The Indians' Revolution
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A cartouche decorating the sentinels certificate distributed to Indian allies by the British. The figure, drawn by Superintendent of Indian Affairs Dr. William Johnson, predates, in terms of Indian metaphor, the Governor's Council of Renovation, leaning Great Britain and its colonists to the Indian League and its allies. Engraving by Henry Dawkins, 1779, New York Historical Society.
A long tradition in American historiography treats the formative era of American society as a time of collision between "civilization" and "savagey," which means, in objective terms, Europeans and Indians. Whether presented in the melodrama of Francis Parkman's multi-volume France and England in North America or in the theorizing of Frederick Jackson Turner's The Frontier in American History, the identification of Indians as savages has served as a convenient way of transforming them to nonpersons and thus to justify their subjection and dispossession.

In reaction against this tradition, some modern revisionists have attempted to restore humanity to Indians by directing attention to the internal evolution of tribal society. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., has made an explicit case for this approach in "The Political Context of a New Indian History," in Pacific Historical Review 40 (August 1971): 357-82. Anthropologists generally have tended to skirt political issues by referring to the acculturation of whole societies and cultures, but their admirably neutral terminology is not very informative about what happened when particular Europeans met particular Indians.

My own work rests on the revisionists' assumption that Indians were indeed human beings with recognizable emotions and rational processes, and I have guided myself by the acculturation theories of the anthropologists' ethnohistory. My primary aim is to explore the interplay of the political-legal institutions of specific European and Indian communities in contact. "Frontier theory" denies even the existence of such a subject by denying that Indian tribes had governments "worthy the name." I find, on the contrary, that the meshing of governmental sanction systems between tribe and nation is evidenced by huge masses of source materials that the frontier mythologists simply refuse to examine.

I am now at work on a long history of a complex bicultural political institution called the Covenant Chain. This was an alliance of Indian tribes under Iroquois leadership on the one hand, with English colonies and the British Crown on the other. Its origins, and the cultural matrices from which it emerged, are explored at length in my book, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonization, and the Cant of Conquest, published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976).

There were more than two sides in the American Revolution. The British Crown and the Continental Congress formulated general strategies and policies that became distorted and sometimes negated when they were put into effect by officers who served themselves as well as their governments. There were thirteen separate and individually sovereign states, which had bitter quarrels among themselves, which they sometimes settled by force of arms even while they jointly engaged in struggle against the Crown. There were colonies in the West Indies and Canada that did not rebel. Though the revolutionaries solicited Quebec to join them, and invaded that province to make persuasion stronger, the French-speaking Catholic inhabitants preferred the liberties and religious toleration guaranteed by the Crown to the more doubtful prospects of subordination to the English-speaking Protestants of the Continental Congress.

Still other affiliates of the Crown that did not rebel were the tribal governments that exerted jurisdiction over lands "reserved" for Indian use. Multiple ambiguities and semantic distortions have excluded tribal governments — as distinct from Indian "auxiliaries" — from recognition as political participants in the revolutionary struggle. The so-called international law created to serve the purposes of governments in the state form does not recognize a parity between bureaucratic states and kin-ordered tribes. A large literature purports to describe Indian communities as congregations of wild men — savages bereft of "real" government, existing in a condition of chronic anarchy. On such convenient assumptions, there had been agreement between Crown and colonist, until 1776, that the country west of the Appalachian Mountains was under British sovereignty. Disputes never challenged that basic agreement; disputes centered upon the competi-
tion of particular jurisdictions within the empire to administer the sovereignty. The Indians, however, did not agree that they lived in Crown lands that had merely been reserved for them. They conceived themselves as living in their own territories under their own free and independent governments, and they started fighting well before 1776 to maintain as much as circumstances would permit of political independence.

The situation was not novel. As is usual in history on the grand scale, details of time and place were unique, and some fresh changes were rung on old tunes, but a familiar theme emerges from the variations. The colonists were the lineal descendants of the conquerors and colonizers of Wales and Ireland, those lords marcher who had created England’s first empire. When England invaded America—what we usually call “settling” it—the Crown lawyers had consulted their only precedents to rationalize the position of the new American outposts in the structure of the empire. Each colony became in legal theory a collective lord analogous to the barons who had marched into Ireland. When the Americans turned against the Crown they continued an ancient tradition of lords who have marched too far and grown too powerful to accept royal orders gladly. In this perspective the American Revolution was a barons’ revolt. Geography determined that these rebels could not follow the tradition to its logical conclusion of seizure of the throne—Washingtons were rather more distant than Tudors—so they fought for the more limited objective of elevating their baronies into sovereignties. Sweet are the uses of sovereignty. In Ireland the “Old English” colonizers had struggled to win sovereignty for themselves in order to dominate the “mere” Irish to greater advantage. So also in America. As Irish peasants strove against king and baron alike to preserve native lands and independence, the Indian natives of North America fought also. When cultural actualities are substituted for the myths of savagery, the Indians’ revolution appears analytically as a series of peasants’ wars.

This paper argues that the American revolutionaries fought for empire over the west as well as for their own freedom in the east. While the colony-states fought for independence from the Crown, the tribes had to fight for independence from the states. It makes a huge embarrassment to ideology that the Revolution wore one face looking eastward across the Atlantic and another looking westward into the continent, but Indians have always ostruded awkwardly from the smooth symmetry of historical rationalization.

Indian trade and Indian land had first brought Europeans to the shores of America. In one sense, the Indian struggle for independence had started with Jamestown, but natives and colonists had managed to accommodate erratically with each other in the symbiotic community of trade. In spite of occasional wars of particular tribes against particular colonies, there had never been a universal conflict of red against white. Some tribes—notably in Virginia and New England—had been subjected by force, but until 1750 most Indians continued to live in “free” tribes allied by treaty to one or more English colony. Crisis came then because of the accelerated growth of colonial population with a concomitant demand for expansion into the Indian territories west of the Appalachians.

Had Great Britain been the only European power colonizing North America, perhaps the pace of colonization might have been regulated and arrangements made to give the Indians alternatives other than desperate war; but France had planted colonies in Canada and Louisiana, and France was determined to halt British expansion beyond the Appalachians by establishing a long chain of Indian protectors controlled from strategically placed French forts. The British Crown and colonies were equally determined to destroy the French barrier and to seize all the territory between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Competition accelerated the plans of both powers, and they raced to confront each other at the strategic junction of waters where the Ohio River begins. Here they set in motion the events that resulted in the first world war of modern times, the vast imperial conflict called the Seven Years War.

The Ohio region and its resident Indians will be constantly at or near the center of attention in this essay. Although southern tribes, especially the Cherokees, faced much the same problems as the Ohio Indians, they lay in a separate theater of action, with a distinct history. The events to be discussed mark a period when many Indian tribes joined together in great confederations to fight for their territorial integrity. These struggles began with diplomatic maneuvers in 1750 and continued through tribal war on the largest scale ever known in this country, intermixed with the imperial and secessionist conflicts of Great Britain with France and the revolutionary United States. The era ended with the Treaty of Greenville that followed the Battle of Fallen Timbers, twelve years after the official conclusion of the American colonists’ war for independence. In this dramatic and turbulent era,
the attention of historians has fastened chiefly upon the motives and initiatives of Europeans and Euramericans with regard to each other; Indians have been treated, usually in afterthoughts, as appendages to the "important" persons and issues. These Indians are presented as robot-like characters who respond reflexively to stimuli and commands from the real people. I propose to show that this attitude is fallacious. Not only did the tribes undertake initiatives for their own reasons, but their independent actions caused colonies and empires to respond, sometimes even reflexively, by drastically revising plans and policies. The tribes' independence, power, and possessions were central issues of what we see only as the American Revolution. Blended in with that familiar process was a tribal revolution conducted by governments effective enough to wage devastating war and to enforce recognition through formal diplomatic protocol by Crown, colonies, and the United States.

The tribes of the upper Ohio in 1750 were Delawares, Shawnees, and "Mingo" Iroquois, confederated in a complex multiple alliance called the Covenant Chain. (The name is specific: there were many alliances "chains" in colonial times, and many "covenants," but only one Covenant Chain.) In this confederation the Ohio Indians were not only "brothers" of the British, but also "nephews" of the Iroquois Six Nations, whose grand council met at Oondaga (where Syracuse, New York, now stands). That is to say, all the Indians were allied by treaty to certain British colonies that diplomatically recognized the Iroquois as responsible spokesmen for the other tribes, and because of this favored status the Iroquois had been able to assume a degree of authority, symbolized by the deferential "uncle" form of address, over the tributary tribes. It was an uneasy relationship in which the tributary Delawares and Shawnees often paid more heed to the ceremony than the substance of deference, but it held together as long as Iroquois diplomacy seemed to preserve the Ohio from European intrusion. Also consequential were guarantees of protection against attack by English colonial forces, and continuing participation in trade with English merchants for such necessities as cloth, tools, and guns. Englishmen gained reciprocally in the trade, and they valued the Covenant Chain also as a barrier against the French and as a stabilizing instrument of order in the "back country."

In 1751 the Covenant Chain was suddenly strained when an advance agent of the Ohio Company of Virginia appeared at the Ohio.
This was the Indians’ declaration of independence, instantly recognized as such by the Yorkers. Its significance is somewhat blurred for modern students by the biases of terminology in histories written to serve political ends. A famous example of such conquest propaganda is the *History of the Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province of New York in America*, written by Cadwallader Colden, lieutenant governor of the state. Even Colden’s title asserts that the jurisdiction of New York took in the native neighbors of England’s emigrants as well as the colonists themselves. It was literally legal double-talk intended to bolster English diplomats contending with the French over claims of territorial sovereignty. The actual status of the Iroquois was conceded more candidly by Sir William Johnson in a confidential summary for officedom. The Iroquois “called themselves a free people,” wrote Johnson, “who had an independent Lands, which were their ancient possessions...so that whatever words are usually made use of respecting submission, etc., are only to be understood as in compliance with form and custom...and whoever should undertake to go further on the subject with them must have a good army at his back to protect him from their resentment.”

Though Johnson’s remark was made years after the Mohawk declaration, it faithfully echoed the private understandings of British officials in 1753, and the Mohawk action was interpreted in accordance with that knowledge. The experienced members of the Crown’s Board of Trade in London immediately recognized the Mohawk declaration as a diplomatic event “of a very serious nature.” The board saw that “the Indians...considered the alliance and friendship between them and the Province of New York to be dissolved,” and this was most alarming because “the steady adherence of these Indians to the British interest” had been vital to the security of all the northern colonies “from the fatal effects of the encroachments of a foreign power”—that is, France. Without the Indians, “all our efforts to check and disappoint the present view of this power may prove ineffectual.”

It was curious language from a government that claimed, when treating with the French, to hold a protectorate over the Iroquois, but it was not a blindingly new revelation. Half a century earlier, Pennsylvania’s Secretary James Logan had known that “if we lose the Iroquois we are gone by land.”

With what was lightning speed for that sluggish body, the Board of Trade moved to remedy the situation. It instructed the colonial governors to assemble the most impressive joint treaty with the Indians of the Covenant Chain that had yet been held, and to treat in the king’s own name rather than in behalf of the individual colonial governments that the Indians so distrusted. Thus was born the famous Albany Congress of 1754.

The gentlemen of Virginia had their own notions of how to deal with that foreign power at the Ohio, and they did not intend to let the Crown hinder their own encroachments. Virginia “excused” itself from attendance at Albany and the possible restrictions that attendance might have entailed; and Virginia continued its rash, calamitous adventuring. The colony fielded troops under young George Washington to attack the French forces on their march. The French were experienced, intelligent, and brave. Washington was self-confident and brave. The headstrong young Virginian disregarded the advice given by his experienced Iroquois ally and succeeded in getting himself completely surrounded, and surrendered. The French chased English traders and Iroquois chieftains out of the region and built Fort Duquesne at the strategic forks of the Ohio. Delaware and Shawnee tributaries of the Covenant Chain found themselves alone, and without resource, living in a country occupied by enemy troops. While the Mohawks had severed the Chain’s links with New York, the French had smashed its links with the western tributaries.

At Albany the Indians were angry and suspicious. “Never were so few Indians seen at any public meeting,” mourned one colonial observer. The colonial delegates made the Congress a vehicle for the very abuses that the Crown was trying to correct. Connecticut speculators of the Susquehanna Company poured rum down some Indians outside the council chamber to get signatures on a “deed” for an enormous tract of land that these Indians had no authority to convey. The clandestine methods of the Susquehanna Company were rendered more necessary because Pennsylvania claimed the same territory and was using much the same methods. The mood of its representatives was expressed by veteran interpreter Conrad Weiser, who had approached the Congress with the thought that “I may fall in with some greedy fellows for money.” His wish was fulfilled. The fellows greedy for land found the fellows greedy for money, and Thomas Penn got another deed. It did not simply the Crown’s problems, nor assuage the Indians’ grievances, that Penn’s new deed for the region at the forks of the Ohio conflicted with the claims of Virginia.
In the midst of this welter of intrigue and conspiracy, the Albany conference produced an edifice of dreams—the Plan of Union that the mythology of the frontier characterized as a foreshadowing of the federal union of the United States. Such hindsight is willful illusion. No colony ratified the Albany Plan, and the Crown rejected it, and they all had good reasons. Albany, in 1754, was the last gasp of an old system rather than a precursor of the new. Intercolonial Indian treaties had been held at Albany since 1677, and the Crown had followed custom in ordering the Congress to assemble there in 1754, but the system had deteriorated so badly that even the delegates recognized the need for change in a time of crisis. They recommended—the one positive result of the Congress, and it was probably a maneuver of Pennsylvania to outflank absent Virginia—that the Crown take over the management of Indian affairs directly. This the Crown soon did, at great expense. The only intercolonial cooperation to be evidenced at Albany was an agreement to abridge the separate regulation of Indian affairs previously exercised by the colonies.

In response, the Crown gradually created a Department of Indian Affairs. It started, without much thought to constitutional issues, as a function of the military. To eject the French from the Ohio, the Crown dispatched two regiments of regular troops under Major General Edward Braddock. On 15 April 1755, Braddock commissioned the New York merchant and public official William Johnson “to have the sole Management and direction of the Affairs of the Six Nations of Indians and their Allies, to the end that the said Indians may be heartily engaged in and attached to the British Interest.” There was not even a name for the new office; Johnson acquired effective authority by supplementary commissions of command over provincial troops, and his primary responsibility was to lead an expedition against the French. His duties with the Indians were simply to round up as many as he could to join the expedition. In his supplementary instructions, however, were the seeds of his office’s growth into a powerful institution. He was authorized to attract Indian recruits by making a large promise: “You are to acquaint the Indians of the Six Nations... with his Majesties design to Recover their Lands at Niagara, and upon the River Ohio, out of the hands of the French, and to protect them against future Inroads, for the benefit of their Tribes.” It will be observed that His Majesty’s expressed design was not to recover his own lands, but the Six Nations’. That sentence, with its ambiguities and seeming commitments, became the center of attention and hope for all the Indians. Though the Crown wavered, vacillated, and reneged, the tribes constantly forced the issue.

Certainly the sentence meant nothing to Johnson’s superior officer, General Braddock. After commissioning Johnson, Braddock sent him off to the north, while he himself began his march westward toward Fort Duquesne. On his way he met with chiefs of the Ohio tribes who wished to negotiate terms for their help in evicting the French. Braddock not only failed to assure the Indians of protection against future encroachments, he guaranteed that the encroachment would take place. It was inconceivable to this powerful, haughty man that he should thereby pronounce his own death sentence.

Here is the conversation and its consequences as given in the only surviving report—a description narrated by Delaware chief Shingas to an English colonial prisoner of war.

He [Shingas] with 5 other Chiefs of the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingos Nations (Being 2 from Each Nation) had applied to General Braddock and Enquired what he intended to do with the Land if he could drive the French and their Indians away. To which General Braddock replied that the English Should Inhabit and Inherit the Land. On which Shingas asked General Braddock whether the Indians that were Friends to the English might not be Permitted to Live and Trade Among the English and have Hunting Ground sufficient to Support themselves and Families as they had no where to Flee too But into the Hands of the French and their Indians who were their Enemies (that is, Shingas’ Enemies). On which General Braddock said that No Savage Should Inherit the Land. On receiving which answer Shingas and the other Chiefs went that night to their own People—To whom they communicated General Braddock’s Answer And the Next Morning Returned to General Braddock again in hopes he might have Changed his Sentiments and then repeated their Former Questions to General Braddock again and General Braddock made the same reply as Formerly. On which Shingas and the other Chiefs answered That if they might not have Liberty To Live on the Land they would not Fight for it. To which General Braddock answered that he did not need their Help.

Shingas remarked that his tribesmen were “very much Enraged” by Braddock, and a Party of them went Immediately... and Join’d the French.
But the Greater Part remained neuter till they saw how Things would go. And they made it their Business to draw nigh the Place where the Engagement Happened that they might see what Passed at it, and were still in hopes that the English would be Victorious. But after the French had ruined Braddock's Army they immediately compelled the Indians To join them and let them know that if they refused they would Immediately cut them off. On which the Indians Joined the French for their Own Safety.28

The last sentence of Shingas's narration is a little on the self-serving side. Certainly the French had the Delawares in an awkward position, because the Indians depended largely for subsistence on the trade which the French now controlled absolutely, but subsequent events show that a number of the Ohio Indians—temporarily, at least—accepted their new necessity with some enthusiasm. The targets chosen for their raids were scenes of old grievances. In bowing to the French yoke, the Ohio Indians paid off many an old score.

Braddock's beaten army, though it still greatly outnumbered the French force at Fort Duquesne, retreated all the way to the coast, leaving the backcountry wide open to the Indian raids. Colonists and Indians alike observed that a fully equipped army, as good as any in the empire, could be beaten by an opposing force less than half its number and made up mostly of poorly armed "savages." What the Indians had concluded from this observation was demonstrated in flames and blood. The entire system of management of Indian affairs lay in ruins. What the Albany Congress had suggested about provincial blundering was now plainly proved. Individual tribes in isolation could be mastered and directed by individual colonies, but tribes collected and supported by a hostile empire could only be resisted by the resources of the Crown. In 1756 the Board of Trade began salvage operations with a new commission to Sir William Johnson. It greatly increased his authority and proceeded directly from the Crown. Johnson had already been elevated to the status of baronet; now he was given large new titles: "Colonel of Our Faithful Subjects, and Allies, the Six united Nations of Indians, and their Confederates, in the Northern Parts of North America" and "Our Sole Agent and Superintendent of the said Indians and their Affairs."29

The royal pomp bore little relation to real circumstance. Johnson's was a commission of potentiality, rather like those of the Lords Lieutenant of medieval Ireland whose writ ran as far as the castle walls surrounding them. It was noticeably equivocal in declaring the Iroquois to be subjects and allies, and at that historical moment the Iroquois left much to be desired in either capacity. We have already seen Johnson's own recognition of them as a self-consciously "free" people, and in 1756 a large proportion of them were ostentatiously demonstrating their freedom by maintaining neutrality between the warring French and British. Their "confederates" at the Ohio had taken up the hatchet against the king's loving subjects in his colonies and were devastating the back settlements of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.

The Crown's ministers understood as well as their new colonel that he was in no position to issue commands to his disorderly regiments. Board of Trade Secretary John Pownall disregarded the formal bombast of Johnson's commission when he sent notification of its issuance. Pownall wrote nothing about "subjects." He instructed Johnson that the "great end" of the appointment was to establish the Indians "steadily in our Interest" and to "engage them in the service." Johnson was to find means (unspecified) to "remove those difficulties and doubts in their minds which have hitherto operated as an obstruction to their heartily engaging with us, and have induced some to enter into engagement with the French." And he was to attend carefully to "redressing the grievances complained of by the Indians, with respect to the Lands which have been fraudulently taken from them."30

Since the statesmen understood so well the distinction between their legal pretenses and the actuality, it seems sensible for historians to take note of some of the implications of the situation. The Crown claimed sovereign jurisdiction over the Indians and their territories, but it admitted (privately to de facto tribal independence and publicly) to a "natural law" right of property of the Indians in their lands. The property right would be enforced by the Crown, even against British colonial subjects, as indisputable for the Indians to formally accept British sovereignty. (It would have created considerable difficulty in Europe if the chiefs were to proclaim French sovereignty instead.) The form would be sufficient. The Indians would not be required to obey statute law of any British jurisdiction. They could continue to order their own customs and councils, and to negotiate their obedience to their "sovereign" by treaties with his representatives. The royal agent for persuading the Indians to accept this bargain would become their "superintendent." Johnson was expected to gain the homage of the tribes—the vassalage of their chiefs—and if he succeeded he would have the status and prerogatives of a great lord
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Iroquois immediately assumed their former position of superiority. They told the Ohio council, "We desire you would lay hold of the covenant we have made with our brethren the English . . . We likewise take the tomahawk out of your hands . . . it is the white people’s; let them use it among themselves." Delaware spokesman Beaver agreed, and expressed the renewal of his tribe’s tributary status in conventional metaphor: “I have not made myself a king. My uncles [the Iroquois] have made me like a queen, that I always should mind what is good and right.”

The Delawares abandoned the French, the French abandoned Fort Duquesne, and the Ohio opened up to the British army that had until then been halted in its approach. Late in 1758 the war turned around for Great Britain where it had begun, at the forks of the Ohio.

A few months later, in 1759, the reinvigorated Iroquois under Johnson’s command captured Fort Niagara, the key to the Canadian west.

But the western Indians discovered that it was harder to get rid of the British than the French. On 4 December 1758, shortly after the fall of Fort Duquesne, the Delawares were summoned to a treaty on the site. Two substantially discrepant reports of the treaty survive: one was recorded by a French officer as the description carried to him by the Delaware chief, Custaloga; the other was dutifully sent to Britain as the official minutes of the occasion. Custaloga noted that the Indians (Delawares and Iroquois alike) had asked the English to withdraw from the smoking ruins. No such disturbance of harmony found its way into the English minutes, though it seems apparent from Colonel Henry Bouquet’s speech to the Indians that he was responding defensively to Indian suggestions. “I return you hearty Thanks for the Speech you made,” he remarked; but he did not record that speech. He went on, “We are not come here to take Possession of your hunting Country in a hostile Manner, as the French did when they came amongst you, but to open a large and extensive Trade with you and all the other Nations of Indians to the Westward who chuse to live in friendship with us.”

In these official minutes, the Delawares have become happy that 200 soldiers are to be left by the British “to support and defend the Traders.”

One of the Pittsburgh traders told a different tale six months later. Quaker James Kenny confided to his journal, “now that I have observ’d that the Indians are very Jealous of the English coming here with an Army. They seem Jealous of thir Lands being settled . . . old [Delaware chief] Piquotmen, the Beaver’s Brother, and some others came
to our Houses and the Old Man put it Closely to me to tell what the English or the General Meant by coming here with a Great Army.\textsuperscript{35}

Discontent grew stronger among the Indians as British troops marched west to seize and garrison Detroit, and as Virginia (ignoring all promises to Indians) sent officials and settlers to occupy western lands. The Iroquois Six Nations split amongst themselves; though the Mohawks held to their alliance with Sir William Johnson, the Senecas circulated a war belt among the western tribes to solicit a general uprising against the British garrisons. The Ohio Delawares gradually developed a new political strategy for achieving total independence. As against the British, they adopted a new nativist religion that required boys to hunt with bow and arrow and abstain from the use of firearms.\textsuperscript{36} After seven years of such training, the Delawares calculated, it would be possible for them to do without European trade and thus to maintain their political positions without suffering corrosion from economic and technological dependence. As against their Iroquois "uncles," the Delawares cemented friendship alliances in a confederation of western tribes strong enough to resist Iroquois pretensions to dominate. Johnson and his deputy, George Croghan, kept well informed of the unrest. They rushed about from one council fire to another, showing favor where friendship seemed strongest, and menacing those elsewhere.\textsuperscript{37}

All came to crisis in 1763 when France ceded all of Canada's territorial claims to Great Britain in the treaty that ended the two empires' long war. The news that the trans-Appalachian west had been ceded stunned the Indians. In their view, as reported by Croghan, "the French had no Right to give away their Country; as, they Say, they were never Conquered by any Nation."\textsuperscript{38} To make things worse, the British commander-in-chief General Jeffrey Amherst decided to discipline the tribes by withholding from them the trade in arms and ammunition which was still essential to their way of making a living.\textsuperscript{39}

The tribes rose in May 1763 in the liberation war for independence, miscalled Pontiac's Conspiracy. It acquired the name because Ottawa chief Pontiac launched the first attack, against Fort Detroit, but Pontiac was a minor figure in the tribal diplomacy that brought the war into being. The Senecas and Delawares had been circulating war belts among the tribes for about two years before combat began, and the French traders of the backcountry obviously played a conspiratorial role. When news of Pontiac's initiative reached the Delawares, they were ready to act upon the grievances they had been voicing for five years; they immediately laid siege to Fort Pitt.\textsuperscript{40}

The rising failed. Although the Indians won minor successes, both major forts held out until the sieges were lifted. Secret advance intelligence enabled Fort Detroit's commander to thwart Pontiac's intended surprise. At Fort Pitt, under orders from General Amherst, the fort commander parleyed with the besieging Indian chiefs and presented them with blankets from the smallpox hospital. The epidemic that subsequently raged among the warriors made easier the task of Colonel Henry Bouquet when he marched to the fort's relief.\textsuperscript{41}

Though the Indians had not won, they had not fully lost. They saved for peace because they could not overwhelm the British, and because they wanted to forestall punitive destruction of their villages. Under strong urging from Sir William Johnson, the British came to terms because they could not overwhelm the Indians. Though they could burn villages and inflict suffering, experience had long shown (and would again) that such measures were not necessarily sufficient to destroy the Indians' will to continue fighting guerrilla war. In short, the peace that followed the liberation war named for Pontiac reflected a military stalemate.\textsuperscript{42} Nevertheless, it left the British with the strategic advantage: their forts and garrisons remained to become a permanent occupation establishment. The price for that advantage was financially and politically extravagant. For an empire already burdened with the unprecedented debt acquired during the recently completed Seven Years War, the cost of the western garrisons was an intolerable extra load. Politically, the military establishment would ultimately aggrieve the empire's colonists as much as the Indians.

Naturally, the empire ministers could not foresee all the future consequences of the western occupation, but they understood budget, and they recognized that the Indians, though subdued, were not submissive. Naturally, also, the ministers resettled to political action to reduce the necessity for maintaining military action; but the harder they worked to mollify the tribes, the more they exacerbated quarrels with their colonies. The Indians were wooed with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, with which the Crown offered them a bargain that advanced the Crown's interests by sacrificing what the colonists regarded as their own interest. A frontier line of separation was decreed, and the territory west of it was declared an Indian sanctuary in which no more colonial settlements would be permitted. Thus, if the Indians would accept a few widely scattered garrisons, the Crown would pre-
serve them from the tide of civilians. The only civil jurisdictions allowed to operate validly beyond the Proclamation Line were those of British appointed Indian superintendents.\(^5\)

The Board of Trade was not satisfied, however, with merely letting the Indians go their own way. To integrate the tribes into the political fabric of the empire, the board proposed a "Plan for the future management of Indian affairs" that provided for extensive administrative machinery for governing the west and enforcing the Proclamation Line. What the board intended was to convert the tribes themselves into "colonies," in one of the senses of that unfortunately ambiguous word—that is, to make the tribes into native "dependencies" linked directly to the Crown instead of being responsible to the intermediate jurisdictions of the Crown's Euramerican provinces. Indeed the provisions of the Board of Trade's plan suggest strongly that the board envisioned a process through which the Indian governments would gradually be transformed from tribes to state-form provinces, through an intermediate feudal form. Superintendents William Johnson and John Stuart, in their respective Northern and Southern districts of the Indian territory, would preside over the transition as lords of the west and protectors of its people.\(^4\)

Apparently, because the process would entail great expense, and further expense was precisely what the Crown was trying to avoid, the board's plan was shelved.\(^6\) Though the Proclamation Line and the superintendents' offices continued in force, it would seem that nobody but the Indians believed that the line could be anything but a temporary measure. Neither the great land speculators nor the penniless squatters got very excited about the line, partly perhaps because the superintendents were so accommodating. The speculators made certain arrangements to the benefit of the superintendents, and the superintendents surveyed the line with gratifyingly large bulges at spots where the speculators had plans for imminent development. Lobbyists besieged ministers in London and made them partners in great schemes for new inland colonies that would, among other things, preclude the possibility of tribal territory evolving into native provinces. Squatters continued to squat beyond the line, and the protesting Indians were merely advised not to disturb the peace so that all could be made well eventually.\(^7\)

If the Indians had just agreed to roll over and play dead, no doubt the Crown and colonies would have worked out an arrangement convenient for all, but the tribes expressed their discontent in word and deed. Because of the Crown's vacillating approach to a political solution of the problem of western stability, the military solution had to be maintained—and paid for. The payment was what finally tore the empire apart. It seemed reasonable to His Majesty's ministers that the colonists should bear some part of the charge for their own defense. It seemed reasonable to the colonists that, since the lands beyond the line had been proclaimed to be outside colonial jurisdictions, the policing of such Crown lands should be wholly at the Crown's expense. Two such conflicting assumptions might have produced an eternal wrangle if submitted to the judgment of the courts, but the Crown's ministers submitted the issue to Parliament instead, and Parliament chose to command rather than negotiate. In 1765 Parliament enacted the Stamp Tax.\(^8\) The colonists challenged Parliament's right to tax them, on the grounds that their own legislatures held that right exclusively, and to underscore their point they rioted a bit. Parliament avoided immediate confrontation by rescinding the Stamp Tax, but in 1767 it declared its own supremacy in principle over any and all legislatures subject to the Crown of England. The colonists correctly perceived this declaration as a restructuring of sovereignty that threatened their liberties and interests, and rioted some more. In a comparatively short time, the Crown concluded that the violence of the eastern colonies was more dangerous than the violence of the western tribes, and the troops whose cost had precipitated the crisis were gradually moved east to restore authority where the need was greater. As the troops continued to require upkeep, Parliament enacted more taxes. Then, indeed, the colonists' grievances became indisputably genuine. Taxes that once had been levied ostensibly to protect them from the French and Indians had become quite plainly taxes levied to suppress their civil liberties.\(^9\)

Meantime, the land speculators had discovered that the Proclamation Line could be bent but not broken. The Virginians of the Ohio Company especially were frustrated. By virtue of its ancient sea-to-sea charter, Virginia claimed jurisdiction over an immense western domain which included, to begin with, the Ohio country, but the Crown viewed Virginia as a royal province subject to the royal pleasure in such matters as boundaries. Ministers seriously considered establishing alternative new colonial jurisdictions where Virginia made its claims, and they disregarded the Ohio Company's grant as legally lapsed. Some of the richest and most important Virginians saw their future in the west, and they would not be denied it. Their anger and determina-
tion mounted simultaneously with the general colonial resentment against Parliament's taxes and the Crown's measures of repression. Virginia's way out of the impasse was Lord Dunmore's War. After the evacuation of Fort Pitt by the royal garrison in 1772, a band of Virginian militiamen occupied the fort and used it as a base from which to terrorize the Ohio Indians. In 1774 Virginia's Governor Dunmore climaxed the process by fomenting a war with the Shawnees to force them to cede land rights to Virginia, apparently hoping thereby to compel the Crown to recognize a fait accompli. Had he succeeded, Virginia would have acquired permanent possession of the whole Ohio region. Dunmore did not succeed in his ultimate objective, though by creating an either/or situation, he forced the cooperation of the Indian superintendents in his war. The quality of that war, and the effect it created among the Indians, is illustrated by what happened to Cayuga chief James Logan. Logan, like his father, the celebrated Shackelton, had been a strong adherent of the British all his life; but without any provocation Virginia's frontier ruffians massacred his entire family. Logan stopped being an adherent of the British. He took thirty scalps in revenge, according to tradition, before he succumbed to depression and drink. His lament has become classic: "I appeal to any white man to say if ever he entered Logan's cabin hungry and he gave him not meat; if ever he came cold and naked, and he clothed him not... [But now] there runs not a drop of my blood in the veins of any living creature... Who is there to mourn for Logan?—Not one!"

The news of these doings aroused strong feeling in Iroquoia where angry Iroquois chiefs confronted Sir William Johnson to demand that the frontiersmen be brought under control. They attributed their own anger to their young men, in a diplomatic device to permit the continuation of speaking terms with Johnson, but their intent was clear: The young men, they said, were "much affected and exasperated at the cruel murders" committed by the "lawless people" of the British colonies. It was a strange complaint to come from a "savage people," but it was not a slip of the tongue. The Iroquois questioned seriously whether the British were capable of making responsible contracts and living up to their terms. "Brother," they addressed Johnson.

We are sorry to observe to you that your people are as un governable, or rather more so, than ours. You must remember that it was most solemnly, and publicly settled, and agreed at the General Congress held at Fort Stanwix in 1768 on behalf of the great King of England our Father, and the Governors, and Commis-

Francis Jennings

sioners of the several Provinces then assembled there, that the Line then pointed out and fixed between the Whites and Indians should forever after be looked upon as a barrier between us, and that the White People were not to go beyond it. It seems, Brother, that your People entirely disregard, and despise the settlement agreed upon by their Superiors and us, and for we find that they, notwithstanding that settlement, are come in vast numbers to the Ohio, and gave our people to understand that they would settle wherever they pleased. If this is the case we must look upon every engagement you made with us as void and of no effect.

Having made their point, the Iroquois pleaded for a peaceable solution:

...but we hope it is not so, and that you will restrain your people over whom you say you have authority, and make them lay aside their ill designs, and encroachments... and we must beg that if your people insist upon settling so near ours, they may be made subject to some authority that can keep them in order."

By a curious coincidence, the same thought was in the minds of the members of Parliament. To make the rebels of Massachusetts Bay subject to some authority, Parliament, in 1774, enacted four Coercive Acts. Then Parliament added an act for the government of Quebec which, by extending Quebec's boundaries to the Ohio River, nullified the land seizures made by Virginia in Lord Dunmore's War. For various reasons, the colonists promptly identified the Quebec Act with the Coercive Acts and called them all "Intolerable." Although the initial outcry against the Quebec Act stressed the horrors of "Papacy," because it permitted Canada's Catholics to worship without disturbance, something more than toleration made it intolerable. A Jesuit scholar has noted that when the First Continental Congress appointed a committee to draw up an address of protest to the king, "the cancelling of the political arrangements effected by the Quebec Bill was included among the conditions essential to a restoration of commerce and good will; of the religious arrangements there was no mention whatever."

The issue was land. The territorial pretensions of the colonies with sea-to-sea charters extending through the Ohio country—Virginia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts—were now nullified by an act of Parliament which, unlike the merely administrative Royal Proclamation of 1763, could only be reversed by another, most improbable, act of Parliament. To obtain and develop a new tract of territory, a
company speculating in land above the north bank of the Ohio River would have multiple barriers to hurdle—the Crown, the superintendent's, the Indians', and that of the almost inaccessible governor of Quebec. Remote geographically, the governor ruled with the support of a permanent garrison under his direct command, and was unhindered by the pressures of a representative assembly.

Colonial reaction to the Quebec Act was swift and strong, but not as unanimous or evenly distributed as appears in formal documents. In the first Continental Congress, which met in the fall of 1774, a seemingly improbable combination of Virginia and Massachusetts delegates demanded the inclusion of the Quebec Act in the list of grievances necessitating a boycott of British trade. New York's delegates at first opposed such inclusion, but were overruled. Their defeat has been dryly and illuminatingly described by a nineteenth-century biographer of New York's James Duane:

> Among the subjects of debate before this committee was the question whether the Quebec bill should be reported as a grievance, and Mr. Duane was against including it in the report, but Mr. Lee, from Virginia, on territorial considerations, the eastern [New England] members, under pretence of religious uses, and others, because it would be popular to insert it both in England and America, having united, formed a great majority against him and he acquiesced in its being reported unanimously.57

The full Congress then resolved unanimously "that these his majesty's colonies were... entitled to all the immunities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal charters," among which privileges (though not literally detailed by the Congress) were the rights to extend jurisdiction and patent real property within their chartered bounds.58

After the battles of Lexington and Concord, the Second Continental Congress made an address to "the oppressed inhabitants of Canada," in which the Congress "perceived the fate of the protestant and catholic colonies to be strongly linked together"—so much for the popish menace—and appealed to the Canadians to overthrow the yoke of their "present form of tyranny." A few months later, the Congress's armies invaded Quebec to confer the boon of liberty upon those poor, deserving Catholics. Had the enterprise succeeded, the Ohio country would certainly have been liberated back into the jurisdictions of the invaders; but Quebec held out, a British fleet arrived with thousands of reinforcements, and the invaders fell back to the enforced protec-
peace with Great Britain in 1783, Congress failed to seek treaties with the Indian tribes, and the reason seems to have been indecision as to whether Congress or Virginia held jurisdiction. While the bargaining continued over the terms for Congress's acceptance of Virginia's cession offer, Pennsylvania forced the issue. Pennsylvania wanted no more trouble with Indians at Pittsburgh, and was equally intent on having no more trouble there with Virginians. The simplest means to acquire undisputed authority in the trouble spot was to follow the ancient practice of the Colony's founder, William Penn—to recognize the Indian property right and negotiate a purchase on terms satisfactory to the Indians; then, with possession of the Indian right backing up Pennsylvania's own charter right, Pennsylvania would be one up on Virginia. But, unless Congress first made formal peace with the Indians, Pennsylvania would have to make its own peace with tribes who would then remain in a state of enmity with the other states. What, then, would be left of Congress's supposed monopoly of the conduct of Indian affairs?

On 12 September 1783, Pennsylvania did Congress the courtesy of requesting approval of its intended Indian purchase. Congress stalled, being still embroiled in its difficulties with Virginia; so Pennsylvania decided to proceed with its treaty and purchase the property regardless of Congress's approval. Congress faced the ridiculous possibility of losing any role in Indian affairs, for the other states would not have been slow in following Pennsylvania's precedent. At the point of crisis, Congress capitulated to Virginia's demands for concessions in order to avoid the total loss of its own authority in the west. On 23 February 1784, Pennsylvania appointed its commissioners to treat with the Indians. On 1 March 1784, Congress accepted Virginia's cession and the national domain came into being. On 4 March 1784, Congress appointed its own commissioners to treat with the Indians, and they assumed political control of the subsequent treaty conference. Speaking for the United States, they made the peace, allotting time to the Pennsylvanians only for the specific purpose of purchasing property within what were now Pennsylvania's unchallenged bounds. The irony of this first American treaty with the tribes—the Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784—was that Pennsylvania's subordinate land purchase was accepted by the Indians as valid, and it lasted, but the general peace with the United States was regarded as invalid, and did not last. The distinction is clear. The validity of the purchase resulted from a fair and acceptable bargain, while the invalidity of the peace was a direct function of its being the product of duress. The commissioners of the United States were accompanied by a body of troops. The commissioners dictated the treaty terms as an ultimatum, and seized hostages to enforce compliance. Looking down the gun barrels, the Indians signed where told, but a treaty made under duress was no more valid in Indian custom than a contract made under duress was valid in American law. The western Indians, far out of range of the guns at Fort Stanwix, simply ignored the treaty dictated there.

The theory of the United States commissioners was that the victory over Great Britain had been simultaneously a conquest of the Indians, and that it made the Indians' lands forfeit to their conquerors. The commissioners therefore assigned boundaries of lands reserved for the Indians at the pleasure of the United States government, instead of negotiating cessions of territory from the Indians on agreed terms of purchase. The trouble with this theory was that the Indians did not agree that they had been conquered, and they subsequently defeated two United States expeditionary forces to demonstrate their point—Harmer's Humiliation, 1780, and St. Clair's Shame, 1791.

Fighting continued until General Anthony Wayne defeated the Indians' western confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. It is always called a "decisive" battle, but Wayne was too intelligent to regard it as conquest. In August 1795 he negotiated the Treaty of Greenville as an agreement between peers. In return for specific "cessions and relinquishments of lands" made by the Indian tribes, and "as the great means of rendering this peace strong and perpetual," Wayne agreed that the United States would relinquish claims "to all other Indian lands, northward of the river Ohio, eastward of the Mississippi, and westward and southward of the Great Lakes, and the waters uniting them, according to the boundary line agreed on by the United States and the King of Great Britain."

The meaning of the agreement was spelled out precisely and unambiguously: "The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon, so long as they please, without any molestation from the United States; but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the United States will protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands, against all citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons who intrude upon the same. And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under
the protection of the said United States, and no other Power whatever."

The consequence of this treaty for the United States was peace in the Northwest Territory, a new flood of immigration into the territory, and the creation of the State of Ohio in 1803. The consequence for the Indians was the firm establishment of the practice by the United States of dealing with the Indian tribes as "nations," a practice continued until 1871. That the treaties so made were often fraudulent and always violated is another matter.

Current theories of history do not fit well on data such as have been recited above. Nationalist and racist doctrines suppress the facts of tribal government in myths about savagery. Theories of history based on class conflict, whether of socialist or capitalist orientation, do not provide for the hybrid relationships that occur when societies with different systems of social organization adjust to each other on terms other than quick assimilation of the one by the other. The romantic theory of revolution, in which all the lowly unite to rise against their oppressors, is embarrassed by the American Revolution's multiplicity of variously oppressed and exploited peoples who preyed upon each other; what most aggrieved the poor frontiersman was his sovereign's ban on robbing the even poorer native, and the first target of the Indian's hatchet was the frontiersman's skull. But realism must also contemplate the disparity between upper class rhetoric and conduct. The gentry cried out passionately for liberty in general, but itemized it as rights for themselves to hold slaves and attack Indians.

Heedless of theories, Americans began the building of their empire with an inheritance of ethnocentric semantics that made logic valid to themselves out of the strange proposition that invasion, conquest, and dispossession of other peoples support the principle that all men are created equal.

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4. See Julius Goebel, Jr., "The Matrix of Empire," introduction to Joseph Henry Smith, *Appell to the Privy Council from the American Plantations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 25–38. By an act of 8 April 1792, the Privy Council recognized the American colonies as tenures in chief of the king, thereby confirming the language of the royal charters, all of which have the grantee's "holding" as of one or other feudal manor. The Privy Council's Act (faced corporate Massachusets and Connecticut as well as other colonies) together with proprietary Pennsylvania and Maryland as not only "proprietors of the soil and Lords comprehended within the said places but also Lords and Government thereof." MSS. in Public Record Office, Proprieties, Board of Trade, vol. 6:16, printed facsimile in *Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina, 1750–1710* (Columbia, S.C.: Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1947), p. 5.


6. I have discussed at length the cultural traits that justify classifying Indians as peasants in *The Frontier of America, Indians, Colonization, and the Cost of Coexistence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), chap. 5.


19. Gipson, *British Empire*, 6, chap. 2. George Washington, *Diasen*, edited by John C. Fitzpatrick, 4 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1925–1929), 1:192–94. Journal of Conrad Weiser, in *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania* [Colonial Records], ed. Samuel Hazard, 10 vols. (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1858–1853), 6:151–52. The Iroquois "Half King" Tanacharison complained that Washington "would by no means take advice from the Indians, that he set at one Place from one fall Moon to the other and made no Fortifications at all, but that little thing upon the Meadow [Fort Necessary], where he thought the French would come up to him in open Field; that he had taken the Half King's advice and made such Fortifications as the Half King advised him to make..."
be would certainly have beat the French off."  
20. Wainwright, George Cruikshank, ch. 3.  
24. The Plan of Union, in N.Y. Hist. Soc., 6:889-91. In the world of Frederick Jackson Turner’s imagination the Albany Congress became evidence that “the unioning tendencies of the Revolutionary period were facilitated by the previous cooperation in the regulation of the frontier.” Indeed the Albany Congress was Turner’s only cited evidence for that strange fantasy. In the world of fact, however, the Albany Congress was evidence of the need for the Crown to take control of relations with the Indians precisely because the squabbling colonies could not cooperate, and the Congress failed of its intended purposes because neither the Indians nor the colonists tried to make it work. J. Turner, Frontier in American History (1920) republished by New York: Holt, 1950, passim; S. E. Morison, ed., The Documentary History of the State of New York. British Empire, 1738-47 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 5:347-48.  
27. Commission and instructions in James Sullivan et al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 vols. (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1925-1965), 1:445-75. It is noted there that the cited instructions concerning Indian lands were not from Braddock. See also J. Powell to W. Johnson, New York, 16 August 1755, in ibid., pp. 854-55. (Hereafter abbreviated as Johnson Papers.)  
32. W. Johnson to W. Denoy, 21 July 1756 in Johnson Papers, 2:879.  
36. Ibid., entries of 15 and 18 October 1762; Peckham, Pipestone, pp. 98-101.  
37. J. Kenrick to J. Wm. Logan, 22 October 1751, in Johnson Papers, 1:513-14.  
40. Ibid., pp. 106-111.  
43. Proclamation, 7 October 1765, in Adam Short and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the History of Canada, 1794-1779, Canadian Archives Sessional Paper No. 18, 6-7 Edward VII (Ottawa, 1907), pp. 119-23.  
44. Ibid., pp. 435-37. There is much contemporary discussion of the Board of Trade and Johnson Papers and N.Y. Hist. Soc. Cornwallis notes.  
47. Jack M. Susin, Whiskall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1779 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), ch. 4. Susin demonstrates that the Stamp Tax was viewed to finance a continuing program rather than to defray the debts left by the Seven Years War.  
51. Variants of Logan’s speech are given crucially in Bracey Maynard, Talbot-Logan or Logan and Camp (Albany: Joel Munson, 1867), pp. 98-104, 120. Maynard wrote with highly biased rhetoric as an apologist for the Confederacy, but even he expressed shock and horror at what he acknowledged to be their “massacre” of the Indians. Susin’s “British Indian Department” (preceding note) pars Maynard’s data in perspective. See also Randolph C. Duvall, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1779 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1940), chap. 7.  
52. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768 made an adjustment in the boundary line set by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It provided by so-called agreements that Euroamericans would not cross the Ohio River from southeast to northwest. This was exactly what Dunmore’s Virginians were doing.  
53. Senate report Snenhouse, twenty minutes, Johnson Hall, 9 July 1774, in N.Y. Hist. Soc., 8:376. Two days later, in the midst of the conflict, Johnson died suddenly.  
54. Susin, Whiskall and the Wilderness, chap. 10, esp. pp. 283. The Quebec Act’s text is in Short and Doughty, Documents Relating to Canada, pp. 401-5, together with early drafts and other documents discussing the minister’s considerations. Ibid., pp. 125-41.  
56. 1805 report of front Lawrence Henry Gipson who held that Parliament intended only a “tertiary” boundary in the Quebec Act. Gipson cited the act’s provision that it should not "in a manner extend the Boundaries of any other Colony." This was a clause intended to safeguard Pennsylvania and New York with precedent to the administration of 1763. That was precisely what the various to-charter schemes had already been mollified by the Proclamation, so far as the British government was concerned, before the Quebec Act was passed. In its defense, it should be noted that the “boundary” consideration, Solicitude General Alexander Wedderburn advocated the enlargement of Quebec’s boundary expressly to command the spurious colonists: “This is the border, beyond which, for the advantage of the whole empire, you shall not extend yourselves.” The land speculators understood this; their outcry against Catholicism would not be in the screen, as their subsequent actions demonstrated. Gipson, British Empire, 13:163; Susin, Whiskall and the Wilderness, p. 248; Aberson, Western Lands, pp. 101, 124.  
59. Lauriston, Canada and the American Revolutions, pp. 46-48, 120-28, 244-45, 255. In England, Dr. Samuel Johnson observed that, “After representing the Canadians as a nation of blood-thirsty bigots, highly dangerous to the freedom of the Protes-
province, we see the Congress fusttering those bigots as they call them into rebellion.”
Quoted in Metzger, Quoee of, p. 159.
60. Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syrac-
racuse University Press, 1972), chaps. 2, 3. See also Downs, Cozules Fires on the Upper Ohio,
pp. 181–82.
290–97.
American Indian Ethnographic Series: Iroquios Indiuns, I (New York: Garland Publish-
64. Anthony C. Wallace, 777 Death and Birth of the Seneca (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1938), pp. 155–59; 777 Pennsylvania Purchase, pp. 113, 120; Graymont,
Iroquois in the Revolution, pp. 276–84; John Hackewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of
the Indians of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1784); Chase, The History of the Iroquois
12 (Philadelphia, 1876); 777 Graymont notes (1983) that some Iroquois chiefs complained
in 1790 about even the Pennsylvania purchase.
65. Both campaigns were sloppily conducted by commanders overwhelmingly
aware of their own importance and contemptuous of the fighting ability of naked men.
General Josiah Harmar lost two battles at or near modern Fort Wright, 18 and 22
October 1790. Northwest Territory Governor Arthur St. Clair was routed at modern
Fort Recovery, 4 November 1791.
66. The process by which the Treaty of Greenville came into being was long
and tortuous. Source materials trace it in Thomas G. Cochran, ed., The New American
13–177; and some comments of importance is to be found in William E. Washburny, Red
Man’s Land / White Man’s Law: A Study of the Past and Present Status of the American Indian
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), pp. 50–58. The treaty terms are in State Papers, 4:550–52,
followed by the minutes of the treaty conference.

The Revolution in Black Life

Ira Berlin