VOL. I

The Philippines:

A PAST REVISITED

(Pre-Spanish – 1941)

by

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With the collaboration of
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(Vol. II: The Continuing Past)
(1941 – 1965)
were:

(1) to unite the whole archipelago into one compact, vigorous, and homogenous body;
(2) Mutual protection in every want and necessity;
(3) Defense against all violence and injustice;
(4) Encouragement of instruction, agriculture, and commerce; and
(5) Study and application of reforms.

As Rizal envisioned it, the league was to be a sort of mutual aid and self-help society dispensing scholarship funds and legal aid, loaning capital and setting up cooperatives. These were innocent, even naive, objectives that could hardly alleviate the social ills of those times, but the Spanish authorities were so alarmed that they arrested Rizal on July 6, 1892, a scant four days after the Liga was organized.\(^{13}\)

With Rizal deported to Dapitan, the Liga became inactive until, through the efforts of Domingo Franco and Andrés Bonifacio, it was reorganized. Apolinario Mabini became the secretary of the Supreme Council. Upon his suggestion, the organization decided to declare its support for La Solidaridad and the reforms it advocated, raise funds for the paper, and defray the expenses of deputies advocating reforms for the country before the Spanish Cortes.\(^{14}\)

The Split

At first the Liga was quite active. Bonifacio in particular exerted great efforts to organize chapters in various districts of Manila. A few months later, however, the Supreme Council of the Liga dissolved the society. The reformist leaders found out that most of the popular councils which Bonifacio had organized were no longer willing to send funds to the Madrid propagandists because, like Bonifacio, they had become convinced that peaceful agitation for reforms was futile. Afraid that the more radical rank and file members might capture the organization and unwilling to involve themselves in an enterprise which would surely invite reprisals from the authorities, the leaders of the Liga opted for dissolution. The Liga membership split into two groups: the conservatives formed the Cuerpo de Compromisarios which pledged to continue supporting La Solidaridad while the radicals led by Bonifacio devoted themselves to a new and secret society, the Katipunan, which Bonifacio had organized on the very day Rizal was deported to Dapitan.\(^{15}\)

With the shift from the Liga to the Katipunan, the goal was transformed from assimilation to separation. The means underwent a similarly drastic change: from peaceful agitation for reforms to armed revolution. The reformism of the ilustrados gave way to the revolution of the masses.

The desire for separation from Spain became more acute as the masses became convinced that the only solution to their problems was revolution. This revolutionary consciousness was the fruit of centuries of practice, but its ideological articulation came from the reformist ilustrados. The stage was set for an anti-colonial, national revolution whose ebb and flow would depend on which of the two currents was temporarily dominant, the revolutionary decisiveness of the masses or the temporizing and reformist nature of their allies.

Ambivalent Classes

Economic progress had brought into being in Philippine society a number of transitional economic and social groups composed of creoles, Chinese mestizos, and urbanized Filipinos. These formed a fairly broad petty bourgeois stratum which occupied a social and economic position between the peninsulares and the masses. Included therein were landowners, inquilinos, shopkeepers, merchants, employees, and professionals. They were joined by some who by Philippine standards were already considered affluent and by others who though quite poor, had economic and social aspirations akin to those of their better situated compatriots because of the nature of their employment, their education and their urbanization. Many ilustrados belonged to this stratum. This accounts for the see-saw attitudes they displayed during various phases of the revolution. They were ambivalent in their attitudes toward the colonizer. This explains the confused stand many of them took during this part of Philippine history. When we use the term ilustrado we refer to this broad stratum with uneven consciousness.

Since their orientation vacillated between the ruling and the lower classes, the ilustrados, like the rising classes from which they emerged, were both reformist and revolutionary. Their grievances impelled them to relate to the people, but because they regarded themselves as the social superiors of the masses they also related to the ruling power. They were willing to join the peninsulares if some of their political and economic
dominantly commercial economy produced a diffusion and admixture of strivings.

Insofar as the peasants were concerned, their consciousness was similar to that of peasants all over the world. The nature of their activities and their isolation militated against their developing an ideology of their own. But because of their incessant struggles against oppression over the centuries, because of their increasing misery and because Bonifacio's call for separation from Spain was a simple and direct solution which they readily understood, the peasants quickly rallied to the struggle. But there were also peasants who joined counter-revolutionary groups such as the Guardias de Honor.\(^6\)

**Urban Ideas, Rural Masses**

It should be noted that at its inception the focus of the revolutionary movement was in the eight Tagalog provinces which were most penetrated by urban ideas and most affected by the growing commercialization of the economy. That the Revolution spread rapidly and often spontaneously to other areas shows that through the centuries, the desire to throw off the Spanish yoke had become universal.

When urban radicalism spreads to the rural areas, the rural masses are usually able to maintain the struggle long after the metropolitan districts have been subdued. This was the case in the Philippines. But it must be noted that many such peasant uprisings were led by elements from the local elite who were still acknowledged as the traditional leaders.

**Urban Sense of Solidarity**

In Manila, a greater awareness of common deprivation and oppression was made possible by economic progress itself. The economy was in its mercantile capitalist stages but there were already quite large concentrations of workers in some factories and in the stevedoring companies. When Spain inaugurated her policy of developing the colony, one of her earliest projects was the setting up of a tobacco monopoly. Since this monopoly was directly controlled, besides the planting of tobacco, also the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes, the government set up five factories in Manila. Starting with a few hundred workers, these factories were employing a total of around twenty thousand workers during the years from 1850 to 1882. Factory oper-
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The convergence of thousands of workers in a single place necessarily developed in them recognition of their solidarity of interest as Filipinos, though not yet as proletarians. This inchoate sense of solidarity provided form to the blind, spontaneous unrest of earlier years; later it was to constitute a base of support for the Katipunan.

A more cohesive core of the oppressed was slowly being engendered by capitalist enterprise; a definite working class was in the offing although the milieu still retained many of the hierarchical ideas that were a residue of the feudal atavism of the Spanish administration.

Depression in Countryside

In the countryside, perhaps more than in the city, economic progress had depressed the living standards of the masses, both absolutely and relatively. The successful development of cash crops for export intensified exploitation and suffering in a number of ways. Land rentals were increased from year to year; tenants forced by landowners to concentrate on cash crops were no longer sure of their food supply; cottage industries, principally weaving, which augmented farm income were destroyed by competition from imports. But above all, the export-crop economy increased the value of land and the desirability of owning as many hectares as possible. The religious orders and other Spanish landowners, the native principalities and the rising class of Chinese mestizos all took advantage of the various land laws, the mortgage law, and the pacto de retroventa to dispose of ignorant and poor peasants of their small plots.

Unrest was particularly strong in the religious estates. In 1888, the tenants of Calamba were dispossessed by the Dominicans. There were some agrarian uprisings against the Jesuits. These were led by inquilinos or middlemen-landowners but their activities against the religious corporations drew support from the masses.

The Land Question

It is not difficult to imagine the bitter anger of poor people forced to work as tenants of the new owners on land their ancestors had regarded as their own for generations. Resentment was particularly great against the landgrabbing activities of the friars and against their other exploitative practices. Not only were they Spaniards, they were religious against whom the charges of hypocrisy and non-compliance with their own preaching might be levelled. To make matters worse, they were absentee landlords who left the management and supervision of their estates to administrators whose efficiency was measured in terms of their ability to extract more profit.

In his memoirs of the Revolution, Isabelo de los Reyes describes some of the exploitative practices of the friar estate administrators.

In San Juan del Monte, the scene of the first battles near Manila, I was told that the ground rent for one loang (ten square fathoms) of farm land was four pesos a year. Furthermore, the hacenderos imposed a surcharge of ten rials vellon for every mango tree planted by the inquilino; two and a half rials for every sapling of bamboo; and 35 cents for every ilang-ilang tree, which is planted only for its flowers.

It is reported of the friar hacenderos of Cavite that in cases where the ground rent is payable in money they assess it on the basis of an arbitrary price for paddy or hulled rice which they fix themselves; and if a tenant refused to agree to this they take back the land which he has under lease, land which he had been developing all this time at his own expense. If the ground rent is payable in kind, the lay brother in charge of collecting it has a sample cavan placed in a vessel of water, and if any grains float to the surface the entire crop is considered to have many of these hollow or empty grains. The rice is then winnowed by means of a high-powered winnowing machine which blows away much good grain, to the inquilino’s loss. Moreover, the rice soaked in water is not counted in the delivery, for it is considered customary to take it for the hacendero’s horses as gift.

The importance of the land question and the depth of the grievance against the friar landowners is evident from the fact that the first provinces that rose in revolt were those in which there were extensive friar estates. (See Chapter 6)

Immediate Causes

That the resentments that had been building up over the years against Spanish colonialism and against the friars reached a peak towards the end of the nineteenth century was due to a number of immediate causes.

An economic depression had set in during the period from
1891 to 1895 which was characterized by an unstable currency and exchange fluctuations. This was especially hard on the Filipino laborer and the small producer. Even the higher wages since 1898 compensated only partly for the previous hardships imposed on the Filipino worker by a declining medium of exchange. And of course, by 1898 any amelioration was too late.

During the recession, hemp and sugar prices fell disastrously while the prices of imported goods rose because of the unfavorable exchange. Scarcity plus the higher cost of importation raised the price of rice, thus compounding the people’s difficulties. Indigo production was paralyzed and a canker which attacked the coffee plant drove coffee planters to bankruptcy.

In June and July of 1896, a locust infestation destroyed the rice fields of the provinces of Central Luzon. Despite this calamity which had come on top of a drought, the friar landowners refused to condone even a part of the rent and in certain instances even demanded an increase. Misery and desperation rallied the peasantry of Luzon to the cause of the Katipunan.

Convergence of Grievances

The economic crisis that aggravated the unrest of the masses also affected the native middle and upper classes. Aside from their own economic reverses, the misery of their countrymen gave greater impetus to their own resentments and encouraged them to make common cause with the people.

The ilustrado drive for political and economic parity with the Spaniards had manifested itself during the propaganda period in demands for reforms which had in turn been partially inspired by Spanish demands for reform of their own government. But the reform measures were too partial and came too late, were for the most part impractical or unsuited to Philippine conditions, and were often not implemented at all. If a governor general was opposed to a given decree, he could delay its implementation in the hope that a political change in the Spanish capital would result in its repeal. These swings in Spanish politics from reaction to liberalism and back again raised the Filipino’s hopes for reform only to doom them to disappointment. Abuses and corruption were, however, constant ingredients of both liberal and reactionary administrations.

Filipino professionals had a special grievance. Filipino university graduates seldom received government positions. The few lawyers and physicians who were given employment had only temporary appointments.

The grievances of each class flowed together to form one common stream of national protest. Conditions were ripe for the advent of a revolutionary movement. Bonifacio and his group were, therefore, able to organize the Katipunan with a wider mass base.

The Katipunan

An analysis of the ideology of the Katipunan must begin with a look into the class backgrounds of its leaders and the ideological influences that helped to shape their thinking.

During the first election of the Katipunan, the following officers were chosen:

Deodato Arellano — president
Andres Bonifacio — comptroller
Ladislao Diwa — fiscal
Teodoro Plata — secretary
Valentin Diaz — treasurer

The original leadership of the Katipunan may be classified as lower-middle to middle-middle class. Deodato Arellano, its first president, studied bookkeeping at the Ateneo Municipal and upon graduation worked as assistant clerk in the artillery corps. He had been the secretary of the Liga Filipina and was in his house where the Katipunan was formed.

Teodoro Plata was the nephew of Gregoria de Jesus, Bonifacio’s second wife. His father was a mail carrier. He studied at the Escuela Municipal where he completed the segunda enseñanza. First employed as a clerk in Binondo, he later became a clerk of the court of first instance of Mindoro, his last post before he joined the Revolution at the instance of Bonifacio.

Ladislao Diwa was an employee of the court of Quiapo and subsequently became clerk of court in Pampanga where he proselytized for the Katipunan. He had worked actively under Bonifacio in the Liga Filipina.

Valentin Diaz was also a court clerk. He helped to draw up the statutes of the Katipunan.
Bonifacio

Bonifacio’s own lower middle class origins may be gleaned from his biography. His mother was a Spanish mestiza who used to work as a cabecilla in a cigarette factory. His father, a tailor, had served as a teniente mayor of Tondo. Bonifacio was born in Tondo in 1863. The early death of his parents forced him to quit school in order to support his brothers and sisters. Bonifacio first earned his livelihood by making walking canes and paper fans which he himself peddled. Later, he worked as a messenger for Fleming and Co. and as a salesman of tar and other goods sold by the same firm. His last job before the Revolution was as a bodeguero or house-keeper for Fressell and Company.

Poverty prevented him from going beyond the second year of high school but he was an avid reader, especially on the subject of revolution. When because of his revolutionary activities the Guardia Civil Veterana of Manila searched his home, they found among his papers copies of revolutionary speeches, masonic documents, a collection of La Solidaridad, and letters of Luna, del Pilar, and Rizal. Among his books were: Rizal’s Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, Les Miserables by Victor Hugo and The Wandering Jew by Eugene Sue. He also had biographies of presidents of the United States, books on the French Revolution, on international law, and on religion.

Influence of Palaridel

The ideas of Marcelo H. del Pilar exerted a strong influence on Bonifacio. Among the propagandists, it was del Pilar who ultimately saw the futility of fighting for reforms and was veering toward revolution. His chosen style of work, proof of his understanding of the masses, made this development possible. His experience in mass propaganda before he was forced to leave the country made him regard the reformists’ work in Spain only as a first stage. He intended to return in a year or two to work on what he called the second phase of the propaganda. While he did not specify what this would entail, in one of his letters he did refer to the expulsion of the friars as a task the Filipinos themselves must undertake. Unlike Rizal, del Pilar was sympathetic toward the Revolution. He declared himself in favor of insurrection as a “last remedy,” especially if the people no longer believed that peaceful means would suffice. Had he been in the country, his pen would have been just right for the Katipunan. Desperately poor, he died in Spain in 1836.

Bonifacio prized del Pilar’s sympathy and support and used his letters as guides to his thinking and action. Bonifacio submitted to del Pilar for his approval the by-laws of the KKK and made use of del Pilar’s letter approving of the organization of the revolutionary society to recruit more adherents. The Katipunan organ, the Kalayaan, carried del Pilar’s name as editor-in-chief, a ploy to throw off the authorities; this had del Pilar’s sanction. So great was Bonifacio’s admiration for del Pilar that he painstakingly copied the letters del Pilar had written to his brother-in-law, Deodato Arellano. Bonifacio treasured these letters and the ones he himself received as sacred relics of the Revolution and was guided by them.

Coming as they did from the lower echelons of the middle class, Bonifacio and his companions instinctively identified with the masses. Although the early leadership of the Katipunan was essentially middle class, many members of this class could be considered almost plebeian in social status, for in the evolving society of that time, class differentiation was not very marked in the lower levels. Thus it was possible for a bodeguero like Bonifacio or a book binder like Aguado del Rosario or court clerks and other small employees like the others to feel an instinctive affinity for the workingmen in the cities and for the peasants in the countryside. It was therefore possible for this middle-class organization to become the triggering force that would galvanize the masses into action because it expressed the masses’ own demands for freedom from Spanish colonialism and friar despotism.

Historic Initiative of the Masses

The Katipunan emerged as the natural heir of the revolutionary tradition of the people, a tradition which had manifested itself in uprising after uprising throughout three centuries of Spanish rule. However, these were fragmented struggles characterized by spontaneity devoid of ideology. They were the instinctual reactions of a people that could not as yet articulate its thoughts and its goals on a national scale. But this spontaneity flowed into the voids and the gaps of society giving rise to an initiative which though negative in nature already delineated, if vaguely, the positive reconstruction of the body politic. Each resistance was both a negative reaction to reality and a positive, if unarticulated attempt, to change the existing
order. Each revolt was a search for an alternative as yet inchoate in the mind, but deeply felt. When the material basis for a national consciousness emerged, it became possible to work on a national scale for an alternative to the colonial condition.

From its inception, the Katipunan set itself the task of arousing national feeling and working for the deliverance of the Filipino people as a whole from Spanish oppression and friar despotism. Believing that only a united people could achieve its own redemption, the Katipunan sought to lay the basis for this unity by fostering a stronger love of country and encouraging mutual aid. It saw all Filipinos as “equals and brothers” regardless of economic status.

The fact that Bonifacio and the other leaders belonged to intermediate classes made them susceptible to a view of society which blurred the conflict between classes, although Bonifacio himself voiced his resentment against those among the rich who were not sympathetic to the movement. The Katipunan’s approach was racial and anti-colonial. The anti-colonial basis of its principles led the leaders to the inescapable goal of independence.

Common Denominator

Because for them the motive force of the Revolution was simply a common grievance of all social strata against a common enemy, they sought to strengthen national unity by emphasizing the need for brotherhood. This is the explanation for their preoccupation with ethical behavior among the members of their organization.

In Bonifacio’s compendium of rules of conduct for Katipunan members entitled “The Duties of the Sons of the People,” and in the Kartilla or primer for the Katipunan written by Emilio Jacinto, close associate of Bonifacio and editor of the Katipunan paper, Kalayaan, we find many admonitions regarding the proper attitude towards women and regarding brotherly cooperation, and many suggestions for good behavior.

The Katipunan was in effect substituting its strictures for the preaching of the friars, with the important difference that this time the admonitions were for equals. The exhortations were addressed to rich and poor alike. There was no class approach. One might classify the aggregation as a primitive form of a united front welded together by a common desire for independence.

Bonifacio — a Synthesis

While the early revolts were movements without theory, the ilustrados were the exponents of theory without a movement. It took a Bonifacio to synthesize the two, for Bonifacio, though he came from the lower middle class, had the instincts of the masses. It is characteristic of the middle class that its members have latent inclinations toward both the upper and the lower class. To his credit, Bonifacio resolved this ambivalence decisively in favor of the masses whereas other leaders of similar economic status would later opt for absorption into the upper class, thus abandoning the people.

Bonifacio and his companions had enough education to be able to imbibe the liberal ideas of the time and transmit them to the people in their own writings. They were, therefore, able to articulate the desires of the people. But unlike the ilustrados, they were incapable of abstractions. Thus their writings voiced the raw ideas of the people.

The ilustrados on the other hand, having acquired more education, could articulate their demands with greater facility and skill; they had a greater mastery of the liberal ideas that could be projected and put to use in the struggles of their compatriots.

But these ilustrados were already acquiring a vested interest in the status quo, hence their aspirations were limited to asking for better accommodation within the system. Although they resented the lack of equality with the Spaniards, they were reaping some of the benefits accruing to the ruling class. Their struggles were therefore based on the preservation of the colonial relation; their goal was to become Spaniards. Although the country was in a revolutionary ferment and many of them were later drawn into the Revolution — particularly when it looked as if the Revolution might succeed — their participation was generally characterized by the prudence of men who from the start were ready for a retreat.

The ideas of Bonifacio did not have a solid ideological content. His was a primitive ideology based more or less on the dignity of man. But the great advance that must be credited to him and to his organization is that they raised the banner of separatism and saw clearly that revolution was the only way to achieve their goal.
Inchoate Ideology

The Katipunan ideology was the articulation of a people just discovering themselves. It was the inchoate ideology of a people that had just become a nation. It was a call for struggle, for separation. While it was a cry for independence, it was also a demand for democracy. And this democracy which took the most elementary form of a vague equality was the answer to the lack of democracy among the Filipinos because they were not the equals of the Spaniards.

In this primitive form, the people under Bonifacio's leadership had already seen the connection between anti-colonialism and democracy. But it was an imperfect view, for while the leaders identified themselves with the masses, they still had the residue of hierarchy which was a legacy from Spain. The masses, too, while now becoming conscious of their power, still looked up to leaders who came from a higher stratum.

In the early days of the Revolution it seemed as if the idealist goal of universal equality was within reach and all the revolutionists shared a common identification as Filipinos. The sincere leaders like Bonifacio failed to see the dangers of ilustrado ambition while the masses, despite their new-found dignity, trustingly followed the ilustrado leadership in their respective provinces.

The Katipunan failed to detect the fundamental bifurcation within its ranks which would soon erupt in a struggle for leadership.

Ilustrado Imprint

It was a beginning for the masses; it was also a beginning for the emerging leadership. Although the Supreme Council was a shadow government and the popular and town councils acted as governing bodies, the Katipunan's ideas of the government that would replace the existing one after the triumph of the Revolution were still vague.

The inchoate desires of the people were responsible for the inchoate declarations of Bonifacio. It took the ilustrados to give these desires more explicit form; at the same time they took care that the resulting creation would carry their imprint. Eventually, the Revolution became a people's war under elite leadership.
XI

Revolution and Compromise

The birth of the Katipunan on the day Rizal was banished to Dapitan aptly symbolized the passage of leadership from the hands of the assimilationist ilustrados to the separatist lower middle class leaders of the people. The ties of its leaders to its reformist predecessor, the Liga Filipina, caused the Katipunan to remain relatively inactive during the Liga’s existence.\(^1\) Bonifacio himself conscientiously performed organizational tasks for the Liga until its dissolution. It was as if he had been giving the reformist solution every chance to prove its worth.

In 1894, however, convinced that the only goal was separation and the only means revolution, Bonifacio activated the Katipunan. The drive for membership yielded adherents from the ranks of workers, peasants, soldiers, government employees, merchants, teachers and priests.\(^2\)

In a repressive colonial state, even the slightest link to a subversive organization like the Katipunan could mean imprisonment, torture, and even death for the suspected party. Nevertheless, recruitment began to gain momentum, a sign that the population was becoming ripe for revolutionary action. Mass sympathy and support is evident in the fact that Bonifacio was able to conduct meetings in Manila and its environs such as Montalban, Pasig, and Tondo under the very noses of the Spanish authorities. Many branches of the society were organized in this area.

Separatism Proclaimed

Although the Katipunan included among its objectives some that were reminiscent of the reformist Liga — mutual aid, defense of the poor and the oppressed, the struggle against religious fanaticism, and the moral uplift of its members — it
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was uncompromisingly separatist and believed in revolution to achieve this main goal. Both the means and the end were affirmed in an event that has been called the Cry of Montalban.

Toward the middle of 1894, Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto, and other leaders reconnoitered the mountains of San Mateo and Montalban in Rizal province for a possible base and hide-out. There, many humble Filipinos were initiated into the Katipunan as "Sons of the People." In one of the caves the revolutionaries vowed to take up arms and on its wall inscribed the words, "Long Live Philippine Independence!"3

Preparations for armed struggle proceeded apace with recruitment. Bonifacio advised Katipunan members to gather what arms they could get and also ordered that bolos be manufactured and distributed to the Katipunaros. Bolos would of course be no match for the Spaniards' Remingtons and Mausers, so Bonifacio attempted to partially remedy the imbalance by asking two Katipunaros who were employed in the Spanish arsenal to steal some rifles and pistols.4 But the bulk of revolutionary arms was eventually seized from the enemy.

According to Teodoro M. Kalaw:

The revolution was begun with no arms other than spears, bolos, and a few shotguns; but, as the engagements between the revolutionists and the Guardia Civil and the Spanish soldiers became more frequent, the number of guns and ammunition increased until the whole army of the revolution was well supplied.5

Kalaw's assessment is probably too sanguine. There is documentary evidence of insufficiency of weapons. In Cavite for example, all men without rifles were ordered to provide themselves with bows and arrows, and arms were moved from one battle front to another.6

Propaganda and Expansion

The propaganda aspect of the organization was handled by Emilio Jacinto who edited the Katipunan's newspaper, Kalayaan. Its first issue which appeared early in 1896 was very successful. Two thousand copies were printed. The issue contained an editorial purportedly penned by Marcelo H. del Pilar but actually written by Jacinto enjoining the people to strive for "solidarity and independence," a patriotic poem by Bonifacio, Jacinto's manifesto urging revolution, and an article by Dr. Pio Valenzuela on friar and civil guard abuses.

REVOLUTION AND COMPROMISE

Unfortunately, before the second issue could be printed, a government raid on the site of the Katipunan printing press put an end to the press and to the Kalayaan as well.7

The Katipunan quickly spread throughout the provinces of Luzon, to Panay in the Visayas, and even as far as Mindanao. On the eve of the Revolution, estimates of the size of the organization varied from Dr. Valenzuela's guess of 20,000 to Sastron's estimate of 123,500 to T.H. Pardo de Tavera's count of 400,000.10

Betrayal

But while enthusiasm for the struggle was high among the poor, this was far from being so among the wealthy. The Katipunan tried to enlist the aid of a millionaire, Don Francisco Roxas, for a contribution of P1,000 with which to purchase arms and ammunition. Roxas' reply was a threat to denounce the secret society to the government if any of its members bothered him again. Other prominent Filipinos were equally unresponsive. Antonio Luna, who would later become a celebrated revolutionary general, informed his superior at the municipal laboratory where he worked as a pharmacist that there were plans to rise up in arms.

Angry and disappointed, Bonifacio and Jacinto decided to manufacture fictitious documents implicating a list of rich Filipinos as heavy contributors to the Katipunan. These documents were discovered by the Spaniards, as they were meant to be. When the Revolution broke out, scores of prominent Filipinos were arrested. Despite his protestations of innocence, Francisco Roxas was executed. Luna was among those imprisoned.11

It was impossible for the rapidly growing Katipunan to remain secret for long. Impatient members met nightly in large numbers, thus arousing suspicion. Rumors about the existence of the secret society began to spread. The friars were the most assiduous in reporting their suspicions. Curates from various parishes in Manila and near-by towns continued to report on rumored seditious activities and secret nocturnal gatherings of suspicious persons, but all these reports were treated as hearsay by the governor-general who was not too well-disposed toward his friar compatriots.

It was not until August 19, 1896 that the Spanish authorities became convinced of the existence of the Katipunan. Teodoro Patiño, a worker in the printing shop of the Diario de Manila,
betrayed the Katipunan to Father Mariano Gil of Tondo. Gil immediately searched the printing shop of the *Diario de Manila* and found incriminating evidence confirming Patiño’s revelations. Under grilling by the military, Patiño revealed the names of his co-workers who were also Katipuneros. The betrayed Katipuneros were arrested and more evidence was found in their possession. Hundreds were then arrested and thrown into jail on suspicion of being connected with the movement.

“The Die Is Cast”

Bonifacio and other leaders of the Katipunan fled to Balintawak. Although the betrayal of the Katipunan had caught its members not yet fully prepared to wage an armed struggle, Bonifacio never wavered in his decision. He summoned Katipunan leaders to a mass meeting which was held in Pugadlawin, in the yard of a son of Melchor Aquino, a woman who would live in revolutionary legend as Tandang Sora, mother of the Katipunan.  

The meeting was a stormy one. Some believed it was premature to start the Revolution, but after much discussion the decisiveness of Bonifacio and Jacinto won the day. As a sign that they had broken all their ties with Spain and would fight her domination to the last, the Katipuneros tore their cedulas (certificates of citizenship) to pieces, shouting, “Long live the Philippines!” This stirring beginning occurred in Pugadlawin on August 23.

The Revolt Spreads

The first real encounter between the Spanish forces and the Katipunan took place in San Juan del Monte when Bonifacio and Jacinto led their men in an attack on the powder magazine in that town. The Katipuneros who had initially outnumbered the Spanish soldiers were forced to withdraw when government reinforcements arrived. Despite this rather shaky beginning, the popular enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause was very high. Almost simultaneously, the people of Santa Mesa, Pandacan, Pateros, Taguig, San Pedro Makati, Caloocan, Balik-Balik, and San Juan del Monte in Manila, and San Francisco de Malabon, Kawit and Noveleta in Cavite rose up in arms.

When Bonifacio, Jacinto, and other leaders like Macario Sakay, Apolonio Samson, Faustino Guillermo, and General Lucino (alias Payat) set up camp in the hills near Mariquina, San Mateo, and Montalban after the San Juan del Monte battle, new adherents to the revolutionary cause arrived daily to join them. Their strength augmented, they attacked the Spanish troops in San Mateo. The Spaniards retreated leaving the rebels in control of the town. But they successfully counter-attacked a few days later. Bonifacio and his men then retreated to Balara.  

Reign of Terror

On the day of the San Juan encounter, Governor-General Ramon Blanco, now fully convinced of the gravity of the situation, proclaimed the existence of a state of war in Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas. The governor also authorized the organization of the *Batallon de Leales Voluntarios de Manila*.

Under strong pressure from the frantic Spanish community in Manila, Blanco inaugurated a reign of terror in the belief that this would quell the nascent rebellion. Every day, people were arrested, homes were searched and the property of suspected rebels confiscated. Suspects packed Fort Santiago; many suffered unspeakable tortures. The luckier ones were banished to the Carolines or to Spanish Africa.

Soon after its proclamation of a state of war, the government began a series of executions. On September 4, four members of the Katipunan were executed at the Luneta. On September 12, thirteen were put to death in Cavite and are now remembered as “Los Trece Martyres de Cavite” (The Thirteen Martyrs of Cavite). Other executions were carried out in Pampanga, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija. The one most deeply felt by the Filipinos was the execution of Jose Rizal on December 30, 1896.

It was a stupid, vengeful act, for Rizal was completely innocent of the charge of rebellion. True, the Katipuneros admired him for his intellectual achievements and had asked him to join them, but he had refused to participate in or even to lend his name to the revolutionary cause. In a statement from his Fort Santiago cell, he had vehemently repudiated the Revolution, a reformist to the end. In fact, when arrested he had been on his way to Cuba to use his medical skills in the service of Spain.
Swelling Forces of Revolt

The reign of terror that began in September, far from discouraging the Filipinos, only swelled the forces of the Revolution. Before the month of September ended, the whole of Cavite and most of Nueva Ecija and Bulacan had revolted, Batangas and Laguna also declared themselves for the Revolution as did the two Camarines provinces. In Nueva Ecija, two thousand revolucionarios under Mariano Llanera, municipal captain of Cabiao, attacked the Spanish garrison in San Isidro on September 2. The assault was carried out in a flamboyant manner. Wearing red ribbons, the revolutionaries first paraded down the principal streets to the music of the Cabiao band. Their leaders cut dashing figures on horseback. Then, armed only with bols and pointed sticks, the revolutionary soldiers attacked. The Filipinos held the town for three days but were forced out after a furious battle against fresh Spanish troops. 18

Bataan and Zambales also joined the Revolution. In Hermosa, Bataan, the people killed the parish priest. Spanish troops dispatched to quell the revolt were confronted by three thousand revolutionaries who had come from Hermosa and Dinalupihan in Bataan and from some Pampango towns to do battle. Pampanga and Morong were becoming restive; a conspiracy was discovered in Vigan, Ilocos Sur which involved prominent citizens.

The revolutionary ferment reached as far south as Puerto Princesa in Palawan where Filipino soldiers serving in the Spanish army mutinied and assaulted their Spanish officers. Although many encounters were indecisive or ended in defeat for the Katipuneros, the Spanish forces were continually harassed and divided by the many simultaneous and spontaneous risings in different provinces. While not all the revolutionary actions were coordinated by the Katipunan, the Revolution itself had become generalized.

The Plot Begins

But within that part of the Revolution under the direction of the Katipunan there were early indications that the rebels in Cavite under the command of Emilio Aguinaldo were thinking in terms of a new government and a new leadership. The Katipunan had two rival provincial councils in Cavite: the Magdiwang led by Mariano Alvarez, Bonifacio's uncle-in-law, and the Magdalo whose President was Baldomero Aguinaldo, Emilio Aguinaldo's cousin. Magdalo was the nom-de-guerre chosen by Emilio Aguinaldo when he was inducted by Bonifacio into the Katipunan. He chose it in honor of the patron saint of his town, St. Mary Magdalene. 19 The fact that the council was called Magdalo shows that despite Baldomero's being president, it was Emilio who was its leading light. Both councils were very active in their respective areas; both won victories against the Spanish troops, thus making Cavite the most successful area for the Revolution.

Emilio Aguinaldo, mayor of Kawit, was then known as Capitan Miong. He won a signal victory in Imus on September 5, 1896 against the forces of General Aguirre. From then on he became General Miong, the hero of the Caviteños.

General Aguinaldo issued two decrees on October 31, 1896 declaring the aim of the Revolution to be the independence of the Philippines and urging all Filipinos to "follow the example of civilized European and American nations" in fighting for freedom. He called on them to "march under the Flag of the Revolution whose watch-words are Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity!" 20

Pre-emptive Leadership

While these manifestos consisted for the most part of inspirational rhetoric, certain passages deserve scrutiny as possible indications of the thinking of Aguinaldo and his faction. Magdalo was only one of two provincial councils of the Katipunan in Cavite, yet the texts make no mention at all of the parent organization (although a K appears on the seal on each document) whose ideals and goals were the very ones Aguinaldo was urging on the people. Although Aguinaldo signed himself Magdalo, he was not confining his appeals to the Caviteños within the jurisdiction of the Magdalo council for he addressed both manifestos to all Filipino citizens. In one manifesto he informed his countrymen of a fait accompli: "We (the Magdalo council, by implication) have established a provisional Government in the towns that have been pacified." This government, he declared, has a "Revolutionary Committee whose task is to carry on the war until all the Islands are freed." In the name of this Revolutionary Committee, Aguinaldo asked all Filipino citizens to take up arms and to recognize "the new Government of the Revolution." 21

In the second manifesto of the same date, Aguinaldo again
A central committee of the Revolution composed of six members and a president will be charged with the continuation of the war, will organize an army of thirty thousand men, with rifles and cannon, for the defense of the pueblos and provinces which adhere to the new Republican Government which will establish order while the revolution spreads through all the islands of the Philippines. The form of government will be like that of the United States of America, founded upon the most rigid principles of liberty, fraternity and equality.\textsuperscript{22}

On the basis of these documents, one is forced to the conclusion that Aguinaldo and the other leaders of Magdalo, flushed with victory, had decided early to discard the original Katipunan organization and pre-empt the leadership of the Revolution. Through these manifestos Emilio Aguinaldo and the Magdalo council were placing themselves at the directing center of the Revolution. What in one paragraph is announced as a "provisional Government in the towns that have been pacified" becomes farther down "the new Revolutionary Government" which the Filipino people are asked to recognize, and to which other towns and provinces are asked to adhere. To organize a provisional government for the liberated towns of Cavite was within the jurisdiction of both the Magdalo and Magdiwang Councils under the Katipunan, but to ask the entire country to recognize one provincial committee as the Revolutionary government was in clear disregard of the Katipunan organization. Bonifacio was still the acknowledged leader of the Katipunan, therefore leadership could not pass on to Magdalo unless and until the Katipunan was superseded by a Revolutionary Government.

In both manifestos Aguinaldo appeals to the people in the name of a Revolutionary Committee which appears to be the executive arm of the Revolutionary Government, but no identification of this committee is made. Magdalo had elected a "government" with Baldomero Aguinaldo as president and Emilio Aguinaldo as commander-in-chief. Was this the committee referred to? Magdiwang had a similar committee. Obviously Aguinaldo's decree was also directed against the Magdiwang on the local level. Tejerers, still five months away, would confirm the anti-Katipunan and anti-Bonifacio implications of the manifestos of October 31, 1896.

As the campaign of the Spanish government progressed, Bonifacio suffered defeat after defeat. Bonifacio was no military leader; his knowledge of military affairs was slight. What he possessed to an admirable degree was stoutness of heart and the singleness of purpose to fight for his country's liberty. This, however, did not prove enough in the face of an enemy with superior military resources and preparation. Bonifacio's prestige suffered at a time when Aguinaldo and the Caviteño rebels were gaining renown in their area through their victories.

The Plot Thickens

Victory exacerbated the rivalry between Magdiwang and Magdalo. Each one held sway over its own territory; they fought independently of one another. In certain instances, Aguinaldo's men did not come to the aid of Magdiwang towns under attack; Magdiwang men for their part did not help defend towns under Magdalo jurisdiction. When the new Spanish governor-general, Camilo de Polavieja, began concentrating his forces on Cavite, this rivalry between the two factions proved disastrous for the Revolution.

Military reverses led the Magdiwang leaders to invite Bonifacio to visit Cavite and intervene in the conflict. Bonifacio must have gone to Cavite that December thinking that as the Katipunan Supremo his mediation would be respected. Instead, two incidents occurred upon his arrival which were portents of further and more serious disagreements.

The first incident occurred when Emilio Aguinaldo and Edilberto Evangelista, a Belgian-educated Filipino engineer, went to meet Bonifacio at Zapote. They came away disgusted with what they regarded as Bonifacio's attitude of superiority. Aguinaldo recalled that the Supremo "acted as if he were a king."\textsuperscript{23}

The Magdalo men kept their feelings to themselves. However, it is possible that the opinion of the Magdalo men was a result, not so much of Bonifacio's behavior as of their own supercilious attitude toward a man they regarded as educationally and socially their inferior and whom they may have already thought of replacing, as the October 31 decrees seem to indicate.

The second incident involved another Aguinaldo and Daniel Tirona. Baldomero Aguinaldo and Tirona, accompanied by a certain Vicente Fernandez, also visited Bonifacio. Fernandez had been the very man who had failed to keep his promise to attack the Spaniards in Laguna and Morong simultaneously with Bonifacio's assault on San Juan del Monte. Bonifacio recognized him and ordered Fernandez' arrest but the
Magdalo leaders refused to surrender him. Bonifacio realized then how little his influence counted with the Magdalo faction.

The people were unaware of the personal animosities wracking the leadership of their Revolution. In Noveleta, the townspeople received Bonifacio enthusiastically, shouting, "Long live the ruler of the Philippines!" to which Bonifacio replied, "Long live Philippine Liberty!"124

Character Assassination

The people's acclamation evidently did not impress the Magdalo elite nor deter them from their plans.

According to General Artemio Ricarte, a few days after Bonifacio's arrival in Cavite, anonymous letters suddenly appeared all over the province and especially in San Francisco de Malabon where Bonifacio was staying, urging the Caviteños not to idolize Bonifacio because the Katipunan head was a mason, an atheist, and an uneducated man, a mere employee of a German firm. Bonifacio, suspecting Daniel Tirona to be the author, confronted the latter and demanded satisfaction. Tirona refused in a manner so arrogant that Bonifacio, greatly angered, drew his gun and might have shot Tirona then and there had not some women intervened.25

Undermining the Katipunan

The Imus assembly of December 31 was avowedly called for the purpose of determining once and for all the leadership of the province so as to resolve the rivalry between Magdiwang and Magdalo. Instead, the man who had been invited to mediate the conflict found his own position as leader of the Revolution directly challenged. The assembly was asked to decide whether the Katipunan should continue leading the Revolution or be replaced by a new revolutionary government. It was Baldomero Aguinaldo who proposed the establishment of a revolutionary government. The Magdalo leaders were well prepared; they promptly submitted a constitution for the proposed government. This had been prepared by Edilberto Evangelista.26

The assembly was divided. Those who favored the continuance of the Katipunan argued that it had its own constitution and by-laws and that it still had to carry out its mission to achieve Philippine independence. Moreover, provincial and municipal governments in Manila and its environs had already been established in accordance with the Katipunan constitution.

"Cavitismo"

Those who were against the Katipunan contended that it was merely a secret society which should have ceased to exist the moment the Revolution emerged in the open. They also declared that Cavite being small, it should not be divided between two groups. They apparently believed that the establishment of their proposed revolutionary government was a matter of consolidating the two revolutionary governments in Cavite.27 This is another indication of the chauvinism that animated the temporarily victorious Caviteños. For them, it seemed, the Revolution was only in Cavite and its leadership must therefore be Caviteño.

The Imus assembly further deepened the rift between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. For his part, Bonifacio showed partiality toward the Magdiwang. Aguinaldo on the other hand, threatened Bonifacio directly by his active campaign to elect Edilberto Evangelista president of the revolutionary government should his group's proposal to establish such a government be approved. Aguinaldo's reason was that among all of them "Evangelista was the best educated."28

Accounts vary as to how the Imus assembly ended. Some say that nothing was resolved except that the leaders present agreed to meet again. Teodoro M. Kalaw says:

At the conclusion of the Assembly, Andres Bonifacio was given carte blanche for the designation of a number of persons who were to form with him a legislative body that was to draw up the bases for the reorganization.29

Ricarte has the same version in his Memoirs and adds that before the session closed, Bonifacio asked that the decision be put in writing. This was not done because of the arrival of Paciano Rizal and Josephine Bracken, widow of Dr. Jose Rizal.30

Ricarte further reveals that in the succeeding days Bonifacio repeatedly asked for the minutes so that he might have written authorization upon which to base his actions, but such minutes were not given to him. Historians have doubted Ricarte's version on the ground that the Magdiwangs to whom Bonifacio was partial had taken charge of the meeting. However,
Bonifacio did make passing mention of the absence of these minutes in a letter to Jacinto. (See Bonifacio Out maneuvered)

The Power Struggle

On March 22, 1897, the Magdiwang and Magdalo councils met once more, this time at the friar estate house in Tejeros, a barrio of San Francisco de Malabon. This convention proved even stormier than the Imus meeting and, as in Imus, the declared objective of the meeting was not even discussed.

According to Jacinto Lumbreras, a Magdiwang and the first presiding officer of the Tejeros Convention, the meeting had been called to adopt measures for the defense of Cavite. Again, this subject was not discussed and instead the assembled leaders, including the Magdiwangs, decided to elect the officers of the revolutionary government, thus unceremoniously discarding the Supreme Council of the Katipunan under whose standard the people had been fighting and would continue to fight.

Bonifacio presided, though reluctantly, over the election. Beforehand, he secured the unanimous pledge of the assembly to abide by the majority decision. The results were:

- President: Emilio Aguinaldo
- Vice-President: Mariano Trias
- Captain-General: Artemio Ricarte
- Director of War: Emiliano Riego de Dios
- Director of the Interior: Andres Bonifacio

The Triumph of Cavismo

Emilio Aguinaldo had been awarded the highest prize of the Revolution on his own birth anniversary, although he was not present, being busy at a military front in Pasong Santol, a barrio of Imus. As for Bonifacio, the death-blow to the Katipunan and his election as a mere Director of the Interior showed clearly that he had been maneuvered out of power. It must have been a bitter pill to swallow, especially since even the Magdiwangs who were supposed to be his supporters did not vote for him either for President or Vice-President.

But another insult was yet to follow. Evidently, the Caviteño elite could not accept an “uneducated” man, and a non-Caviteño at that, even for the minor post of Director of the Interior. Daniel Tirona protested Bonifacio’s election saying that the post should not be occupied by a person without a lawyer’s diploma. He suggested a Caviteño lawyer, Jose del Rosario, for the position.

This was clearly an intended insult. It naturally infuriated Bonifacio who thereupon hotly declared: “I, as chairman of this assembly and as President of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, as all of you do not deny, declare this assembly dissolved, and I annul all that has been approved and resolved.”

Bonifacio Outmaneuvered

In a letter to his friend, Emilio Jacinto, Bonifacio made known his reluctance to hold the elections because of the absence of representatives from other districts. He also cited the Imus agreement which authorized him to appoint a body that would formulate the bases for a reorganization. In his view, even this preliminary step could not be taken because of the minutes of the Imus Convention rendered its acts of doubtful validity. Bonifacio admitted to Jacinto that despite his misgivings he acceded to the election of officers because it was the will of the majority of those present. In the following passage from his letter, Bonifacio hints at plots and pressures in the campaign for Aguinaldo’s election.

... before the elections were held, I discovered the underhanded scheme of some of those from Imus who were quietly and secretly spreading the word that it was not good that they should be under the leadership of men from other towns. Because of this, Captain Emilio Aguinaldo was elected President. As soon as I heard about this, I said that this meeting was nothing more than a scheme of people with bad consciences because that was all that they wanted [obviously referring to Aguinaldo’s election] and they were deceiving the people, and I added that if they wished me to point out, one by one, those who comport themselves in this manner, I would do so. Those present said that this was no longer necessary. I also said that if the will of those present was not followed I would not recognize those already elected, and if I would not recognize them they would not be recognized by our people there. General Ricarte who was elected General also declared that that meeting was the result of evil machinations.

The simple Bonifacio had been badly outmaneuvered. Although it was his duty to mediate quarrels within his organization, his going to Cavite may be termed a tactical error especially at a time when he had been suffering military reverses
while the Caviteños had been winning victories. Bonifacio had few friends in Cavite. On the other hand, the victories of the Cavite rebels were bound to arouse strong feelings of regionalism and pride in their local champion, General Aguinaldo.

But Bonifacio’s biggest error lay in his failure to insist that representatives from other provinces be present to participate in such a crucial decision. His suspicions should have been aroused by the unexpected agitation for the formation of a central government to supersede the Katipunan, but he was too naive and trusting and perhaps also too secure in his pre-eminent position in the movement to think that anyone could be planning to wrest the leadership from his hands.

**Ilustrado Syndrome**

A fundamental factor underlying the power-play at Tejeros may be deduced from Tirona’s attack on Bonifacio for the latter’s lack of education. It pointed up the typical ilustrado belief that leadership should be the exclusive prerogative of the educated. Now that the Revolution appeared to have good expectations of success, those with present or prospective interests to protect wanted its leadership securely in their hands.

The birth of the Katipunan marked the passage of the leadership of the movement from the hands of the ilustrados to a leadership based on the people; the elections at Tejeros symbolized the seizure by a provincial elite of the leadership of a mass movement that held prospects of success. As the Revolution gained further ground, the Caviteños would find themselves yielding power and position to the Manila elite.

Tejeros was the defeat of the revolution of the masses; it was the victory of a clique intent on taking advantage of the historic initiative of the people and the momentum the Revolution had already acquired. Future events would demonstrate how the revolutionary forces of the people would be used as a bargaining lever by the elite for the protection of their own interests.

**Sharing Honors**

Aguinaldo took his oath of office the day after the Tejeros assembly. The composition of his government was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emilio Aguinaldo</th>
<th>President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mariano Trias</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**REVOLUTION AND COMPROMISE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artemio Ricarte</th>
<th>Captain-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emiliano Riego de Dios</td>
<td>Director of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascual Alvarez</td>
<td>Director of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacinto Lumbresas</td>
<td>Director of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldomero Aguinaldo</td>
<td>Director of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariano Alvarez</td>
<td>Director of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severino de las Alas</td>
<td>Director of Justice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of Ricarte who hailed from Batac, Ilocos Norte, all of these men were Caviteños born and bred. Ricarte himself was practically a Caviteño, being a permanent resident of the province. Of greater significance was the fact that these men belonged to the elite of Cavite. They had taken college courses in such Manila schools as San Juan de Letran, Ateneo, Sto. Tomas, and San Jose. Ricarte and Mariano Alvarez were school teachers; de las Alas was a lawyer. Some of them occupied official positions. Emilio Aguinaldo was municipal captain (mayor) of Kawit in 1895 and his cousin Baldomero was justice of the peace of the same town. Mariano Alvarez had been a municipal captain and later justice of the peace of Noveleta.

Aside from the Aguinaldos who belonged to Magdalo, all the other elected officials were members of the Magdiwang Council. So in the last analysis, the rivalry between Magdalo and Magdiwang leaders was resolved by booting out the non-Caviteño and sharing the honors among themselves.

Between Imus and Tejeros, some change seems to have occurred in the Magdiwang position. Whereas in Imus the Magdiwang partisans were firmly for continuing the Revolution under Katipunan direction and would agree to a revolutionary government only if Bonifacio were automatically made president with power to appoint the ministers, in Tejeros it was a Magdiwang, Severino de las Alas, who opened the question as to the kind of government that should be set up. Subsequently, even the Magdiwangs voted in favor of establishing a new revolutionary government to supplant the Katipunan. The results of the elections in which the Magdiwangs got all the positions except the Presidency and the Finance portfolio indicate that the majority of the Magdiwang leaders had abandoned or would soon abandon Bonifacio.

Evidently their major differences with the Magdalo Council were resolved with this apportionment of positions. Cavismo won the day. This also ties up with Bonifacio’s charge of a secret pro-Caviteño campaign. In this connection, it should be
noted that none of the other leaders of the Katipunan, notably Jacinto, were even mentioned for positions at Tejeros.

Rival Power Centers

Bonifacio refused to recognize the new government. In a document drawn at Tejeros (the Acta de Tejeros) and in another signed at Naic (the Naic Military Agreement) Bonifacio reasserted his leadership of the Revolution. Charging fraud and pressure in the Tejeros elections and accusing the Aguinaldo faction of treason by “sowing discord and conniving with the Spaniards,” Bonifacio and the other signatories of the Naic agreement served notice that they were determined to continue direction of the Revolution. The Naic Military Agreement appointed General Pio del Pilar as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary forces. Bonifacio also appointed Emilio Jacinto general of the North Military Area comprising the provinces of Morong (Rizal), Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Manila.

Bonifacio again attempted to assert his authority by ordering the re-arrest of Spanish prisoners whom the Aguinaldo government in one of its first acts had ordered freed. The escorts of these prisoners were General Tomas Mascardo and Cayetano Topacio. Furthermore, Bonifacio was then planning to go to Batangas where the regional government had recognized his authority.

There were now two declared and rival foci of power. In the ensuing struggle, several prominent leaders initially vacillated between the two. But this was Cavite and Bonifacio was not only a non-Caviteño among predominantly Caviteño leaders but worse, a propertyless man in the midst of the Cavite elite. Moreover, Aguinaldo had won an election. This gave his position a stamp of legality which carried weight with the ilustrados. Bonifacio did not have a chance. With more or less naked opportunism, those who at first joined him later abandoned the founder of the Katipunan and turned against him.

Contrite Turncoats

Among these leaders were Artemio Ricarte, Pio del Pilar, and Severino de las Alas, all signatories of the Naic Military Agreement. General Ricarte was persuaded by the Aguinaldo group to take his oath as Captain-General. General Pio del Pilar, whom Aguinaldo had discovered together with General Noriel conferring with Bonifacio in Naic, readily switched sides admitting contritely, according to Aguinaldo, that Noriel and he “were blinded by false promises.” It is interesting to note how del Pilar, Noriel and de las Alas were afterwards able, each in his own way, to make up for having once supported Bonifacio. Del Pilar testified in the trial of Bonifacio alleging that the latter had been forcing officers to join him. Later, he and General Noriel were among those adamantly opposed to the commutation of Bonifacio’s sentence—“for the cause of the Revolution.”

As for Severino de las Alas, it was he who made the patently false charges that the friars had bribed Bonifacio to establish the Katipunan and egg the Filipinos into fighting a war for which they were poorly armed, that Bonifacio ordered the burning of the convent and church of Indang, that his soldiers had taken by force from the people carabao and other animals, and finally that Bonifacio and his men were planning to surrender to the Spaniards.

From Aguinaldo’s point of view, Bonifacio was a threat. He had to be eliminated. He therefore ordered Col. Agapito Bonzon to arrest Bonifacio and his brothers. They were charged with sedition and treason before a military court presided over by General Mariano Noriel.

The trial opened on April 20, 1897 and was over by May 4 despite a change of venue due to military reverses.

The Mock Trial

The trial was a farce from beginning to end. Personal prejudice and the very fact that the man on trial was the enemy of President Aguinaldo made a verdict of guilty a foregone conclusion.

Consider these facts: first, all the members of the Council of War, were Aguinaldo men including not only Gen. Noriel but also Gen. Tomas Mascardo whom Bonifacio had earlier arrested in connection with the freeing of Spanish prisoners; second, Bonifacio’s counsel, Placido Martinez, acted more like a prosecutor, going so far as to say that if a punishment worse than death was available, Bonifacio deserved it for plotting Aguinaldo’s death; third, the court gave credence to the fantastic story of Lt. Col. Pedro Giron, a Bonifacio partisan turned state witness, who said that Bonifacio had given him ten pesos in advance to kill Aguinaldo in case the latter did not submit to Bonifacio’s authority. During the trial, Bonifacio
was told that he could not confront Giron as the latter had been
killed in Naic, but after Bonifacio’s death, Giron was seen in the
company of the prosecutors. \(^{42}\)

The actual trial before Noriel lasted only one day, May 5. On
May 6, the decision was ready. On May 8, Baldomero
Aguinaldo, now auditor of war, recommended to his cousin, the
President, approval of the decision rendered by the court on the
ground that it had been proven that Bonifacio wanted to kill
the President and overthrow the government. On the same day,
Aguinaldo commuted the death sentence to banishment but was
persuaded by Generals Noriel and del Pilar to allow the sentence
to stand. On May 10, Major Lazaro Makapagal who had acted as
Secretary of the court martial carried out Noriel’s order of
execution.

Bonifacio’s Role Appraised

Historians may choose to evaluate the charge of sedition
against Bonifacio on formalistic grounds or they may assess the
two protagonists, Aguinaldo and Bonifacio, in terms of their
adherence to the people’s revolutionary goals. The second
criterion is certainly the fundamental one.

The Cavite leaders condemned Bonifacio for his refusal to
submit to what they claimed was duly constituted authority on
the basis of the election at Tejeros. But even setting aside
Bonifacio’s charges of a rigged election and the obvious
maneuvers that preceded this election, there remains the
question of representation. It was very clear from the start as
well as from the roster of elected officials that other revolution-
ary councils were neither represented nor consulted. In his
letters to Jacinto, Bonifacio mentioned his misgivings on this
score although his position is weakened by his having consented
to the election.

As far as the Katipunan was concerned, the Revolution was
being conducted in separate areas by various members of the
organization, and no thought of setting up a formal government
had been entertained because of the pressures of conducting the
uprising. A careful scrutiny of events supports the conclusion
that the sudden call on October 31, 1896 for a revolutionary
government was in fact a planned pre-emptive action of the
Cavite leadership executed at a time when its victories within
the province spurred elitist ambitions to seize the control and
direction of the Revolution. The fact that the Cavite leadership
later succeeded in bringing under its wing other forces in other

provinces gave it formal status, but it should not be forgotten
that at its inception no matter how it represented itself, it was
no more than a provincial government without representation
even from the other Tagalog provinces alone. The regional
government of Batangas, for example, recognized Bonifacio.

Bonifacio could not have been dangerous to the Revolution
as a whole for he remained resolved to continue the anti-
Spanish struggle. Neither was he a threat to the revolutionary
movement in Cavite since he was planning to move out of
Cavite. But he was a threat to the Cavite leadership that wanted
to seize control of the entire Revolution, and for this reason he
had to be eliminated. Given Bonifacio’s prestige with the masses
as the Katipunan Supremo, Aguinaldo’s leadership could be
stabilized only with Bonifacio’s death.

Bonifacio’s actions after Tejeros have been branded by some
as counter-revolutionary. This charge touches on the fundamen-
tal question of who among the protagonists adhered most
faithfully to the people’s revolutionary goals. Up to the time of
his death, Bonifacio had no record of compromise nor did he
ever issue any statement of doubtful patriotism. His actions
were uncompromising against the enemy and stern toward those
who showed weakness before the Spaniards. On the other hand,
the group that eliminated Bonifacio was the one that sub-
sequently entered into a series of compromises with the enemy
which negated the original objectives of the Revolution.
Resistance to the forces of compromise cannot be counter-
revolutionary.

The defeat of Bonifacio at Tejeros was the defeat of the
Revolution. The initial success of the Revolution which had
influenced many members of the local elite to join the
movement complicated the composition of the leadership; the
elimination of Bonifacio simplified both the leadership and its
alternatives. There was only one logical outcome of the triumph
of the elite. Leading the Revolution meant leading it to suit the
desires of those who had interests to defend. Such a leader-
ship could offer only a vacillating attitude towards the enemy.

The Long Trek to Compromise

Aguinaldo’s moment of triumph at Tejeros was short-lived.
Even as the leaders occupied themselves with jockeying for
position and consolidating control over the revolutionary movement, Governor Camilo de Polavieja launched a determined offensive on Cavite. On March 25, three days after the Tejeros convention, Imus fell to the Spaniards. Bacoor, Noveleta, Kawit, Binakayan, and Santa Cruz de Malabon were captured in quick succession. A bloody hand-to-hand fight failed to save San Francisco de Malabon. After its fall on April 6, the towns around it submitted to Spanish occupation.\(^\text{43}\)

Aguinaldo retreated to Naic. Many patriotic volunteers, ignoring an amnesty proclamation, continued to reinforce his ranks, but on May 3, after a bloody battle, Aguinaldo was forced to retreat again. Defeat followed defeat until by May 17, the whole of Cavite was once more in Spanish hands.\(^\text{44}\)

Aguinaldo fled to Talisay, Batangas where he joined up with General Miguel Malvar. Spanish troops attacked Talisay on May 30 inflicting another defeat on the combined forces of the two generals. Aguinaldo then left Batangas with around five hundred men. June 10 found him camped at Mount Puray near Montalban where on June 14, 1897, he won a victory against Spanish forces that attacked his headquarters. Deciding that Biak-na-Bato in San Miguel, Bulacan, provided a more favorable terrain for his base, Aguinaldo moved his headquarters there.

Reformist Atavism

In July, a manifesto appeared bearing the nom-de-guerre, Malabar.\(^\text{45}\) Almost identical manifesto issued by Aguinaldo in September proves that the earlier one was as his as well. The Malabar manifesto is a curious document. It called on “the brave sons of the Philippines” to shift to guerrilla warfare and ambushes so that the rebel forces could thus “for an indefinite period, defy Spain, exhaust her resources, and oblige her to surrender from poverty . . . .” It advocated the extension of the revolutionary movement to other provinces so that once the Revolution had become general the revolutionaries could attain their goals. This sounded like a call for a protracted struggle, for a war of attrition — until we examine closely what Aguinaldo calls “the ends which we all so ardently desire.” They were:

1. Expulsion of the friars and restitution to the townships of the lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbrances held by them, as well as the episcopal sees equally between Peninsular and Insular secular priests.

2. Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba, Parliamentary representation, freedom of the Press, toleration of all religious sects, laws common with hers, and administrative and economic autonomy.

3. Equality in treatment and pay between Peninsular and Insular civil servants.

4. Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or in default of finding such owners, the State is to put them up to public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all and payable within four years, the same as the present State lands.

5. Abolition of the Government authorities power to banish citizens, as well as all unjust measures against Filipinos; legal equality for all persons, whether Peninsular or Insular, under the Civil as well as the Penal Code.\(^\text{46}\)

Coming from the leader of the Revolution, these demands were strange indeed for they were all premised on the continuation of Spanish sovereignty. They were goals appropriate for the earlier reform movement and constituted a clear abandonment of the fundamental revolutionary objective of the Katipunan under Bonifacio: separation from Spain, independence.

As far as the class that now led the Revolution was concerned, it was running true to form: willing to fight but ready for retreat, capable of fighting bravely but prudently preferring to negotiate in pursuance of its own interests. The formula, evidently, was to use the fighting as a leverage for negotiations. There is a clear indication of this frame of mind in this very manifesto where Aguinaldo was calling for protracted hostilities. His last sentence read:

“...The war must be prolonged to give the greatest signs of vitality possible so that Spain may be compelled to grant our demands. Otherwise she will consider us an effete race and curtail, rather than extend our rights.\(^\text{47}\)"

This manifesto was widely circulated even in Spanish-controlled areas. If the Spanish authorities read it, as they most probably did, could they have failed to note Aguinaldo’s willingness to accept the continuation of Spanish rule?

By August, different groups had begun resorting to guerrilla tactics. The forces of Generals Ricarte, Riego de Dios, Severino de las Alas, and Baldomero Aguinaldo attacked several Spanish
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Garrisons. There were two attacks on San Rafael, Bulacan, both repulsed by the Spaniards and a successful one on Paombong by Col. Gregorio del Pilar on August 31.

Six thousand men under Ramon Tagle fought a bloody battle in Mount Taao near Atimonan, Tayabas from September 3 to 9 but lost to the Spanish troops. Tagle was captured and executed. While this battle raged, Generals Llanera, Manuel Tinio, and Mamerto Natividad attacked Aliaga in Nueva Ecija. It took eight thousand troops to repel the attackers. Guerrillas also operated in Batangas, Laguna, Zambales, and Pangasinan.8

The people continued to fight. In early October the garrisons of Concepcion, Tarlac, and San Quintin, Pangasinan were attacked and General Malvar's men laid siege on San Pablo, Laguna. However, all these actions failed.49

But even as the people fought on against all odds in many provinces, despite Aguinaldo's own ringing call to engage in protracted guerrilla warfare, and notwithstanding the grandiose plans for a Biak-na-bato Republic and Constitution, Aguinaldo had already entered into negotiations with the enemy as early as August.

The Right Credentials

In the manner of all colonialists, the Spaniards alternately used a policy of attraction and a policy of repression. After the fall of Imus in March, Polavieja had issued an amnesty proclamation which the majority of the population simply ignored.50 His successor, Primo de Rivera, subsequently revived the amnesty offer and after the Spanish victories in Cavite gave other inducements such as pardons for minor offenders, the return of exiled patriots, and the lifting of the embargo on the property of suspected revolutionaries.51

It should be noted that two attempts at mediation had been made prior to the Tejeros convention by the Jesuit Father Pio Pi and the Spanish journalist Rafael Comenge. Bonifacio suspected at the time that Aguinaldo was considering these offers but the latter evidently shed away from dealing with a Spanish negotiator. But when five months later, Pedro A. Paterno, a prominent lawyer descended from Chinese mestizos, volunteered his services, he had the right credentials for both sides.

Paterno arrived in Biak-na-bato on August 8, 1897. The next day he presented a letter to Aguinaldo offering his services as mediator. Although the letter states that reforms will be forthcoming when the fighting ends, Paterno does not say that this is a Spanish promise but only that he had often heard the governor general say so. Moreover, there is no mention of specific reforms, only a suggestion that the rebels rely on the good intentions of Primo de Rivera.

The Bargain

There were those who objected to any negotiations, but obviously Aguinaldo himself was ready to negotiate, for only two days later he ordered the release of prisoners taken in the battle of Puray and informed Governor Rivera of this fact in a letter in which he assured Rivera of his "high esteem and great respect" for the governor general who, he also declared, was respected and loved by the Filipino people. Aguinaldo followed up these conciliatory acts with a draft agreement which merely repeats what Paterno said regarding Spanish intentions of instituting reforms and then appoints Paterno as arbitrator with full powers, not to negotiate for reforms, but only to determine, fix, and receive such funds as the Spanish government may concede. Once the funds have been secured, Aguinaldo promises to surrender all arms. Then coming to what would become the crux of the negotiations, this sentence appears in the draft: "The President and his council consider that this action on their part is worth 3,000,000 pesos." The next paragraph again mentions the funds: once the money has been received, Aguinaldo and company ask to be allowed "to freely reside under the protection of the Spanish authorities, in the towns where our property has been destroyed, or in foreign parts where we shall have established our homes."52

The draft ends with an enumeration of reforms requested and a three-year deadline for their accomplishment. Among the reforms asked: expulsion of the religious orders, representation in the Spanish Cortes, equal justice for Spaniards and Filipinos, freedom of association and of the press. Of course, such basic reforms were not within the power of a governor-general to grant. This and the fact that in the second draft, all mention of these demands was omitted makes one strongly suspect that their inclusion was only pro forma. This seems to have been the view of the Spanish authorities, for their counter-proposal was nothing more than a detailed schedule of payments, the surrender of arms, and the departure of Aguinaldo for Hong-kong.53 The initial offer of Governor Rivera was P400,000 but the final amount mentioned in this counter-proposal made in
November was P1,700,000.

Aguinaldo's second draft was identical to the first with the important omission of the enumeration of reforms and the deadline for carrying them out. Its only proviso was the appointment of Paterno as sole and absolute negotiator. There was no more talk of reforms, only more discussion of the synchronization of the schedules until the third and final schedule was approved on December 14, 1897.

The pact provided that the Spanish government would pay a total of P800,000 provided Aguinaldo and his companions went into voluntary exile. This sum would be paid out in three installments: P400,000 to Aguinaldo upon his departure from Biak-na-bato, P200,000 when the arms surrendered exceeded seven hundred, and P200,000 when the Te Deum had been sung at the Cathedral in Manila, and a general amnesty had been proclaimed. Spain further agreed to pay another P900,000 to be distributed among non-combatants who had suffered losses as a result of the war.54

It should be recalled that Aguinaldo reissued his Malabar manifesto in September after the preliminary negotiations had begun. This manifesto asked the people to take the offensive, switch to guerrilla warfare, and thus fight Spain "for an indefinite period, wear out her resources and oblige her to give up through sheer weakness..."55 It is now clear that the people's sacrifices were to be used merely as leverage in the negotiations. Even this would have been acceptable if Aguinaldo wanted to strengthen his hand to secure firm commitments for reforms but, sadly, this was not the case. As Governor Primo de Rivera put it:

The proposition framed by Señor Paterno... clearly indicated that chief among the wishes of those he represented was that, before they lay down their arms for the welfare of the country, their future be assured, exempting them from all punishment and providing them with the indispensable means of subsistence, either within the national territory or abroad... 56

The Logic of Tejeros

The negotiations went on from August to December with Paterno going back and forth carrying proposals and counter-proposals between Manila and Biak-na-Bato. All the while, the people were being exhorted to fight and preparations were going on for the establishment of the Biak-na-Bato Republic complete with a constitution although this was only a copy of the Cuban constitution of Jimaguayu. The Constitution was signed on November 1, 1897, and in accordance with its provisions for officers, the following were named to the Supreme Council:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emilio Aguinaldo</th>
<th>President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mariano Trias</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Montenegro</td>
<td>Secretary of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabelo Artacho</td>
<td>Secretary of the Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilio Riego de Dios</td>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldomero Aguinaldo</td>
<td>Secretary of the Treasury</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that by and large, this was still the old Cavite group. There was also an Assembly of Representatives whose signal act was to ratify the agreement of Biak-na-Bato.

Considering that as early as August Aguinaldo had already given clear evidence of his willingness to end his struggle, it would seem that the writing of a constitution and the formation of a government were exercises in futility. That the first sentence of the Constitution declared the separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy was no more than empty rhetoric because while the handful of leaders were mulling over the adoption of the Constitution these very men were already deep in negotiations for the surrender of the Revolution.58 Perhaps they harbored the illusion that the result of the negotiations could be made to appear as an agreement between two governments. On the other hand, they could not have seriously believed that the Spaniards would regard them as more than mere insurgents.

Besides effecting the distribution of high sounding titles of office, the formation of the Biak-na-Bato Republic and the promulgation of the Constitution served at least one other purpose. The Constitution established a centralized government. In the eyes of its signatories it gave them the right to dissolve such autonomous regional governments as those of Central Luzon and Batangas and reorganize them under the central government.59 That decrees for this purpose were issued as late as November and December when surrender was clearly imminent gives rise to the suspicion that the end desired was a consolidation of leadership in one center.
Negation of Pugad Lawin

The Pact of Biak-na-bato was a shameful repudiation of all that the Revolution had stood for. It made a mockery of the revolutionary cry for freedom that had resounded in Pugad-lawin when the people, led by Bonifacio, were still in control of their Revolution. Biak-na-bato was the logical outcome of the ilustrados' seizure of power at Tejeros.

The pact was nothing more nor less than a business proposition. The negotiations had not dragged on for five months because of any insistence by Aguinaldo's side that the Spaniards comply with any of the people's revolutionary demands. The principal bone of contention had been the amount to be paid to the leaders and the terms of payment.

The Revolutionaries Repudiated

After he had concluded a personally satisfactory arrangement with the Spanish government, Aguinaldo complied with a demand contained in the first Spanish counter-proposal by issuing a proclamation in which he declared his "sincere desire to aid the Spanish Government in the pacification of the Philippine Islands" and then proceeded to brand as tulisanes or bandits and

without the right to call themselves insurrecto or revolutionary, or to profit by any of the charities or other benefits forthcoming under the agreement with the Spanish Government, all those who disobey my orders to lay down their arms... (underscored added)

Aguinaldo and his group left for Hongkong on December 27. A correspondent of El Imparcial, a Madrid newspaper, reported that before boarding the ship that was to take him to Hongkong, Aguinaldo himself led in shouting "Vivaz" for Spain and "The Philippines, always Spanish!" The same correspondent wrote that he interviewed Aguinaldo who asked him to convey to Spain his pledge of loyalty. The correspondent writes that Aguinaldo told him:

The patriotism I speak of today will be unchangeable. We took the field, not because we wished for separation from the mother country... but because we were tired of hearing the material and moral burden of that arch, the keystone of which in our country is the friars. It is quite true that the Katipunan instilled in us another desire — that

of independence — but that desire was unattainable, and moreover, it was in opposition to our sentiments. It served as the banner of Andres Bonifacio, a cruel man whom I ordered shot, and with his death the Katipunan disappeared. You may be sure of this, we ask no reforms other than that the influence which the friars hold under the laws in all our towns be restrained... the Marques de Estella, with his great knowledge of the country, will know how to introduce such reforms as may be timely and necessary...

I recognize that when we took the field we wandered from the right road. More than this, today, recognizing our error, we ask for peace, and I commit all those who have followed me to accept it denouncing as outlaws in the decree I signed at Biak-na-bato all those who do not recognize it.

Aguinaldo requested the correspondent to tell General de Rivera that if the latter deemed it proper to make Biak-na-bato a barrio of San Miguel, Aguinaldo wished the barrio to be called "Barrio de Primo de Rivera" or "Barrio of the Peace."

On January 2, 1898 the sum of P400,000 from the Spanish government was deposited by Aguinaldo in the Hongkong Bank. Aguinaldo and his companions lived frugally on the interest of this deposit.

In a note written by Felipe Agoncillo and submitted to the United States Commissioners at Paris in September 1898, Agoncillo states that Aguinaldo and his companions did not want to touch the money because they intended to buy arms to start another revolution if Spain failed to carry out the terms of the peace agreement. On the other hand, Aguinaldo himself would state in the future that he considered the money to be his personal property. In 1929, when political foes asked him to render an accounting of the money, Aguinaldo summarized the Biak-na-bato provisions on this point as follows:

I was to be at liberty to live abroad with such of my companions as wanted to accompany me, and I accordingly chose Hongkong as a place of residence, where the 800,000 pesos of indemnity were to be paid in three installments...

Refusing to be baited into making an accounting, he declared that as per the pact provisions "the amount of P400,000 belonged exclusively to me," shrewdly adding:

I am willing to do so, on condition that revelations be first made of the
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occult mysteries of the inversion of many millions of pesos for the campaign for Independence.66

Aguinaldo was thus able to stalemate his opponents, the politicians of the American colonial era, who likewise preferred not to open the subject of funds entrusted to their care.

Quarrel Over Spoils

It is not surprising that men who had been so preoccupied with the amount and manner of payment of the indemnity they asked for should soon be quarrelling over the spoils. Thinking it grossly unfair that the Aguinaldo group had been awarded P400,000 while they who remained in Biak-na-bato had received nothing, Isabelo Artacho, Artemio Ricarte, Isidoro Torres, Paciano Rizal, and Francisco Makabulos Soliman petitioned the governor-general barely two days after Aguinaldo’s departure to give them the remaining $400,000 to be divided among those who had suffered personal losses and did not have the means to support themselves.67 The governor-general gave them P200,000 which they promptly divided among themselves.

Among those who received large amounts were Emilio Riego de Dios, P7,000; Francisco Macabulos, P14,000; U. Lacuna and Pio del Pilar, P19,000; Isabelo Artacho, P5,000; Miguel Malvar, P8,000; Mariano Trias, P6,000; Artemio Ricarte, P6,500; Pedro Paterno, P89,500 for distribution as per agreement at meetings in Malacañang in January, 1898.68

The Hongkong Exiles

This action of his erstwhile comrades-in-arms angered Aguinaldo. He called a meeting of the members of the Supreme Council residing in Hongkong and the group promptly elected new council members from among the exiles, displacing those left in Biak-na-bato whom Aguinaldo now considered as traitors. This new council then proceeded to declare the division of the money by the Biak-na-bato generals an illegal act.

This new Supreme Council of the Nation elected by exiles from among exiles, was still regarded by Aguinaldo as representing the Filipino people.69 That the Hongkong Junta did not really speak for the people was conclusively proved by the people themselves. While the exiles were busying themselves with petty quarrels, the people continued to support the Revolution.

REVOLUTION AND COMPROMISE

The Struggle Continues

Aguinaldo’s departure did not mean the end of the struggle. Evidently, neither the order of the august President of the Republic of Biak-na-bato to lay down their arms nor his threat to regard them as tulisanes if they disobeyed him made much of an impression on the people and their leaders: a few from the old Aguinaldo group, some of Bonifacio’s men, and many new patriots who sprang from the rebel localities. There was practically no interruption in the revolutionary activities of the people.

As in the early days of the Katipunan, the people once again demonstrated by their spontaneous and almost simultaneous risings in different provinces that they had the will to fight for their freedom.

Aguinaldo had sailed for Hongkong at year’s end. By February 1898, revolutionaries tried to cut the railway lines to Dapagun to prevent the arrival there of Spanish reinforcements. By March, the struggle had gained new momentum. In Northern Zambales, the local people besieged the cable station and seized the telegraph line between Manila and Bolinao, the landing-place of the cable from Hongkong.70

In many places, new leaders were taking up the struggle, capturing and holding towns, killing friars or holding them and other Spaniards prisoners. Some of these local actions were directed against the Guardia de Honor, a group organized by some friars from among their more fanatical parishioners. This group was used as a counter-revolutionary force to spy upon those suspected by the friars of being rebels or filibusteros.71

The People’s Fury

Revolutionary forces became active again in Pampanga, Laguna, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Camarines Norte, and even as far north as La Union and Ilocos Sur.

Bulacan revolted again under the leadership of Isidoro Torres. He established two insurgent camps near Malolos. An Augustinian friar of Malolos was hacked to death with bolos. General Francisco Makabulos Soliman who was an officer under Aguinaldo renewed his operations in Central Luzon. On March
25, one thousand Ilocanos from La Union and Ilocos Sur under the leadership of Isabelo Abaya seized Candon. They dragged two priests out of the church where the latter had hidden, took them to the hills and killed them. A revolt erupted in Daet, Camarines but it was suppressed by the dreaded guardia civil.72

Manila itself was not exempt from unrest. The guardia civil instituted a reign of terror in the city raiding houses where they suspected that Katipunan meetings were being held. In one such house, the guardia civil killed ten of the men they found there and imprisoned sixty others.73

Katipunan Revival

Several conspiracies were credited to a certain Feliciano Jhooson, a pharmacist who having opposed the Pact of Biak-na-bato refused to go into exile with Aguinaldo. Instead, he went to Barrio Fugad-Baboy in Caloocan from which base he continued exhorting the people to support the Revolution. He also sent letters and circulars pleading with other revolutionary leaders not to surrender. He was most influential in the area around Manila.74

The Spaniards considered all these evidences of resistance as mere bandit operations. But two documents attest to the fact that the killing of Spaniards and especially of friars, the seizure of towns, and the other people's actions were not just isolated expressions of rebellion, personal vendetta, or anti-clericalism, but conscious efforts to achieve the goals of the old Katipunan. One such document is Jacinto's Sangguniang Hukuman. Written in February, 1898 by Bonifacio’s close associate and friend and the acknowledged “brains” of the Katipunan, this document proves that Jacinto was busy with organization work in Laguna.75

During the Hongkong Sojourn

Another proof of the serious intent of the post-Biak-na-bato rebel activities is the existence of a second document: the “Constitution of the general executive committee of Central Luzon.” This constitution was adopted in April 1898 and had forty-five signatories, among them General Makabulos and Valentin Diaz, one of the founders of the Katipunan. The revolutionary leaders of Central Luzon headed by General Makabulos had been organizing municipal councils in many towns. They called an assembly into session. This assembly produced a constitution and established a Central Government which tried to operate in Tarlac, Pampanga, Pangasinan, La Union, and Nueva Ecija for the purpose of raising an army and continuing the fight for independence.76

The Cebuanos rose in revolt almost simultaneously with their Tagalog brothers. In February, 1898, Francisco Llamas who used to be the municipal treasurer of San Nicolas, Cebu began organizing and immediately found enthusiastic support. A revolutionary committee was formed.77 On April 2, with shouts of “Viva la Independencia!” the revolutionaries, though poorly armed, marched toward the capital city. Commanded by Leon Quilat, the revolutionary forces were augmented at every turn by enthusiastic volunteers until their number reached around six thousand. In some places they engaged the guardia civil in hand-to-hand combat. They took the capital on April 3. The rebels sacked the convents and burned parts of the business section. In five days they were in control of practically the whole province as other localities followed suit. Eight friars were captured and three of them were killed. Only when sizeable reinforcements arrived were the Spaniards able to retake the principal towns.78

Revolutionary activity began on the island of Panay in March, 1898 with the formation of a Conspirators’ Committee in Molo, Iloilo.79

Aguinaldo Capitulated: The People Did Not

The extent of the ferment and the seriousness with which the Spaniards viewed the situation may be gleaned from the fact that when the new provincial governors for Luzon arrived from Spain in March, only a few were allowed to assume their positions in the provinces to which they had been assigned because of the danger to their lives.80

When Aguinaldo arrived aboard the American ship, McCulloch on May 19, 1898, the rebellion had been going on. The Pact of Biak-na-bato ended hostilities only insofar as the compromising sector of the revolutionary forces was concerned. The people continued to struggle.

Aguinaldo and his clique surrendered but the people did not.