnment of humanization as imposture indicates an essential ideological correlation between universalism and individualism: the one and the other may be condemned equally and in the same gesture because they represent the two doctrinal faces of the spirit of abstraction. The antiuniversalist position therefore involves a struggle on two fronts. On the first front, it must defend the thesis that there is no anthropological universalism either in a substantivist perspective, which would in some way postulate the existence of a "human nature" (for example, represented as a common store of biopsychosocial characteristics), or in a normative sense, which would indicate an "ought" and an "ought to be" of humanity in general, that is, a certain anthropological ideality endowed with a regulatory power over behaviors, from the fact that it incarnates a constellation of positive values. On a second front, the antiuniversalist position must confront one of the most powerful ideological pairs of the modern world, which we have proposed to name individuo-universalism.

Finally we will note that, in the political vulgate, the antiuniversalist position tends to be formulated in the form of the denunciation of "cosmopolitanism" and "globalism," counternatural tendencies supposedly aiming for the abolition of the diversity of the races, a fact of nature or of divine creation. Most of the texts that come from the so-called extreme right groups (from Catholic traditionalism to national populism) link together the condemnation of globalism (in its Janus-faced form, both capitalistic and communist), the stigmatization of métissage; and the denunciation of reverse-racism ("antiracism"). These three ideological elements clearly appear in the following exemplary sentence: "On the level of race, globalism encourages métissage as a panacea, and produces the frenzied antiracism that is now in the process of transforming into antiracism,"
One of the least questionable criteria of the position—which I will call racist—of a certain author is indirectly furnished by the attribution of the universalist thesis by the latter to his designated adversary. "Racist" authors tend to define the theoretical position of their adversaries by "the belief in the dogma of the unity of the human race." Antinomianism willingly presents itself as an antidogmatism, cloaks itself in the signs of tolerance, of intellectual openness, and sometimes calls on the spirit of the progress of knowledge.

2. The set categorization of individuals is the second operation implied by every racialization and itself presupposes a deracialization of the dimension of the individual. In fact, on the one hand, individuals are assigned to classes of humans that are supposedly stable (in a creationist perspective, for example) or stabilized in the course of an evolutionary process; on the other hand, the individual is treated as any representative whatever of her category of affiliation, presumed to be her original one, to which a certain fixity is attributed. By the "deracialization" of the individual, we intend to designate the process of dissolution of the individual as such a collective entity that would alone really exist, in a fashion that one might call permanence: "race," "ethnic group," "culture," "civilization," "mentality," "people," and so on. The thesis of the fixity of individual affiliations presupposes the thesis of the permanency of the types of affiliation. Whatever shape it may take, the community of affiliation is posed as the value of values, at the same time as it is interpreted as the only true reality—as a substantial type or a first substance in the anthropological order. The type is a destiny thus may be formulated the basic belief of supraindividualist ideology. The essentializing categorization of the individual implies the ineluctability and the insurmountability of the incarnation of the type. The individual has no other status than to be the epiphenomenon of the type, a moment of its epiphany. Hence the essential insufficiency of the individual echoes the existential inconsistency of the universal.

A second ideological operation, correlative with the deracialization of the individual, may be gauged: collective identity, as a class of affiliation, is treated as an individual—individualism in se, divisum a quoddam adhii, according to the scholastic adage. The individualization of the collective: a shift of individuality, or at least of its scheme, is thus effected, from the level of the biological individual (the singular living being) to that of the community, redefined as the only true individual.

In short, the ideological reaction named racism puts into play the very model of individualism that at first sight seems to impugn but transposes it from the realm of the indivisible biological to the social totality, metaphorized into a great individuated organism or even the "organic community." 13

Racism may be defined as a holistic reaction against modern individualism, but within modern ideological space, where it brings to bear the schemes borrowed from the conception of the individual. The mechanism of the analogical transposition of the individual is nonetheless found outside the specific domain of racial theories, as indicated by these critical remarks of Husserl: "All the fond talk of common spirit, of the common will of a people, of nations' ideal political goals, and the like, are romanticism and mythology, derived from an analogous application [analogischer Ubertragung] of concepts that have proper sense only in the individual sphere." 14

In the nationalist imaginary, the self-racialization of the nation contains a supplementary trait: the presumption of the homogeneity of the social body. 15 Vacher de Lapouge presented the observation of the nationalist/racist deracialization of the individual, reduced to a mere abstraction of his community or lineage: "The individual is crushed by his race, and is nothing. Race and nation are everything." 16

In many contexts, the individual is treated as half-informed raw material, whose complete form and final meaning are found only on a supraindividual level. In such a holistic perspective, any sufficiently typed (and therefore individualized on its level) collective entity is susceptible of playing the role of causal and integrative Form, from regional community to race, by way of ethnic group and nation. The metaphor of the letter, as a minimal form in itself stripped of meaning, allows the forcible exposition of the elementarization of the individual: "The individual is a letter from the book of race; the letter has no meaning. But the book does." 17 Hence the meaning of the individual should be sought not in the fiction of some universal human or other but rather in the concretion of that great diasporic individual that is race. Racism is an ontology of the intermediate substances between individual half-beings and universal nonbeings. It matters little that these anthroposocial substances, once posited as really existing, are denominated "races." Racism may not be reduced to a question of explicit vocabulary.

The elementarization of the individual may be stated through another play of metaphors: the individual is treated as the imper-
fect incarnation of a type that integrally exists only in its temporal deployment, as ligneage. Here again we will have Lapouge speak, making explicit the representations and evaluations associated with the postulate of the determinism of heredity:

Merédity weighs on and literally crushes us. It is far from the case that a man's value is individual; he hardly has any except by way of his ancestors, and his individuality is but one more or less happy and always complex assembly of elements borrowed from all his ancestral lineages. Reciprocally, each lives again in his descendants, and the most effective solidarity binds together members of a family, to such a point that in a lineage it is in a way descent that is the reality and the descendants who are the temporary and phenomenal manifestations of heredity, the successive incarnations of an imperfectly realized type. 14

3. The third operation implied by every racialization may be represented by the postulate of absolute difference among the categories of affiliation; when the difference between "races" or "cultures" is absolutized, it then ceases to be a difference, and the two terms become incomparable. 15 What follows is the thesis of the unassimilability of the individuals of one define "race" to any other "race." Irreducible, incomparable, and unassimilable, the human types that differ (the reasons for difference are infinite), moreover, may not communicate with each other, neither de facto nor de jure. The impossibility of a human community beyond the enclosures is the ultimate conclusion of the thesis of incomununicability. Hence the violent denunciations of "cosmopolitization" or "globalization," processes and ideals that are supposed to destroy singular and closed communities, and, more profoundly and less distinctly, their "identity." Hence also the impugnment out of principle of interethnic crossing or "cultural métissage," identified as concerted modes of the same process of dissolution of collective identities, that is, of universal "café-au-laitization," a metaphor that renews the catastrophic figment of the "chaos of races" 16 that Houston Stewart Chamberlain attacked in his famous description of the fall of the Roman Empire, the "decadence of reference" 17 for the whole mythical history of Europe. The norm involved in the absolutization of difference is formulated either as an "ought-to-preserve" of proper identity or as an "ought-to-guarantee" of the purity of all identity.

If interethnic difference is absolute, it follows that the lack of differentiation that transgresses the law must engender an evolution of the better toward the worse, this evolution itself absolute: a decadence. The mixophobic argument has been expressed just as well, in clinical thought, through the concept of "divergent anthropicrage," borrowed from the zoological tradition. The following reflections by Dr. Edgar Berillon attest to this, exemplary as they are of a common manner of posing the problem of métissage and its pathological effects:

It is not only in métis animals that one observes the states of instability that zootechnicians designate with the term disoriented variation or turmoil, as little attention as one may pay to them, one observes those instabilities in human métis. If... the first sign of normal heredity is to resemble one's parents, one will understand the difficulty for the métis presented by the fact of resembling two types of very different characters at once... (Now), in the new reality of abnormal children and adolescents that, for the last thirty years, I have had the opportunity to examine and follow, I have been able to convince myself that intellectual and instinctual flaws and defects originate in métissage. In fact, as a result of the crossing of individuals of very differentiated races, the great majority of abnormal infants are found among the métis. 18

It seems that one may post a speculative correlation between two basic "differentalist" arguments that appeared in nineteenth-century anthropological thought: namely, ethnic crossings (that is, the nonrespect for the principle of absolute interethnic difference) as a general rule produce poor results (physical and/or intellectual "decadence," "decline," "degeneration:" that is, the movement contrary to the "perfection of the races"); the human races are not (all) perfectible, and that comes down to holding that the permanency of types defines a destiny. The combination of the two alternatives that these arguments engage (perfectibility/nonperfectibility, crossing leading to decadence/leading to decadence) permits the definition of an ideological boundary between "racists" and "nonracists," as represented in the following figure.
In the French anthropological tradition, Armand de Quatrefages de Bréau stands out by the aracist exceptionalism of his theoretical positions:

- He is a universalist with regard to the question of the origin of the races, in the doctrinal debate that was condemned, in the 1840s, "the great controversy," namely, monogenesis or polygenism. His metaphysical option in favor of universalism implies that he maintains, in the field of anthropology, the monogenist thesis.
- He maintains the thesis of the perfectibility of every race, including the inferior races.25
- He refuses the thesis of fatal decline through interethnic crossing, either in its radical form ("any race crossing in [followed by physical or intellectual decadence]")26 or in its moderate form ("distant crossings offer only poor results, and... pure races are superior to crossed races").27 He even maintains the thesis, at that time ultramontinarian, of a certain positiveness of crossings. In 1856, Paul Broca thus summed up the universally views of Quatrefages: Mr. de Quatrefages... thinks that, in many cases, crossing retemplans the races, complements their instincts, develops their aptitudes, and sometimes even gives birth to aptitudes foreign to the primal race.28

4. Naturalization, which historically begins with biologization, of the differences among primitive and absolute-collective "identities"; cultural distances and national borders become impenetrable barriers. What will later be named genetic determinism is established in the second half of the nineteenth century: a determinism of differential heredity that is only the scientific and materialist version of fatalism, applied to human lineages — from family to race.29 This was quite well seen by the all-too-forgotten Joseph-Pierre Durand (de Gros), the isolated Leibnizian of the late nineteenth century: "Determinism is the ancient doctrine of fatalism or predestination rejuvenated by biology."30 Also to be noted, in addition to biologizing naturalization, is the more recent "culturalist naturalization" of differences and collective identities, instituted by an ideologization of the cultural relativism that appeared in the American ethnological school around Franz Boas, in the 1920s and 1930s; this tendency was radicalized by certain currents in the international community of ethnologists during the 1960s and 1970s, who professionalized, so to speak, the denunciation of ethnocide, identified as the racist act par excellence (in the same way as genocide), and who correlatively fetishized cultural affiliations. For mental traditions, cultural types or heritages, supposedly specific imaginations, or particular configurations of value may be "naturalized," projected, and inscribed in a cultural nature posited as in itself and absolutely of value and may hence produce a "culturalist" mode of racialization. Naturalization is therefore either biologizing or culturalist. This analytical (and ideal-typical) distinction must not mask the fact that, in really produced discourses, the themes of "race" and "culture" may appear simultaneously, the argumentative moves authorized by some coexistence that reinforces the power of resistance to criticism, and so the force of persuasion, of the discourses of racialization (responding, for example, to a critique of biologism by a culturalist profession of faith). In the 1970s and 1980s, we have lived31 the passage to the political argument of the great culturalist wave of the modes of racialization, hitherto implicit and contained within the limits of scholarly debate broadened by the antihumanistic commitment of an intellectual elite. A perverse effect: cultural pluralism, of antiracist intention, is at the origin of the new modes of racialization.

Through the combination of these four trains, differentialist ideolog- ogy is at this point constituted, ready to be incarnated in its acceptable formulations: the "right to difference," the "respect for differences," or the "praise of differences" then comes to legitimate the prescrip- tion of separating what differs in nature. It is difficult not to discern here an incitement to atherosclerosis, by other names, behind new cultural barriers, and too often in the name of some individualist version of the humanist requirement: "rights of peoples," a legitimate defense of threatened collective identities, a respect for specific particularities. These are so many ideological instrumentalizations of ethical requirements, which are thus placed in the service of racist intentions. These instrumentalizations willingly make use of the appeal to the authority of science: biology and ethnology furnish most of the ground arguments.

Lapouge thus reinterpreted the Darwinian theory of evolution as a theory "of survival."32 "The true law of the struggle for existence is that of the struggle for descent."33 In Lapouge's "anthroposociology," as in contemporary sociobiology, the importance accorded to heredity is correlative to that accorded to differential reproduction, such that the social bond is reduced to blood ties and its normality to the
preservation of race identity — racial mixture inevitably engendering "the rupture of the social bonds."44

The assignment of interindividual and interethnic differences to a differential hierarchy involves a valorization of temporality as the

element of transmission of the "genetic patrimony." The outstanding quality of blood ties is essentially manifested in the concern for the

lineage, for ancestry and descent: "The individual who dies without leaving descendants puts an end to the immortality of his ancestry. He

finishes killing the dead."45 The norm of conserving the identity of a

blood community appears as an absolute: each individual is responsible for her descent and her ancestry, responsible before them. "That

is why the absolute sin is infertility."53

5. The egalitarian interpretation of differences recognizes as natural, insurmountable, and "eternal." Paradoxically (from the point of

view of ordinary racist opinion), the positing of an inequality among "races" or "cultures" re-introduces the universal into racist thought:

for one must be able to compare collective "identities" in order to relate them to a common scale. Egalitarianism thus appears as a

derived and retrocorrective phenomenon of the fundamentalism of difference, the effect of a "reading" of differences by a thinking that

classifies by hierarchizing, that therefore de-absolutizes them, confers a relativity onto them by submitting them to the act of comparison. The

egalitarian interpretation of differences, from the fact that it relativizes the latter according to a universal hierarchy, corrects differentialist ideol-

ogy. Any hierarchization postulates a comparability of hierarchized terms and suggests that they have a common nature. The logic of in-

egalitarian racism is illustrated by domination and exploitation of the imperial type, which are legitimated by a paternalistic project of

education of "inferior peoples" — and their educability is thereby suggested. Whereas the logic of differentialist racism, centered on the

imperative of preserving proper identity and governed by the phobia of mixture (melange, and so on), is developed either as a politics and

ethics of apartheid or as a racio-eugenic program of exterminating the irretrievable "waste" of humanity (less the "inferior" or "not as capa-

ble" than the "parasites" and other "harmful" figures of an animalized and demonized inhumanity). It is hardly difficult to judge which of

these two logics is the worse;46 for one cannot avoid evaluating, if one is less than an angel.

The Logics of the "Right to Difference"
(Variations on a Text by Louis Dumont)

What I maintain is that, if the advocates of difference claim for it both equality and recognition, they claim the impossible.

Louis Dumont

If we agree to define modern ideology, with Louis Dumont, as the set of common representations characteristic of the modern world, a

configuration itself definable as individualist in that it valorizes the indi-

vidual (the moral, independent, autonomous, and extrasocial being) by neglecting or subordinating the social totality,48 the question of the

"struggle against racism" transforms into a necessary and preliminary critique of antiracism. For if racism results from the "dissociation" of

holytic representation by individualism,49 it is consequently presents constitutive individualist traits, and if racism implies the transposition of

the scheme of individuality from the empirical singular being to the community, antiracism in turn assumes the individualist ideology,

aligns itself in the space of the latter, namely takes on its essential postulates. The polemical difficulties of antiracism are to be related to

its paradoxical speculative position: racism and antiracism uncriti-

cally share most of the statements that ground modern ideology as individualist. They represent two of its recurrent variants. This is the

first motif of a critique of antiracism.50

A second motif appears once one takes note of the central politi-

cal inadequacy of antiracism: the impasse in the communitarian fact

no less than in the ethical and political questions to which it refers.51

Antiracism in fact waves between the focalization on the individual

and the focalization on humanity — as if nothing very important ex-

isted between individual human beings and the human race hence the
turfold effect, contradictory on the background of shared values, of

modern ideology. The latter carries, on the one hand, "a powerful uni-

versalist slant which leads to rejecting the differences, when actually

encountered, from the cognitive domain":52 a reduction of the inter-

mediate dimension, which is collective or communitarian, between the

individual and the universal, and so of intercultural or international
difference. Antiracism inherits this bias toward the universal, holds it

up as dogma, fixes it into combat formulas. The position that is in

principle universalist hence becomes one of the basic arguments of the

human-racism to which ordinary antiracist doctrine is reduced. But
if individualist ideology, in this sense, prompts the privileging of the empirical individual as a representative of the species, it just as much allows the person, or the supposedly independent and non-social moral being, to be held up as the supreme value. This is the humanist or personalist version of individualism, which must be compared with its racist version, which appears to be absolutely opposed to it. The ideology of the nation, in its German form, offers a striking preparation for racism: the nation, in Herder or Fichte, is less a collection of individuals than an individual on the collective level, facing other nation-individuals. The individualization of the collective responds to the moralization of the individual, in the same way as the logic of framing, of communion, of rooting replies to the logic of the emancipation of individuals. Antiracism, then, only develops the two argumentative possibilities offered by modern ideology, in emphasizing one of the two terms of the individualism/universalism pair. In doing so, it reproduces the conditions of appearance of racism as a community-racist reaction to the plays of individualism and universalism, in the very space of modern ideology. In short, antiracism and racism in some way form a system, feed each other with themes, arguments, metaphors. It is such a vicious circle that is, by a twofold critique of racism and of the antiracist vulgarity, to be deconstructed, in order to escape from it without falling back into the same field of recurring illusions, in other discursive dregs.

The powerlessness of the antiracist vulgarity to conceive the collective thus defines one of its several political weaknesses, which have been quite well confirmed by sociohistorical observation. There will be no more surprise before a new classical phenomenon: the nationalism right tends to seize on the supposed problem of community existence (from the "ethnic group" to the nation) and poses it in its own way, which most often includes the figment and the rhetoric of race. It must be recognized that such behavior is part and parcel of ideological warfare.

But in addition, the antiracist vulgarity commits the sin of taking recourse to a fundamental postulate that is rarely made explicit, the origin of an illusion containing a speculative error. The fundamental antiracist demand is in fact to respect difference, to rehabilitate those who are (or are perceived as) in some way different, to recognize the Other as the Other. Now, the recognition of the difference of the Other, as Dumont remarks, may signify two fundamentally different things.

In the first place, it may signify the set of claims centered on obtaining equal rights, equal treatment, or equal opportunity. If no theoretical problem appears in this first sense, a paradox immediately arises that stems from the fact that the "right to difference," by the very requirement of an egalitarian treatment of "those who are different," implies some reduction of difference, its subordination to the egalitarian imperative, indeed the long-term risk of an "erasing of distinctive characteristics," accompanied by a forgetting of the initial valorization of difference. Stated otherwise, egalitarian logic is susceptible of being captured by identitarian logic, and the valorization of difference of being correlatively turned around into the valorization of similarity, indeed of uniformity. The egalitarian interpretation of the right to difference carries the risk of engendering such a perverse effect.

In the second place, the demand to recognize the Other may signify the recognition of the Other as the Other, the valorization of the Other as such, in her pure difference. The categorical imperative would then be evaluate the Other as herself. Stated otherwise recognize her without placing her on a hierarchical scale. This is certainly a very widespread ethical ideal for the antiracist portion of humanity. The sole but decisive question that it commits one to posing is the following: Is a recognition of the Other as such even possible, without hierarchizing evaluation? Or again: Can one affirm the value of difference without presupposing any scale of values? The question comes down to that of the possibility of a judgment of value that would operate without hierarchizing values. The response is simple, even though it costs us dear vital illusions a great deal if to recognize signifies nothing other than to evaluate or to integrate, and if to evaluate implies at once the distinction and the hierarchization of values, then the recognition of the Other can be only hierarchical. The antiracist vulgarity henceforth turns out to be resting on a postulate that contains an impossibility or a contradiction in terms. We can only agree with Dumont's conclusion: "If the advocates of difference claim for it both equality and recognition, they claim the impossible. Here we are reminded of the American slogan "separate but equal" which marked the transition from slavery to racism."

The argument of the "right to difference" is distributed over three distinct and incompatible ideological regions.

1. Egalitarianism, whose logic leads either to a petitio principii (the "right to difference" = the right to equal rights) or to a production
of a perverse effect (the egalitarian treatment of difference as the latent devalorization of difference).

2. Ethical differentiation, whose prescription contains two contradictory imperatives or is grounded on the illusory possibility of an evaluative act without a hierarchization of values.

3. Differentialis, or mixophobic, racism, whose two possibilities of ideological manifestation must be distinguished: (1) Differentialis racism that is presented as the praise of tolerant affirmation of all differences and takes itself for a rejection of "all racisms" no less than of "all totalitarianisms." In this perspective, the value of difference is exalted in that it is a condition of the conservation of collective identities. The hypervalorization of intercollective differences is in no way a position indicator in bipolar political space: an ultraleft that has denounced ethnocide since 1970 expresses it just as well as the New Right that impugns the West as a process destructive of identities or a "system for killing peoples." One must not doubt note certain rhetorical variations that seem to operate between two limits: either one insists on equality in difference, for which there can be no consensus or one applies oneself to demonstrating the incomparability of supposedly different collective entities (they may then be called "superior," each in its own genre). (2) Differentialis may also appear as the tactical dressing of inegalitarian racism, as an acceptable reformulation making an appeal to an ideological keyword (difference). Such a use of the differentialis argument only follows a suggestion from ordinary language: everything happens as if one could not affirm a difference without at the same time affirming a difference of value. So if differentiating, as a language act, comes down to hierarchizing, a continuous effort will have to be made to separate the two operations that are linked in verbal spontaneity—in other words, to go against the natural leaning of ordinary usage, which ceaselessly reproduces the obvious point that to differentiate is to hierarchize. Hence the constitutional weaknesses, so to speak, of differentialis antiracism, which must always climb against the leaning of the evidence that contemporary nationalist (or ethnonationalist) discourse is content to follow.

Eight

The Specter of Métissage:

The Mixophobic Hypothesis

The Rejection of Métissage

Racism is the refusal to be further bastardized.

Abel Bewarad

Earl Finch, in the paper he gave at the First Universal Races Congress (London, July 26-29, 1922), "The Effects of Racial Miscegenation," began by recalling that "the followers of Gobineau, in France, and Morton, in America, have maintained that racial intermixture has had and can have only disastrous consequences." To these two names one might of course add many others: Nott, Agassiz, Perier, and Dally, as Théophile Ribot indicated in 1873; Davenport, Mjöen, Humphrey, Widener, Grant, and Stoddard, according to the inventory Frank H. Haskins made half a century later. The Gobinean axioms are well known, as they have been crystallized in a vulgar since the end of the nineteenth century: "Nations die when they are composed of elements that have degenerated"; "Peoples degenerate only in consequence of the various admixtures of blood which they understand... their degeneration corresponds exactly to the quantity and quality of the new blood." The received idea is that métissage is the fatal medicalization of the species: the end of the human world would coincide with...
without for all that lamenting it — glimpses the twofold possibility of a universalist barbarism and a differentialist barbarism. Because of the acute awareness of this “crux” of ideological corruptions, we do not take the comfortable point of view of Sirus. We commit ourselves to the opposite, but after the disengagement made possible through understanding the principle of debates and controversies. The awareness of the principle as such eludes the grip of the principle. The subject that shows such an understanding of axiological dispute places itself at a distance from the manifestations of the latter in what makes up “ideological life.” It is as wary as possible of intersecting exclusivisms. 

But the subject who knows and comprehends is not the whole subject, nor the whole of the subject. That is why the subject must wager, as the intellectual expression of the insufficiency of the power of the intellect. We see here what intelligence can do. The rest stems from chance and from the heart, from courage and from decision. 

Pessimism is not necessarily conservative. For it obligates. It calls for living in spite of the understanding that depresses life and requires that one take on an insane hope. It brings on thinking on both counteries and contradictions at the same time. Hence it makes us philosopher, child, or novelist. Here is one of the half-certainties whose plain obviousness we would like to have shown, stated in the words of F. Scott Fitzgerald: “One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise.”

Notes

Introduction

1. [GRECE: Groupe de Recherche et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne.—Research and Study Group in European Civilization. — Trans.] 

2. [The Club de l’Hérèse is a French group largely made up of intellectuals, government employees, and businessmen whose raison d’être is to oppose socialism, on the grounds that the latter is “contrary to the republican values of liberty, equality, fraternity, and national sovereignty.” The Club de l’Hérèse, L’Identité de la France (Paris: Albin Michel, 1983), 531. — Trans.] 

3. (The term racialization translates the French assimilation, a term used in Taguieff’s usage, it refers to the ideological or rhetorical operation by which a person or group is characterized by traits associated with the notion of “race.” — Trans.)

4. In 1971, Maxime Rodinson deathly saw the necessity to make a distinction between “racism” and “ethnicity” (“Racisme, néopodephie et ethnisme,” in L’Histoire, l de 1971 à 1971: Les idées, les problèmes [Paris: Bibliothèque du CEPL, Les Dictionnaires du Savoir Moderne, 1974], 393-431; the same text was reprinted in its entirety several years later: “Racisme et ethnisme,” Parnel 3 (1975): 7-29.)

5. (The word métissage refers to the process of mixing. In the racist and anti-racist discourse that Taguieff is analyzing, it refers specifically to the mixture of “races” or ethnic groups such that offspring are a “mixture” of the groups to which the parents belong. The term for the person who is of mixed “racial” background is métis, akin to the English word (of Spanish origin) mozzo. In many of the texts to which Taguieff refers, the words métis and métissage translate or are translated by, respectively, hybrid and hybridity or miscegenation; but I have preserved the two French words as often as possible because of the particular sense they carry in the discourses that constitute Taguieff’s subject. — Trans.)

6. On the discourse and ideology of “national populism,” see the studies in which I

7. Cf. Georges Vignale, "Individualization becomes a total phenomenon, touching on the entirety of attitudes and social relations," ("La Deuxième Age de l'Individualisation,"沂等 (30 October-1986) 62. But we do not follow Vignale when he postulates that "the era of the real presentability marks the end of transcendence, the moment of promotion of the present," for it is exactly "differentness" that is erected into a new transcendence, doing away with the transcendence of the collective process and the universalizing process of installing a "new man." On the "individualistic" theme of "the affirmation of difference" (or "the respect for differences"), in the framework of an interpretation of the end of the universal, as an entry to the postmodern, see Gilles Lipovetsky, Elles du vide: Essai sur l'individualisme contemporain (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), especially 9, 17, 24, 228, 229, 247.

8. Cf. Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism. Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980): "The recognition of alter ego ... an alternative is the same in value or to integrate ... What I maintain is that, if the advocates of difference claim for it both equality and recognition, they claim the impossible. Here we are reminded of the American song 'separate but equal' which marked the transition from slavery to racism" (266-67 see also chapter 7 in this book). During the National Conference against Racism (Paris, Maison de l'UNESCO, March 26-27, 1986), two independent contributors raised the question of the theoretical pertinence of the term 'Living together with our differences,' as well as its ideological significance: that of Francis Delaporte, Compte-rendu des Jours (Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 1984, 18-19, 22) and my own (cf). In the same vein, for a more elaborate analysis, the reader is referred to Jean-Pierre Dupuy's study ("Differences and Inequalities") published in the proceedings of the conference (Paris, December 12, 1985, proceedings published by Differencism, 1984) and to Pierre-Jean Taguieff, Les Propositions définitionnelles d'un indéfinissable: 'La Racine,' Mots 8 (March 1982) 71-79. See also the accompanying remarks of Jean-Pierre Dupuy, "Debats propos sur l'égalité, la science et la racine," in Délit d'honneur (November 1985): 42-44 (in which the author remarks and develops the paper of December 12, 1985). We were followed in our critical analysis of "differences" arguments by Alan Palmer, (Les Pages). Le Monde, April 30, 1986, 21: "Abolition of the difference or ambiguities of the antagonism," Le Monde diplomatique 1985 (273): 47-52. See also Alan Palmer, Racisms and Its Mirror Images, Telos 53 (spring 1986): 95-108.


10. As an example of the conclusion, which is quite ordinary in the antiracist vocabulary, between the praise of difference (heteropolihe) and the praise of mixture (intonopolhe), we may read this conclusion to a study devoted to racism: "If therefore science has a lesson to offer us in the model realm, what it teaches us concerns above all of discovering the richness of what we call mixture, diversity, heterogeneity, difference, and of promoting their valorizations" (Anouch Chahine and Jean-Luc de Mourre, Le Racisme, rituelles et sciences. Un Essai critique., Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie 3-4 (1984-1985): 414. When the antiracist movement notices the antithesis between the norms of mixture (dissociative of difference) and those of difference (prohibiting mixture), it tends to come back to the norms of equality. But the differences then come back to the field of equality, which problematizes them, hence the formation of a new perspective that envisages a reappropriation of the antithesis equality 'difference in difference' (see chapter 2 in this book).

11. (The Dreyfus Affair was a prolonged series of incidents around the turn of the twentieth century involving accusations of treason made against Captain Alfred Dreyfus of the French army. In 1894, Dreyfus was convicted on fabrication evidence and incarcerated on Devil's Island for what was to be a life term. In the face of enormous public outcry and declarations of anti-Semitism, the government conducted an investigation that suggested that another officer, Esterhazy, was the guilty party. After Esterhazy was acquitted, public protest grew. The best-known document from this time, and perhaps the most famous piece of journalism in two hundred years of French history, is Émile Zola's J'accuse, published in L'Assiette au Beurre in January 1898, in which the author attacks, with rasping sharpness, various officials of the army and the government for having condoned an innocent man on anti-Semitic motives. The Dreyfus Affair divided France into two very distinct camps. After several more investigations and the suicide of a colonel who had participated in the falsification of evidence, in 1906 Esterhazy was finally found guilty, and Dreyfus was released and restored to his old rank. The consolidation of groups of the left over the Dreyfus Affair is often credited with giving strong impetus to the socialist movements that flourished throughout the twentieth century. —Trans.)

12. "The Minority of Anticapitalism" was the subtitle of a paper ("Contemporary Anticapitalism and Dissident Capitalism") we gave at the meeting organized by the research seminar "Migrations and Paradoxes" (Vivéolbat de Ruddle, René Gallioux) on April 23, 1989 (at the University of Paris 1). Gallioux found the formula sufficiently suggestive to use it as the title of a pamphlet, Mise de l'anticapitalisme (Paris: Azonitas, 1981). See also Pierre-Jean Taguieff, Les Enfants de l'intégrisme (Paris: Michelau, 1995); Taguieff, Le Racisme (Paris: Flammarion, 1997).


14. Our apparent severity, we should specify, does not apply to the numerous military whose devotion and good faith, bolstered by ethical convictions, we have sensed, not without admiration. But as Charles Péguy would say, if there are minorities pure of heart, there are also profuse and exploitative, "crooks" who speculate in raking up "great causes." In addition, there are organizations, ideological-political apparatuses such as workers and parties, that obey specific, epistemological modes of reasoning in the heart of the social system. From the outset, the fact of antiracism requires a thorough questioning, one that is ethical, political, and sociological.


16. Ibid., 7.

rightly characterized by the "horror of political and social surgery." This may be translated by the base for social voluntarists see Silvia Reale, "La Drame de l'horreur de la violence," Le Drame 31 (January 1965): 45-49, the author's thesis is that "the horror of the will" is at the heart of the metaphysical (and as a consequence political) positions that one can call on the right." (16)

18. The typical characterization is the following: "the first great doctrinarian of racism, Count Gobineau..." Michel Leiris, "Racisme et civilisation," in Le Racisme devant la science (Paris: UNESCO-Guillaumin, 1949), 246.

19. Duschehn, Socialism, 7 (the author thus characterizes socialism and individualism).

20. Ibid.

21. In the view Louis Dumont has given to this general model.

1. Heterophobia, Heterophobia

1. [The term base antinomy was in English in Taguieff's text.—TRAN.]


2. Heterophobia, designing a general category of which racism is a "subset" (characterized by a biologistic ideology), is defined by the rejection of the either in the name of no matter what difference" (121). The mental model of racism is deeply distinguishable from the common sense notions.


5. On the metaphorical distinction between anthropophagous and anthropocentric, which we here generalize and shift into a broader field (that of racist ideologies), see Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Atheneum, 1974), 387-88.

6. Ibid., 388.

7. Cf. Christian Delaigle, "L'idéologie raciste: Genese et langage actuel (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 4, the possibility of racism may be defined as "a biolo-
gization of social thought, which attains through this bias as no goanna as absolute any observed or supposed difference." Memmi, Racism, 275-76. ("Placing a value on differ-
ence is certainly one of the key elements in the racist process.... The racism will do its utmost to stretch the distance between the man and the other signs, to maximize the differ-
sence... the difference must be made absolute... it must be made radical.

8. René Dypeyret retains the criterion of the focalization of difference racism is "the atti-
ude that consists of underscoring the difference of the other, instead of recognizing that
the other is in my "circle," in the one who participates in a common destiny with me.

9. "The essentialist perspective system—that is, racist ideology;" see also Raymond Aron, Progress and Distinction: The Dogmatism of Modern Society (New York: Praeger, 1968), 19-20. Jean-Monte Maynard and Madeleine Rabier, Bernar de.sox, on the Dreyfus Affair, "No doubt the racial analysis was often sec-
ndary. Sometimes anti-semites even officially denied the essential component in their raeism." (The Third Republic from Its Origins to the Great War, 1870-1914, trans. J. P. Foster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 103.)


8. Ibid.


10. Guillaume, Ideologie, 44.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Cf. Pierre-André Taguieff, "Sur une augmentation arrière de base L'Anti-

17. Vladimir Jankelovich, "Psycho-analyse de l'antisémitisme" (published anony-
mously), in Le Messager Nazi, pamphlet published by the National Movement against
Racism (Toulouse, 1943), 19-19.

18. Ibid., 79.


20. Here I introduce the term heterophobia to designate the symmetrical reverse of heterophobia. Cf. Pierre-André Taguieff, Le Néo-racisme differencialisant, paper pre-

21. See, for example, Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Fran-
scis Atkins (New York: Knopf, 1925), 45-46 (and the end of the universal as an illusion, giving way to a pluralism and radical reduction of values; on this point, see Pierre-
André Taguieff, "L'idée de décadence et le diction de l'univers," Politique Asymétrique, special issue, L'Europe (fall 1985): 248. In quite another perspective, see Emmanuel Wellekens, Historical Capitalism (London: Verso, 1986), 82-88 in particular as an instrument of rationalization of the world to which historical capitalism is given over, and the planetary system of the middle classes, modernization is hence reduced to a legitimat-
ing ideology of the global expansion of capitalism: "the" (83), a portent of the powerfull to the weak, a priori impetus of latent racism. The "downplaying," critique of human rights, in the name of the postwar revolution, proceeds in the same direction; see Ralph Dorey, "Dans les esclaves aux hommes libres," Le Monde Diplomatique (October 1980) (this supplement of "sociologists" origin, descriptive of collective identities, see Elements 37 (January-March 1981), report on human rights; 5-5 (the title of the report, on the cover: "Droits de l'Humain: Le Pape"—"Human Rights: The Pope")

22. Irreza 2: Eichhöld, Die Juden moc.love Wiesbaden, 1973), 146. Here we could have just as easily quoted Arthur de Gobineau, Claude Levi-Strauss,
Konrad Lorenz, Robert Jastrow, or Alain de Benoist. This suggests how much the themes can cross boundaries between discursive genres or disciplines, as well as philosophical and political divisions.

23. Albert Memmi, Le Racisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1981), 67: "This position is exactly the reverse of the race’s position. Racism makes difference into something bad; I myself make it the possible occasion for a richness." [The recent translation of Memmi’s Le Racisme, cited above, does not include the section quoted here. In references to Tagarelli, make to this section below, I will refer to and indicate the French edition. — Trans.] The praise of difference as richness is common to antimasonic positions as different as those of MRP (Movement contre le Racisme et pour l’Amitié entre les Peuples — Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples) (“live together with our differences”) or of ULCA (Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme — International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism), of differentiation feminism, of most regionalists, of Lévi-Strauss (see Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Race and History" in Structural Anthropology, trans. Monique Lainé [New York: Basic Books, 1971], 125-126). Lévi-Strauss, "Race and Culture," in The View from Afar, trans. Jeanne Naug-Mozes and Pierre Hous [New York: Basic Books, 1975], 25-44, on a certain liberalism and concern or modern right (see Bernard Stasi, L’Homosexualité: Une Chance pour la France [Paris: Lafont, 1984]), of the ethnologist Robert Jastrow, and of a part of the ideology of "Beur" organizations (which in general proceed to a coupling of equality and difference: "Equity with our differences").


25. The recollection of the "Beur" militancy on the occasion claim is exemplary; see La Barre vers Pigalle (Mélanges) (Paris, 1981), 7.

26. See the definition of "race" adopted in 1979 by UNESCO, in Racisme, science et pseudo-sciences, introduction (quotation from the 1978 Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice): "Any theory that postulates the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of racial or ethnic groups that would give to the white on dominance or eliminate the others, presumed inferior; or that base judgments of value on a racial difference" (11). The last part of the definition implies the prescription that one must not judge when it is a matter of racial differences, which is presumed to be contestable.


2 "Racism"


5. See, for example, this comment by Jean Fournet on ramadan Émilie Salliot made on Agence PRESS: "Now, we have to declare age for any age. ... At thirty-seven you're offered a job you'd be relaxed at forty-four, even before being asked about your qualifications and abilities. ... Except in the arts and politics, everyone is subject to the dictatorship of the notion of age. ... Nonetheless we don't all age the same way."

Finally, someone is publicly raising to the racism of age? ("Racisme de l’âge"), Le Figaro-Magazine, January 18, 1986. Here the journalist applies the word racism to a mode of categorization that encompasses and reduces individuals, classed on the scale of ages, without accounting for individual differences (performances that vary from one individual to another). The expression "anti X X (not X), racism of X (not X), and X (anti-X) racism" have a performative value: in being said, they legitimate the attitude to which they refer, by reducing it to a prejudice to be destroyed or overcome. Hence "anti-X racism" is denounced just as the "anti-X periodical" is stigmatized: a reaction of anti-racists racism," (Le Figaro, July 25, 1976), 17.


7. Let us here recall the strict definition of "race" in the perspective of physical anthropology the human groups called races "may be defined as ‘natural groupings of men,’ which present a set of common physical and hereditary characteristics, whatever their languages, mums, or nationalities may otherwise be" (Héctor-Víctor Vázquez, Las Raza Humanas [Paris: Frères Universitaires de France, 1976], 41). Races, defined by sets of physical characteristics, are thus distinguished from nations, groups that correspond to political communities, and ethnic groups, groupings based on characteristics of civilization, in particular a language or a group of related languages." (p.4-5). To most any group all at once "as a race" implies that one attributes to it a set of "natural" characteristics, shared by each of its members, who are nonetheless identifiable by a sum of "bodily physical characteristics." But the analogy is rarely achieved in a rigorous fashion in everyday discourse. "Natural logic" cannot be reduced to either formal logic or codified rhetoric.


9. Georges Marcou, Les Étrangers en France et le problème de racisme (Paris: La Pensée Universelle, 1977), 151: "‘tolérance,’ the criterion of ‘racism’ in the general sense, is analyzed as hostility (hat, violence) and as contempt (disreverence, discrimination). There remains the gap, unnoticed in the antireacist attacks, between attitudes and behaviors at one end, ‘antipolice racism’; at the other, ‘racist murders,’
On Racism


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid., 81. To recall that the neutrality of theoretical knowledge does not imply a neutrality of ethical and political knowledge. Hence, in the Revolui perspective, the traditional concept of substance is reworked without its inherent philosophical implications. It makes no difference, from the point of view of language, whether the objects on which it operates are real or imaginary, personal or impersonal, corporeal or incorporeal (82). At a lower level of abstraction, one might say as much about "race"—that the groups of affiliation presented as "races" may or may not be races in the view of biological knowledge. It is the social perception of racial quality that makes race, as well as the meanings of accepting the racial element. Hence the functioning of a paradigmatic lexicon, comprising the definitions of a set open to terms such as tribal group, culture, tradition, mentality, people, nation, religion, and so on.

5. Belonging to the New in the reserved sense is the GREECE. To simplify the question, let us say that the position held "nationalist" (not without risk of equivocation) by Ammon Muller and Alain de Benoist is in line with the tradition of organic remonstrance in which Joseph de Maistre formulated them in his 1797 Considérations sur la France. The ideal is that of an organic community (not a separate individual nor an abstract humanist) and the means that of starting. This communautarian problem, not clear of traditional elements (indeed of cliché notables), must be distinguished from the conservativeness and postmodern positions of a Guillaume Faye, whose imperial Europeanism is coupled with a technocratic ethos. See A. Moctezuma, Le Freinet nationaliste: Un Fais de clarification, Nouvelle École 33 (summer 1976): 17-22; Alain de Benoist, "Fondements nationalistes d’une attitude devant la vie," Nouvelle École 33 (summer 1976): 25-35, repr. in Alain de Benoist, Les Idées à l’œuvre (Paris: Librairie des Champs, 1978), 13-18; Guillaume Faye, Nous avons Disparu à la nation européenne (Paris: Aubier, 1981), 88ff. (an integrate ment of "rooting in the past"). On the idea of a "people," as opposed to the abstract universal of humanity, see La Cause des peuples. Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference of the GRECE (Nouvelles, May 17, 1981) (Paris: Librairie, 1982). On the question of "nationalism" as an antirevolutionary doctrine, see Pierre-André Tagüet, "Alain de Benoist philosophique," Les Temps Modernes 43:1 (February 1984): 140ff.


8. See, for example, Henry Cotton, La Fortune anonyme et seigneuriale (Paris: Coton, 1974), 7.

9. Cf. J.-G. Millière, "Rapidions les immigrés," Troisième Voix 20:3 (September-October 1982): 10: the "revolutionary nationalist" leader connotes the "Shoh to make France, through a massive immigration, a new Israel." We find the same obsessive fear of outgrowth, no less linked to the figure of an anti-French and anti-white glue, in the publications of the French Nationalist Party (founded December 40, 1981), and especially in the monthly Millière (see, for example, the editorial "Désormais il sera trop tard," Millière 115 [November 1983]: 2, 1.


13. Cf. Louis Dumont, Essais d’Individuelisation: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 7:8. "Cultures are viewed as no more individuals. . . culture are individuals of a collective nature. In other words, Herder . . . used the individualist principle by transferring it to the level of compounds." 


16. Georges Vacher de Lapouge, L’Étranger: Soi étranger social (Paris: Fornetti, 1976), 57. Here we cite Lapouge, whose work may in no way be reduced to a suit of "racist" statements, only much as his arguments illustrate then current representatives of social evaluatons in the complex ideological space in which the nascent science of anthropoculture allied a symptom with the political projects of reform, revolution, and social reform. Hence, in the quoted proposition, Lapouge seems to have caught in a conceptual conclusion that he never ceased to demonstrate the lapearing together of "race" and "nation." The proposition is thus less Lapouge than it is a faithful (and unfortunate) reflection of the dominant ideologicalization of the question in a given period.

17. Notes by Yvan Lapouge, undated (in the Lapouge Collection housed at Paul Valéry University at Montpellier, in the care of Professor Jean Bauwelin).


20. See Henri Lévi-Strauss and the Club de l’Étude, La Politique du rite (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979), 170-71. [The French expression fait de la danse is descriptive of the skin color of certain peoples, especially of Caribou origin, whose ancestry includes people of both European and African descent. —Trans.]


26. Ibid., 30.

27. Ibid., Broca here terms the position defended by "several modern authors".

28. Ibid. (Broca here summarizes the position defended by Perrier).

29. The biologisation of differences implies the "broadening" of property, itself a central element in any definition of the concept of a "human race." The main widespread theoretical definition of racism is constructed around the prevalent of genetic determinism. See, for example, Raymond Kury, Les Nouveaux idéologues (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1935). It is true that the thesis of production, on a simple causal model, of culture by the factors of race (the strictly ecological definition) has since 1894 become an ideological myth. Few statements that come from "characterised" racism may be found today in public writings, such as this note to a study on the "metaphysics of blood" published in a "voluntary-conditional" (the self-designation of the schools of Julius Evola) journal. The proportion of genes that come from the white population and make up a part of the geneticity of contemporary black Americans is on the order of thirty-one percent—"the recognized superiority of the American black among the other blacks" (Jean-Benoit Faidutti, "A group supplemental to "Metaphysics of Blood"), Totalité [for the European cultural revolution] 13 (Fall 1987), 38 n. 42.


31. Again, the reader should keep in mind that Taguieff is writing in the mid-1980s—Tours.


33. Ibid., 107.


36. Vacher de Lapouge, Sélections sociales, 106. An undated note from the Lapouge Collection at the Paul Valéry University at Montpellier reads "Science against Democracy. The individual is the synthesis of his ancestors, modified by a particular environment." In his essay on "sociobiology," Vacher Béjin does not fail to insist on the ideal of genetic preservation, with various formulations of it found just as much in Lapouge as in Guerrière Le Bou Guy Chastier, Biologie de l'Ethnologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1984), 114-15. Notes to Chapter 7 375
at once differentialist and relativist. "All races are superior. All have their proper genius... One may therefore say that each race is superior to the others in carrying out the achievements that belong to it." ("Comme tous les races," Edmonde 4 [November 1927-February 1928]: 1, 14). This is a reformulation of racism in a nominalistic (that is, antiantirealistic) problematic. See Pierre-André Taguieff, "The New Cultural Racism in France," Tidskrift for Kultur og Klima (1993), 11-18; see also Pierre-André Taguieff, "The Doctrine of the National Front in France (1932-1939)," New Political Science 16 (Fall/Winter 1998): 20-27.

52. The axiom that grounds this analysis may be better formulated. It is useful to see this analysis does not also misconceive a "pure" differentialism racism that we have ways with it.

53. See, for example, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Les Français d'origine (Paris: Carlier/Luton, 1984), 1-16; see Pierre-André Taguieff, "The Doctrine of the National Front in France (1932-1939)," New Political Science 16 (Fall/Winter 1998): 20-27.

54. The Specter of Métissage


9. Ibid., 311.


17. Ibid., 35.

18. Finch, "Effets," 118. Let us recall that contemporary anti-racism, if we go by its explicit declarations, is a matter of unintentional miscegenation.

19. Ibid.


25. See Martial, Race, biéridité, folio, 135ff.


27. "Each race-type, formed ages ago, and set by millennia of isolation and submerging, is in a stubbornly persistent race" (Abshur S. Loudar, The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy (New York: Scribner's), 1943, 165). On the "immortal racial character" of "the various races," see Voge, Lectures on Man, 103-104.

28. "Blood" is therefore that whose purity must be preserved at any price: "One element should be fundamental in all the compounds of the social pharmacopoeia. That element is blood... It is clear, viable, genic-braining blood, streaming down the ages through the uttering action of heredity" (Moodering, Rising Tide, 92).


31. Martial, Race, biéridité, folio, 240 (and 218).


33. Martial, Race, biéridité, folio, 243. In a general fashion, from the point of view of blood groups and the biochemical index, métissage is more profitable to the less beautiful, the less intelligent, the less cultured, the less strong race: it depresses,