I

THE FIRST EMPIRE

1. FRANCE IN 1799

The pattern of French society, and even its physical setting, received so strong an imprint in the eighteenth century that the mark of that age still remains in many aspects of national life the dominant characteristic of France. In its provincial capitals, the solid eighteenth-century quarters, well-planned enclaves, or graceful urban extensions in a semi-rural setting, still recall the memory of a more elegant age. In Paris, when the older buildings were swept away under the Second Empire and even the street plan modernized out of recognition, the eighteenth century survived in the great town-houses scattered from the Chaussée d'Antin through the faubourg Saint-Honoré to the Seine, and by way of the place de la Concorde across the river to the faubourg Saint-Germain. Under Louis XV, Paris, pushing outwards, had swallowed up the limits traced by Charles V in the fourteenth century and their western extension of 1631 under Louis XIII. The hated wall of the Farmers General, built in 1785 as a customs barrier with imposing monumental gates, took in a vast new area, stretching round the western and northern heights of Passy, Chaillot, Belleville, and Ménilmontant, including—south of the river—the faubourgs Saint-Victor, Saint-Marceau, Saint-Jacques, and Saint-Germain, and curving back round the Champ de Mars. At the end of the eighteenth century much of this new territory was not yet built up; within the barrier, beyond the Bastille and the Temple in the East, were fields and scattered houses with their gardens. In the West the Champs Élysées were woodland crossed by roads and wandering paths, and the Champ de Mars a huge open space. Paris
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proper still huddled together within the boulevards that marked the site of its former fortifications, a solid agglomeration of high, closely-packed, terraced houses separated by winding, narrow streets and alleys, noisy with street cries, busy with passers-by, crowded and dangerous with carriages and wagons of all kinds, strewed with rubbish and filth lying about in heaps or carried along in the torrents of water pouring after a storm down the wide gutters, across which pedestrians could pass only dry-shod by little plank bridges. After a decade of revolution the house-fronts were dilapidated, their plaster falling, paint-work peeling, and shreds of posters flapping in the wind. At night, when there was no moon, an occasional lanterne, jetting out from the wall, shed a feeble and after 1789 a rather sinister light in these dark canyons. For all the fine architecture of the classical age, and the palatial hôtels of the wealthy, urban amenities were rare. Voltaire, in 1749, had called for such improvements as fountains to supply pure drinking water, roads adequate for the traffic of a great capital, and worthy public buildings, especially theatres. The narrow and squalid streets of Paris, he declared, should be widened, and fine buildings which were concealed from sight by a huddle of houses freed from their squalid surroundings. It was a century later before his hopes for Paris began to be realized, and then to the artistic taste of the Second Empire instead of that of the age of Louis Quinze.

Paris, at the end of the eighteenth century, was still in some respects an homogeneous city. Though there were faubourgs like Saint-Antoine and Saint-Marché, inhabited mainly by small masters and their journeymen, and new wealthy quarters like the faubourg Saint-Germain, in much of older Paris the homes of the well-to-do, of the middling people and of the poor existed under the same roof. It might almost be said that class stratification was vertical, the rich and the poor entering by the same door, the former to mount by a short and broad staircase to the impressive apartments of the first floor, the latter to climb high up by ever narrowing stairs till they reached the attics in the mansard roof.

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From Paris and the provincial capitals already radiated out the network of great roads that so impressed Arthur Young, as did the lack of traffic on them. The new industrial regions of France have witnessed many changes since the eighteenth century, but the great ports were already considerable cities. They still glory in their eighteenth-century quarters, while to many smaller towns and villages, scattered up and down the length and breadth of the country, alteration has come only slowly and imperceptibly. It was from the provinces that was drawn, then as now, much of the busy, scurrying population of the ant heap of Paris, and many a Parisian, his fortune made or lost and his active life over, withdrew to pass his declining years in the quiet town or village of his childhood, along with the men who had been boys when he was a boy, who had not stirred from their native soil and who were the millions of France. Perhaps 600,000 lived in Paris at the end of the eighteenth century. The total urban population of France must have been well under two millions. Probably some 95 per cent of France’s 26 millions lived in isolated farms, hamlets, villages, and small country towns. Mountain and forest still covered, as they do today, large tracts of country, though under pressure of rural over-population farming had pushed into marginal land on moor and hill-top that has since been abandoned. Agriculture, little influenced by the new methods developed in eighteenth-century England, followed its routine of the Middle Ages. Industry was still largely domestic.

In all these fundamental respects it matters little whether we are writing of 1789 or 1799. The Revolution did not materially add to or subtract from the basic resources of France, though it altered the use that was, or could be, made of them. What France had that still endowed her, at the end of the eighteenth century, with a potentially greater strength than any other country, was the largest population in Europe under a single government, apart from Russia, and even that had only just caught up with France. The application of the steam engine to industry was hardly yet
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a factor in national strength; and this apart, France had a technical skill and equipment second to none. The Revolution had freed her from the trammels of the ancien régime. Paris, which for some five years had tried to rule France, had been disciplined with the aid of the armies drawn from the unpolitical rural millions. All was ready for a great general to concentrate the newly released forces into a centralized despotism and direct them into a bid for world empire.

2. FROM CONSULATE TO EMPIRE

Centuries do not usually end so punctually as the French eighteenth century did with the year 1799; though in another sense, as I have suggested, the France of the ancien régime still survives. For both its sudden conclusion and its persistence the chief responsibility must be attributed to Bonaparte. With his sense of realism, executive capacity, and ruthless strength of will, he wrote finis to the doubts and feuds of the revolutionaries, and imposed, out of the materials to hand, a new-fashioned framework on France, which was to last in its essentials to the present day. For the very reason that it was an artificial superstructure, which bore the weight of the state without ever being consciously shaped to the society on which it was arbitrarily imposed, it prevented the natural growth of institutions which might otherwise have taken place. This is, of course, wisdom after the event. When Bonaparte was brought to the chief office in the republic, though there was a general feeling that a new period had opened, the politicians who had effected the coup d'état did not appreciate what they had done, any more than those who had overthrown Robespierre five years earlier.

On the morrow of brumaire Bonaparte himself had only taken the first step, though a long one, on the path to Empire. He had yet to show that he was more than a successful general and to consolidate by the art of politics what he had staked out a claim to by those of war. The original proposals for the new constitution came from that self-appointed Solon of the Revolution, Sieyes. Given a third opportunity to demonstrate his genius at making constitutional bricks without straw, he framed a system of legislative bodies ingeniously devised to remove all effective political power from the sovereign people without attributing it to anyone else. In the best revolutionary tradition he was proposing to set up an imposing machine of government without providing any motive power to work it. The central position in the whole complicated system was to be occupied by a Conservative Senate, and if we ask how this was to be created we come to the heart of the matter: it was to be nominated, in effect, by Sieyes. The executive power, on the other hand, was to be entrusted to a Grand Elector with powers so carefully cabined and confined that he could do nothing by himself; this role was reserved for Bonaparte.

We can hardly be surprised that for the third time Sieyes' plans proved abortive. His proposal for drawing the teeth of democratic sovereignty by attributing the right of voting to electors nominated from above - 'authority must come from above and confidence from below', to quote his new-style formula for democracy - suited Bonaparte well enough, as did the various devices for preventing the legislative chambers from exercising any real power. But Bonaparte was determined that he himself, as First Consul, should have effective and undivided executive authority. Even the other two Consuls were to be little more than rubber stamps. The result of his revision of the constitutional proposals was that whereas the age of divine-right monarchy had ended in 1789, the age of dictatorship began in 1799. Sieyes, who had written the birth-certificate of the Revolution, also signed its death warrant. He accepted, soon after, a large estate from Bonaparte, and confined himself henceforth to drawing-room politics. In a popular vote on the Constitution, which was in effect a plebiscite for or against General Bonaparte, the people performed what was to become its customary role in dictatorships in exemplary fashion: 3,011,007 voted for and 1,562 against.
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The politicians of Paris did not immediately acknowledge the finality of Brumaire. No sooner was Bonaparte installed in power than they began to intrigue against him. For his part, the First Consul set about consolidating his position by winning over, through the personal charm which he had at his command, as well as by material favours, men of all parties, revolutionary or royalist, so long as they were willing to forget their principles in his service. All the arts of popularity and propaganda were put to work. The propertied classes, old and new, saw in Bonaparte a saviour of society. A mixture of clemency and force pacified the rebellious departments of the West. The outlines of a new administrative structure for France were drawn up and – more important – put into effective operation. A peace offensive – and peace the French people now ardently longed for, gone the warlike passions of the early nineties – was launched by personal letters from the First Consul to George III and the Emperor; but peace, he was careful to tell the French people, could only come after victory. This was also necessary if he was to be able to put an end to the political intrigues of Paris and consolidate his personal authority.

The military situation was unpromising. When the year 1800 began the remnants of the defeated French army of Italy were still hanging on in Genoa in imminent danger of starvation, and their final collapse would open the door into France. Therefore, leaving Moreau in charge of an offensive on the Rhine, Bonaparte hastily gathered an army at Dijon and descended on Italy by way of the Great St Bernard. The campaign which followed was confused and unplanned. Important documents which might have revealed too much about it were destroyed by Bonaparte subsequently, and his own dispatches are a tissue of lies, so that it is difficult to know exactly what happened. The decisive clash of the French and Austrians at Marengo on 14 June 1800 took Bonaparte by surprise, with his army scattered. He was saved by the return, in the nick of time, of the division he had sent off under Desaix. It was a soldiers’ battle, won by the staunchness of the Guard and the dash of Desaix, who was killed in the fighting. Bonaparte, in a dispatch from the battle-field, provided for him a romanticized death: a dead man could be no rival. By the battle of Marengo Lombardy was regained and France relieved from the threat of an Austrian invasion. Meanwhile Moreau had advanced through Bavaria, occupied Munich, and in December, after routing the Austrians at Hohenlinden, was within fifty miles of Vienna.

Bonaparte had not waited for the completion of the German campaign to return to Paris, where, he knew, his enemies, Carnot prominent among them, were counting on defeat or at least a stalemate in Italy to enable them to overthrow the Consulate. Instead, hot on the heels of the news of Marengo, Bonaparte came spurting across France to pluck the fruits of victory. The Guards, who had served him so well, were brought back hurriedly to enter Paris with their general on the morning of the Quartorze Juillet, so that their entry could coincide with the celebration of the fête of the Bastille. The faubourg Saint-Antoine, where Robespierre had once been the idol, turned out its sans-culottes in their thousands to hail the triumph and welcome the victor.

Peace with victory was now within reach. The Holy Roman Emperor, threatened by French armies advancing from southern Germany on Austria itself and from northern Italy on Venetia, acknowledged defeat. By the treaty of Lunéville, in February 1801, French possession on the left bank of the Rhine, from Switzerland to the sea, and the French satellite states – the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics in northern Italy, the Helvetic Republic in Switzerland, and the Batavian Republic of the Dutch – were recognized. The hereditary princes of the Empire who lost territory on the left bank of the Rhine were to be compensated within Germany, and France as a party to the Treaty was to participate in the process of territorial redistribution. This was to open the door to large-scale French intervention in the Holy Roman Empire.

Now only England remained in the way of complete
pacification. To ensure her isolation Bonaparte negotiated an agreement with Russia, and conciliated Spain by the grant of the duchy of Tuscany to the Bourbon Duke of Parma. Under Russian leadership the Armed Neutrality was formed to oppose British attacks on neutral shipping, but the assassination of Paul I of Russia, and the bombardment of Copenhagen, dislocated it. In Egypt the isolated French army had been forced to capitulate by a British expeditionary force. These, however, were peripheral events. Faced with the bankruptcy of their European policy, Pitt and Grenville resigned and a new British government was ready to conclude peace with France. The negotiations were long and difficult, but slowly and reluctantly Great Britain gave up a large part of her conquests: it is true they had mainly been at the expense of former allies and not of France. In March 1802 the Treaty of Amiens was signed; Bonaparte had achieved peace for France and could proceed to collect the fruits of victory.

The change from Consulate to Empire was to be effected with the aid of victories abroad and plots at home. Marengo was followed, on 24 December 1800, by an attempt to blow up Bonaparte on his way to the opera. The attempted assassination was the work of a group of royalists under the Vendéan leader, Georges Cadoudal, but the First Consul seized the opportunity to eliminate the unreconciled Jacobins, whom he regarded as his more dangerous opponents. Many of them were sent to rot to death in Guiana or the Seychelles.

The signature of the Treaty of Amiens enabled Bonaparte to secure the passing, by a majority of 31 millions to eight thousand, of a new plebiscite making him Consul for life. The next step followed fairly soon after. Cadoudal, who had taken refuge in England after the failure of his plot in 1800, organized a new attempt on Bonaparte’s life in 1803, possibly with the connivance of Windham among the British ministers. Moreau, whose victory at Hohenlinden had been deliberately played down by Bonaparte to enhance his own glory, and Pichegru, returning secretly from

England where he had taken refuge since his failure to overthrow the Directory, were also implicated. The conspiracy was discovered before it could be put into effect. Cadoudal and his group of desperate men were arrested and executed; Pichegru was imprisoned in the Temple and found strangled one morning. According to the official theory he had committed suicide, as enemies of dictators are apt to do. Moreau, against whom the evidence was weaker, and whose victories were too recent for him to be disposed of so easily, was allowed to go into exile.

Bonaparte now decided that the royalists must be taught a lesson, as the Jacobins had been. The young duc d’Enghien, the last of the Condés, was seized on territory neighbouring France, brought back over the frontier and shot as an émigré in foreign service. There was nothing to link him with the plot of Cadoudal: it was an exemplary murder. As a Corsican perhaps Bonaparte regarded it as a legitimate exercise of the right of vendetta, his own life having undoubtedly been threatened by royalist plots. The much-publicized Cadoudal conspiracy also provided an appropriate atmosphere for the final transmutation of the First Consul into the Emperor. The Senate, duly prompted, passed the necessary legislative measures and the subsequent plebiscite, now de rigueur, gave popular sanction by 3,572,399 votes against 2,579 to the establishment of an hereditary Empire. This was perhaps less of a shock to republican sentiment than one might think, because, as early as 1789, the term empire had been in use to describe the French state, as a means of avoiding the word monarchy without falling into that of republic. The religious sanction was the one thing lacking, Napoleon felt, to make him a real Emperor. It could be provided. Pius VII was prepared for what to a less holy-minded man might have seemed an humiliation, if it could be regarded as a further step to win France back to the fold, and agreed to perform the ceremony of crowning Napoleon in Notre-Dame. There were many difficulties to be smoothed out but – except that the Pope, or according to the version at the time of the divorcee
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Josephine herself, insisted that Napoleon should go through a religious ceremony of marriage with her, which he did in strict privacy— in most matters the Emperor had his own way. Anointed by the Pope, Napoleon himself placed the crown on his own head. The day was 2 December 1804.

3. NAPOLEONIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

When he became First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte was only thirty years old, but already marked as a man of destiny. The impecunious son of what passed for a gentle family in Corsica, after the French conquest he went with government assistance to the school at Brienne and then to the École Militaire, whence he emerged as sub-lieutenant of artillery. The Revolution was the time, the army was the career, for an ambitious young man. Short, but thin and muscular, he had good looks, though little notice should be taken of portraits in which he is already the Byronic hero of the coming romantic movement. He had tremendous energy and a powerful and disciplined memory. He could work continuously for long periods, with only snatches of sleep. In order not to disturb his habits, says his police official, Rétal, he had taken care not to form any. He had a thirst for glory, fed partly on the writings of the pre-romantics but more on the history of the great conquerors of the ancient world, Caesar and Alexander, for this was also the period of the classical revival. Although he read Rousseau and was not uninfluenced by the ideals of the Enlightenment, his contribution to the legal code which bears his name showed a natural preference for the more conservative and less enlightened ideas of the ancien régime. Politically his bent was towards despotism untrammeled by divine right. His experience of the Revolution had left him with a deep contempt, not unmixed with fear, for the people. For politicians he had the dictator's natural aversion. He was not without humane instincts, and was capable of kindness in private life, to say nothing of the charm which he could turn on at will; but such qualities vanished when they stood in the way of his success. Even early in his career, before overweening egoism had quite mastered him, when military considerations demanded it he was entirely ruthless. There is no evidence that bloodshed mattered a scrap to him, or that he ever thought, as a Marlborough or a Wellington did, of economizing in the lives of his soldiers. The mass attack on which he relied depended on not counting the cost in dead and wounded. A French Colonel describes him riding, as was his custom, over the field of Borodino after the battle, rubbing his hands and radiant with satisfaction as he counted five dead Russians to every one French corpse. I suppose, the Colonel adds sardonically, he took the bodies of his German allies for Russians. Such nobility as might have been given, even to the career of a military despot, by the service of some end, although a mistaken one, was lacking. Apart from his own personal glory, the only other ambition he had at heart was to found a dynasty. When, in his last campaign, he might have saved much for France by abandoning his dream of Empire, he was incapable of such moderation, or even realism. After all this, to say that he was an adventurer is an anti-climax; but it is not irrelevant or unimportant. Coming from islanders whose social institutions were the banditti and the vendetta, he carried the same standards into a country where the Revolution had already shown how uncertain were the conquests of the Enlightenment. For fifteen years France and Europe were to be at the mercy of a gambler to whom fate and his own genius gave for a time all the aces. He always cheated at cards and his carriage had diamonds concealed in its lining in case of hurried flight.

The short intermission from continual war that the Treaty of Amiens inaugurated gave Bonaparte the opportunity to establish the basis of a new government. As soon as he became First Consul he began the task of reconstruction. The simulacrum of representative institutions was preserved as a sop to revolutionary tradition, with an
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advisory Senate, a Legislative Body which could vote but not speak, and a Tribunate which could speak but not vote. Since the last, powerless as it was, did not invariably say just what the Emperor wanted, it was reduced in membership to fifty, divided into sections, and finally, in 1807, abolished. The Legislative Body, chosen by the Senate and composed mostly of obscure former revolutionaries, was then gagged but remained a passive register of the Emperor's will. The Senate, including many of the great names of the period, at first sight looks a more substantial body, with real legislative powers; but for all their distinction, its members were a mere collection of nominees, serving only to give dignity to their master's decisions.

If we turn from the legislative to the executive, even the façade of limitation on the will of the Emperor disappears. The reorganization of the ministries had mostly been effected during the Revolution. Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine, to which was attached Colonies now that France had lost them all, remained as before 1789. The Keeper of the Seals became the Minister for Justice. The most important changes were the result of amalgamating, and then subdividing on more logical grounds, the Contrôle Général and Maison du Roi, out of which emerged the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior. Finally, like all dictators, Bonaparte required a Minister of Police. A State Secretariat was also set up, through which the First Consul controlled and coordinated the policies of his ministers.

Over the Police the ex-terrorist Fouche, later, when titles were handed round, to become the duc d'Otranto, reigned, with the assistance of a choice collection of scoundrels gathered from the police of the ancien régime and the underworld of the Revolution. At Foreign Affairs Talleyrand was indispensable. Berthier at the War Office was an invaluable chief of staff. Lucien Bonaparte, the first Minister of the Interior, though efficient showed signs of independence which could not be tolerated, least of all in a brother, and was soon dismissed. Finances were entrusted to Gaudin, formerly a high official of the Contrôle Général. There was,

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of course, no first minister, and the ministers never constituted a cabinet. The Emperor consulted them individually, took their advice or gave them their orders as it pleased him, like an ancien régime monarch. Louis XIV had at last found a successor and France was again ruled by the bon plaisir of an autocrat, but one enfranchised from the bonds of aristocratic and provincial privilege and controlling a new-fashioned and far more efficient administrative machine.

At the centre of the new administrative structure was the Council of State. Napoleon, for all his seizure of arbitrary power, was no mere vulgar dictator imposing unconsidered decisions on a servile nation. An expert himself in the matter of war, he knew the value of experts. He was also, at least when he first came to power, conscious of his own limitations and of his need for a body of specialists who, without possessing political power, could provide him with the advice he needed in all fields of government. The Council of State was intended, in the first place, as the means of his own political education. It was also to draw up laws and administrative regulations and expound them to the legislative bodies; it was in fact the real legislative organ. The Councillors of State took the place of the masters of requests and councillors of the ancien régime, from whom the intendants and higher officials had been recruited. They formed a permanent corps whence Napoleon could draw missi dominici for the varied tasks of imperial government. The sections into which the Council was divided supervised the various fields of government and provided him with a means of checking and controlling the actions of his ministers. The importance he attributed to the Council was well shown in his advice to the former parlementaire and constitutional monarchist, Roederer, one of Bonaparte's associates in the coup d'état of brumaire, not to accept a nomination to the Senate but rather to enter the Council of State. 'In that', the First Consul said, 'there are great things to be done; from that I will draw my ambassadors and ministers.' The advice, as was inevitable with Bonap-
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parte, was not disinterested. He was courting on the Council of State, more than on any other of his administrative bodies, to draw into his service able men from all fields and from all points on the political scale, except the most intransigent republicans and royalists. Former magistrates and high officials of the ancien régime sat side by side with men who had made their mark on the struggles of the Revolution, generals of the revolutionary armies with civilian technicians and scientists.

What was to be ultimately the greatest achievement of the Council of State, the creation of a system of administrative law, was as yet a minor activity; but as well as its major role in the central government it exercised an unlimited supervision over local administration and all public establishments, and gradually filled in the details of the administrative and financial system sketched out under the Consulate. From its creation in 1800 to 1813, 58,435 separate cases were brought up for examination in the general assembly of the Council; the number dealt with annually rose from 911 in 1800 to 6,285 in 1811. While the Council of State formed the ideal instrument for an absolute régime, its work was far too valuable to any subsequent government to dispense with its services. Though under Napoleon it was no more than an instrument; without any independence, the Council of State developed in due course a tradition and an esprit de corps of its own and became the unshakable cornerstone of the French bureaucracy. In the absence of an effective parliamentary system it provided, along with the administrative substructure, the ferroconcrete framework of government, which was to enable French society to survive and emerge comparatively unchanged from so many political upheavals. At the same time, and for this very reason, it also stood in the way of the creation of effective parliamentary institutions. Through the Council of State and his other administrative institutions, the shadow of Napoleon continued to darken the following century. He had given France, when she needed it after the stresses of the Revolution, a steel corset on which she was to become dependent and from which she was to emancipate herself only slowly and painfully and never completely.

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The system of centralized bureaucracy called for the creation of machinery of local administration which could carry the will of the government at Paris into the most remote communes. Administrative centralization, as de Tocqueville pointed out, was not an invention of Napoleon. The modern prefect can trace his ancestry back to the intendants of Louis XIV and Richelieu, and even to the sénéchaux and baillis of the Middle Ages; but the element of continuity, though important, must not be exaggerated. The ancien régime still retained too many medieval relics for the wits of the central government to run unchallenged and unimpeded throughout the provinces. The great achievement of the Revolution, for good or ill, had been to make a tabula rasa, administratively speaking, of France. The system of democratic councils with which the Constitutional Assembly endowed, as by a stroke of the pen, its new administrative divisions, could not survive the strains of the Revolution. Already under the Committee of Public Safety a big step had been taken in the direction of the restoration of central control. Under the Directory the local authorities became increasingly weak and corrupt, though the more exaggerated accounts of Directorial decay are perhaps the work of Bonapartist propaganda. However, an official report of 1799 declared, 'The pillege of public funds, attacks directed on public officials, the inertia of a great number of them, the assassination of republicans - such is unfortunately the picture which several departments present.' The picture had at least some truth in it and was perhaps more generally true than was admitted.

Bonaparte and his advisers, in 1800, had no doubt what was wrong: it was the attempt, still surviving in theory, to govern the departments and communes by a system of elected councils. In the basic law on local government of the year VIII the elective principle was eliminated from the appointment of all local officials. Local councils still
survived in name, it is true, but their functions were reduced to microscopic proportions. As Chaptal, wealthy proprietor and scientist, ennobled before 1789, and the successor to Lucien Bonaparte at the Ministry of the Interior, put it, 'These popular councils are placed, so to speak, to one side of the line of executive action: they do not hamper in any way the rapid progress of the administration.' In fact adequate precautions were taken to ensure that they should not do so. They were not allowed to meet for a longer period than fifteen days in the year; their chief function was to give their approval to the distribution of taxation between the various arrondissements, towns, and villages of the department. All administrative authority in the department was placed in the hands of a prefect, appointed from Paris, with sub-prefects under him. The latter were generally local men and often former revolutionaries, but a job was a job. They had no independent authority. The first list of prefects included many Jacobins who had rallied to Bonaparte, as well as former ancien régime officials. The prefects, unlike the sub-prefects, were never local men. There has been much discussion whether they were mere passive agents of the central government. They probably possessed less independence than the former intendants; but since, even now, instructions took eight days to reach Toulouse from Paris, and the newly invented system of telegraphs was only used for important communications, mostly military, detailed control of the prefects' actions was obviously difficult. Lucien Bonaparte in a circular of the year 1811 said, 'General ideas must come from the centre. I note with regret that some of you, with praiseworthy intentions doubtless, concern yourselves with the interpretation of the laws. . . . It is not this that the government expects of its administration.' That the prefects were the officers of a central government and subject to the same kind of obedience as was expected of officers of the army was made quite clear by putting them into uniform. It was a dignified one - blue coat, white waistcoat and breeches, silver thread on collar, cuffs, and pockets, a chapeau français ornamented with silver, red scarf with silver fringes, and a sword - but one wonders what an intendant would have said if he had been expected to wear a uniform.

The first task of the prefects was that of economic restoration. In a note of 1800 Bonaparte wrote, 'The 36,000 communes in France represent 36,000 orphans, heirs of the old feudal rights, which have been abandoned or pillaged for ten years by the municipal guardians of the Convention and the Directory.' Now the communes were to be taught that they had a master and a more efficient one than the medley of ancien régime authorities. This is not to say that the prefects could afford to ride rough-shod over all local feeling. Under the Empire the local notabilities re-emerged as the dominant interest and the prefects and sub-prefects found it wise to remain on friendly terms with them, for their mutual advantage. Of the general ability of the prefects and the valuable work they did in restoring administrative good habits to the departments there can be no question. Taine once expressed the regret of not having had the experience of serving for a year as secretary to one of Napoleon's prefects.

The prefects had other tasks besides that of promoting the economic well-being of their departments. They had to collect favourable votes for the plebiscites: the success with which they performed this duty foretold their future political role. Gradually, as the war pressed increasingly heavily on French life, its requirements came to dominate the activities of the prefects. They drew up lists of conscripts, authorized exemptions, sought out deserters, confiscated horses for the army, looked after troops in passage, and guarded prisoners of war. As early as 1801 a prefect is found complaining that the enforcement of conscription occupies one-third of the employees of his prefecture and that these are barely sufficient. Continually increasing military demands bore so heavily on the departments that by 1814 their financial resources had been exhausted.

In the later years of the Empire the personnel of the administration underwent considerable changes. Especially
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from 1809 onwards, Napoleon, with the weakness of a new man for real gentlemen, tended to appoint former nobles to office. A host of émigrés flocked back to take up good jobs, to introduce more easy-going methods into the prefectorates, and leave the real work to their secretaries-general. From 1810 all prefects were given the title of count or baron and ordered to assume coats of arms. Many were now secret royalists, ready to accept the Emperor’s pay while he was in power, but prepared to desert him with cynical haste in 1814. During the Hundred Days the prefects exhibited what would be a comic, if it were not equally a cowardly and treacherous anxiety to be on the winning side. Official adulation of the Emperor was carried to extreme lengths. A prefect of the Pas-de-Calais, formerly officer of the Royal Normandy regiment, apostrophized his department, when it was about to receive a visit from the Emperor, thus: ‘You are about to see him, that Napoleon, proclaimed so justly the greatest of men in the greatest of nations... Dieu créa Bonaparte et se repose.’ As soon as Napoleon lost power the same official addressed his devotions with equal fervour to the duc de Berry, only to renew his loyal protestations to the Emperor when he returned from Elba. Among those with a genius for guessing which way the cat was going to jump and getting there in advance, the prize must be held by M. de Jessaint, prefect of the Marne uninterruptedly from 1800 to 1838. The fact is that the prefectural system was an immensely powerful instrument in the hands of the central government, but its power was entirely derivative. While the régime was strong at the centre the prefects could guarantee to control the rest of the country; but a coup d’état in Paris could shatter the whole fabric, for no element capable of standing by itself existed in the provinces. The prefectural system, for all its merits, combined the vices of excessive rigidity and excessive instability. It was to be in no small measure responsible for the alternation of revolution and reaction that marked the history of nineteenth-century France.

Besides creating a unified administrative machinery,

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Napoleon laid down the legislative basis on which it was to operate. The idea of reducing the varied laws of France to a uniform, written code was inherited by the Revolution from the ancien régime. The work had been begun by the Ordonnances drawn up under Colbert and d’Aguesseau. The revolutionary Assemblies set up committees to complete the work of codification, but they were never able to catch up with the mass of their own legislation. In 1800 Bonaparte appointed a committee of distinguished lawyers to draw up a civil code, and gave them five months to do it in. After their draft code had been discussed in the Council of State, the First Consul himself being present at about half of the meetings though of course he had not the legal knowledge to make a serious contribution to them, it was submitted to the legislative bodies, where criticism was so hostile that it did not obtain final acceptance until 1804. The criticism to which the Code was subjected, though it infuriated Napoleon, was largely sound. His role was not to frame the Code but to see that the lawyers came to a conclusion, good or bad, without further delay. For some of the worst features he was personally responsible. Such were the deterioration in the legal status of women, who were allowed no control over the family property and could not acquire, sell, or give property without their husband’s consent; the reintroduction of confiscation as a legal penalty; and the use of the fiction of civil death. The First Consul’s influence was also responsible for the tightening up of the laws of marriage and divorce and the restoration of paternal authority in the family. The great gains of the Revolution, however, were maintained: equality before the law, the principle of religious toleration, the abolition of privileges and seigneurial burdens. Property rights were strictly maintained and there was particular emphasis on the interests of the small owner. Property was to be inherited equally by all legitimate children at death, except for a certain disposable proportion: to this provision has been speculatively attributed the limitation of families in nineteenth-century France. Perhaps the most important feature of the Civil
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Code was that all its 2,281 articles could be contained in a single fairly small volume. It was to be the most effective agency for the propagation of the basic principles of the French Revolution that was, or perhaps that could have been, devised. It was carried by the French armies through Europe and thence spread across the world. There followed in France a Code of Civil Procedure, cumbersome and mostly copied from ancien régime rules, a Commercial Code, and a severe and arbitrary Criminal Code, which was all the same a model of enlightenment compared with the barbarous laws that still prevailed in Great Britain.

The Revolution had in nothing failed so completely as in its finances. The first step towards their rehabilitation was taken by Gaudin, head of a division in the Contrôle Général before the Revolution and after the 18 brumaire Minister of Finances, when he removed the assessment and collection of direct taxation from the control of local authorities and formed a central organization charged with the task. France, however, has never been able to draw the major part of its revenue from the wealthy, and the new rich were no more willing to pay for the privilege of being governed than had been the old privileged orders. All indirect taxes had been abolished by the Constituent Assembly, though the Directory re-introduced them on playing cards and tobacco. Napoleon revived the tax on salt, brought back the hated droits on wines and cider, and created a régime for their collection. The Directory had also re-established local ostellis; these were greatly extended under the Empire and the central government took an increasing proportion of them.

In 1800 was founded another of the great and permanent creations of the Consulate, the Bank of France. Though with semi-public functions, this was a private bank, its shareholders represented by a general assembly of the 200 most important, who elected the 15 regents and 3 censors. The Bank, like the other Napoleonic institutions, was to remain a power in France throughout the régimes which followed.

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In 1802 the French budget was balanced, but this was only a temporary success. The existence of private and military funds under the direct control of the Emperor prevented the imperial budgets from ever being more than paper exercises, with little relation to the facts. No institutional reforms could put the country on a sound financial basis in time of continual war; and there was never sufficient confidence in the permanence of the régime for the government to draw, as Great Britain did to such a great extent, on loans. Moreover, Napoleon had a profound suspicion of them. He had to fall back, just like the ancien régime, on expedients, and live from hand to mouth. And like the Revolution he exploited the conquered countries, to such an extent that it might almost be said that war was a financial necessity for France.

Yet another of the loose ends left by the Revolution for Napoleon to cut and tie up in his own fashion was the problem of a religious settlement, and this also was largely, if not essentially, an administrative question. Whether religious differences still remained, in 1799, a source of danger to France, or whether the increasingly tolerant modus vivendi reached by the Directory could have survived, is a much disputed point on which agreement is unlikely to be reached; but it can be agreed that religious persecution during the Revolution had not merely failed to destroy the hold of the Roman Catholic religion on the people, it had strengthened religious feeling and played some part in promoting a religious revival. The more moderate policies of the Directory were perhaps more dangerous to the Church than active declchristianization. The secularization of education—a circular of the year viii ordered teachers in the central schools to avoid ‘everything that pertained to the doctrines and rites of all religions and sects whatever they may be’—may be regarded as initiating a struggle that was to continue to the present day.

The Catholic Church had certainly something to gain in this respect from the renewal of State support. There were also powerful inducements to the State to abandon its
policy of religious neutrality and secularization. The complete pacification of the Vendée and Normandy would undoubtedly be greatly facilitated if the support of the clergy could be gained. This would also powerfully aid in the assimilation of the Belgic provinces and other newly acquired territory where the Catholic religion was strong. Bonaparte himself was aware of the sentimental appeal of a vague kind of Rousseauist religiosity, though one can hardly envisage him as a disciple of the Savoyard vicar. Religion, like every other ideal, was to him a means to an end, his own power. Sayings attributed to him represent truly his essential attitude — 'Religion is a kind of inoculation which by satisfying our love of marvels guarantees us against charlatans and sorcerers'; 'Society cannot exist without inequality of wealth, and inequality of wealth cannot exist without religion.' Walking in the park at Malmaison he is alleged to have said, listening to the bells, 'What an impression that must make on the simple and credulous... How can your philosophers and ideologues answer that? The people must have a religion and that religion must be in the hands of the government.'

The Vatican, for its part, despite its denunciation of the Revolution, was prepared to make considerable concessions to regain official recognition in France. The new Pope, Pius VII, elected in 1800, a simple and holy monk with little knowledge of the world, was not violently hostile to the Revolution, and papal agents had been sent secretly to Paris as early as September 1800. The victory over Austria and the Peace of Lunéville in February 1801 made it desirable to come to terms with a France which now controlled all northern Italy. Secretly instituted negotiations were concluded in July 1801. To minimize the inevitable resistance of the strong anti-clerical elements in the legislative bodies, Bonaparte waited until the Peace of Amiens had been concluded before he announced the Concordat, in April 1802. Characteristically, having secured an agreement, he proceeded to distort it in his own interest by means of the issue of Organic Articles. Even so, many of the former revolutionaries exhibited open hostility to the Concordat and Fouché issued a mocking circular. By the Concordat the Vatican agreed to the institution of a new episcopate which should contain a proportion of bishops from the Constitutional Church, recognized the alienation of Church lands as permanent, and accepted the payment of clerical salaries by the State. Catholicism was described as 'the religion of the great majority of citizens', and its practice was to be free and public so long as it conformed to such police regulations as were required by public order. By the supplementary Organic Articles Bonaparte tried to turn the Concordat into the instrument of a new and stronger Gallicanism. No Papal bull was to be published, nor any Papal representative to function in France, without the permission of the government. The bishops were placed under the direct control of the prefects and the lesser clergy lost the considerable independence of episcopal authority they had formerly enjoyed. Subsequent concessions to religious opinion included the suppression of the official ten-day cult, already practically dead, the restoration of Sunday as the day of rest for officials, and of the Gregorian calendar; children were to be given only saints' names or those of the great figures of antiquity; the payment of salaries was extended to all clergy and the actual salaries were increased; religious orders reappeared in France, with official sanction for women's orders and for male missionary orders, while others, such as the Jesuits, were tolerated by official connivance; primary, though not higher education, was restored to the control of the clergy.

Despite all these concessions the Vatican was not quite happy about the bargain it had concluded. The Pope protested against the Organic Articles and only consecrated the bishops Bonaparte had chosen from the Constitutional Church after two years' delay. On the face of it the Concordat was a great victory for Bonaparte and a masterstroke of policy. The Emperor was able henceforth to use the clergy as an instrument of government. They celebrated his victories with Te Deums, published his imperial pro-
clamations from their pulpits, delivered patriotic sermons, stimulated conscription, and promoted loyal sentiments. An Imperial Catechism was issued for the purpose of 'binding by religious sanctions the conscience of the people to the august person of the Emperor'. A national fête was created for the day of the Assumption which was also Napoleon's birthday and turned out conveniently to be the Saint's day of a newly discovered St Napoleon. Yet with all this he failed to obtain any permanent religious sanction for his rule. In the last years of the Empire the barely concealed royalist sentiments of most of the clergy undermined the loyalty of the people and prepared the way for his fall.

The religious revival, of which the first great manifesto was Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme* in 1802, would have come about without Napoleon. The Concordat, by pushing Gallican principles farther than ever before, and this in the interests of no divine-right sovereign, did much to discredit Gallicanism and strengthen the ultramontane tendency in the French Church. It also reduced the lower clergy to a position of total dependence on their bishops, and made the bishops themselves much more dependent on the Papacy than formerly. The act by which the Pope, in agreement with Napoleon, deposed the whole episcopate of France, including many lawfully appointed and consecrated bishops, marked a great step forward in the assertion of papal authority. The thirty-seven ancien régime bishops who were excluded from their sees by the Concordat kept the allegiance of a small group of the faithful who founded what was called la petite Église. The injury to vested interests and nice consciences, and the elevation of a dozen somewhat grisly constitutional bishops, was a cheap price to pay for such a great extension of papal authority. The ultimate result was inescapably to strengthen the influence of the Vatican in France. Napoleon had won for himself an unreliable and temporary ally, and he had bequeathed to his successors a Church which would henceforth never willingly be the junior partner of the State. The intermittent struggle between Church and State which be-

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devilled French politics for the following century and a half was as much the inheritance of the Napoleonic Concordat as of revolutionary anti-clericalism.

That hierarchical conception of society which made it easy for Napoleon to come to terms with the Roman Church, so long as he imagined that he had safeguarded his own position at the apex of the pyramid, was applied also, though less appropriately, to the organization of the Protestant churches. Their pastors became salaried officials and like the curés took an oath of loyalty. Their synods and consistories were chosen from the wealthier adherents of the faith and controlled by the secular authorities. Louis XIV had failed to extirpate French Protestantism, Napoleon succeeded in domesticating it.

While Napoleon restored official recognition to the Roman Catholic Church, he had no intention of returning the control of education they had possessed under the ancien régime to the ecclesiastical authorities. But he needed a system of education to provide administrators and technical experts for the service of the State. The Revolution had destroyed the old system of education but created nothing to put in its place apart from a limited number of Central Schools, which were neither sufficiently traditional in their curriculum, nor sufficiently authoritarian in their discipline, for Bonaparte's taste. They would produce, he thought, liberals and ideologists, for neither of which was there room in the Napoleonic state. Bonaparte himself expounded the basic principles of his theory of education: 'So long as children are not taught that they must be republican or monarchist, catholic or irreligious, etc. . . . the State will not be a nation, it will rest on insecure or vague foundations. . . . In a properly organized state there is always a body destined to regulate the principles of morality and politics.' Defending the law of 1802 on education, presented to the Legislative Body, ironically enough, by Fourcroy, a leading chemist, another of Bonaparte's necessary experts, Roederer, declared that Latin must be restored to its primacy and quasi-monopoly in the educa-
There followed an almost complete return to the syllabus and methods of the ancien régime, which lasted with little change until the reforms of 1865. The Central Schools were replaced by lycees, boarding-schools with a semi-military uniform and discipline and military training from the age of twelve.

In these the new élite of France was to be formed with the aid of some 6,000 national bourses, of which rather more than a third were reserved for the sons of officials and officers. They led on to the specialized schools of law, medicine, and pharmacy, the école militaire spéciale and the famous école normale, founded in 1808 to prepare for service in schools and universities 300 young men chosen by competitive examination. These were to provide the technical experts needed by the Empire. On a lower level, secondary schools, established by municipalities or individuals, gave the education needed for commercial or minor administrative posts. At the bottom, the primary schools were left to the initiative of the communes and the teaching Orders, and were still too few to bestow even a modicum of literacy upon more than a small fraction of the population. The educational system was placed, by a law of 1808, under the control of a single imperial university. The whole structure formed a rigid hierarchy, under a Grand Master nominated by and responsible to the Emperor. An imposing bureaucratic apparatus centred in Paris was charged with regulating the educational life of France down to the smallest detail. If, today, the Rector of a university cannot appoint his secretary, dismiss a cleaner, or modify an academic course without reference to Paris, it is in obedience to the dead hand of Napoleon.

In the lycees religion was kept, by Napoleon's prescription, to the 'necessary minimum'. Primary education, on the other hand, he was content to leave in the hands of the Church. Under the influence of its Grand Master, Fontanes, the University was increasingly subjected to clerical influence. The schools run by priests prospered at the expense of the state lycees. Even before his fall the instrument created by Napoleon to dragon the mind of France was escaping from his control, and the conflict between secular and clerical education, which was to be one of the dominant themes in the history of the following century, was emerging.

Where the task was simply one of repression, the success of the Napoleonic system was less qualified. The press became a mere instrument of imperial propaganda, and papers which were not sufficiently docile soon disappeared. A censorship controlled the publication of books. Theatres were put under the Ministry of Police and reduced in Paris to eight. Even in the midst of a desperate war, at Moscow in October 1812, Napoleon could concern himself with drawing up the regulations for the Comédie-Française, a gesture illustrating less his interest in the promotion of the drama than his determination to ensure that every medium for the expression of opinion remained under strict control.

The First Empire was hardly the milieu from which literature was likely to emerge, and very little did. The mock-heroics of Ossian, translated in 1801, suited the Emperor's literary taste. The romantic melancholy of Chateaubriand's Atala and René, Mme de Stael's assertion, in Délépine and Corinne, of woman's right to happiness, but also of the unhappiness that is the fate of superior persons; Joseph de Maistre's theocratic ideals, had no appeal to him. Of these authors only Chateaubriand stayed under Napoleon's rule. Most of the writing of the Empire falls into the category of journalism or propaganda rather than literature.

In painting also the Empire has little to its credit. Fragonard, when he died in 1806, had long been an anachronism. David was capable of magnificent portraits, but he was prepared to serve Napoleon as faithfully as he had served the Jacobins and wasted his talents on huge, neo-classical, historical set pieces. In such a painting as his Sabine Women interrupting the battle between Romans and Sabines, every figure, down to the smallest child, is posed in a rhetorical attitude, consciously playing a part on the stage of history, just like David's own contemporaries of the
Revolution and Empire. The whole scene is as moving as the waxworks of Mme Tussaud which also date from the same period. A more poetical spirit is infused by Prud’hon into his classical compositions: the Empress Josephine reclines in reverie and classical déshabillé on mossy rocks amid a romantic landscape. But most of the painting of the period is frank propaganda. David rearranges the Coronation of Napoleon to order, as he had already done the Tennis-court Oath. Napoleon’s charger rears up as his master with an heroic gesture points the way across the Alps to a stage army in the background. The baron Gros paints huge battle scenes to the glorification of the Emperor and his Marshals. He was perhaps the most successful of the official painters of the Empire until he committed suicide.

Napoleon himself was represented ad nauseam, the hero leading the charge across the bridge at Lodi, presenting the eagles to his legionaries, riding his chariot in a Roman triumph or apotheosized as a classical deity, sparing the conquered on the battlefield or subjecting the proud, visiting the victims of plague, rousing by his very presence the spirit of devotion in the wounded and dying. It is quite clear that the French painters of the period and Goya—of course, a painter on a different scale of magnitude—were not illustrating the same war. But it would be a mistake to judge the political success of Napoleon’s artists by their artistic merits. Their influence in the formation of the Napoleonic legend and in creating and perpetuating a romantic attitude to war is not to be underestimated. More important for the history of art is the group of young men—Ingres, Vernet, Géricault—which was appearing in the last years of the Empire.

The decorative taste of the Empire was luxurious and heavy, adding Egyptian and Etruscan motives to the influence of the now triumphant classical revival. The provincial cities were not important enough to receive much imperial attention, and there the eighteenth century largely survived, but considerable steps were taken towards the spoiling of Paris. Napoleon required a grandiose setting for the capital of his Empire, and of course a classical one. Triumphal arches—such as the Étoile and the Carrousel—were de rigueur. For public buildings the correct thing was temples; so we have the temples of Finance—the Bourse with its sixty-four Corinthian columns, the temple of religion—the Madeleine, the temple of the laws—the palais Bourbon, all heavy pastiches and all equally unsuited to the purposes for which they were intended. The proportions of the place Vendôme were ruined by sticking in its middle, in place of the destroyed royal statue, a monstrous column, in imitation of that of Trajan. To enable the Napoleonic monuments to be seen, the process of driving long straight roads through Paris, which was to be carried much further under the Second Empire, was begun. Unlike the lath and plaster erections of the Revolution, the buildings of the Empire were made to last—unfortunately, for they embody too well the Emperor’s chief aesthetic rule: ‘Ce qui est grand est toujours beau.’

Literature and art could not be expected to flourish in the hard climate of the Empire. Speculation about society was even less likely to be encouraged. In 1803 Napoleon suppressed the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. On the other hand the natural and mathematical sciences have usually seemed able to accommodate themselves quite happily to absolutism. Apart from the guillotining of Lavoisier as a Farmer General, the Revolution and Empire did nothing to check scientific progress. The older generation of mathematicians and physicists such as Lagrange, Laplace, whose name is identified with the theory of nebulae, Monge, mathematician and accomplice of Bonaparte, and the botanist Lamarck, overlapped with younger men—Cuvier, who brought geology and paleontology to the aid of zoological studies, Ampère, the founder of electromagnetism, and the astronomer Arago. In psychology, Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis continued the materialist theories of Condillac.

All this—art or science—is incidental or irrelevant to the
history of the Empire. Napoleon's peculiar and lasting achievement was the work of the Consulate—that administrative reorganization, which, in perspective, can be seen as bequeathing not only to France but to much of the rest of the world, the most powerful instrument of bureaucratic control that the Western world had known since the Roman Empire. It was not a framework for the kind of society that the idealistic liberals of 1789 had imagined themselves to be inaugurating, nor should we treat the Napoleonic system, as it often has been treated, as the mere logical sequel to the ancien régime and the Revolution, and Napoleon simply as the heir of Louis XIV and the Committee of Public Safety. This is to underestimate the scope of his achievement. The Grand Monarch did not leave an imprint on French institutions that can be compared with the heritage of the Emperor. His immediate successors might repudiate his work, they could not undo it, and the Napoleonic state was long to outlive its author and the ends to which he had directed it.

4. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE: RISE

The Consulate was more important in the history of France, though not of Europe, than the Empire. What remains is a ten-years wonder, the history of conquests as dazzling as they were ephemeral, of armies marching and counter-marching from Lisbon to Moscow, and peace a brief breathing-space between wars. If we ask, as the Greeks would have done, what was the end of the Napoleonic state, the answer must be war. In war it had begun, war remained its raison d'être, and by war it was to end.

The Treaty of Amiens could not in the nature of things be more than an armistice, but it proved an opportunity for extra-European policies to be developed by Bonaparte. With France's position in Europe consolidated, he looked to the restoration of her overseas empire. Louisiana and the colony of St Domingo had been gained from Spain, and the colonies which had been conquered by Great Britain during the Revolutionary War were restored to France, which thus had in 1802 a larger colonial domain than in 1789. The position was less favourable than it might seem, but to understand the reason for this we must briefly look back over developments in the West Indies since 1789.

The Revolution had at first seemed a golden opportunity for the wealthy planters of the French Antilles, the Grands Blancs, in the name of self-government (the usual demand of those who want to oppress others) to relieve themselves of the control of the authorities in Paris. At the same time, to prevent the liberal ideas of the Constituent Assembly from being applied to the colonies, a number of big colonial proprietors had formed in Paris, in June 1789, a club to defend their interests, called from its meeting-place the club Massiac. On the other side, the Société des Amis des Noirs rallied anti-slavery opinion. The liberal tendency was the stronger in the Assembly, and it was joined to a belief in centralized control. The principle that the colonies are an integral part of France was first enunciated by the Revolution in a decree of March 1790; it was repeated in August 1792 and again in the Constitution of the year 111. The extension of civic rights was much slower and more reluctant. In May 1791 coloured men who were sons of a free father and mother were given the vote. This was only some 5 per cent of the whole black or mulatto population, but both white and black now began to take up arms. In an attempt to restore peace the Legislative Assembly gave political rights to all free men, and sent over to St Domingo, in September 1792, commissaires and 6,000 troops to enforce its policy. The planters resisted and their leaders signed a treaty temporarily delivering the islands to the British, in return for military and naval assistance. The commissaires, in desperation, proclaimed the emancipation of all blacks who would join them. Meanwhile, in July 1793, the Convention had abolished the slave trade, and in February 1794 was to vote the abolition of slavery. In the confused triangular struggle of English, French, and
coloured that followed, the chief victor was the yellow fever. But by 1798 the great Negro general Toussaint-Louverture was undisputed ruler of St Domingo; while in Guadeloupe a revolutionary commissaire with the aid of the Negroes had driven out a British force of occupation.

The legislation of the Revolution had, in spite of everything, made important reforms, but the French colonists, supported by Bonaparte, had no intention of accepting them. The Constitution of the year VIII laid it down that the colonies should be ruled by special laws; in 1802 they were placed under executive regulations and exempted from legislative control. The department of the Colonies in the Ministry of the Marine, staffed with ancien régime officials from whom Bonaparte took his advice, willingly abandoned all the reforms of the Revolution. The French trading monopoly was restored in the West Indies. Slavery was re-established where it had been abolished, Negroes were excluded from France, and mixed marriages prohibited. It is reasonable to suppose that the influence of the créole Josephine reinforced Bonaparte's native milliberalism in his dealings with the colonies. In the lesser islands small military expeditions from France restored French authority without difficulty. St Domingo, where Toussaint-Louverture had established an autonomous authority with himself as Governor though recognizing French suzerainty, presented a more difficult problem. To solve it Bonaparte dispatched an army of 30,000 under General Leclerc, with instructions to gain the confidence of the Negroes and arrest their leader. Toussaint was seized and sent to France, where he died within a year in prison, to be remembered in one of Wordsworth's greatest sonnets. The removal of the one Negro leader with authority and statesmanship intensified the ferocity of the servile war against France. Those of the French who were not killed by the Negroes were exterminated by disease, and the pearl of the Antilles passed for ever out of French possession.

Louisiana was lost in a different way. Officially annexed in March 1803, it was sold to the United States in December. The remaining scattered colonies fell to English naval expeditions in the course of the following years. The loss of the first French Empire, begun in 1763, had been completed by Bonaparte. He was too much a man of the ancien régime to be really interested in colonies save as pawns in the military struggle, and his imagination turned more easily to the East than to the West. There, the army he had left behind in Egypt, defeated by a British expeditionary force in 1801, had capitulated; but Napoleon's eyes still saw the Mediterranean as the route to India, where French agents were hard at work. His troops remained at Leghorn and Ancona on the west and east coasts of Italy; treaties were concluded with Tripoli and Tunis; Algiers, after the pillage of a French ship, was threatened with attack; French diplomacy was active at Constantinople; and a French agent, Sébastiani, was sent on a mission to Syria and Egypt. All this, while perfectly within French rights, was not likely to reassure her recent enemies.

Military movements on the Continent were also a source of alarm to Great Britain. French control over the satellites was strengthened. In Italy, Piedmont was divided into six departments and its army amalgamated with the French; the Ligurian Republic became a French military division; and Bonaparte appointed himself president of the Cisalpine Republic. In the north, French troops continued to occupy the Dutch ports. By an Act of Mediation the Swiss cantons were re-organized and French control was established over the Alpine passes. Italians, Swiss, and Dutch were all called on to furnish contingents of conscripts for the French army.

None of these measures, except the retention of troops in Holland, was an infringement of the Treaty of Amiens. The new casus belli was to arise in the Mediterranean, where Great Britain had undertaken by the Treaty of Amiens to restore Malta to the Knights of St John, but on second thoughts, despite her treaty obligation, could not bring herself to abandon such a valuable strategic position. British intransigence was encouraged by secret negotiations with Russia, also alarmed at the evidence of Bonaparte's
interest in the Near East. On 30 January 1803 the *Moniteur* published Sébastiani's report on his tour there, in which he seemed to be putting forward, in language referring to the British in terms of contempt, proposals for a French reconquest of Egypt.

Why did Bonaparte, although he toned down the report slightly, publish such a provocative document at a moment when — though we need not attribute any noble dreams of permanent peace to him — he was not yet ready for a renewal of war? The answer seems to lie in the natural incapacity of a dictator for understanding the politics of a parliamentary country. The vulgar and immoderate personal attacks of the British press, which he attributed to the inspiration of the British government, drove him to fury; and the language of the parliamentary opposition led him to believe that the country was too divided by political conflicts to react strongly to his provocations. British opinion, on its side, had now overwhelmingly decided that Bonaparte was merely using the peace as an armistice during which to prepare for further aggression. The British government was determined to obtain further securities. Bonaparte, who had given hostages to fortune overseas and had not yet rebuilt French naval strength, was also suspicious of the reliability of his Russian alliance. He therefore temporized and even offered concessions. A British ultimatum on 23 April insisted on the continued occupation of Malta for ten years, the cession of the neighbouring island of Lampedusa to Great Britain, the evacuation of Holland by French forces, and the recognition of the Italian satellites on condition of compensation to Sardinia and Switzerland. This was in effect a repudiation of the terms of Amiens. Bonaparte offered more concessions but the British government would be satisfied only by the integral acceptance of its ultimatum. Failing this, negotiations were broken off and the war renewed in May 1803, after fourteen months of uneasy peace.

The Treaty of Amiens had not contained the conditions of a lasting peace. Bonaparte was not prepared permanently to accept a situation in which Great Britain outweighed France in naval power and in overseas empire; Great Britain, for her part, did not regard French military hegemony in Europe as compatible with her own security. War was inevitable in these circumstances: the problem was how it could be waged, how the land and the sea power could measure their strength against one another. The British could seize French shipping and mop up the French colonies again one by one; but they could only intervene in Europe by means of alliances. Bonaparte's problem on the other hand was to find some means of bringing his far greater military power to bear directly against England. His solution was the Boulogne Camp and invasion across the Channel.

All through the wars of the eighteenth century plans for the invasion of England had accumulated in the dossiers of the French ministries. Bonaparte put these into practice on an unprecedented scale. No attempt was made to conceal his preparations. The Bayeux tapestry was brought to Paris for exhibition as a reminder of a previous successful invasion of England from France. By the summer of 1804 there were six to seven hundred invasion barges and a Grand Army of over 100,000 men gathered on the coast at Boulogne. A year later they were still there. The French admiral Villeneuve's manoeuvre to entice the British fleet to the West Indies had failed to produce that temporary French control of the Channel which was necessary for the invasion. The battle at Trafalgar, into which Villeneuve was driven by Bonaparte's reproaches, brought about the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets and guaranteed British control of the seas for the rest of the war. But even before the battle Napoleon had — he believed temporarily — abandoned his invasion plan and struck camp at Boulogne.

Russia, which had decided on war with France, and Austria, under pressure from Russia and alarmed at the growth of French power in Italy and Germany, joined Great Britain to form the Third Coalition in July 1805. By the
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end of August the Grand Army was marching across southern Germany in seven columns. By agents and informers Napoleon already knew exactly the dispositions of the Austrians. He fell on the incompetent Austrian general, Mack, at Ulm and routed him. The Russian allies, with another Austrian army, barred the French advance at Austerlitz where, on 2 December, in turn they were overwhelmed. Twice defeated, Austria concluded a humiliating peace at Pressburg.

Prussia, alarmed at the continual growth of French power in Germany, which it had so far done much, passively and even actively, to promote, now belatedly took to arms - the most highly polished, as well as the most antiquated, in Europe - to be humiliatingly crushed at Jena in November 1806. Russia, which alone remained of the European allies, was defeated in the bloodiest and most hard-fought battles Napoleon had so far been engaged in, at Eylau and Friedland, in 1807.

The sequel was the meeting of Napoleon and Alexander on the Battlefield at Tilsit, on 25 June 1807, when Napoleon dictated the terms of peace. Prussia was reduced to a mere torso. Russia had to make major concessions in the Near East, abandoning the Ionian Islands to Napoleon, evacuating the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia on the Danube, accepting the Continental System, and, if Great Britain did not agree to Russian mediation, concluding an alliance with France. Napoleon was master of Europe west of the Russian border. The frontiers of France were extended to the Rhine in the north-east and to take in Piedmont, Parma, Genoa, and Tuscany in Italy. They were bordered by a glacis of satellite states - the former Batavian Republic, now the Kingdom of Holland, under his brother Louis; the Confederation of the Rhine, with Bavaria, Württemburg, Baden, and other states, and the electorate of Saxony promoted to be a kingdom; the kingdom of Westphalia, formed out of the territories of the deposed rulers of Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel, with the subsequent addition of part of Hanover, placed under Napoleon's younger brother, Jerome; Prussian Poland, formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, under the King of Saxony; the Helvetic Republic; the Kingdom of Italy, based on Lombardy-Venetia and stretching down the coast of the peninsula through the eastern part of the Papal States to Ancona, with the privilege of having Napoleon himself as its king, crowned in 1805 with the iron crown of Lombardy at Milan, his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, being Viceroy. The western half of the Papal States, surrounded by French power, still had a precarious and short-lived independence; but to the south the Kingdom of Naples - not of the Two Sicilies, for sea-power and a British force under General Stuart which won the small but significant battle of Maida in 1806, kept the French armies on the landward side of the Straits of Messina - was given in 1806 to Joseph Bonaparte, who was succeeded, when he was transferred to the throne of Spain, by Murat, not so much in his capacity of cavalry general as in that of husband of Caroline Bonaparte. Napoleon had done well by his clan. This was not to be the farthest limit of his empire, but already Russia and Austria were the only continental powers not dominated by him.

How was it that France, which under Louis XIV had known no such success, which since Fleury had had no luck in its foreign policy and known hardly anything but defeat, within fifteen years had acquired the hegemony of Europe? The military genius of Napoleon is part of the answer; the improved weapons, which he inherited from the reforms of the later years of the ancien régime, another part. But neither leadership nor material would have won victories without the men, the armies which had grown out of the ragged battalions of the Republic. What the Revolution had bequeathed to Napoleon was a large body of veterans, by now all really professional soldiers, many of them trained in the army of the line before 1789 and all blooded in the battles of the Republic. Young men of adventurous spirit, ability, and ambition from all ranks of society, seeking the quickest path to advancement, furnished the officers. The wars of the Revolution provided a supply,
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though a wasting one, of able generals. The masses that were required to be poured into and amalgamated with these cadres to fill out the armies of the Empire were provided by conscription. Although there were many exemptions and evasions, between 1800 and 1812 Napoleon raised well over a million men from France; a week at the depot to equip them and give them a rudimentary notion of military discipline, and they could be sent to the front, to be fused with trained men and learn the art of war on the field of battle. The brutal punishments which were regarded as necessary to discipline in British and other armies had been abolished by the revolutionaries. Esprit de corps, honours, and the spirit with which Napoleon inspired his soldiers from top to bottom, were a better substitute.

To picture a French army, using French resources, as conquering Europe, would, however, not be correct. From the beginnings of the Revolutionary War the French armies had lived off the country, and as their wars were always, until 1813, fought on foreign soil, the main burden did not fall on France. The numbers of men raised from France, though large by ancien régime standards, were not excessive. Up to 1812 the annual average works out at some 85,000, and this from a France which was steadily expanding its frontiers. As well as Piedmontese, Belgians, Dutch, and inhabitants of some German states, which were subjected to the laws of conscription when they were annexed, levies were raised from the satellite states. The army that invaded Russia in 1812 had contingents from every nation of Europe: of its 700,000 men only a third were French.

It was in moving the huge bodies of men he commanded across the map of Europe and concentrating them on the chosen field of battle that Napoleon showed his greatest military genius. The battle engaged, solid columns were flung at the enemy, a method that was costly in lives but the most efficient way of using masses of half-trained or untrained conscripts; it was successful until it met the concentrated fire of the English regiments of the line.

The most important factor of all in the Napoleonic conquests was the result of a technical change. The art of war seems to progress through alternate periods in which the defence and the offensive predominate. At the end of the eighteenth century the mobility of armies was greatly increased; the French were the first to exploit this and Napoleon was the first great master of the new techniques. Improved road surfaces, light field-guns, organization of armies in divisions, moving along different roads and therefore able to live off the country and dispense with cumbersome baggage-trains, the concentration of artillery fire and infantry attack — these methods, learnt from the military theorists of the ancien régime, especially Guibert, author of the Essai général de tactique of 1772, were put into practice by Napoleon, with such effect that by 1807 all Europe, except Russia, was at his feet.

After Tilsit it might have been thought that Napoleon would rest on his laurels, content with his unchallenged military supremacy. The capacity for accepting a limit to his ambition was against his nature, but we need not resort simply to an explanation in terms of personal character; the perpetuation of war was in the nature of his régime, but in a more subtle way. England remained unconquered and after Trafalgar could apparently only be conquered by a restoration of French sea-power to the level at which it could challenge and defeat the might of the British navy. With the resources of France and all the satellite states to draw on, one might have thought that the creation of a new navy would not have been beyond Napoleon’s power. If he chose another way of attack it was not, perhaps, because he recognized the restoration of French naval strength as impossible, but because he believed implicitly that this other way, while ensuring the collapse of British power equally, and perhaps more expeditiously and certainly, possessed also other and inherent attractions which made it desirable in itself. The Continental System was a device for bringing Great Britain to her knees, but it was also, quite apart from this, a method of increasing and consolidating the wealth and therefore the greatness of
France. Moreover the Continental System was not invented out of nothing by Napoleon: it was a development of the policies of the Republic and the ancien régime.

The use of economic weapons in the struggle for power was not new. The revolutionaries had used them in their war against Great Britain. The hated commercial treaty of 1786 was annulled immediately after the declaration of war in 1793. All British goods were excluded from France; all shipping entering French ports had to be French or that of the country from which the goods came. 'Let us decree,' cried Barrère, 'a solemn navigation act: and the isle of shipkeepers will be ruined.' As early as 1795 there was a proposal to use the alliance with Dutch naval power to exclude British trade from the Continent. Napoleon did not have to invent the Continental System; as in so many other fields, he found an idea already in existence and merely applied it with his own method and whole-heartedness. It was generally believed that British power rested on her naval strength and her subsidies - the guineas of Pitt; and both these on the profits she derived from trade. To destroy that trade by cutting off its markets would ruin her finance and rob her of her power as effectively as if every port in the British Isles were sealed: thus could the sea power be blockaded from the land.

This, however, is only one side of the Continental System. There was also the thought that what England lost France could gain, taking the place of her rival as the great industrial nation of Europe, and drawing in by her exports the wealth that would be barred to England. The Treaty of Amiens gave Napoleon the respite he needed to begin his policy of Bonapartist Colbertism by injecting a stimulus into French industry. His efforts were vigorous and at first at least unsuccessful. Schools were set up for technical training, prizes offered for inventions, industrial fairs organized. Jacquard's machine for silk weaving was brought into use. Great French chemists, Lavoisier, Fourcroy, Berthollet, discovered new methods of dyeing, bleaching, and tanning. Industrialists and technicians visited the factories of Great Britain, and British machines and workers were imported into France, where they were put into operation with the aid of government credits and patronage. The French industrialist, Richard Lenoir, by 1810 had six cotton spinning mills with 3,600 workers in Normandy. Ternaux, a wool manufacturer of Sedan, employed 24,000 workers. Between 1788 and 1812 the number of looms increased from some 7,000 to 17,000 and the workers from 76,000 to 131,000. Such details, however, must not be allowed to give the impression of rapid industrial progress. The Revolution and the Empire may have provided a stimulus in some directions, but it is doubtful whether the pace had in fact increased. By 1815 French industry, it is estimated, was at the same level of mechanization reached in Great Britain by 1786. Domestic labour was still the norm. Little workshops, with a master man and a few compagnons, working from one to five looms, still overwhelmingly predominated even in the textile industry. The small scale of industry is revealed by a few figures: 452 mines with 43,396 workers, 41 ironworks with 1,202, 1,219 forges with 7,120, 98 sugar refineries with 285. At Marseille the soap industry had 73 workshops and 1,000 workers. The industrial revolution in France, of which there were notable signs before 1789, was progressing very slowly. The energy of the nation had been diverted first to civil strife and then to conquest.

The authoritarian and hierarchical spirit of the Emperor, as well as the victory in the Revolution of the men of property, was reflected in the labour laws of the Empire. In 1803 was introduced the tinent, a kind of passport and police visa, which every worker had to possess and in which were recorded all his changes of employment, reasons for leaving each job, and wages. It was kept by the employer and without it a worker could not be employed and would be regarded as a vagabond. Strikes were vigorously prohibited under severe penalties. The compagnonnages only survived clandestinely. Working conditions were miserable, though there seems to have been a modest rise in real wages up to 1810 and a fall after this.
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Napoleon, like his predecessors, was chiefly interested in power, and in prosperity only as a means to power. His commercial policy was therefore at the service of his political ends. His conquests gave him ample opportunity to exclude British trade from the Continent, beginning with the occupation of Hanover in May 1803, which enabled him to close the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. These measures, along with the prohibition of, or heavy duties on, colonial produce, increased the cost and diminished the supplies of raw material for French industry. This policy was intensified and systematized by the Berlin Decrees of 1806. By the Milan Decrees of December 1807 any ship which had called at a British port, paid a duty to Britain, or even been examined at sea by the British, was made a lawful prize. The result was in effect to exclude neutral shipping, on which Europe now depended for its supplies from overseas, from ports under French control.

The British Orders in Council, blockading all French ports, were imposed more effectively by a fleet which swept the seas, and by raiding privateers. French privateers, the most successful of whom was the famous Surcouf, took a heavy toll of British shipping, at a rate of nearly 450 losses a year; but a high percentage of British exports (from 25 to 42 per cent), and re-exports (71 to 83 per cent) continued to go to the Continent. In the attempt to prevent this, Napoleon organized an army of customs officials round the coasts of Europe. The extent to which the Continental System dictated the aggressions of the Empire, such as the invasion of the Iberian peninsula, has perhaps been exaggerated; but annexations were at least influenced by the needs of the System. Napoleon's aim was, in his own words, to close every port from the Sound to the Hellespont to British shipping.

To portray the Continental System, as it has been portrayed, as an attempt to create a great pan-European economic union, is to attribute to Napoleon a degree of enlightenment in the pursuance of his ends which dictators do not usually possess. If it had been this the System might
conceivably have aroused less resentment in the rest of Europe. On the contrary, it was, as I have already said, a device not only for defeating England, but also for ensuring French economic supremacy. The economies of the other nations were subordinated and geared to that of France. His object, Napoleon declared in 1810, was to encourage the export of French goods and the import of foreign bullion. Thus, new frontiers in Italy, with high customs barriers between them, were devised to enable French industrial products to capture the Italian market. The Grand Duchy of Berg, centred on the Ruhr valley, already a growing industrial area, was cut off from its markets in the Netherlands and the Baltic by high tariffs. The export of Italian textiles to southern Germany was prohibited. Raw silk from Piedmont was directed to Lyon and away from the silk workers of Lombardy by means of tariff adjustments. French manufactures could be exported freely into Holland, but Dutch goods had to pay customs dues to enter France.

As has already been indicated, these efforts to turn France into the great industrial nation of Europe failed. The lack of colonial raw materials was incompatible with their success, though desperate efforts were made to improve substitutes. The growing of wool was promoted in the south-west of France, where its production had flourished in the Middle Ages, to replace colonial indigo; coffee provided a substitute for coffee and beet for the sugar ca. Attempts were made to introduce the growing of cotton in southern Italy, but the cotton industry languished for lack of raw materials. The substitutes had at the time only mediocre success.

The decisive factor in Napoleon's attempt to create a French industrial empire was that he was not men setting land power against sea power, but land communications against sea communications, at a time when transport by water was immeasurably cheaper than transport by land. If the rivers of Europe had flowed in a different direction, the prospects might have been brighter, but the gains of the First Empire were driven across France and stretched out to the French Empire could not materially diminish the cost of land transport. Despite all Napoleon's efforts, French foreign trade under the Empire never regained the level it had reached in 1789. In Bordeaux, wrote the American consul in 1808, grass was growing in the streets and at the great quays a mere handful of vessels with cargo swung in the tide.

When the economic crisis of 1811-13 burst on Europe, though the contemporary crisis in Great Britain would suggest more general causes, Europe naturally attributed it to the Napoleonic system. In France itself, at Mulhouse 40,000 workers out of 60,000 were unemployed, and 16,000 to 25,000 at Lyon. Napoleon, who had learnt during the Revolution to fear starving urban mobs, modified and opened loopholes in his economic legislation, and this was the effective end of the real enforcement of the Continental System, though it had already broken down largely in practice. Round the coastline of Napoleonic Europe, from Gothenburg in Sweden, Heligoland, Gibraltar, the Balearics, Malta, after their capture in 1809 the Ionian Isles, a flood of contraband goods seeped into Europe. Smuggling became one of the most remunerative and by no means the least numerous of professions. It was conducted sometimes by official subterfuge, sometimes by force of arms. Administrators and generals, and the customs officials themselves, made a regular trade of corruption. Against universal smuggling the Napoleonic machine of repression that had been created was powerless. When confiscated goods were ordered to be burnt, valueless rubbish was destroyed in their place. Smuggling became so much an organized trade that smuggled goods were even insured against seizure. The rate at Strasbourg on illicit goods destined for France was 50 per cent. Napoleon himself connived at the infringement of his own laws. He wrote to his brother Louis to fix the point where English smugglers were to land to purchase Dutch gin; what was essential, he believed, was that they should be made to pay in bullion and not in goods. But at
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Hamburg, English clothing and shoes were being bought for the French army.

It was only after the economic crisis of the latter years of the Empire that Napoleon had recourse to the organized breach of the Continental System by the method of licences. Since Great Britain was doing the same, an interchange of goods developed between the two countries at war. French ships were allowed to trade with England under a neutral flag; unfortunately, once outside Napoleon's clutches they generally stayed outside, to swell the merchant marine in British service. The licences were, of course, expensive, and there were heavy duties on the imported goods, so that fiscal motives were not absent from Napoleon's mind. Finally, the opposition that his economic policies had always aroused in the rest of Europe spread to France. The commercial and industrial classes began to detach themselves openly from a régime the burden of which went on increasing and the benefits diminishing.

Empire and military glory were in the end as incompatible with economic progress as the political chaos of the Revolution had been. And the Emperor himself, if he had started as the heir of the Revolution, was turning in his social policy into something more like the restorer of a pseudo-ancien régime. The creation of the Legion of Honour in 1802, against the advice of many of his supporters, was an early sign of his anti-egalitarian tendencies. Once he was Emperor he needed a Court, the nucleus of which was provided by the six Grand Dignitaries of the Empire - Grand Elector Joseph Bonaparte, Grand Constable Louis Arch-chancellor of State Eugène de Beauharnais, Grand Admiral Murat, Arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and Arch-treasurer Lebrun - four relations plus the former second and third consuls. For the ceremonies of the new court a series of Grand Officers of the Crown, drawn from the ancien régime, provided the correct tone. Mme Campan was there to explain to the Ladies of Honour and the Empress how Marie-Antoinette used to do things. A whole gamut of titles, from duke to chevalier, was recreated and made hereditary on the granting of an appropriate entail. Sons of ministers, councillors of state and the like, and the nephews of archbishops, became counts. Prefects were barons or counts. Altogether Napoleon created over 3,000 nobles. Of course, a real noble was even better. Those among the ancien régime, nobility who rallied to the imperial banner were singled out for favour. They came increasingly to dominate the Court and the administration as the Empire reached its zenith.

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5. The Napoleonic Empire: Fall

In 1807, after Tilsit, there was a reorganization of the ministries, in which Talleyrand lost the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, though he was made a Grand Dignitary. He had already decided that Napoleon's ambition would bring him to ultimate ruin, and having served him well and gained a huge fortune by the acceptance of bribes, he was now secretly negotiating with Napoleon's enemies. He had never believed in the wisdom of the humiliation of Austria. In the course of 1808 Talleyrand and Fouché, when Napoleon was absent in Spain, began to make plans for the choice of a successor, who was apparently to be Murat. Napoleon did not remain in ignorance of this. When he returned he dismissed Talleyrand with a torrent of abuse; but the ex-bishop, ex-revolutionary, ex-minister of Foreign Affairs, ex-Grand Chamberlain, continued to haunt the Court like a vulture of ill omen biding his time. Fouché, former terrorist and regicide, minister of police since 1799, and a particular friend of Josephine, had been useful to Napoleon as a link with the revolutionaries, but subsequently established a position also as a kind of patron to many royalists. During the Revolution, while a leader of the anti-religious party, he had protected priests, especially members of his old order of the Oratory. His contempt for the Concordat was unconcealed, not for lack of a clerical capacity for dissimulation but from a natural independence of mind. He was the least
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servile of all Napoleon’s servants and the humanest minister of police a dictator ever had. But when, in 1810, Napoleon discovered that Fouché had been engaging for the past year in secret negotiations with England, his dismissal was inevitable. Though Talleyrand and Fouché waited to be dismissed—and it is a sign of their confidence that they feared no more—it is evident that they had deserted Napoleon by their own choice and were preparing for a future in which they foresaw his inevitable defeat. It was an ominous sign. Their successors, often former royalists, were men of inferior calibre and untried loyalty. Whereas at first Napoleon had gathered round him a collection of the ablest men in France, his later appointments were increasingly influenced by favouritism and Court intrigue. He now wanted flunkeys, says Chaptal bitterly, not advisers.

Intolerance of criticism was only one sign of the degeneration that was beginning to come over the Emperor, both physically and mentally. His decline may be said to have begun even before the Empire had reached its height. His aggressions were increasingly irrational. Thus the Pope had not realized the nature of the relationship which Napoleon assumed to have been created by the Concordat. ‘So far as the Pope is concerned’, he wrote, ‘I am Charlemagne’. If the Pope did not behave he would be reduced to the status of bishop of Rome. For military purposes, French troops had already occupied the Adriatic coastline of the Papal States and the port of Ancona. In 1809 the Papal States were annexed to the French Empire and the Pope was arrested and carried off to captivity. His subsequent refusal to collaborate with Napoleon, though inconvenient especially because it prevented the filling of vacant sees in France, had surprisingly little practical result.

The French intervention in Spain was to have momentous consequences. Under Godoy, Prince of the Peace, an adventurer who had made the Queen his mistress, Spain had become a French satellite. To extend French control over the whole peninsula, a joint Franco-Spanish army invaded Portugal in 1807. Napoleon, however, was not satisfied with the aid he was getting from Spain. Under direct French rule, he believed, this backward and priest-ridden nation could be modernized and so contribute far more to the strength of the French Empire. The sordid intrigues which followed in the Spanish Court need not delay us. In May 1808 the King and Queen and the heir Ferdinand were summoned to Bayonne and by threats made to sign away their rights over Spain. Godoy was imprisoned, regretted only by the infatuated Queen and a few other mistresses. Joseph Bonaparte, brought from the throne of Naples, was put on that of Madrid.

Even before Joseph entered his new capital, where he was able to stay on this occasion only for eleven days, a spontaneous insurrection all over Spain had imperilled some 150,000 French troops dispersed over the whole peninsula. In July one force had to capitulate at Baylen and in August another, beaten at Vimeiro by a hurriedly dispatched British expeditionary force under Wellesley, signed the Convention of Cintra and was shipped back to France. Joseph and the remaining French troops withdrew behind the Ebro. All this was unprecedented. If allowed to succeed it might set a fatal example. The veteran corps of Victor, Mortier, and Ney were called from Germany and a great French army was assembled under Napoleon on the Ebro. The Spaniards were routed and driven back. A small British force under Moore retreated to Corunna and was evacuated by sea. Joseph was reinstated in Madrid. However, the diversion effected by Moore’s army had drawn back the French forces from their triumphal sweep through the peninsula. After this Napoleon returned to Paris and never came to Spain again. During the remainder of the wars of the Empire, Wellington from his base in Portugal, and the Spanish guerillas, were to tie down a large French army permanently. In Napoleon’s winter campaign of 1808 he had over 300,000 men in Spain; in the spring offensive of 1810 the number rose to 370,000; in the crisis of the Empire in 1812 there were 290,000 and in 1813 still 244,000. The wastage by battle and disease was heavy all
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through. If it was a side-show it was a very expensive one; henceforth Napoleon was to have to fight on two fronts.

The French reverses in Spain may have played some part in the resurgence of Austria, which had remained unconquered to the humiliation of Austerlitz and had since been reorganizing her military forces. A hard-fought campaign from April to July 1809 ended in another Austrian defeat, at Wagram; but Napoleon's position was still not secure. The Tyrol had revolted, Venetia had been captured by the Austrians, Prussia and Russia were hesitating on the brink of war, far away to the West Soult had been driven out of Portugal, and a British expedition had landed in Walcheren. Even Wagram, though an Austrian defeat, was not a rout, and was only worth an armistice. But when it became clear that Russian aid was not coming, and that Vienna itself was exposed to attack, the Austrian Emperor gave up the struggle and bought peace with more territorial concessions—a large part of Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw, Salzburg and the Tyrol to Bavaria, the Illyrian provinces, in accordance with the requirements of the Continental System, to direct French rule.

Victory still followed the imperial eagles but one that was lacking to Napoleon's ambitions. The intrigues of Talleyrand and Fouqué had made the insecurity of his position clear. His clan evidently depended entirely on himself: there was no hope in it for the establishment of a Bonapartist dynasty. Josephine would now never give him a child, but he knew through a mistress, in 1807, that he was capable of getting one. For some time schemes for a divorce and re-marriage had been mooted, and after a few unsuccessful approaches to the old dynasties, the House of Habsburg, unlucky in battle, remembered their tradition—Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube. They had an available princess, Marie-Louise, ready for the sacrifice, and as the young Austrian minister Metternich wrote, the Austrian Emperor 'will shrink from nothing that may contribute to the welfare and peace of the state'. He would however have shrunk from a civil marriage, which in any case would not have been adequate for Napoleon's purpose. Josephine therefore had to be got rid of, not by a divorce, but by a declaration of the nullity of her marriage. This involved proving the invalidity of the religious ceremony which she and Napoleon had gone through on the eve of the coronation in 1804. Though performed by a cardinal—Napoleon's uncle, Fesch—this marriage had been clandestine, it was argued, and without adequate witnesses. To complete the conviction of the religious court that tried the case, it was established that Napoleon had acted under compulsion from Josephine. The religious requirements of the Church were thus met, and it was disappointing—seeing that everything was in order—that thirteen cardinals out of twenty-seven should have stayed away from the marriage ceremony with Marie-Louise in 1810. Napoleon in revenge assigned to them compulsory residences and forbade them to wear their robes of office. Hence they became known as the black cardinals. In 1811 was born the little boy who was proclaimed King of Rome but never to inherit an Empire in which the cracks were already visible.

Now that Austria had been once more defeated, and by the dynastic alliance had apparently accepted defeat, Russia remained the only continental power that was not subordinate to France. The nominal ties of Tilsit could not prevent the growth of mutual suspicion and conflict of interests. Alexander and Napoleon suspected each other—and rightly—of preparing an attack when the opportunity came. They had more concrete grievances. Napoleon strengthened his position in the Baltic by the annexation of Oldenburg in December 1810, although Alexander's sister was married to the heir to the Duchy, and despite the guarantees of Tilsit. He began to move his troops eastwards, pinning down Danzig, turning the Grand Duchy of Warsaw into a great military base and gathering huge magazines of supplies there. Meanwhile Russia, like the rest of Europe, was suffering from the economic crisis. To cope with the consequent discontent Alexander imposed heavy duties on French imports and opened his ports to neutral shipping. In
effect he was withdrawing Russia from the Continental System, and although British trade with Russia was insignificant, this may have influenced Napoleon. More alarming was the fact that in May 1812 Russia concluded peace with the Turks. This was perhaps the decisive event, for Napoleon knew that it freed Alexander's hands in a way that nothing else could have done. Alexander had also concluded an agreement with Bernadotte of Sweden, received promises from Austria that her support for Napoleon would be only formal, and was negotiating secretly with Great Britain. Of all this Napoleon was not unaware. A defensive reaction would have been against the nature of the man and his system. War it had to be.

On 24 June 1812 the Grand Army began to cross the Niemen. Napoleon had gathered in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 675,000 men and 1,350 cannon. Poles, Prussians, Austrians, Dutch, Swiss, Italians, all the nations of Europe, had sent their conscripts tramping across Europe. Russia was to be overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. Indeed it was Napoleon's own military machine that, in the barren distances of Russia, was to collapse under its own weight. As the Russian armies avoided battle and withdrew, Napoleon moved forward, his armies struggling on through the heat of summer. At last, in front of Moscow, the Russians stood and Napoleon could fight the battle to which he had been longing. But it was not the coup de grace he needed to deliver. At Borodino some 30,000 of his troops were killed, and though the Russians lost more, he retreated in order. The occupation of an empty Moscow, the burning of the city, the retreat after five weeks waiting for peace emissaries who never came, with an army already reduced to about 100,000, with officers and men, baggage, trains, horses, carriages loaded down with the spoils of Russia's conquered and looted capital, across a region that it had already desolated, in the rain and mud of autumn, turning to the snows of winter—all this is a many times told tale of greed and cruelty, heroism and despair. After the tragic crossing of the Beresina on 27 November, famine and frost and the pursuing Russians completed the annihilation of the army of the Empire. It was not beaten in battle; under the stress of a long, starving retreat, the great cosmopolitan military machine collapsed and disintegrated, leaving behind it a legend in history. Some 1,000 of the Guards, out of the great host that had set out, held together when Ney re-crossed the Niemen on 14 December.

Napoleon had already, on 6 December, deserted an army that no longer existed and was hastening back to Paris, where the essentially ephemeral nature of his régime had just been demonstrated by the Malet conspiracy. In this extraordinary episode a republican general, Malet, and a royalist priest, Lafon, both in custody as political prisoners, came near to overthowing the Empire in its capital by the simple device of forging a document announcing the death of Napoleon and the constitution of a provisional government under the banished general Moreau. In his name Malet assumed command of Paris, and arrested the Minister of Police, the War Minister, and the Prefect of Police—all in the space of a single morning. Only when the commander of the Paris garrison challenged the news, and the little band of conspirators failed to keep up the pretence of Napoleon's death successfully, were they resisted. Then, of course, they were easily seized and after a rapid trial executed. It was a gallant adventure and deserved a better sequel. It was also clear evidence that the whole government of Napoleon rested on the cohesion of the military and administrative machine he had created and that this in turn depended exclusively on his person.

Back in Paris, Napoleon set the administration to the task of raising conscripts from France, for the first time really ruthlessly. Europe was now rising everywhere against his domination, but there were still Napoleonic armies and garrisons far and wide. Indecisive battles against Russians and Prussians, at Lützen and Bautzen, in May 1813, were followed by an armistice. If Napoleon had been capable of concessions, he might now have kept the Austrians out of the war and disintegrated the alliance; but such moderation
had long since ceased to be possible for him and the struggle was resumed. He had some half a million men in the field, the allies rather more. Moreau was advising them to Bernadotte bringing an army down from Sweden. A French victory at Dresden in August was followed in October by the battle of the nations at Leipzig. After this, with its soldiers dead in battle or by disease, deserters or prisoners, or uselessly shut up in fortresses scattered about Germany, the Army of 1813 followed that of 1812 into the void. Only a fragment retired across the Rhine.

More conscripts were called up from France: there were no foreign allies or dependents left to exploit. Still, in December 1813, Napoleon refused to negotiate in time for a recognition of the 'natural frontiers' of France. By now the armies of the coalition were in Switzerland and on the Rhine, and Wellington had crossed the Pyrenees. In January 1814 Murat deserted Napoleon and Italy was lost. In France itself his regime was patently breaking down. It had entered the winter of its discontent. Under the rust surface of dictatorship resentment brooded. Conscription had reached the point at which it was meeting open resistance even from the inert peasantry. They were touched more closely when Napoleon's armies, fighting for the first time on French soil, supplied themselves by the normal method of requisitioning which had carried them all over Europe. The drets réunis, the hated taxes on alcohol, drinks, tobacco, and salt, were a long-standing grievance to the peasantry. Industry had lost its markets with the collapse of the Empire and unemployment was widespread in the towns. Commerce was languishing and the finances in disorder. The clergy, who had never quite forgotten their loyalty to the Bourbons, were a centre of opposition everywhere. All those who had acquired wealth and jobs saw it need to insurge against the future. An underground royalist movement, a kind of royalist and catholic free-masonry which had been created in 1810, was reviving the sense of the Bourbons in a country that had begun to forget them. But though the royalists were active and beginning to emerge above ground, the nation as a whole remained passive.

When the allies invaded France, it accepted the foreign invaders as passively as it had borne the rule of Napoleon. Spinal surrendered to fifty cossacks, Reims to a platoon, Chaumont to a single horseman. The one demand of the country was peace. The Senate, called together by Napoleon in December 1813, performed its last act of homage towards the man to whom so many of its members owed fame and fortune. But the Legislative Body, that collection of insignificant yes-men, voted by 223 to 51 an address of unprecedented independence: 'Our ills are at their height. The Faîte is threatened at all points of the frontier; we are suffering from a destitution unexampled in the whole history of the state. Commerce is destroyed, industry dying... What are the causes of these unutterable miseries? A vexatious administration, excessive taxes, the deplorable methods adopted for their collection, and the even crueler excesses practised for the recruitment of the armies... A barbarous and endless war swallows up periodically the youth torn from education, agriculture, commerce, and the arts. This is strong language, and the Legislative Body ended with an appeal for abandoning the ambitious schemes which had been for twenty years so fatal to all the peoples of Europe. No wonder that Napoleon banished the author of the address, forbade its publication, and proscribed the Legislative Body.

He had been willing to buy peace by renouncing the Empire; he might still have got it and remained the ruler of France. In February and March 1814 negotiations with the allies at Chaillot proved that he could not bring himself to do this. Instead, with a small army of some 60,000 men, largely untrained conscripts, he manoeuvred brilliantly between the invading armies in the East of France and inflicted reverses on them. The requisitions and brutalities of the invaders aroused patriotic feeling in the occupied areas, but this did not spread to the rest of France. The allies, realizing the scarcity of Napoleon's troops, ceased to
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play his game, by-passed his forces, and advanced on Paris. On 29 March, in accordance with orders from Napoleon, Marie-Louise and the King of Rome left the capital. All the higher officers of state were commanded to leave with them, but many found means of remaining. On 31 March Paris capitulated and the troops garrisoning it moved to Fontainebleau, where Napoleon established his headquarters. The same day the allied forces entered through the porte Saint-Denis, marched across Paris amidst curious crowds and bivouacked in the Champs Élysées.

A provisional government, of which Talleyrand was the leading member, was set up. The Senate and the Legislative Body voted the deposition of Napoleon. But what was to take his place? Talleyrand, who had established close relations with the Czar, had largely won him over to a restoration of the Bourbons. The Paris press, now under royalist control, agitated for a restoration. But the allies were still hesitant. Europe had been conditioned to fear the French nation and was still alarmed at what it might do if an unpopular régime were forced on it. At this stage what was happening in the South-west was perhaps decisive. The army of Wellington, having crossed the Pyrenees, was advancing towards Toulouse in pursuit of Soult. A small British force, detached from the main army, was sent east to occupy Bordeaux. The imperial authorities fled across the Gironde, and on 22 March the British advance-guard, which a squadron of young royalists had attached themselves to, entered the city, to be welcomed by the Mayor of Bordeaux, a member of the royalist secret society de la Foi, with a white cockade and the cry of 'Vive le Roi'. In the afternoon arrived the duc d'Angoulême, greeted with wild demonstrations of joy. The influence of this spontaneous French rejection of Napoleon and proclamation of the Bourbons, on both the allies and the French leaders in Paris, was considerable. Napoleon himself, faced with the refusal of the marshals to engage in another battle, had abdicated in favour of the King of Rome and his plenipotentiaries to Alexander. It was already too late.

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save even this from the wreck. Marshal Marmont, despite a short-lived mutiny among his troops, marched them to the enemy lines and surrendered. On 5 April Napoleon abdicated unconditionally. Four days later, so slow did news travel, the last battle of the allied invasion was to be fought, a bloody assault in which Wellington overcame Soult's entrenchments before Toulouse.

On 12 April the comte d'Artois, as lieutenant-general for his brother, Louis XVIII, entered Paris in triumph. Through decorated streets and applauding crowds, he went to Notre Dame where the Te Deum was sung. Louis XVIII himself landed at Boulogne on 24 April and, received everywhere with enthusiasm, moved slowly to Saint-Omer where he met a delegation from the Senate and issued a royal proclamation, 'Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre', recalled by the love of his people to the throne of his fathers, promised France representative government in a Senate and Chamber of Deputies, taxation only with consent, public and individual liberty, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, responsible government, judicial independence, a career open to talent, and - not least - that no one should be punished for opinions or votes during the fallen régime, the recognition of the national debt of pensions, grades, and military honours, of titles of both the old and new nobility, and of the sales of national property. It was a compromise between divine right and the Revolution, rather to the advantage of the latter. On 5 May Louis XVIII and the royal family made their ceremonial entry into the capital.

Napoleon, largely by the mediation of Alexander, was meanwhile journeying to a smaller kingdom in Elba. While he travelled through country that had experienced the allied occupation his reception was favourable, but as he moved south, according to the Prussian commissioner who accompanied him, it became increasingly hostile. He got through Lyon at night. At Orange there were shouts of 'Vive Louis XVIII!', and at Avignon 'À bas le tyran'; he saw himself hanged in effigy and after this disguised himself in
an old blue coat, put up a white cockade, and preceded his carriage in the guise of a courier. Later he dressed himself as an Austrian officer. He embarked from Fréjus, where he had landed fifteen years earlier on his way home from Egypt, leaving then also a defeated army behind, but with the triumphs of brumaire and the Empire before him. Fearing assassination he refused to embark on the French ship provided for him and sailed to Elba in a British frigate. He left a France which, it has been estimated, had lost in his wars 860,000 men between the ages of 23 and 44, half of them under 26.

The Restoration did not begin well. Talleyrand confined himself to foreign affairs. The old system of government by a conseil d'en haut, with no chief minister, no unity, and therefore no policy, was revived. The two most important ministers were baron Louis for Finance, and Dupont, remembered only for his defeat at Baylen and perhaps unmerited disgrace, at the Ministry of War. By an austere financial policy Louis put the budget into better shape, but at the price of maintaining the unpopular droits réunis and of economies which cut down pensions and salaries. Dupont's policy demoralized the army. He retired many officers and put many more on half-pay, brought into it, over the heads of Napoleon's veterans, a host of émigrés who had never seen a battlefield or commanded a man, recreated the Household Guard — the Light Horse, Grey and Black Musketeers, the Cent Suisses, and the rest, crammed with dissatisfied royalists, expensive, intriguing, and useless — 6,000 men, all with the rank and pay of officers, costing twenty million francs a year. 'The indignation and exasperation of the army', wrote Philippe de Ségur, 'himself a noble of the ancien régime but one who had acquired other ideas and other loyalties in the Imperial Army, and a veteran of the Moscow campaign, 'had become so violent that at the Tuileries, among the officers of the Old Guard on half-pay, spectators like myself of the reviews which were held, I had difficulty in preventing an outbreak.' The flag also was already a burning issue. 'They imposed on us,' wrote de Ségur, 'the flag under which they had fought us.' At the same time, the old court ceremonies and the King's household were re-created as though nothing had happened since 1789.

Napoleon at Elba was not uninformed of the dissatisfaction in France, and at the end of ten months was sufficiently dissatisfied himself with ruling a tiny island in place of half Europe to be ready to set out on his last and most reckless venture. On 1 March 1815 he landed with 1,050 troops, once again at Fréjus, and avoiding this time royalist Provence, took the mountain road from Cannes to Grenoble. Opposition melted away wherever he appeared. By itself the march from Fréjus to Paris is sufficient evidence of his magnetic personality. It is clear, however, that what he could appeal to now was primarily the loyalty of the old soldiers to a great leader, and their habit of obedience. The survival of revolutionary sentiments, and the possibility of their re-awakening, was shown at Lyon, where enthusiastic crowds added to cries of 'Vive l'Empereur' those of 'À bas les prêtres', 'À bas les nobles', 'Mort aux royalistes'.

The news of Napoleon's landing reached Paris on 5 March. Before anything could be done, on the next day he was at Grenoble, and in the capital complacency was rapidly being succeeded by frantic and futile orders and counter-orders, and something approaching panic. The defection of Ney, in command of the royal troops in Franche-Comté, was decisive. At midnight on 19 March, Louis XVIII, accompanied by a few horsemen only, took the road for Lille. Finding the garrison there hostile, he crossed the frontier to Ghent.

Napoleon was once again master of Europe, but what use would he make of his revived authority? He announced that he had given up the Grand Empire, but was alarmingly ambiguous as to the scope he envisaged for the French Empire to which he now promised to limit himself. No promises could have disarmed the enmity of the other Great Powers. They declared Napoleon outside the pale of civilized society and had 700,000–800,000 men under arms to back up their ban.
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To give the new régime a more liberal cloak, Napoleon issued, with the advice of Benjamin Constant, an *Acte additionel*, proposing a constitution not so very dissimilar from that adumbrated in Louis XVIII's *Charte*. Either believing in Napoleon's professions of liberalism, or thinking him a lesser evil than the Bourbons, Carnot emerged from retirement to become Minister of the Interior. But even if Napoleon had been sincere, and there is little reason to suppose that he was, he could not give France what its people still wanted more than anything else - peace, or its ruling classes what they wanted - stability, and security for their property and jobs. The chief reason for his successful return, after the loyalty of the old army, was the passivity, the political inertia of the nation. Of course, protestations of loyalty flowed in from the same officials who a year earlier had hastened to offer their allegiance to Louis XVIII and were to repeat the performance once the Emperor had been defeated. The weakness of the royalists was shown by their inability to offer serious resistance, except in the Vendée, where a rising pinned down 30,000 men whom Napoleon could well have used in Belgium.

The thought of an appeal to the masses, if it ever entered Napoleon's head, was rejected. There is no evidence, of course, that the masses would have risen, or what they could have done if they had. Instead, the governmental machine was put into operation in the orthodox way to raise a new conscript army. 600,000 men were called up, but when Napoleon invaded Belgium he could only assemble an army of 125,000, though these included many veterans, gathered back in France from the scattered remnants of his former armies. He marched off, leaving treachery behind him in the person of Fouché, once again Minister of Police, working with the liberals, protecting royalists, in secret correspondence with Metternich and Talleyrand at Vienna and Artois at Ghent, and revealing half of what he was doing to Napoleon, with a foot in every camp. He calculated on Napoleon's survival for some three months, in the course of which the duc d'Otranto reckoned to make himself - as

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for a short while he was to be - indispensable to all parties.

In Belgium, the only forces ready to oppose Napoleon were 120,000 Prussians under Blücher, and a mixed force of Belgians, Dutch, Hanoverians, and English under Wellington. The Prussians were driven back at Ligny and Wellington's forces, held by Ney at Quatre Bras, retreated on the hill of Mont-Saint-Jean near the village of Waterloo. There, on 18 June, Napoleon flung his massed columns at them with little attempt at manœuvre, in increasingly desperate attacks as the threat of the Prussian army, coming up on his flank, became greater. In the later stages of the battle only a retreat could have saved the French army, but Napoleon knew that farther off were the Austrians and Russians, and that if he did not win his first battle his chance was gone for ever. The retreat therefore became a rout and his last army vanished.

*Comme s'envolait un vent saisi d'effet*.
*S'évanouit ce bruit qui fut la grande armée.*

Back in Paris, on 21 June, Napoleon still talked of fighting on, draining the country of men, but there were none now to follow his frantic egotism. He signed his second abdication. If he had not done so the Chambers would have done it for him.

The liberals in Paris, being rid of the Emperor, did not want to replace him with a king, least of all a Bourbon. The man of the moment, however, was Fouché, who had turned to the royalists. He secured the withdrawal of the French army covering Paris and by a series of masterly manouevres was able to present to Louis XVIII, returning as rapidly from the frontier as he had fled there, a peaceful and unopposed restoration, and himself as his Minister of Police.

Meanwhile, Napoleon was *en route*, by way of Rochefort, though he did not suspect this as yet, to St Helena. From the *Bellerophon*, on which he had taken refuge, he wrote to the Prince Regent in a last fine gesture, 'I come, like Themistocles, to sit myself at the hearth of the British people.' The
hearth of the British people was a very cold one but we need not waste too much sympathy on Napoleon. The last fling of his ambition had to be paid for, like the earlier ones, by France; not only in the loss of life and the expense of war, but in a severer treaty of peace. France was reduced to the frontiers of 1789, with the additional loss of one or two small areas for strategic reasons, the most important being the Saar, its future economic importance not yet suspected. An indemnity of 700 million francs was extorted. The works of art looted from Europe were to be returned. The fortresses of the North and the East were to be occupied by 150,000 allied troops for a period of from three to five years. The price of the Hundred Days in the terms of a treaty can easily be stated: its price in terms of the subsequent history of France remains undefinable.

II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

I. THE RESTORATION

The Second Restoration was to take place under very different auspices from those that had presided over the First. Fouché prepared the way for it in Paris. Talleyrand, hurrying back from Vienna, met the King at Saint Denis - where the kings of France had been buried for centuries, until the revolutionaries dug them up - and presented Fouché, vice leaning on the arm of crime Chateaubriand said, to Louis XVIII, who accepted the regicide as his Minister of Police. It was a very different homecoming from the first. Even if Wellington and the King's advisers, who urged on him the necessity of accepting Fouché and Talleyrand as his ministers, were mistaken in believing that this was the only way to a peaceful second restoration, the fact that they believed it, and that the King yielded to their opinion, is in itself significant of the latent weakness and even contradiction in his position; for despite his ministers Louis XVIII did not intend to return the second time, any more than he had come back the first, as the king of a crowned Revolution. When, on the news of the abdication of Napoleon in 1814, a courtier announced to him, 'Sire, you are King of France,' he had replied, 'Have I ever ceased to be?' His sense of indefeasible, hereditary, divine right, which supported him in the years of exile, had become second nature. It gave him a dignity which his physical appearance might otherwise have prohibited. Immensely fat and walking only with difficulty, he occupied the throne like an old idol, self-sufficient in divinely sanctioned egotism. If he compromised with new conditions it was without faith and with very little hope.
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Louis XVIII's English exile had not taught him the virtues of parliamentary government. At bottom he shared the views of his younger brother, who once declared that he would sooner earn his living as a wood-cutter than be King of England. This did not mean that the restored Bourbons intended, even if they had had the power, to bring back the absolute monarchy. The question is often discussed as though there were no other choice, at least in ideology, than that between the absolutism of a Louis XIV and the principles of the Revolution. This is to forget that it was not the ministers of Louis XVI but the émigrés who returned in 1814, and that the kings of the Restoration had formerly been, when they were Provence and Artois, the leaders of the Counter-revolution. Their programme had been that of the aristocratic revolt, of the Assembly of Notables and the Royal Session of 1789. These were the political ideas that Louis XVIII and his advisers embodied in the Charter of 1814.

The concessions it offered should not be underestimated. The recognition of the principles of liberty and equality, with which it commenced, perhaps meant less, but not in practice so much less, than it had in 1789. More important was the assurance that a curtain of forgetfulness was to be dropped over opinions and votes expressed before the Restoration: this was necessary if the political, administrative, military, and religious personnel which had served the Empire was to continue to serve the restored monarchy. The Civil Code and all existing laws which were not contrary to the Charter were maintained in force: this was to retain the administrative and social structure given to France by Napoleon, and here the fundamental contradictions of the Restoration begin. To superimpose the pseudo-Gothic of an aristocratic reaction on the pseudo-classical pillars of the Napoleonic system was to create a piece of wedding-cake architecture, essentially ephemeral.

A second problem was that of land ownership. It was met by a recognition of the inviolable right of all existing property, including specifically all the lands of the Church
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and the émigrés which had been confiscated by the Revolution and had passed to new possessors. Legal recognition of the changes in land ownership was doubtless inevitable, but could those who had been dispossessed reconcile themselves to the fact that even if the King was enjoying his own again, they were not?

Thirdly, religious toleration was proclaimed. This was an achievement of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, consolidated by the Revolution; but Roman Catholicism, a declining, emasculated force in the eighteenth century, was now moving towards a new militancy on the crest of a wave of religious revival. The immediate question was whether it would continue passively to tolerate its enemies. A more fundamental issue was whether the anti-clerical spirit, now deeply rooted among the educated classes, would ever be prepared to accept willingly the recognition in the Chartes of the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion as the official religion of France, and the close alliance between Church and State that was the natural corollary. A minor problem, but one which was to give the Restoration much trouble, was slurred over in the clause which recognized both the liberty of the press and the right of the government to repress its abuse.

When we turn to purely political issues, contradictions are equally apparent in the Chartes, though here there was more scope for a compromise to be worked out in practice. The aim was to establish a constitutional but not a parliamentary monarchy. The King embodied the executive power and had the initiative in legislation; but a parliament composed of two chambers was to discuss and vote the laws and the taxes, and the Chamber of Deputies had the right of impeaching the King’s ministers before the upper chamber. These provisions were illogical but reasonable. They were to prove quite workable and to give France a valuable apprenticeship in parliamentary government. The issue that had divided the noblesse in 1789, the creation of a house of peers, was settled without any dispute, and here perhaps the example of Great Britain and of the institutions of the Empire were not without influence. An assembly of the highest dignitaries, lay, ecclesiastical, and military, of both the old régime and the Empire, nominated by the King, formed a decorative, impressive, and workable upper chamber.

The fundamental problems of the Restoration were, however, essentially extra-political in the narrower meaning of politics. Louis XVIII recognized clearly what they were when he wrote to his brother, in 1817, that he did not intend to be the King of a divided people. ‘All the efforts of my government,’ he said, ‘are directed to the effort to fuse the two peoples, who exist only too much in fact, into a single one.’

Unhappily the Hundred Days had broken the spell of general reconciliation which seemed for a moment to be operating in 1814. A White Terror raged in the South before the central government was able to regain control. La Bourdonnaye, in the Chamber at Paris, demanded chains, executioners, tortures. ‘Defenders of humanity’, he cried, ‘learn how to shed a few drops of blood to spare a torrent of it.’ Doubtless to the disappointment of such real enthusiasts, the legal proceedings resulted only in a few thousand imprisonments. Fouché connived at the escape of many of those who had compromised themselves during the Hundred Days. Ney, bravest of the brave, whose execution was undoubtedly a political blunder, was given every opportunity of escaping before his trial, even though his desertion to Napoleon had been flagrant.

The first step out of the provisional for the Second Restoration was the election of a Chamber of Deputies. The government of Talleyrand and Fouché appointed the prefects and the presidents of the electoral colleges, and perhaps assumed that having chosen the makers of elections, the election was as good as made. But, not for the last time in the nineteenth century, it was shown that there were limits to what the administration could achieve by electoral management. Local notabilities dominated an election which took place in two stages, the primary electors having

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the task of choosing the actual electoral colleges. Out of a
total electorate of 72,000, those who voted numbered
48,000. The result, which has never received a fully satis-
factory explanation, was an overwhelmingly reactionary
and royalist assembly, the famous Chambre introuvable. In the
face of this striking repudiation by the electorate even the
cleverness of Talleyrand and Touché could do nothing and
they faded from the scene. In their place Louis XVIII
called on the duc de Richelieu, whose disinterested loyalty
was well known, who had proved his capacity as an adminis-
trator in the service of Russia, where he had been governor
of the newly conquered territory on the Black Sea, and who
because of his long absence was uninvolved in any of the
fraction of the Emigration. Wellington said of him that his
word was equal to a treaty. His colleagues, however, were
weak, and the Chambre introuvable ungovernable. Louis
XVIII has been praised for breaking with the reactionary
elements which dominated it and at the same time blamed
for rejecting, at the outset of his reign, the principle of
parliamentary government; but the former was probably
inevitable and the latter he had never accepted. The
Chamber was dissolved in September 1816 and in the new
elections the government of Richelieu obtained a working
majority. Under him, by one of those remarkable financial
recoveries which are a feature of French history, the
indemnity imposed after the Hundred Days was paid off
and the occupying armies withdrew in November 1818.
Richelieu resigned in December 1818 but he had brought
France back into the comity of nations.

The resignation of Richelieu, much more than the
dissolution of 1816, was the proof that the régime was still a
monarchical and not a parliamentary one, and that a
minister could not hold office without the favour of the king.
Louis XVIII was not ill disposed to the minister, but
behind the scenes he was taking the advice of a personal
favourite. This was Decazes, son of a notary of the Girondes.
Decazes had become prefect of police for Paris after the
Hundred Days, as such obtained access to the King, and

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completely won his devotion. 'Come to receive the tenderest
embraces of thy friend, thy father, thy Louis', the King
would write to him. Decazes has perhaps been unduly
written down because of the way in which his political
fortune was built up. If he had not an elevated character
and was no great statesman, he was successful in reconciling
the role of royal favourite with moderate concessions to the
left. In the new government, of which he was virtual though
not nominal head, he combined the offices of Police and the
Interior. Where Richelieu's administration had rested on
the centre but looked for support towards the right, Decazes,
equally with a centre government, relied on the support of
the left.

The difficulty for any such government was that the one
strongly organized and coherent party in Parliament
belonged to the right. This was the party of the Ultras or
pure royalists. It looked towards the King's brother, Artois,
and represented the purest ideas of the Counter-revolution.
Its strength in the country came from the support of the
secret society of the Chevaliers de la Foi. Its leader in the
Chamber of Deputies was the able parliamentarian,
Villèle, and in the Chamber of Peers it had Polignac,
Montmorency, and Chateaubriand to speak for it. The
paradox was that the pure royalists from the beginning
found themselves in opposition to the King; the less pure
royalists who supported him formed the political centre,
with a right wing represented by Richelieu and a left wing
by Decazes. The left proper, only gradually returning to the
political arena after the fiasco of the Hundred Days, took
cover under the title of Independents.

With the revival of political life had come also that of
political thought. The chief theorist of the left was Benjamin
Constant, who saw the safeguard of the liberal principles
to which he was devoted in a parliamentary monarchy after
the English fashion, and whose political thinking, possibly
for that reason, has lacked in France the recognition it
deserves. The centre-left found its theorists in the doc-
trinaires Royer-Collard, Barante, Guizot, de Broglie,
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Charles de Rémusat, who saw political life as a careful balancing of interests, and recognized no authority but that of law, or impartial reason, which however they tended to identify in practice with the interests of the socially dominant classes. The Ultras obtained doctrinal support from the writings of the theocrats, Joseph de Maistre, de Bonald, and Lamennais, for whom politics was the handmaid of religion and kings were the servants of the Pope, in whom was embodied the divine will on earth.

Political realities were far below this realm of high theory. They have to be discussed in terms of the membership of parliaments and cabinets, of party manoeuvres, franchise adjustments, and electoral wrangling. The *pays légal*, those who had the vote, was restricted to some 30,000 electors in a nation of well over twenty-six millions, the qualification being the payment of 300 francs in direct taxation. Since by far the greater proportion of the wealth of France was in the form of land, and it was in land that those who had made money chiefly tended to invest it, this was primarily a landowners’ franchise. To be eligible to stand as a candidate it was necessary in addition to be subject to a tax of 1,000 francs and to be over forty years of age. The number of possible candidates in the whole of France was some 15,000 of the wealthiest men. Nothing very revolutionary, it might be thought, could emerge from such an electorate. An analysis of the last Chamber of Deputies of the Restoration gives 28.5 per cent higher officials, 14.8 per cent engaged in trade, finance, or industry, 52 per cent belonging to the liberal professions, and 41.5 per cent large landowners, apart from such members of the previous categories as were also landowners, as probably most were.

The large proportion of the deputies who had played a part in public life under the Revolution and the Empire is an indication that the Restoration assembles were not likely to be wholly swayed by Ultra views; nor was there much chance for the left in the elections. But to obtain a reliable body of supporters the government had to resort to methods of electoral management such as had been used experimentally under the Directory and were to become classic in nineteenth-century France. Reducing the taxes of known opponents for the purpose of robbing them of the franchise was a common device. To prevent appeals against exclusions, the lists of electors might be posted up only at the last moment, at night, not in alphabetical order, and at a height which made them unreadable without a ladder. The prefects who managed the elections for the government saw to it that all government servants voted for the right candidate. Electoral meetings were prohibited. The electoral colleges were presided over by officials, and although the ballot was in theory secret, supporters of the government took care not to conceal their votes.

Once in the Chamber, the functions of the deputies were limited. The choice of ministers rested in the hands of the King, and the cabinet system was as yet only imperfectly evolved. Under Talleyrand, Richelieu, and Decazes there was an effective President of the Council, who coordinated the policy of the ministers. Villèle, on the other hand, when he became head of the government, adopted the practice of working alone with the King, and Charles X aspired to be himself the real leader of the ministers. This identification of the last of the Bourbons with the policy of his government was so close that it was impossible to prevent the fall of the government from bringing with it the abdication of the monarch.

In spite of the narrowness of the franchise and the control exercised by the government over elections, the multiplicity of parties stood in the way of stable administration during the Restoration. Decazes tried to conciliate the opposition, but when he went to the country in 1819 the result was merely an electoral victory for the left, in which even the former constitutional bishop and regicide, Grégoire, was returned, it is true with the aid of ultra-royalist votes. This was a blow to Decazes, but the fatal event for him was the assassination, in February 1820, of the duc de Berry, as he was leaving the Opera. It was an isolated crime but it gave an opening to all the enemies of
the minister, and enabled them to force Louis XVIII reluctantly to abandon his favourite and recall Richelieu to office. To bring under control the reviving political activity, laws permitting the arrest of suspected persons, extending the censorship of the press, and conferring a double vote on the wealthier members of the electorate were passed. In September 1820, the birth of the posthumous son of the duc de Berry guaranteed the continuance of the Bourbon line.

The left now began to flirt with revolutionary movements. Representatives of small secret societies met under the chairmanship of Lafayette to discuss insurrectionary plans; but Richelieu, who was as well informed of these plans as the left-wing leaders themselves, took steps to make them aware of this fact and the embryo revolution was still-born. The international secret society of the Carbonari, which had perhaps as many as 40,000 members in France, was stirred into activity by the revolutions in Spain and Naples, but achieved nothing beyond a few petty local disturbances. The best known was the attempt of the four sergeants of La Rochelle to subvert their regiment. Denounced, they were arrested, tried, and executed. The left, however ineffectively, was thus abandoning the policy of compromise; the right was preparing to take over power; and the centre, on which Richelieu based his government, was fast disappearing.

France under the Restoration was not yet a parliamentary monarchy, and when the second Richelieu ministry fell, in 1822, it was again not because of a change in the balance of power in the Chamber but because the King had acquired a new favourite. Some years earlier a young woman named Zofe, Countess of Cayla, had sought the royal protection in a lawsuit against an 'unworthy spouse'. Beautiful, witty, and aged twenty-seven, Mme du Cayla won her suit and the royal affections at the same time. Given the age and infirmity of the King she could hardly become a royal mistress in the full sense of the term; but every Wednesday she visited the Tuileries for a private game of chess with the King, during which the doors of the royal apartment were guarded; and every day she wrote the King a letter, in composing which she was assisted by Villèle. Not surprisingly, Villèle, who had entered the government in 1820, in September 1822 became President of the Council.

Villèle, a minor noble from Toulouse, short, ugly, intriguing, and ambitious, was the leader of the ultraroialist party in the Chamber of Deputies, so that even without Mme du Cayla he would have been the appropriate minister for the royalist reaction. He was inexhaustible in his capacity for work, a master of detail, and unwilling to share his authority with anyone. Louis XVIII, now completely preoccupied with his health and Mme du Cayla, left the control of affairs almost entirely to his brother and successor, Artois, along with Villèle, whose great achievement was in the field of finance. Between 1822 and 1827 he put public finances in France on foundations which kept them sound and stable until the crisis of the twentieth century. The task of establishing a budgetary system and strict control of governmental expenditure, which had proved beyond the powers of the Controllers General of the ancien régime, but to which the Finance Ministers of Napoleon had made an important contribution, was now completed. This was perhaps the most important service of the Restoration to France. It was the return to peaceful international relations which made financial stability possible, of course. It is no accident that while the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, which were centuries of large-scale wars for France, were marked by instability in the national finances, the nineteenth century, with no really great and prolonged war between 1815 and 1914, was one of balanced budgets.

Peace after 1815 also brought with it a marked improvement in trade. According to one set of statistics French foreign trade more than doubled between 1814 and 1825. It is true that according to another set it remained stationary, but the former seems on the face of it the more likely. Altogether the Restoration gave France efficient and honest government, and, so long as Louis XVIII lived, moderation and a reasonable degree of stability, which endured long
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enough to prove that there was no inherent reason why it should have broken down.

2. CLERICALISM AND ANTI-CLERICALISM

The failure of the Restoration was not primarily in the field of government, where it was weak, but in that of religion, where it was strong. Although the succession of Charles X may have precipitated the crisis, its beginnings can already be seen under Louis XVIII. Europe, in the early years of the nineteenth century, witnessed a widespread religious revival. This strongly affected the French church, in which there was now a zealous episcopate and a lower clergy gradually growing in number and unexceptionable in devoutness. Religious houses for women increased from 1,829 in 1815 to 2,875 in 1830. Orders for men were tolerated, though only in the case of three missionary orders were they authorized by law, but these also were increasing in number. The Jesuit-inspired Congregation engaged in energetic religious propaganda throughout France. An attempt was even made to annul the Napoleonic Concordat and return to the relations between Church and State that had prevailed under the ancien régime; but the terms of the Concordat — and that is perhaps the ultimate judgement on it — were too favourable for the Papacy to abandon and the negotiation for its revision proved abortive.

The Gallicanism of the Restoration was an anachronism, as became quite evident after 1830, when there was no longer a king with the sanctity of hereditary divine right on the throne. With Bonald, de Maistre, Lamennais, force of argument and literary talent were both on the side of the Ultramontanes. The religious revival naturally worked to the benefit of Rome. Gallicanism now stood for the authority of the French bishops, authoritarian and often aristocratic, with all the enhanced power conferred on them by the Concordat over the lower clergy, who could be transferred from parish to parish, or deprived of their office, at the bishop's arbitrary will. No wonder that a habit of looking, or even appealing, to Rome grew up among the clergy; they had no one else to appeal to.

Napoleon had attempted to use the Concordat to reduce the Church to the role of an instrument of the State: under the Restoration there seemed a danger that the State might be made the instrument of the Church. In the interests of religion the episcopate did not hesitate to call on the support of the administration. With the Ultras in power this tendency was intensified. The Panthéon, purged of the infidel remains of Voltaire and Rousseau, was given over to religious uses. Secondary education was placed, in 1831, under the supervision of the bishops. A high ecclesiastic, Mgr Fraysse, was appointed Grand Master of the University. In 1834 the appointment of all teachers in primary schools was given to the episcopate. In 1822 two new press offences were created — criticism of the divine right of kings and outrage on religion. A law against sacrilege made the profanation of sacred vessels punishable with imprisonment for life, and, in the case of profanation of the consecrated host, with death, though in fact the law was never applied.

When Charles X, who succeeded to the throne in 1824, was crowned in the cathedral at Reims, it was with all the apparatus of the religious revival. The assembled multitude cried Vivez Rex in aeternum; but it was noted when the King returned after the ceremony to Paris that his reception in the capital was distinctly lukewarm. Eternity was to last for five years.

While the depth and seriousness of the religious revival in France must not be underestimated, its limitations also should not be forgotten. Rationalism and anti-clericalism had driven too deeply into French soil to be easily uprooted. The intellectual life which had flourished under the ancien régime had been blighted but not killed by the frosts of the Revolution and the Empire. Now, in a milder, if still somewhat austere, climate, it reburgeoned as in a new spring. Science continued its progress, uninfluenced by, and unin-
fluencing, the changing political scene. Lamarck, who had studied under Buffon, links the zoology of the encyclopedists with the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century. Cuvier practically created palaeontology, and Ampère has been called the Newton of electricity. The son of the great Carnot, Sadi Carnot, founded thermodynamics and Fresnel produced the wave theory of light.

History experienced a remarkable revival, amounting almost to a rebirth, under the Restoration. The famous École des Chartes was founded and the publication of the great collections of memoirs relating to the history of France was begun. Barante's History of the Dukes of Burgundy (1824-6) was as successful as a novel, and Augustin Thierry wrote a notable history of the Norman Conquest of England (1825). Guizot's Essais sur l'histoire de France (1823) was followed by the six volumes of his lectures on modern history at the Sorbonne in 1828-30. As opposition became bolder, historians turned to more recent times with the histories of the French Revolution by Thiès in 1829-7 and Mignet in 1824.

Above all this was a period of rebirth in literature. The new romantic spirit which crossed the Channel with Walter Scott and the Rhine with Mme de Staël's De l'Allemagne (1810) was in the beginning religious, monarchial, hierarchic, its eyes turned backwards to the Middle Ages. Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Mérimée, Alfred de Vigny, Stendhal, Chateaubriand raised the flag of romanticism. The paintings of Géricault and Delacroix might have been conceived as illustrations of their writings. The new trend appeared in music with Weber, Rossini, Berlioz.

Literature was not at first hostile to the Restoration, which represented emancipation from the strait-jacket of the Empire and an age of poetry after prose. Louis XVIII, a patron of poetry, impressed by the merit of a young beginner in the art who had determined to do what few dared to attempt - make literature a career - gave him a pension of 1,000 francs, and so eased the first steps of Victor Hugo, whose writings were to be a changing illustration of his age.

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He was the son of a general of Napoleon, who had somehow picked up the title of count in the service of Joseph in Spain. After 1815 General Hugo, like so many others, transferred himself to the service of Louis XVIII, and by discovering a noble family of Lorraine with the same name, which had conveniently died out, annexed a more distinguished ancestry for himself. Victor Hugo was not only a poet but a viscomte; and in both capacities Catholic and royalist, writing poems on the death of the duc de Berry, the funeral of Louis XVIII, the war in Spain, attending the Sacre of Charles X at Reims.

But despite its initial affiliations the new wine of romanticism was too heady to be confined in the old bottles of Restoration politics or Vatican religion. Literature has during the last two centuries traditionally migrated to the opposition in France. In the years that preceded the revolution of 1830 romanticism deserted Catholicism and monarchicalism and formed an alliance with liberalism, carrying into the camp of its new partner some of that passionate vigour and anti-rationalist spirit which it had perhaps in part acquired from its former ally. Victor Hugo's Préface de Cromwell, a more notable piece of writing than the unplayable drama it introduced, is an invocation to liberty; and in 1830, in the preface to Hernani, Hugo denounced the Ultras of all brands.

The clerical reaction continued without the support of many of its former adherents in the literary world. Charles X, who presided over a régime which was now throwing off the hesitations and compromises which had marked the reign of Louis XVIII, had forgotten little; in intellectual goods his mind was so sparsely furnished that there was little for him to forget. At sixty-seven still youthful in manner and child-like in mind, he was determined to be king. However, he continued to support Villèle, whose government had added foreign victory to its financial successes.

The civil war, which had begun in Spain in 1820, could not leave the sister Bourbon monarchy in France uncon-
cerned. Villèle, who was anxious to avoid military intervention, managed to drive the extremier Montmorency out of the ministry on this issue; but his place was taken by Chateaubriand who adopted the same policy. Despite Villèle's reluctance, in 1823 a French army was despatched to restore the Bourbon King of Spain, an ill-omened venture which unexpectedly achieved rapid and complete success. The invasion was little more than a military promenade. By lavish expenditure the financier Ouvrard, in charge of supplies, bought both provisions and an almost unopposed passage through Spain. French intervention re-established the king on his throne without difficulty. Comparisons were drawn, naturally, between this speedy success and the disasters that had encompassed Napoleon's armies in Spain. Villèle was not the better disposed to Chateaubriand because his policy had proved successful, and when the Foreign Minister refused to support a governmental finance measure took the opportunity to secure his dismissal. This was a great mistake, for Chateaubriand flung himself into opposition with vigour, taking the influential *Journal des débats* with him. The Spanish war, thus, though successful, crystallized an incipient split in the ranks of the right, and promoted the growth of a royalist counter-opposition. This is in part attributable to the narrowness and inflexibility of Villèle; but it is difficult not to believe also that the royalists were so unaccustomed to the compromises necessary in government, and the nobility so deeply imbued with the Frondeur spirit, that that opposition came naturally to them.

They had a material reason for dissatisfaction. Disappointed under Louis XVIII, with Charles X the émigrés expected at last to receive the fruit of their sacrifices in the form of the undoing of the revolutionary land settlement. Villèle gave them the laws on sacrilege, the press, and education, but they wanted something of greater substance. The solution Villèle found was to create 90 million francs in annual new *rentes*, representing the interest at 3 per cent on a capital nominally of a thousand million francs, at which the value or the confiscated property was calculated, in fact of about 630 millions. The former émigrés, or their heirs, now numbered some 70,000 and the indemnity to be divided between them came to an average of some 1,377 francs a year each. It did not satisfy their wishes, while it exacerbated the feelings of the great majority of persons of property who felt that in one way or another they were paying for it.

The propertied men who were aggrieved by the indemnity to the former émigrés included also those who were most suspicious of the clerical influences at work in the new reign. The outburst of anti-clerical propaganda which occurred in 1825 has been attributed to the subtle tactics of the liberal opposition, hoping to achieve by this means the electoral success which it had not been able to gain by more legitimate methods. All the measures in favour of the Church and religion were attributed to the influence of the Jesuit Congregation; the existence of the secret Chevaliers de la Foi was unknown to the general public. In fact, while the extent of the clerical reaction was exaggerated, the strength of anti-clerical feeling in France had also been under-estimated. If the liberals were able to use the fear of clericalism to achieve political results that could not have been achieved by more direct methods in a country that was not very interested in politics, this is in itself proof of the strength of anti-clerical sentiment. It was the major current in a rising tide of hostility against Charles X and his government. What two and a half years of Ultra rule had done was shown in March 1827, when the King, reviewing the National Guard of Paris composed largely of the well-to-do middle class, was greeted with cries of 'Down with the Jesuits!', 'Down with the Ministers!', 'Vive la liberté de la presse!' It was hardly possible to impose any sanction in reply except to dissolve the National Guard.

Meanwhile the extreme Ultras had been becoming increasingly discontented with what they regarded as the excessive moderation of Villèle. A naval intervention in the Greek struggle for independence, which resulted in the
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successful engagement of Navarino in 1827, had little repercussion in France. If Villèle was to remain in office, he would have to try to secure a change in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, but after elections held in November 1827 the government found itself with some 160 to 180 supporters in the new house, against an approximately equal liberal opposition, and with a group of 60 to 80 extremists forming a royalist counter-opposition on its right flank. Villèle had now no choice but to resign. The King appointed a ministry of technical experts, without any President of the Council, though the new Minister of the Interior, Marnignac, was its spokesman in the Chambers and is often referred to as its head. This government offered some minor concessions, especially in matters of education, to the left; but it was clear that it would not be more than a stop-gap. Charles X was determined not to compromise with the liberal opposition, and if the Villélist and the royalist counter-opposition could be brought to work together a majority of the right seemed still possible.

The fall of the last Bourbon king of France was so little determined by the nature of things, that in spite of the acute struggle over clericalism it took almost inconceivable imbecility on the part of Charles X and his minister to bring it about. For the new king also had his favourite. This was Polignac, his 'dear Jules'. In secret correspondence with Polignac by the back-stairs of the palace, a new ministry was arranged. Jules de Polignac, a prisoner of Napoleon from 1802 to 1814, was an exalt with no grasp of political realities. To him was added La Bourdonnaye, who had been identified with the White Terror of 1815, as Minister of the Interior, and Bournont, who had deserted Napoleon on the eve of Waterloo, as Minister of War. At the Ministry of Justice was Courvoisier, a recent convert from infidelity to Catholicism, whose chief political guide was the Apocalypse. The government thus oddly constituted took office in August 1829. For six months it proceeded to do nothing, while the opposition prepared itself for resistance. Under the patronage of Lafayette, the society

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Aide-toi, le ciel t’aidera organized electoral committees. The students of Paris formed a republicans committee called jeunes France. Inspired by Talleyrand and organized and financed by the banker Lafitte, the Orleanists made their preparations and founded a new paper, the National, edited by the liberal historians, Thiers and Mignet.

While the forces of the left were gaining coherence, the ministry was becoming increasingly incoherent. Except for Polignac it was completely renewed, with ministers whose names are not worth recording. The Chamber was dissolved and elections were held in June and July 1830. The customary methods of administrative pressure were employed, and the king issued a personal appeal to the electors to support the official candidates. All was in vain; the opposition won 274 seats against 143 for the government, and 11 of doubtful allegiance. The Polignac ministry had been decisively rejected by the pays légal. Everything would now depend on whether the king was prepared to accept the verdict of the electorate and appoint a President of the Council who could work with the new Chamber.

Charles X and Polignac had no such intention. Divine right could not make compromises. Moreover they wore fresh laurels of victory, won in the colonial field, on their brows. After Napoleon the French overseas empire was an attenuated one. In 1815 France possessed five trading stations in India, the isle Bourbon (formerly La Réunion), Saint-Louis and Gorée in Senegal, the small West Indian islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, Guiana in South America, and the rocky islets of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland, chiefly valuable because of the fishing rights that went with them. It was not much. The Restoration picked up the scanty and broken threads of French colonial policy, resuming rather the traditions of power politics of the ancien régime than the more liberal if muddled policies of the Revolution; there was nothing to inherit from Napoleon. Expansion began in Senegal and a foothold was won in Madagascar; but the major achievement of the restored Bourbons was the result of Polignac ministry's
need for prestige: the expeditions to Spain and Greece were followed, in 1830, by one against Algiers. Efficiently organized and well led by Bourmont, anxious to retrieve his reputation, in three weeks it achieved complete success; the foundation stone of the French North African Empire had been laid under the last and least considered of the legitimate sovereigns.

News of the victory at Algiers reached Paris on 9 July. Charles X and Polignac, encouraged by this success abroad, proceeded to take the steps necessary to reverse their electoral defeat at home. On 10 July Polignac produced the first draft of proposals which, after discussion in the King's Council, were issued on 25 July as the Four Ordinances. These prohibited the publication of any journal or pamphlet of less than twenty-five pages without official authorization; dissolved the Chamber which had just been elected; restricted the effective use of the franchise to the wealthiest 25 per cent of the existing electors; and convoked the electoral colleges to choose a new Chamber.

The first step in opposition was taken by the journalists, led by Thiers and the National. They issued a manifesto calling on France to resist. Shops and workshops in Paris were closed on 26 July: the King, as though to model himself on Louis XVI, spent the day hunting. Polignac, who in his blind infatuation did not for a moment expect the opposition to pick up the gage of battle which he did not even realize that he had thrown down, had taken no military precautions. Indeed the best troops, to the number of 40,000, were in Algiers. On 27 July, when it began to dawn even on Polignac that the situation was not quite normal, Marmont was put in charge of the garrison of Paris. On 28 July rioting began in the streets. A number of deputies met and sent a deputation to Polignac which he refused to see. By 29 July, Marmont having found it necessary to concentrate his troops, Paris was in the hands of the rioters, who had lost some 1,800 killed against 200 among the soldiers, in the course of the fighting. The deputies now decided to accept the leadership of the revolution to prevent it from falling into the hands of extremists, and the Orleanist Lafitte joined other deputies in a self-elected municipal council, the next day to promote itself to the rank of provisional government. Three days of street fighting — les trois glorieuses — had been sufficient to overthrow the restored monarchy.

On 30 July Charles X at last recognized that something had happened and that concessions were necessary; but already on the walls of Paris was the placard, drawn up by Thiers and Mignet, calling on the people to place the Duke of Orleans on the throne. The self-chosen provisional government invited him to become lieutenant-general of the kingdom. Orleans, who had been hesitating at a safe distance from Paris, accepted and on 1 August appointed provisional ministers. Meanwhile Charles X, threatened by the populace of Versailles, had taken flight to Rambouillet. There he himself appointed Orleans lieutenant-general and abdicated in favour of his own grandson, l'enfant du miracle. Orleans himself still had some legitimist scruples, and if he had accepted this solution it might have been better for France and better perhaps in the long run for himself. The monarchical principle would have been preserved, the fatal cleavage between legitimists and Orleanists averted, and a parliamentary government set up in the name of the legitimate line. But the Orleanists had waited and intrigued too long for this moment to give up the prize at last within their grasp. Orleans convoked the Chambers and announced the abdication of Charles X, without any reference to his grandson. The fallen king slowly made his way with the royal family to Cherbourg, where he dismissed his bodyguard and took ship for England.

The Restoration had failed: this does not prove that it was from the beginning inexorably doomed to failure. On the contrary, the Revolution of 1830 seems at first impression rather the result of a series of accidents, and above all of the obstinacy of Charles X, who went from blunder to blunder as though driven by a blind fate, or as though the
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little sense there had ever been in that addled pate had entirely vanished with age. He was such a nonentity as to be hardly worth a revolution, and indeed, looking behind the passing events of 1830, one can see that it was not really directed against him; it was against the anachronistic reappearance of a noblesse which believed that the eighteenth century had never ended and a clergy which, since the eighteenth century was, so far as the church was concerned, a rather unfortunate episode, looked back to the century of the Compagnie du Saint Sacrement, Bossuet, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. On the other hand, an important section of the educated classes in France, even if they thought that religion might be good for the masses, did not intend that priests should rule, or that their own sons should be educated by them. They turned against a régime in which the influence of the Church seemed to be increasingly dominant.

They also found that the Restoration was robbing them of one of the chief perquisites resulting from the Revolution. The new aristocracy of office created by the Revolution and Napoleon found its ranks swollen after 1815 by an unwelcome accession of strength from ancien régime families, who joined in the competition for even the humblest official appointments, and who, because of their ancestry and loyalty to the crown, had what seemed an unfair advantage in the game. The unemployed educated proletariat, searching for a career and especially concentrated in the student population of Paris, which has been wrongly seen as a factor in 1789, was perhaps a reality by 1830. At a higher social level the bankers and business men of the chaussée d'Antin looked with jealousy on the aristocratic exclusiveness of the faubourg Saint-Germain. The monarchy, which might have bridged the gulf between ancient names and new fortunes, in the person of Charles X allowed its policies to be dictated and its councils to be monopolized by clergy and noblesse. At the same time, inconsistently, it attributed the franchise exclusively to men of wealth. It is true that this was mainly wealth in the form of land, but the extent to which land

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had passed into the possession of new men was perhaps not realized. Only this can explain the fact that the Restoration lost the support of even such a restricted electorate.

One thing more was needed to make a revolution possible: a mob to riot in the streets of Paris. Economic conditions supplied the material to fill this gap. The population of France had increased by nearly two and a half million between 1815 and 1830, without any marked increase in agricultural or industrial productivity in these years. After a short economic recession in 1817, a new and severer crisis began in 1826 and was to last until 1832. In 1828, out of 224,000 workers in the department of the Nord 163,000 were receiving some form of charitable assistance. That misery alone does not make revolutions is suggested by the significant fact that the populace provided insurrectionary mobs only in Paris, where the political agitation was concentrated.

Having won Paris with the aid of the mob, the journalists and politicians speedily brought the disturbances under control. The noblesse as a whole had perhaps not put up much of a fight in the first Revolution, outside Brittany and the Vendée. In 1830 they offered no resistance at all. In 1789 and the subsequent years at least they fled abroad to start a Counter-revolution; in 1830 they merely gave up their jobs and took refuge in that abstention from public life which has been called l'émigration intérieure, which robbed France of the services of a host of families whose position and traditions called on them to contribute to the ruling elite, but who had learnt under the bureaucracy of an absolute monarchy to disassociate rights from duties and who had ceased to be a governing class while remaining an aristocracy.