THE
INTRODUCTION.

Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is [1]
by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that
it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of
Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part within; why
may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by
springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what
is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerve, but so many Strings; and the
Joints, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as
was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that
Racionall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is
created that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth, or
State, (in latine Civitas) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of
greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection
and defence it was intended; and in which, the Sovranity is an
Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The
Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall
Joints; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of the
Sovranity, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty)
are the Nerve, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth and
Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi (the
peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things needfull for
it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an
artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and
Civil war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of
this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united,
The Introduction

resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

First, the Matter thereof, and the Artificer; both which is Man.
Secondly, How, and by what Covenants it is made; what are the Rights and just Power or Authority of a Sovereign; and what it is that preserves and dissolveth it.
Thirdly, what is a Christian Common-wealth.
Lastly, what is the Kingdom of Darkness.

Concerning the first, there is a saying much usurped of late, That Wisdom is acquired, not by reading of Books, but of Men. Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thy self; which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looked into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does think, opine, reason, hope, feare, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men, desire, feare, hope, &c; not the similitude of the objects of the Passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, &c: for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so casic to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, bloated and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts. And though by mens actions wee do discover their designe sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered, is to deypher without a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence; as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.
Of Man

Use of Names Positive.

Negative Names with their User.

Words insignificant.

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Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorporeal body, or (which is all one) an incorporeal substance, and a great number more. For whosoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signify nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a mere sound. So likewise if it be false, to say that virtue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words in-powred vertue, in-blowen vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a round quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senselsse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signify; Then he is said to understand it: Understanding being nothing else, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is), then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and

Reason, and Science

false affirmations, in case they be univerall, there can be no Understanding: though many think they understand, when, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversion, and Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing; nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdom, what another calleth Faire; and one cruelty, what another justice, one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratioconization. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not.

CHAP. V.

Of Reason, and Science.

When a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing else but conceive a summe toall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Reminder, from Subtraction of one summe from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence* from* the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole

1 Syn.: of
and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Subtracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Adding together of things equal; and Division, but Subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers alone, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to add and subtract in numbers; so the Geometrians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficially,) angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power, and the like. The Logicians teach the same in Consequences of words; adding together two Names, to make an Affirmation; and two Affirmations, to make a Syllogisme; and many Syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the summe, or Conclusion of a Syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, add together Actions, to find mens duties; and Lawyers, Laws, and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and subraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For Reason, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other men.

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blows, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereas they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversie: bewraying their want of right Reason, by the clamour they lay to it.

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusio, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summe of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advaunces himself no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty: so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions,) loses his labour; and does not know any thing, but only beliefeth.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it,) if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called Error; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall significatio, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an Absurdity, or senslesse Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility
discoverable. But when we make a generall assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immateriell Substance; or of A free Subject; A free will; or any Free, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour, but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I add this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he finds to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not only in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or subtracted from another.

But this priviledge, is allied by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that profess Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his Ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numeral words, one, two, and three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these considerations being diversely named, divers absurdisties proceed from the confusion, and un sist connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of bodies, to accidents, or of accidents, to bodies; As they do, that say, Faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be poured, or

breathed into any thing, but body; and that, extension is body; that phantasmes are spiritus, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies; as they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies, to names, or of names, or of names without us, to names; as they do that say, there be things universally; that a living creature is Genesis, or a generall thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names and of names, or of names without us, to names; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a man's command is his will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetorical figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be unlawful to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb says this or that (whereas ways cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signify nothing; but are taken up, and learned by rote from the Schoolemen, as hypothetical, transubstantiation, consubstantiacion, eternal-Nay, and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoid these things, it is not ceste to fall into any absurdity, unless it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience only, as Prudence is; but attained by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogisms, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call Science. And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when
we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quickness of memory, and inclinations to several ends; but specially according to good or evil fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conjuring: But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progress in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first sniffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatales; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

As much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience. For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did always distinguish between Prudentia and Sapiencia; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appear more clearly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired

Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversary, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the latter, as Prudence to Sapience; both useful; but the later infallible. But they that trusting only to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures praeusumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

The signs of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he says they must. Signs of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successs, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own naturall judgement, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Counsells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successs of anothers businesse.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the Passions.

And the Speeches by which they are expressed.

There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One

called Vital; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the Blood, the Pulse,
Of Man

the Breathing, the Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other is Animal motion, otherwise called Voluntary motion, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedunt thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internal beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortness of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called Endeavour.

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called Appetite, or Desire; the latter, being the general name; and the other, often-times restrained to signify the Desire of Food, namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called Aversion. These words Appetite, and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retirring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are ἔθησις, and ἀφεττήσις. For Nature it selfe does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schoole find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no actual Motion at all; but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphorical Motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though Words may be called metaphorical; Bodies, and Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to Love: and to Hate those things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we always signify the Absence of the Object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signify the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exonation, (which may also and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feel in their Bodies,) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not only which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to Contemne: Contempt being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evil: And of his Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evil, and Contemptsible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evil; but are not precisely the same; And those are Pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the latter, that, which promiseth Evil. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to express them by. But for Pulchrum we say in some things, Fair; in others Beautiful, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foul, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nausous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifies nothing els, but the Mine, or Countenance, that pro-
Of Man

miseth Good and Evil *or the lustre and gloss of some ability to Good […]*. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jacundum, Delightfull; and Good as the Means, which is called Vile, Profitable; and as many of Evil: For Evil, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; Evil in Effect, and End, is Malestum, Unpleasant; Troublesome; and Evil in the Means, Indulge; Unprofitable, Hurtfull.

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apperance; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the real effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the apperance, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apperance of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vital motion; and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight were not improperly called Jacunda, (à Jacunda,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Malestum, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apperance, or sense of Good; and Malestum or Displeasure, the apperance, or sense of Evil. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aversion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures of Sense, (The word sensualis, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Operations and Exonerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are Pleasures of the Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called Joy. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and

The Passions

called Payne; others, in the Expectation of consequences; and are called Grieve.

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Grieve, have their names for divers considerations diversifed. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.

For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called Hope. The same, without such opinion, is Despair. Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, is Fear. The same, with hope of avoiding that Hurt by resistence, is Courage.

Sudden courage, Anger.

Constant Hope, Confidence of our selves.

Constant Despayre, Disidence of our selves.

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, Indignation.

Desire of good to another, Benevolence, Good Will.

Charity, if to man generally, Good Nature.

Desire of Riches, Covetousnesse: a name used always in signification of blame; because men contending for them, are displeased with one another attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Desire of Office, or precedence, Ambition: a name used also in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Desire of things that conduceth but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, Purillanimity.

Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, Magnanimity.

Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, Valour.

Fortitude.

Magnanimity, in the use of Riches, Liberality.

Purillanimity, in the same Wretchednesse, Miserablenesse; or Parsimony; as it is liked, or disliked.

Love of Persons for society, Kindnesse.

Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, Natural Lust.

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1 Inserted by T.H. (rest of insertion now illegible).
Of Man

Luxury.

Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutual, JEALOUSIE.

Revengefulnesse.

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity.

Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but Man: so that Man is distinguished, not only by his Reason, but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetites of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by predominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continual and indefatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION.

And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Fear, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the Fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth, there is always in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration.

Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to Man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Joy, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability, is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORVING: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with CONFIDENCE: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called VAIN-Glory: which name is properly given; because a well grounded CONFIDENCE begeteth Attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Vaine.

Dejection.

Grieve, from opinion of want of power, is called DEJECTION of mind.

The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons; and is correctet oftentimes by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory, is the passion which makest those Grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able.

On the contrary, Sudden Dejection, is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: And they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children. Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends; Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

Grieve, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or the passion that discovereth itself in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: In old men it is a signe of the same; but because it comes too late, not commendable.

The Contempt of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE. Grieve, for the Calamity of another, is PITY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-Feeling: And therefore for Calamy arriving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pity; and for the same Calamy, those have least Pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which men
call Cruelty; proceeding from Security of their own fortune. For, that any man should take pleasure in other men's great harms, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Grieve, for the success of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyed with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called Emulation. But joyed with Endeavour to supplant, or hinder a Competition, Envie.

When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despair, or Fear to attempt it; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call Deliberation.

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, is no lesse in other living Creatures then in Man; and therefore Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then said to End, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appetite, or Aversion.

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the Will; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that have Deliberation, must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceedeth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that nevertheless he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the interviennent Appetites, make any action Voluntary; then by the same Reason all interviennent Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from Covetousnesse, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Fear of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.

The forms of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the same, and partly different from those, by which we express our Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as I love, I fear, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which nevertheless are not affirmations, unless it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Subjunctively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in general words; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as Do this, forbear that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbear, is Command; otherwise Prayer, or el's Counsel. The language of Vain-Glory, of Indignation, Pity and Revengefulness, Opiates; But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why? other language of the Passions I find none: For Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, and the like, do not signify as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These forms of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signs they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such
Of Man

Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are *in* the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aimes, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end. But for so farre as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences, be greater than the Evill, the whole chaine is that Writers call Apparent, or Seeming Good. And contrariwise, when the Evill exceedeth the Good, the whole is Apparent, or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himselfe; and is able when he will, to give the best counsell unto others.

Continuall success in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquility of mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Fear, no more than without Sense. What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of Schoole-men Beatifical Vision is unintelligible.

The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is Praise. That whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing, is Magnifying. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a mans Felicity, is by the Greeks called μεγαλομοιος, for which we have no name in our tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the Passions.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Ends, or Resolutions of DISCOURSE.

Of all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

If the Discourse be merely Mental, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chain of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Presumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been; All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Future. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the Will; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the Judgement, or Resolve and Final Sentence of him that discourses. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called Doubt.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another, but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into general Affirmations, and of these again into Sylogisms; the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Know-