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Politics
B. Jowett

BOOK I

1· Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.

Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.

2· He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin,
whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them.
In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist
without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may
continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of choice, but
because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind
have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves),
and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that
which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature lord and
master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is
a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same
interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female and slave.
For she is notiggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian
knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every
instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many
uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women
and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a
community of slaves, male and female. That is why the poets say,~

It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;¹

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these two relationships the first thing to arise is the family,
and Hesiod is right when he says,~

First house and wife and an ox for the plough,²

for the ox is the poor man’s slave. The family is the association
established by nature for the supply of men’s everyday wants, and the
members of it are called by Charondas, ‘companions of the cupboard’,
and by Epimenides the Cretan, ‘companions of the manger’. But when several families are united, and the association aims at
something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be
formed is the village. And the most normal form of the village appears
to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and
grandchildren, who are said to be ‘suckled with the same milk’. And
this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by
kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came
together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest,
and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of

¹ Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis, 1400. ² Hesiod, Works and Days, 405.

government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As
Homer says:

Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.¹

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. That is
why men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves 25
either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they
imagine not only the forms of the Gods but their ways of life to be like their
own.

When several villages are united in a single complete community,
large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in
existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms
of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the
nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully
developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a
horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the
best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that
man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by
mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above
humanity; he is like the

Tribeless, lawless, heartless one,²

whom Homer denounces – the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of
war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.

Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing
in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And
whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is
therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the
perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one
another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth
the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the
unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of
good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

¹ Homer, Odyssey, ix 114–15. ² Homer, Iliad, ix 63.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their function and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they are homonymous. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use for the worst ends. That is why, if he has not excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states; for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

3 · Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be: — I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the paternal relation (this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

4 · Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he is provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument for instruments. For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods; if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Now the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. From a shuttle we get something else besides the use of it, whereas a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of

1 Homer, *Iliad*, xviii 369.
The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a slave, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

5 But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects – for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject element comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures, originating from nature as a whole; even in things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But perhaps this is matter for a more popular investigation. A living creature consists in the first place of soul and body, and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler and the other the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two: although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason, they obey their passions. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens – that some have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? But the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.

6 But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by convention as well as by nature. The convention is a sort of agreement – the convention by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurisprudents impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest

"Reading λάγους."
The notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and
is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject.
Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin
of the dispute, and what makes the views invade each other's territory,
is as follows: in some sense excellence, when furnished with means,
has actually the greatest power of exercising force: and as superior
power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind,
power seems to imply excellence, and the dispute to be simply one
about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice with
goodwill, while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the
stronger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views
have no force or plausibility against the view that the superior in
excellence ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think,
simply to a principle of justice (for convention is a sort of justice),
assume that slavery in accordance with the custom of war is just, but at
the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be
unjust? And again, no one would ever say that he is a slave who is
unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank
would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents
chanced to have been taken captive and sold. That is why people do
not like to call themselves slaves, but confine the term to foreigners.
Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom
we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves
everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility.
People regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their
own country, but they deem foreigners noble only when at home,
thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the
one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:

Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides
sprung from the stem of the Gods?

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery,
noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They
think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good
men a good man springs. Nature intends to do this often but cannot.

We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of
opinion, and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by
nature, and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction

"Reading ῥά... ῥίμωνας δοσίν.

between the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one
to be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practising
obedience, the other exercising the authority and lordship which
nature intended them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious
to both: for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the
same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part
of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave
between them is natural they are friends and have a common interest,
but where it rests merely on convention and force the reverse is true.

7: The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a
master is not constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule
are not, as some affirm, the same as each other. For there is one rule
exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects
who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for
every house is under one head; whereas constitutional rule is a
government of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master
because he has science, but because he is of a certain character; and
the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may
be a science for the master and a science for the slave. The science of
the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made
money by instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a
knowledge may be carried further, so as to include cookery and
similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more necessary, others
of the more honourable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before slave,
master before master'. But all such branches of knowledge are servile.
There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of
slaves; for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition,
but with the use of them. Yet this science is not anything great or
wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which the
slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a position
which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their
households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with
politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring
them, differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave,
being a species of hunting or war. Enough of the distinction between
master and slave.

8: Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of

Reading ῥά... ῥίμωνας δοσίν.
The Politics

getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has
been shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the
art of getting wealth is the same as the art of managing a household or
a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that
the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or in
the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the
statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one
provides tools and the other material; by the material I mean the
substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is the material of
the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of
household management is not identical with the art of getting wealth,
for the one uses the material which the other provides. For the art
which uses household stores can be no other than the art of
household management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art
of getting wealth is a part of household management or a distinct art.

If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth and property can
be procured, but there are many sorts of property and riches, then are
husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general, parts of the
art of household management or distinct arts? Again, there are many
sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of
animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their
food have made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some
are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which is best
adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or
herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them
by nature with regard to their case and choice of food. But the same
things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the lives
of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among them-
theselves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference. The laziest
are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without
trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place
to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them,
cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support themselves by
hunting, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are brigands,
others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which
there are fish, are fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or
wild beasts. The greater number obtain a living from the cultivated
fruits of the soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail
among those whose industry springs up of itself, and whose food is
not acquired by exchange and retail trade – there is the shepherd, and
husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a
comfortable maintenance out of two employments, eking out the
deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life of a shepherd may
be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a
hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any way which
the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare
livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they
are first born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring
forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they
are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiculous or oviparous
animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a
certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is
called milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of
animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for
the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least
the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing
and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete,
and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all
animals for the sake of man. And so, from one point of view, the art of
war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes
hunting, an art which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and
against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not
submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a
part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of
household management must either find ready to hand, or itself
provide, such things necessary to life, and useful for the community
of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true
riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is
not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

No bound to riches has been fixed for man.

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the
instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size,
and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a
household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of

*Retaining ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
acquisition which is practised by managers of households and by statesmen, and the reason for this.

9. There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art.

Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations. Of everything which we possess there are two uses; both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the other the improper use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper use, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first community, indeed, which is the family, this art is of no use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of the family originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one another the necessary of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for corn, and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men’s natural wants. The other form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of this one. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealing with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.

When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of wealth-getting, namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth, having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is presumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?

Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of getting wealth, and they are right. For natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing; in their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the unit of exchange and the limit of it. And there is no bound to the riches which spring from this art of wealth-getting. As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the unlimited acquisi-

"Reading αβ for αi."