enough to prove that there was no inherent reason why it should have broken down.

2. CLERICALISM AND ANTI-CLERICALISM

The failure of the Restoration was not primarily in the field of government, where it was weak, but in that of religion, where it was strong. Although the succession of Charles X may have precipitated the crisis, its beginnings can already be seen under Louis XVIII. Europe, in the early years of the nineteenth century, witnessed a widespread religious revival. This strongly affected the French church, in which there was now a zealous episcopate and a lower clergy gradually growing in number and unexceptionable in devoutness. Religious houses for women increased from 1,829 in 1815 to 2,875 in 1830. Orders for men were tolerated, though only in the case of three missionary orders were they authorized by law, but these also were increasing in number. The Jesuit-inspired Congregation engaged in energetic religious propaganda throughout France. An attempt was even made to annul the Napoleonic Concordat and return to the relations between Church and State that had prevailed under the ancien régime; but the terms of the Concordat — and that is perhaps the ultimate judgement on it — were too favourable for the Papacy to abandon and the negotiation for its revision proved abortive.

The Gallicanism of the Restoration was an anachronism, as became quite evident after 1830, when there was no longer a king with the sanctity of hereditary divine right on the throne. With Bonald, de Maistre, Lamennais, force of argument and literary talent were both on the side of the Ultramontanes. The religious revival naturally worked to the benefit of Rome. Gallicanism now stood for the authority of the French bishops, authoritarian and often aristocratic, with all the enhanced power conferred on them by the Concordat over the lower clergy, who could be transferred from parish to parish, or deprived of their office, at the bishop's arbitrary will. No wonder that a habit of looking, or even appealing, to Rome grew up among the clergy; they had no one else to appeal to.

Napoleon had attempted to use the Concordat to reduce the Church to the role of an instrument of the State: under the Restoration there seemed a danger that the State might be made the instrument of the Church. In the interests of religion the episcopate did not hesitate to call on the support of the administration. With the ultramontanists this tendency was intensified. The Panthéon, purged of the infidel remains of Voltaire and Rousseau, was given over to religious uses. Secondary education was placed, in 1821, under the supervision of the bishops. A high ecclesiastical, Mgr Frayssinet, was appointed Grand Master of the University. In 1824 the appointment of all teachers in primary schools was given to the episcopate. In 1822 two new press offences were created — the concept of the divine right of kings and outrage on religion. A law against sacrilege made the profanation of sacred vessels punishable with imprisonment for life, and, in the case of profanation of the consecrated host, with death, though in fact the law was never applied.

When Charles X, who succeeded to the throne in 1824, was crowned in the cathedral at Reims, it was with all the apparatus of the religious revival. The assembled multitude cried "Vivat Rex in aeternum"; but it was noted when the King returned after the ceremony to Paris that his reception in the capital was distinctly lukewarm. Eternity was to last for five years.

While the depth and seriousness of the religious revival in France must not be underestimated, its limitations also should not be forgotten. Rationalism and anti-clericalism had driven too deeply into French soil to be easily uprooted. The intellectual life which had flourished under the ancien régime had been blighted but not killed by the frosts of the Revolution and the Empire. Now, in a milder, if still somewhat austere, climate, it reburgeoned as in a new spring. Science continued its progress, uninfluenced by, and unin-
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fluencing, the changing political scene. Lamarck, who had studied under Buffon, links the zoology of the encyclopedists with the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century. Cuvier practically created palaeontology, and Ampère has been called the Newton of electricity. The son of the great Carnot, Sadi Carnot, founded thermodynamics and Fresnel produced the wave theory of light.

History experienced a remarkable revival, amounting almost to a rebirth, under the Restoration. The famous École des Chartes was founded and the publication of the great collections of memoirs relating to the history of France was begun. Barante’s History of the Dukes of Burgundy (1824–6) was as successful as a novel, and Augustin Thierry wrote a notable history of the Norman Conquest of England (1825). Guizot’s Essais sur l’histoire de France (1825) was followed by the six volumes of his lectures on modern history at the Sorbonne in 1828–30. As opposition became bolder, historians turned to more recent times with the histories of the French Revolution by Thiès in 1823–7 and Miguet in 1824.

Above all this was a period of rebirth in literature. The new romantic spirit which crossed the Channel with Walter Scott and the Rhine with Mme de Staël’s De l’Allemagne (1810) was in the beginning religious, monarchical, hierarchic, its eyes turned backwards to the Middle Ages. Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Mérimée, Alfred de Vigny, Stendhal, Chateaubriand raised the flag of romanticism. The paintings of Géricault and Delacroix might have been conceived as illustrations of their writings. The new trend appeared in music with Weber, Rossini, Berlioz.

Literature was not at first hostile to the Restoration, which represented emancipation from the strait-jacket of the Empire and an age of poetry after prose. Louis XVIII, a patron of poetry, impressed by the merit of a young beginner in the art who had determined to do what few dared to attempt – make literature a career – gave him a pension of 1,000 francs, and so eased the first steps of Victor Hugo, whose writings were to be a changing illustration of his age.

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He was the son of a general of Napoleon, who had somehow picked up the title of count in the service of Joseph in Spain. After 1815 General Hugo, like so many others, transferred himself to the service of Louis XVIII, and by discovering a noble family of Lorraine with the same name, which had conveniently died out, annexed a more distinguished ancestry for himself. Victor Hugo was not only a poet but a vicomte; and in both capacities Catholic and royalist, writing poems on the death of the duc de Berry, the funeral of Louis XVIII, the war in Spain, attending the Sacré of Charles X at Reims.

But despite its initial affiliations the new wine of romanticism was too heady to be confined in the old bottles of Restoration politics or Vatican religion. Literature has during the last two centuries traditionally migrated to the opposition in France. In the years that preceded the revolution of 1830 romanticism deserted Catholicism and monar-
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cerned. Villèle, who was anxious to avoid military intervention, managed to drive the extreme Montmorency out of the ministry on this issue; but his place was taken by Chateaubriand who adopted the same policy. Despite Villèle's reluctance, in 1823 a French army was despatched to restore the Bourbon King of Spain, an ill-omened venture which unexpectedly achieved rapid and complete success. The invasion was little more than a military promenade. By lavish expenditure the financier Ouvrard, in charge of supplies, bought both provisions and an almost unopposed passage through Spain. French intervention re-established the king on his throne without difficulty. Comparisons were drawn, naturally, between this speedy success and the disasters that had encompassed Napoleon's armies in Spain. Villèle was not the better disposed to Chateaubriand because his policy had proved successful, and when the Foreign Minister refused to support a governmental finance measure took the opportunity to secure his dismissal. This was a great mistake, for Chateaubriand flung himself into opposition with vigour, taking the influential *Journal des débats* with him. The Spanish war, thus, though successful, crystallized an incipient split in the ranks of the right, and promoted the growth of a royalist counter-opposition. This is in part attributable to the narrowness and inflexibility of Villèle; but it is difficult not to believe also that the royalists were so unaccustomed to the compromises necessary in government, and the nobility so deeply imbued with the Frondeur spirit, that opposition came naturally to them.

They had a material reason for dissatisfaction. Disappointed under Louis XVIII, with Charles X the émigrés expected at last to receive the fruit of their sacrifices in the form of the undoing of the revolutionary land settlement. Villèle gave them the laws on sacrilege, the press, and education, but they wanted something of greater substance. The solution Villèle found was to create 90 million francs in annual new *rentes*, representing the interest at 3 per cent on a capital nominally of a thousand million francs, at which the value or the confiscated property was calculated, in fact of about 630 millions. The former émigrés, or their heirs, now numbered some 70,000 and the indemnity to be divided between them came to an average of some 1,377 francs a year each. It did not satisfy their wishes, while it exacerbated the feelings of the great majority of persons of property who felt that in one way or another they were paying for it.

The propertied men who were aggrieved by the indemnity to the former émigrés included also those who were most suspicious of the clerical influences at work in the new reign. The outburst of anti-clerical propaganda which occurred in 1823 has been attributed to the subtle tactics of the liberal opposition, hoping to achieve by this means the electoral success which it had not been able to gain by more legitimate methods. All the measures in favour of the Church and religion were attributed to the influence of the Jesuit Congregation; the existence of the secret Chevaliers de la Foi was unknown to the general public. In fact, while the extent of the clerical reaction was exaggerated, the strength of anti-clerical feeling in France had also been under-estimated. If the liberals were able to use the fear of clericalism to achieve political results that could not have been achieved by more direct methods in a country that was not very interested in politics, this is in itself proof of the strength of anti-clerical sentiment. It was the major current in a rising tide of hostility against Charles X and his government. What two and a half years of Ultra rule had done was shown in March 1827, when the King, reviewing the National Guard of Paris composed largely of the well-to-do middle class, was greeted with cries of 'Down with the Jesuits!', 'Down with the Ministers!', 'Vive la liberté de la presse!' It was hardly possible to impose any sanction in reply except to dissolve the National Guard.

Meanwhile the extreme Ultras had been becoming increasingly discontented with what they regarded as the excessive moderation of Villèle. A naval intervention in the Greek struggle for independence, which resulted in the
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successful engagement of Navarino in 1827, had little repercussion in France. If Villèle was to remain in office, he would have to try to secure a change in the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, but after elections held in November 1827 the government found itself with some 160 to 180 supporters in the new house, against an approximately equal liberal opposition, and with a group of 60 to 80 extremists forming a royalist counter-opposition on its right flank. Villèle had now no choice but to resign. The King appointed a ministry of technical experts, without any President of the Council, though the new Minister of the Interior, Martignac, was its spokesman in the Chambers and is often referred to as its head. This government offered some minor concessions, especially in matters of education, to the left; but it was clear that it would not be more than a stop-gap. Charles X was determined not to compromise with the liberal opposition, and if the Villélists and the royalist counter-opposition could be brought to work together a majority of the right seemed still possible.

The fall of the last Bourbon king of France was so little determined by the nature of things, that in spite of the acute struggle over clericalism it took almost inconceivable imbecility on the part of Charles X and his minister to bring it about. For the new king also had his favourite. This was Polignac, his ‘dear Jules’. In secret correspondence with Polignac by the back-stairs of the palace, a new ministry was arranged. Jules de Polignac, a prisoner of Napoleon from 1802 to 1814, was an exalté with no grasp of political realities. To him was added La Bourdonnay, who had been identified with the White Terror of 1815, as Minister of the Interior, and Bourmont, who had deserted Napoleon on the eve of Waterloo, as Minister of War. At the Ministry of Justice was Courvoisier, a recent convert from infidelity to Catholicism, whose chief political guide was the Apocalypse. The government thus oddly constituted took office in August 1829. For six months it proceeded to do nothing, while the opposition prepared itself for resistance. Under the patronage of Lafayette, the society

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Aide-toi, le ciel t’aidera organized electoral committees. The students of Paris formed a republican society called Jenne France. Inspired by Talleyrand and organized and financed by the banker Lafitte, the Orleanists made their preparations and founded a new paper, the National, edited by the liberal historians, Thiers and Mignet.

While the forces of the left were gaining coherence, the ministry was becoming increasingly incoherent. Except for Polignac it was completely renewed, with ministers whose names are not worth recording. The Chamber was dissolved and elections were held in June and July 1830. The customary methods of administrative pressure were employed, and the king issued a personal appeal to the electors to support the official candidates. All was in vain; the opposition won 274 seats against 143 for the government, and 11 of doubtful allegiance. The Polignac ministry had been decisively rejected by the pays légal. Everything would now depend on whether the king was prepared to accept the verdict of the electorate and appoint a President of the Council who could work with the new Chamber.

Charles X and Polignac had no such intention. Divine right could not make compromises. Moreover they wore fresh laurels of victory, won in the colonial field, on their brows. After Napoleon the French overseas empire was an attenuated one. In 1815 France possessed five trading stations in India, the Isle Bourbon (formerly La Réunion), Saint-Louis and Gorée in Senegal, the small West Indian islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, Guiana in South America, and the rocky islets of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland, chiefly valuable because of the fishing rights that went with them. It was not much. The Restoration picked up the scanty and broken threads of French colonial policy, resuming rather the traditions of power politics of the ancien régime than the more liberal if muddled policies of the Revolution; there was nothing to inherit from Napoleon. Expansion began in Senegal and a foothold was won in Madagascar; but the major achievement of the restored Bourbons was the result of Polignac ministry’s
need for prestige: the expeditions to Spain and Greece were followed, in 1830, by one against Algiers. Efficiently organized and well led by Bournon, anxious to retrieve his reputation, in three weeks it achieved complete success; the foundation stone of the French North African Empire had been laid under the last and least considered of the legitimate sovereigns.

News of the victory at Algiers reached Paris on 9 July. Charles X and Polignac, encouraged by this success abroad, proceeded to take the steps necessary to reverse their electoral defeat at home. On 10 July Polignac produced the first draft of proposals which, after discussion in the King's Council, were issued on 25 July as the Four Ordinances. These prohibited the publication of any journal or pamphlet of less than twenty-five pages without official authorization; dissolved the Chamber which had just been elected; restricted the effective use of the franchise to the wealthiest 25 per cent of the existing electors; and convoked the electoral colleges to choose a new Chamber.

The first step in opposition was taken by the journalists, led by Thiers and the National. They issued a manifesto calling on France to resist. Shops and workshops in Paris were closed on 26 July; the King, as though to model himself on Louis XVI, spent the day hunting. Polignac, who in his blind infatuation did not for a moment expect the opposition to pick up the gage of battle which he did not even realize that he had thrown down, had taken no military precautions. Indeed the best troops, to the number of 40,000, were in Algiers. On 27 July, when it began to dawn even on Polignac that the situation was not quite normal, Marmont was put in charge of the garrison of Paris. On 28 July rioting began in the streets. A number of deputies met and sent a deputation to Polignac which he refused to see. By 29 July, Marmont having found it necessary to concentrate his troops, Paris was in the hands of the rioters, who had lost some 1,800 killed against 200 among the soldiers, in the course of the fighting. The deputies now decided to accept the leadership of the revolution to prevent it from falling into the hands of extremists, and the Orleanist Lafayette joined other deputies in a self-elected municipal council, the next day to promote itself to the rank of provisional government. Three days of street fighting – les trois glorieuses – had been sufficient to overthrow the restored monarchy.

On 30 July Charles X at last recognized that something had happened and that concessions were necessary; but already on the walls of Paris was the placard, drawn up by Thiers and Mignet, calling on the people to place the Duke of Orleans on the throne. The self-chosen provisional government invited him to become lieutenant-general of the kingdom. Orleans, who had been hesitating at a safe distance from Paris, accepted and on 1 August appointed provisional ministers. Meanwhile Charles X, threatened by the populace of Versailles, had taken flight to Rambouillet. There he himself appointed Orleans lieutenant-general and abdicated in favour of his own grandson, l'enfant du miracle. Orleans himself still had some legitimist scruples, and if he had accepted this solution it might have been better for France and better perhaps in the long run for himself. The monarchical principle would have been preserved, the fatal cleavage between legitimists and Orleanists averted, and a parliamentary government set up in the name of the legitimate line. But the Orleanists had waited and intrigued too long for this moment to give up the prize at last within their grasp. Orleans convoked the Chambers and announced the abdication of Charles X, without any reference to his grandson. The fallen king slowly made his way with the royal family to Cherbourg, where he dismissed his bodyguard and took ship for England.

The Restoration had failed: this does not prove that it was from the beginning inexorably doomed to failure. On the contrary, the Revolution of 1830 seems at first impression rather the result of a series of accidents, and above all of the obstinacy of Charles X, who went from blunder to blunder as though driven by a blind fate, or as though the
little sense there had ever been in that addled pate had entirely vanished with age. He was such a nonentity as to be hardly worth a revolution, and indeed, looking behind the passing events of 1830, one can see that it was not really directed against him; it was against the anachronistic reappearance of a noblesse which believed that the eighteenth century had never ended and a clergy which, since the eighteenth century was, so far as the church was concerned, a rather unfortunate episode, looked back to the century of the Compagnie du Saint Sacrement, Bossuet, and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. On the other hand, an important section of the educated classes in France, even if they thought that religion might be good for the masses, did not intend that priests should rule, or that their own sons should be educated by them. They turned against a régime in which the influence of the Church seemed to be increasingly dominant.

They also found that the Restoration was robbing them of one of the chief perquisites resulting from the Revolution. The new aristocracy of office created by the Revolution and Napoleon found its ranks swollen after 1815 by an unwelcome accession of strength from ancien régime families, who joined in the competition for even the humblest official appointments, and who, because of their ancestry and loyalty to the crown, had what seemed an unfair advantage in the game. The unemployed educated proletariat, searching for a career and especially concentrated in the student population of Paris, which has been wrongly seen as a factor in 1830, was perhaps a reality by 1830. At a higher social level the bankers and businessmen of the chaussée d'Antin looked with jealousy on the aristocratic exclusiveness of the faubourg Saint-Germain. The monarchy, which might have bridged the gulf between ancient names and new fortunes, in the person of Charles X allowed its policies to be dictated and its councils to be monopolized by clergy and noblesse. At the same time, inconsistently, it attributed the franchise exclusively to men of wealth. It is true that this was mainly wealth in the form of land, but the extent to which land

had passed into the possession of new men was perhaps not realized. Only this can explain the fact that the Restoration lost the support of even such a restricted electorate.

One thing more was needed to make a revolution possible: a mob to riot in the streets of Paris. Economic conditions supplied the material to fill this gap. The population of France had increased by nearly two and a half million between 1815 and 1830, without any marked increase in agricultural or industrial productivity in these years. After a short economic recession in 1817, a new and severer crisis began in 1826 and was to last until 1832. In 1828, out of 224,000 workers in the department of the Nord 163,000 were receiving some form of charitable assistance. That misery alone does not make revolutions is suggested by the significant fact that the populace provided insurrectionary mobs only in Paris, where the political agitation was concentrated.

Having won Paris with the aid of the mob, the journalists and politicians speedily brought the disturbances under control. The noblesse as a whole had perhaps not put up much of a fight in the first Revolution, outside Brittany and the Vendée. In 1830 they offered no resistance at all. In 1792 and the subsequent years at least they fled abroad to start a Counter-revolution; in 1830 they merely gave up their jobs and took refuge in that abstention from public life which has been called l'émigration intérieure, which robbed France of the services of a host of families whose position and traditions called on them to contribute to the ruling élite, but who had learnt under the bureaucracy of an absolute monarchy to disassociate rights from duties and who had ceased to be a governing class while remaining an aristocracy.
3. THE FOUNDATION OF THE JULY MONARCHY

In 1830 a political movement which had begun as an attempt to force Charles X to dismiss an unpopular minister turned into a revolution. The republican leaders who now centered the revolutionary movement with the Paris mob behind them were determined that the monarch should disappear with the monarch. They had a ready-made candidate for President of the republic they believed were about to establish in the person of the exiled Emile de Laayette. Radicals and other republicans had been promoting the idea of a republic for some time. The only practical solution to the problem of a revolution was to create a republic without really starting in them.

The only practical candidate for a republic was Emile de Laayette. He had been a friend of Charles X and had been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was a radical and a democrat, and he was the only person who seemed likely to win the support of the people. He was a man of energy and determination, and he was not afraid to take risks. He was also a man of principle, and he was willing to fight for what he believed in. He was a man of the people, and he was able to speak for them. He was a man of the future, and he was able to see beyond the immediate problems of the day.

Emile de Laayette was elected President of the republic, and he was able to put the government on a new footing. He was able to establish a republic that was truly democratic, and he was able to make France a great nation again. He was a man of great vision, and he was able to see beyond the immediate problems of the day. He was a man of great courage, and he was able to stand up to the forces of reaction. He was a man of great dedication, and he was able to work tirelessly for the good of the people. He was a man of great achievement, and he was able to leave a lasting legacy.

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The hopes of a great international revolution, which have always accompanied domestic revolution in France, were also to be frustrated. The July revolution had sparked off a Belgian revolt against the Dutch. But if the left saw this as the opportunity to reverse the decisions of 1815 and renew the conquests of the First Republic, Louis-Philippe knew that the other powers would never tolerate a French annexation of Belgium. He believed that Great Britain might be persuaded to accept an independent Belgium, and appointed Talleyrand ambassador in London to implement this policy. He accepted the perpetual neutrality of the new state – envisaged as a safeguard against France – to win British support, and he resisted manfully the temptation presented by the offer of the new throne of Belgium to his son, the duc de Nemours. The success of his policy was demonstrated when, in August 1831, the Dutch king, rejecting the decisions of an international conference, launched his army against Belgium. Louis-Philippe was able, with British approval, to dispatch an expeditionary force which preserved Belgian independence.

The conservative nature of the July revolution was marked from the start and embodied in the terms of the new constitutional Charter. It could hardly have been otherwise when the Chamber which drew up the Charter of 1830 was the last elected, on the narrow Restoration franchise, under Charles X, minus the ultra-royalists. There was inevitably a breach with the divine-right monarchy, and if the constitutional changes were more marked in symbols than in positive institutional arrangements, those who made them knew that men are governed by symbols. The new king would have been Philip VII or Louis XIX if he had succeeded legitimately to the throne; instead he became king as Louis-Philippe. In recognition of the fact that he was one of the new national sovereigns of the nineteenth century he took the designation – already given to Louis XVI in 1789 – of roi des Français instead of roi de France. And that he was the heir of the Revolution and not of the Bourbons was shown by the return to the tricolore, in place of the white flag and the fleur-de-lis, the personal emblems of the dispossessed dynasty. Louis-Philippe had fought under the flag of the Revolution at Jemappes. According to a story, when he first appeared in revolutionary Paris and was greeted with cries of 'À bas les Bourbons!', Thiers and Mignet rapidly produced a placard announcing, 'Ce n’est pas un Bourbon, c’est un Valois'. This was nonsense: his ancestry was nothing to the point. His raison d’être was to stand between France and a republic.

Yet the principle of popular sovereignty was tacitly admitted. The Charter was not a concession granted (octroyé) by the king, as in 1814, but a declaration of the rights of the nation. Apart from this, the changes made in it were significant, but hardly revolutionary. Catholicism was no longer to be 'the religion of the State', but the religion 'professed by the majority'. The power of suspending or dispensing with laws was specifically taken away from the king, who also had to share the initiative in legislation with parliament. Censorship was to be abolished for ever: which meant that journalists in future were, with certain qualifications, to be allowed to publish before they were damned.

The sessions of the upper chamber were to be public, though when the Charter was drawn up views on its future composition were too contradictory to allow more to be said than that the question of the peerage would be re-examined later. The interests of the king in this matter coincided with left-wing opinion, and a law of December 1831 suppressed the hereditary peerage and made the upper chamber in effect a house of royal nominees. This was a more important decision than might be thought: aristocratic France was doubtless already dead of the kind of pernicious anaemia which had been sapping it for centuries, but this was the last nail in its coffin. The 'Corinthian capitals of polished society' had been finally knocked away, and their removal left the bare structure of power exposed in all its rather unlovely nakedness. Perhaps those, like Guizot and Broglie, who opposed the measure, were not wrong in fearing its social and political implica-
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tions. The government of France could now be seen to be a combination of bureaucracy and plutocracy. The legitimist gentry and aristocracy withdrew into their manor-houses, or the salons and inner courts of the faubourg St Germain, and abandoned public service of all kinds, though they returned to the Army later in the century. Political power was shared by the king and the Chamber of Deputies. What this meant in practice can be seen from an examination of the electoral laws. The age of eligibility as a deputy was lowered from forty to thirty, and the census, or electoral qualification, to the payment of 200 francs annually in direct taxation. In this respect it seemed that a revolution had been made to raise the total electorate of France to a number estimated in 1846 as 241,000, some 2.8 per cent of the male population over the age of twenty-one. Moreover, since even the great Revolution had never ventured to introduce such a frightful socialistic measure as an income tax in France, direct taxation fell mainly on real estate. Therefore about 90 per cent of the tiny electorate of Orleanist France, it has been calculated, obtained their qualifications from taxes on property, the remaining 10 per cent representing commerce, industry, and the professions. The so-called ‘bourgeois monarchy’ was in fact an oligarchy of landowners. In the absence of a more detailed analysis of Orleanist society, we must not read too much into this statement; but at least it suggests that the landed wealth of the country was no longer mainly in the hands of old legitimist families, but partly in those of a class of new men, who had doubtless made their wealth in many ways in the course of the ancien régime and the Revolution. Their figures, like that of père Grandet, dominate the novels of Balzac. Their new wealth had largely been invested in land, and they were now a well-established propertied class, with a sufficiently strong sense of its own interests to use the revolution of 1830 to oust the legitimist-clerical régime of the restored Bourbons, and at the same time prevent the republicans from acceding to power.

The narrow oligarchical pattern extended from central

to local institutions. The Municipal Law of 1831 established elected councils, but on such a narrow basis that a town of 5,000 inhabitants might have only 300 electors, one of 15,000 could have 700; and towns of 100,000 might reach the figure of 3,000 electors. Even these petty municipal oligarchies were kept under strict government control. The maires continued to be chosen by the central government for the larger towns, and by the prefect for the rest.

It was not to be expected that France would at once settle down peacefully after the disorders of 1830. The economic depression continued into 1832, and while in Paris political interests called the tune, in Lyon, always more influenced by economic considerations, industrial disturbances continued. Although the silk weavers of Lyon had not suffered from unemployment, the prices paid by the merchants for their handwork had been greatly reduced and the tariff to which they were accustomed was abandoned. In October 1831 a mass demonstration won the restoration of a minimum tariff of payments, but it was soon repudiated by the merchants. In November, at a review of the National Guard of Lyon, ill-feeling developed between the wealthier members with an elaborate uniform and the artisans in their ordinary clothes. The next day a crowd of several hundred weavers started to go round the town proclaiming, and enforcing, a strike. They were fired on and eight were killed. This was the normal pattern for a revolutionary outbreak in nineteenth-century France. It set fire to Lyon. The weavers rose as a man, barricaded the streets, descended from their quarter on the hillside of the Croix-Rousse. They were joined by companies of the National Guard and in pitched battle with the royal troops captured Lyon. Having won their victory, they policed the city, set guards on the Monnaie and the Recette Générale, and repressed all looting, for these were Lyonnais, sober and serious workers, master craftsmen, men of order. But of course not quite of the prevailing order, as the government realized. A large body of troops was dispatched to Lyon, its National Guard was dissolved, the prefect—who had been too reason-
able — was dismissed, and the tariff of prices revoked. The workers of Lyon were crushed, but not for good.

In Paris, at the same time, the effervescence assumed a different form. As always, political and ideological motivation was more evident than economic in the capital. There it had not been forgotten that the threat which had stimulated the July Revolution had been clericalism, and the struggle of clericalism and anti-clericalism took a little while after 1830 to settle down. At the outset a group of ardent Catholics had been stirred up by the July Revolution to envisage the possibility of a reconciliation of religion with liberty and to found a journal to advocate this. The leaders — it is not certain if there were any followers — were Lamennais, by now a Republican, Lacordaire, a liberal, and Montalembert, a romantic medievalist. Their paper, L’Avenir, founded in October 1830, was abandoned in November 1831. While it lasted it had advocated, among other proposals, the abolition of censorship, freedom of education, universal suffrage, and the separation of Church and State. In 1832 the Encyclical Mirari vos pronounced the wickedness of all these ideas and the editors submitted to the verdict of the Pope.

Anti-clericalism was less easily brought under control, and it is not certain that all those in positions of power wanted it to be controlled. Whatever its deeper roots, anti-clericalism naturally appears above ground wherever the aspiration of priests to political power and the exercise of control over the life of society brings them into conflict with secular interests. The Church in France had overbid its hand in the twenties, so naturally it lost some tricks in the thirties.

Anti-clerical sentiments formed the excuse for a violent outbreak on 14 February 1831, when a Mass for the duc de Berry, assassinated ten years earlier, was held at the Church of Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois, with white flags and fleurs-de-lys, a congregation of devout legitimists, and rows of aristocratic carriages with armorials waiting outside. It is difficult to believe that a crowd of rioters also found themselves there by accident, or that they unintentionally allowed the legitimists to depart without more than an ugly scene before beginning the real attack. A detachment of National Guard which now arrived escorted the priests away through the mob, which was left to pull down and destroy images, crucifixes, and all the destructible furnishings of the church. Some of the rioters then made their way to the Archbishop’s palace, next to Notre Dame, where a fine thirteenth-century building and a great library offered the prospect of even more enjoyable destruction. Books are always a temptation: they burn so well. The task was broken off when night fell, but was resumed the next day till the whole building had been demolished. In true revolutionary tradition mock religious rites were performed in the ruins. Similar scenes were witnessed in other towns, the authorities remaining neutral. Then, as rapidly as it had flared up, the agitation died down. The episode is a curious one. It is difficult to believe in the spontaneity of the outburst, but who organized it, and how did it spread through France? How far was there a deep-rooted and extensive anti-clericalism among the urban population, and how far was it artificially incited, the work of a mere handful stirred up by bourgeois anti-clericals? If we knew more about the provincial movements it might be possible at least to attempt to answer these questions.

Even the legitimists contributed to the prevailing disorder after 1830, with one feeble attempt to reverse the decision of July. The duchesse de Berry, mother of the legitimist heir, the young comte de Chambord, was the heroine of this romantic adventure. She travelled in disguise across France from Marseille, finding, like Bonnie Prince Charlie in similar circumstances, much profession of loyalty but little willingness to take up arms, until she reached the old centre of royalist resistance, the Vendée. There, a small rising was easily crushed. The duchess escaped and went into hiding but was captured later in the year. It then gradually became impossible for her to hide the fact that she was pregnant. Obviously this could not be a second enfant du miracle, and she had in the end to confess to the

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awful truth, that she was re-married to a minor Italian count. This ended the political significance of the romantic duchess. As a royalist supporter said, a mistake might have been forgiven the duchesse de Berry, a marriage excluded her from the royal family. This pathetic episode was the sum total of the Counter-revolution after 1830: things had certainly changed since 1789.

The last outbreak of violence linked with the July Revolution came in 1832, when the funeral of General Lamarque, a former Napoleonian general and a popular member of the Chamber of Deputies, was used by republicans and Bonapartists – to whom legitimists joined themselves – as the excuse for an attempted insurrection in Paris. The army and the National Guard, both now well under government control, suppressed it at the cost of some 800 killed and wounded. After this it was clear that the revolutionary movement was over; indeed this miserable affair looks forward to the street affrays of the Third Republic rather than back to the great journées of 1789 and 1792.

The new régime might not have survived its growing pains if it had had to rely on its first government. Its leading figure, in so far as there was one, was the banker Lafitte, but his conduct of affairs was so notoriously incompetent that he had to resign. Since France could not yet afford the weak government that Louis-Philippe really preferred, power fell into the hands of the most forceful of the existing ministers. This was Casimir-Périer, who declared that his policy was to combine order with liberty; but there is no doubt that the emphasis was on the former. France, he said, must be governed. In the elections of July 1831, Casimir-Périer made it clear that his government had no intention of being neutral. The prefects were instructed to use all their influence to secure the return of suitable candidates, though everyone was so new and untried that they found it difficult to know who was suitable. However, the great majority in the new chamber was conservative and prepared to accept a strong hand so long as there seemed any danger of reaction or further revolution.

Of the two bankers who had been patrons, and perhaps financiers, of the liberal movement under Charles X, Lafitte inclined to the left, whereas Périer, who regarded 1830 as not a change of system but only of person, was a leader of the 'resistance' to any liberal concessions. Naturally, whereas Lafitte has left the reputation of a weak minister, Périer was able to justify his reputation as a strong man. The new President of the Council also found his task of pacifying France facilitated by the ending of the economic slump. Louis-Philippe, however, whose position was now becoming secure, was not altogether happy with a strong minister who kept him out of cabinet discussions, and it was perhaps rather a relief to him when the cholera epidemic, failing to observe the strict class discrimination of the Périer régime, carried off his prime minister in May 1832.

Although the struggle to put curbs on the revolution had now in effect been won, the republican secret societies were still agitating and there was a good deal of repressed popular discontent. The government determined to take the offensive. The popular associations were attacked by direct prohibitions, by extending penalties from the organizers to all members, and by transferring trials arising out of breaches of the laws against political associations to courts without juries. The debate on these proposals suggested that the prime motive behind the new laws was the fear of political revolution. The insecurity of the régime was still such that all opposition seemed dangerous. Resistance, declared Guizot, is turned by the opposition leaders into revolution. Thiers described the opposition as an illegal government, prepared to use the associations to overthrow the legal government. And in fact the Society of the Rights of Man was planning an armed rising, and a secret committee was formed to organize it. But in the event the government itself was responsible for provoking the armed outbreak.

Lyon was once again the scene of the major disturbances. In February 1834 the silk merchants again reduced their
rate of payments to the weavers. A ten-day strike failed and the silk weavers returned to work. The city was peaceful when the government arrested six leaders of the strike, and anticipating the opposition that this action was bound to arouse, sent 10,000 troops to occupy the strategic positions and chief buildings of Lyon. Sporadic rioting broke out, and as so often, the authorities only offered a weak resistance until the insurrection had thoroughly developed. This is often attributed to callous calculation; it seems more likely to have been due to a natural slowness to react, and perhaps to mere stupidity. The rising, having been allowed to develop, was then ruthlessly crushed. A merciless struggle went on for four days. The royal troops gradually forced their way back into the town, while the forts on the outskirts bombarded the rebel-held quarters.

At the news of the revolt of Lyon troubles also broke out in many other towns, but only in Paris was there an attempt at actual insurrection. There, in the quarter of the Marais, some desperate republicans and their followers erected barricades. But Paris had a large garrison, and a National Guard which feared social revolution and the revolt of the workers more than anything else. They descended on the tiny nucleus of revolution, crushed it without difficulty, and proceeded to engage in a little private massacre in the rue Transnonain. Daumier made one of his most pathetically effective cartoons of it. The government might defend the actions of its supporters on the plea that it was just that those who had appealed to force should perish by force. Another view might be that what had happened in Paris was an attempt to exploit the genuine economic grievances of the workers by a small faction of political republicans. And yet a third view is that the republicans had played into the hands of the authorities, who were not sorry to have the chance of damming the workers of Lyon as revolutionary republicans for their attempt to defend their standard of living, and the republicans of Paris as social revolutionaries because of their connexions with the workers’ movement.

After the failure of this pathetic attempt at a revolution, out of 3,000 prisoners rather over 100 were selected for trial – a moderate measure of repression compared with the sequel to social struggles later in the century, when class hatred had become much more intense. And after the danger, or supposed danger, was over, public sympathies began to veer on to the side of the accused, whose trial was thoroughly mismanaged. Twenty-eight of them escaped from prison; and apart from a number of sentences to deportation or imprisonment, most of the prisoners were only condemned to periods of police supervision. On the whole, in spite of the massacre of the rue Transnonain, the republicans had discredited themselves by the events of 1834 and the government had behaved with comparative moderation.

An attempted assassination of Louis-Philippe in July 1835, by a bomb explosion which killed several National Guards, other persons round the king, and spectators, strengthened the hand of the government further, for the assassin, a Corsican named Fieschi, had been assisted by two members of the Society for the Rights of Man. Steps were taken after this to check the incitements to violence in the republican press. The Charter of 1830 had abolished censorship, but this did not mean that the government was powerless in its relations with journalists. Political journals had still to deposit a substantial sum as caution money. Conviction on such charges as offering an affront to the king or holding the government up to contempt might bring a fine of 1,000 francs, accompanied by a term of imprisonment for the editor. On the other hand, though juries were chosen only from the wealthy class which possessed the right of franchise, they had a regrettable tendency to acquit journalists charged with press offences. Louis-Philippe and his government continued to be showered with insults, and portrayed in venomous caricature by Daumier, Grandville, and other less brilliant but equally bitter cartoonists.

Casimir-Périer, from whom Louis-Philippe had been relieved by the hand of fate, was succeeded by a ‘doctrinaire’ ministry, including the able conservative peer
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Broglie, Thiers, and Guizot, with a 'non-political' general, Marshal Soult, as nominal head. This was still much too strong a government for a king who wanted to hold the reins himself. A palace intrigue eliminated Broglie in April 1834, but after nearly a year of confusion he returned in March 1835, making the condition, like Casimir-Périer, that the cabinet should not meet in the presence of the king. But Broglie's authoritarian style was as little to the liking of the Parliament as of the king, and in February 1836 he lost his majority again. Louis-Philippe had now to split Thiers and Guizot, which he did by inviting Thiers to form a ministry. It lasted only six months; the king broke with Thiers over foreign policy, and then called on Molé, a peer who had served Bonaparte and the Bourbons in turn, and was equally willing to serve the house of Orleans. He was an official and a capable one, not a statesman; but it was an official that Louis-Philippe wanted, for, as he put it in rather unkindly language, 'c'est moi qui mène la danse.' The series of events that began in July 1830 may be said to have been completed now, with all political or social opposition to the new monarchy driven underground, and Louis-Philippe himself the real head of his own government.

4. LOUIS-PHILIPPE

The one and only Orleanist king came to the throne at the age of fifty-seven. He was already sixteen in 1789 and had been educated in the sentimental philanthropy of the ancien régime by Mme de Genlis. His presence in the armies of the Revolution provided Orleanist propagandists with the material for a military reputation, which somehow never stuck. An émigré in 1793, as the son of Philippe Égalité and an officer of the revolutionary army, he could hardly seek refuge among the allies. Wanderings in neutral countries, such as Switzerland, Scandinavia, the United States, and disagreements with Great Britain, occupied the next twenty years, leaving him a man of neither Revolution nor

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Counter-revolution, a suitable king for a régime of the juste milieu; leaving him also with a love of wealth and power which were concealed beneath habits of bourgeois modesty. What he lacked was style. Louis-Philippe had neither the decadent grace of the eighteenth century nor the romantic panache of the nineteenth. He was gossiping, fussy, undignified, and with his pear-shaped face a gift to caricaturists. Above all, he was already ageing when he came to the throne. The skill and determination he showed in 1830–1 too soon turned into smug complacency and self-satisfied intrigue.

Yet Louis-Philippe had a good deal over which he might well feel self-satisfied. He had a model queen in Marie-Amélie of the Sicilian Bourbons, and five sons — Joinville, Orléans, Nemours, Aumale, Montpensier — handsome, distinguished, able in their different fields, and damned for ever by the wit who called them a family of brilliant second lieutenants. Within ten years he had established himself so firmly on the throne that his dynasty seemed secure. Legitimism had ceased to be a political force; republicanism was discredited among all proper-minded people and reduced to an underground intrigue; and that Bonapartism was not to be taken seriously had been shown when it could not even make a bid for power in 1839, as well as by the Strasbourg fiasco of Louis Napoleon in 1836, of which more later.

Hopes of a Napoleonic restoration apparently ended with the death of the young duc de Reichstadt, son and heir of the Emperor, l'Aiglon of romantic legend, in 1832. So innocuous did the Bonapartist legend seem, that the régime even tried to exploit it. Thiers filled in the gaps in his political activity with the composition of his History of the Consulate and the Empire. In 1833 Napoleon I was put back on the Vendôme column, though in civil attire. And in 1840 Joinville was sent to fetch the Emperor's remains from St Helena for reburial in the Invalides. The second fiasco of Louis Napoleon, this time in the form of a day excursion to Boulogne in 1840, showed once more that Bonapartism was
not a force in France. Orleanist politics could pursue their placid if erratic course undisturbed by any fear of rapid
decision.

The absence of any effective nucleus of opposition was perhaps one reason for the weakness of Louis-Philippe’s
governments. The other was his own aversion from ministers with policies of their own. Molé was obviously no more than a
stop-gap. With all the great figures in parliament ranged
against him, his tenure of office was uncertain. In 1839 he
appealed to the electorate, and in spite of all that official
pressure could do, lost some thirty seats. The king had to
look for a successor. He was in the dilemma of George III:
weak ministers could not control parliament, and strong
ministers pursued their own policies. Soult reappeared
transiently, then Thiers, but once again foreign policy was
the apple of discord. Since 1832 Louis-Philippe had been
the effective manager of French foreign policy. He prided
himself on his knowledge of Europe and his success in
coping with its problems, not without some justification.
He had kept the peace, brought about a rapprochement
between France and the other great powers, played his part
in solving the Belgian problem satisfactorily, and main-
tained French prestige.

Unfortunately he had given one hostage to fortune by
encouraging Mehemet Ali’s revolt against the authority of
the Sultan. French opinion, tending to divide the world
between friends of France and others, enthusiastically
supported the Pasha of Egypt. But the success of Mehemet
Ali, when war with Turkey broke out again in 1839,
alarmed the other great powers, which in July 1840 issued
an ultimatum calling on him to cease hostilities or face
military intervention. French opinion was indignant. Thiers
was all for war in defence of the French protégé, though it
would be without an ally and against the four other great
powers. France had a good deal at stake. With officers,
teachers, business men, and loans, she was the dominating
influence in the Egypt of Mehemet Ali, and stood to gain or
lose a major position in the Near East according as Mehemet

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Ali succeeded or failed. Thiers was the minister for a foreign
policy that recalled the ambitions of Napoleon. On the
other hand, the British government saw French influence in
the Ottoman Empire as a menace to vital British interests.
To British representatives Thiers replied that France would
never tolerate the use of force by the other European
powers against Mehemet Ali. This has been regarded as a
policy of bluff, though it was one that might have led to war.
But when British and Turkish troops intervened in Syria,
and the local population turned against the occupying
Egyptian forces, Thiers realized that he had over-estimated
the strength of Mehemet Ali and accepted the situation.
Having done so, he still wanted to save his face by making
the threatening and now meaningless gesture of inserting a
bellicose statement in the speech from the throne in October.
This was too much for Louis-Philippe, who had been
watching with increasing alarm Thiers’ policy of going to
the brink of war before he withdrew. He now exercised his
influence in the Chamber to overthrow Thiers.

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The game of general post that the king had been playing
with his governments since 1832 was resumed with the
appointment of Guizot as Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Soult as nominal President of the Council. Contrary to all
expectation, however, the new ministry was to last, with
minor changes, to the final catastrophe. Guizot was perhaps
the most intelligent and high-minded minister ever to
preside over the ruin of a political system. A Protestant,
with all the austerity of a French Huguenot, he accepted
the politics of wealth and influence; a distinguished histor-
ian with profound critical powers, who envisaged behind
changing circumstances the movement of great historical
forces and the evolution and conflict of classes, he behaved
as if he thought his own régime could somehow escape
from historical fatality; a doctrinaire who had asserted
mildly liberal principles under the Restoration, he never
moved beyond the narrowest interpretation of them when
he was in power.

Disdain for all opposition, and a certain noble serenity,
insulated him from the effects of the attacks that were continually made on him, but he gave the impression of rather more deviousness than seems compatible with his elevated character. He was undoubtedly a man of remarkable intellectual calibre, but one must not exaggerate the political skill that was shown by his long tenure of power; Guizot was free from the weakness which had undermined previous ministers—the intrigues of the king—for Louis-Philippe had found a minister who was indispensable to him. As for the support of parliament and the country, that was guaranteed by the electoral system. Each constituency had its college, many as small as 150 voters, and easily managed by the administration. The whole conduct of the elections was in the hands of the prefects, sub-prefects, and maires, one of whose chief functions was to secure the return of the official candidate. They practised every form of chicanery that was possible before the Second Empire turned the system of official candidatures into a fine art, though perhaps only fully in the election of 1846. Not that it mattered much: the propertied class was satisfied so long as its own wealth and social position were safeguarded. It was entirely content with a profoundly conservative régime that proposed no changes at home, and only such adventures abroad as were likely to involve no new taxes.

True, a new French Empire was founded under the constitutional monarchy, but this was the result more of the force of inertia than of considered policy. The Orléanist monarchy saw no profit or prestige in colonies, and if the forward movement begun under the Bourbon Restoration did not cease, this was due rather to the officials than to the ministers. After the first step had been taken with the attack on Algiers more determination was needed to stop the slow forward movement than to continue it. From the three initial conquests of Algiers, Oran, and Bône, French occupation was gradually extended until, in 1839, the Arab chief Abd-el-Kader abandoned his treaty and took to arms in the endeavour to check its progress. Bugeaud, promoted
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corporal on the battle-field of Austerlitz, who had already
had much experience of fighting in Algiers, was put in
charge by Guizot. He dealt with the scattered threat of Arab
warfare by lightening the equipment of his troops and
organizing them in mobile columns. He had under his
command Cavaignac, Changarnier, Lamoricière, and the
king’s son Aumale, a group of able subordinates, but it took
an army of some 88,000 men and several years campaigning
before Abd-el-Kader was finally defeated and captured in
1847. The war was bloody and barbarous on both sides.
The Algerians massacred their prisoners; the French destro-
yed crops, orchards, villages, and asphyxiated 600 men,
women, and children, who had taken refuge in a cave.
Behind the fighting, colonization was slowly but steadily
proceeding. By 1847 Algeria had 109,000 Europeans, about
half of them French, and the new French Empire, with
its promises and problems, was solidly founded. It was the
achievement of the constitutional monarchy, even though
Louis-Philippe had taken no particular interest in it him-
self.

Foreign policy was what Louis-Philippe regarded as his
special expertise, for he knew Europe well, though he knew
it as an exile. Yet he had no luck in international affairs
after the initial and well-deserved success over Belgium.
The trouble was that, while he was wisely determined not
to get involved in war, he hoped to collect some useful
trophies at a cheaper price. As the failure of the gamble on
Mehemet Ali showed, this was not possible. Louis-Philippe
always felt something of an outsider among the sovereigns
of Europe. If Victor Hugo’s account of a conversation of
1844 is to be believed, the king confessed to a belief that
both France and its ruler were hated by the kings of
Europe, and he himself even more than France. ‘I tell you
frankly, they hate me because I am an Orleans, and they
hate me for myself.’

This was perhaps the reason for the rapprochement with
Great Britain, though to call it an entente is to stretch the
meaning of the term. Superficially friendly relations were

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patched up after the failure of Mehemet Ali and the dis-
missal of Thiers. Queen Victoria paid a state visit to Louis-
Philippe in 1843, when she seems to have been mostly
impressed with the middle and lack of dignity of the
French Court. The French king repaid the visit the follow-
ing year.

Essentially the so-called Franco-British entente was no
more than an expression of the personal liking and mutual
trust of the French and English ministers, Guizot and
Aberdeen. It was not even proof against a trivial dispute in
a Pacific island, which arose out of the rivalry of French and
English missionaries in Tahiti, and the not altogether in-
comprehensible habit of the local ruler of accepting the
protectorate of whichever power had last sent a gun-boat
there. An ambitious English missionary named Fritchard,
who believed that the flag followed the Bible, attempted to
interfere with this amicable arrangement and got himself
expelled by the French in 1844. This produced much
British indignation, for these were the days of cives Brithannus
sum. Under pressure from the Foreign Office, the French
government expressed its regret, which aroused correspond-
ing French wrath. In 1847, the French protectorate was
recognized, which restored the situation as it had been
before the Fritchard affair, but rumblings of discontent
continued. As for the shadowy entente, that vanished when
Palmerston returned to the Foreign Office in 1846.

Anglo-French rivalry had been particularly evident in
the affairs of Spain, where marriage with the young queen
Isabella was a political triumph which either the house of
Coburg or that of Orleans might aspire to. Since either
could have been happy with her, it was decided, in Sep-
tember 1843, that by a mutual renunciation neither should
enjoy the prize. But Guizot, who was being out-maneuvered
by Palmerston, had to take counter-measures. He arranged
a double marriage of the due de Montpensier, son of Louis-
Philippe, with the sister of Isabella, while the queen of
Spain herself was to marry her cousin. Thus it was assumed
that in due course there would be an Orleanist heir to the
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Spanish throne. However, there must have been a miscalculation somewhere, for Isabella had a son and the whole intrigue came to nothing.

The lack of a glorious foreign policy, along with a supposed revival of Bonapartist sentiment, have been accounted main factors in the failure of the Orléanist monarchy. It will be more convenient to discuss the part played, or not played, by the ‘Napoleonic legend’, and the attempts of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, at Strasbourg in 1836 and Boulogne in 1840, to exploit it, at a later stage. As for the lack of a glorious foreign policy, the belief that this was a cause of the revolution in 1848 may go back to a phrase of Lamartine in 1839, which has had only too much success, – ‘La France est une nation qui s’ennuie’; but there is no reason to suppose that the poet was complaining of the absence of military glory. Like so many young literary men a royalist under the Restoration, Lamartine had become a liberal by 1830, and under the Orléanist monarchy was converted to the principle of universal suffrage, in reaction against the narrow and selfish plutocracy that ruled France. There was a cleavage growing up in France, not so much between the two nations of Disraeli’s Sybil, for, unlike Great Britain, France had not yet come anywhere near that stage of industrial development, but between the mind and heart and ideals of France and its political and social structure. Genius was bored, as it normally is, with the rule of vested interests. Louis-Philippe had nothing to offer to a romantic generation.

5. AN AGE OF IDEALISM

The politics and economics of the July Monarchy were perhaps no more sordid than such things usually are; if they seemed so it was because this was a generation of unexampled idealism, of romantic and not always rational hopes or despairs, and of a widely diffused religiosity which was now spilling over the bounds of the Catholic revival,

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producing a crop of new cults in England and America, and in France becoming closely linked with schemes for social regeneration.

In the history of art and literature there is no dividing line at 1830. Theocracy, of course, became a memory then; the romantic writers who had been royalists, like Hugo and Lamartine, now moved over to liberalism; and the humanitarian themes of the Enlightenment were resumed, though with a more emotional tone infused into them by the revival of religious feeling, the new sense of history, and the cult of the people. Politically, romanticism may be said to have migrated to the opposition in 1830, though a simple formula like this can hardly do justice to such a complex movement, with such diverse sources.

The strongest influence over the nascent romantic movement had been that of Rousseau, who set the tradition of romantic melancholy, self-inquiry, reverie, which was continued by Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and Chateaubriand. Lamartine, in the Méditations of 1820, brought the Rousseauist spirit of soul-searching, sorrow for lost love, search for religious consolation, into poetry. There was something deeper and more classic in the pessimism of Alfred de Vigny; and the lyrical spirit was to be carried on in the sentimental, easy, and attractive poems of Alfred de Musset, in the prose of Théophile Gautier, who inspired the ballet Giselle (1841), which remains the perfect expression of a certain romantic feeling, and in the charm of the rustic Berrichon romances of George Sand.

But this muted note was not the characteristic or the dominant one in French romanticism. More exotic influences were also at work. Normally, in the history of art and literature, inspiration has come from France and spread to the rest of Europe; but the French spirit has been too self-contained and insular, and the French too unwilling to read foreign languages, for much to be accepted back in return. The Emigration and the Empire temporarily changed this situation. Mme de Staël’s De l’Allemagne in 1810 introduced France to Sturm und Drang. Shakespeare was adapted for the
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French stage in the late twenties by Alfred de Vigny. Gérard de Nerval translated Faust in 1826. One cannot pretend that the romantic drama which flowered in France under these influences was quite up to the level of Shakespeare or Goethe. It was closer to, and more directly influenced by, the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott, which had a great vogue in France under the Restoration, and inspired in 1826 the austere Cinq-Mars of de Vigny, in 1829 the Chronique de Charles IX of Mérimée, and, going back to the Middle Ages, that astonishing, ridiculous, and wonderful source-book of romantic clichés, Notre-Dame de Paris by Victor Hugo, in 1831.

The historical movement was also evident in painting. Delacroix painted scenes from recent and ancient history – the Massacre of Scio (1824) or the Death of Sardanapalus (1829) – with brilliant colour and drama. Géricault, as in his most famous painting, the Raft of the Medusa (1819), drew scenes of violent action and death. With Daumier romantic art became the expression of the social conscience and abandoned the Middle Ages.

Romantic medievalism had its most disastrous effects in architecture. The destruction of famous medieval buildings, including Cluny, mother house of the Benedictine Order and greatest abbey of medieval France, aroused the indignation of both romantic and religious medievalists. Led by Montalembert and Victor Hugo, a press campaign produced a Commission on National Monuments, with Prosper Mérimée as its secretary. The chief living authority on medieval architecture, Viollet-le-Duc, was put in charge of the work of preservation. Alas, the most complete neglect would have been more salutary. A new Vandal invasion could not have done worse, for that would merely have pulled down whereas Viollet-le-Duc also rebuilt. Moreover he did not work alone but had his emulators. Abadie raged through the West, restoring: at Angoulême he dealt with the deficiencies of the cathedral by taking down everything that was not text-book thirteenth-century style – this was most of the cathedral – and rebuilding it as he thought it ought to have been built if the medieval architects had read the right text-books.

In literature and art the more ridiculous aspects of romantic medievalism, which was never married very happily to French traditions, can easily be overstressed. In contemporary life it was linked with an awakening of the social conscience. For all its enlightenment and humanitarianism, the eighteenth century never really faced the problem of poverty; perhaps it believed, with the Church, that the poor we shall always have with us. Particularly after the July Revolution, however, the humanitarian tradition of the Enlightenment combined with a new, and largely Rousseauist, religious influence, to make the amelioration of the condition of the poor the central object of social thought.

'Religion', wrote Saint-Simon in his Nouveau Christianisme, 'should direct society towards the great end of the most rapid amelioration possible of the lot of the poorest class.' The goodness of the people became a romantic doctrine, and the people was now no longer the idealized peasantry and honest craftsmen of the Rousseauist illusion, still surviving in the rustic idylls of George Sand, but the ragged and starving populace of Paris. They appeared in medieval guise in Hugo’s Notre-Dame, and in a more contemporary costume in Eugène Sue’s serial, Les Mystères de Paris. The fellowship of poet and pauper was exemplified by de Vigny, himself from a family of lesser nobility ruined by the Revolution, in his play Chatterton (1835), in which also can be detected the first shots in the war that was now beginning between the artist or man of letters and bourgeois society.

Though there was much idealistic republicanism, the battle was against a social order based almost exclusively upon distinctions of wealth, rather than against the monarchy as such. True, Louis-Philippe was for many the symbol of this social order, but the prosaic nature of the Orléanist monarchy has been exaggerated. The sons of Louis-Philippe were, in their various ways, a surprisingly intelligent and cultured group of men. The heir to the throne, the duc d’Orléans, had genuine literary interests;
his duchess, the adorable Hélène, was an admirer and patron of Victor Hugo. It was through her influence that Hugo became one of the exceptional men of literary genius in France to be admitted to the Académie Française before he was moribund if at all, and it was through the duchess that he became a peer of France. He never forgot his debt to the house of Orleans or wrote ill of Louis-Philippe.

The cartoonists were less sparing of the king. The editor of Charivari fought a running battle with the censorship, and if a great cartoonist like Daumier experienced short prison sentences, it did not prevent him from creating a gallery of sub-human figures out of the Orléanist officials, judges, lawyers, and financiers. The character who symbolized the whole régime was taken from an inferior play about an amoral adventurer named Robert Macaire, who was built up by the great actor of the period, Frédéric Lemaitre, into a monster of cynical rascality, and portrayed by Daumier as an out-at-elbows ruffian. He became the type of a society on the make, with no conscience, no pity, no standards of conduct. On a higher literary level we have the long series of novels that make up Balzac’s Comédie humaine, which exhibits a society dominated by money, a world of men of property like the Forsytes without their principles. Oddly enough, Balzac himself, with his grandiose ideas, frantic struggle for fortune, financial adventures, bankruptcies, passionate love affairs, and craving for luxury, was a man of his age almost to exaggeration, and like so many of his own characters, and for the same reason, he was a believer in authority and the social function of religion.

The wealth of the rich might have seemed less blatant if it had not been for the equally unconcealed misery of the masses, particularly in Paris. The population of France grew from some 29 millions in 1815 to nearly 36 millions in 1851, and since the countryside already supported as many as it could under existing conditions, the bulk of the increase took refuge in the towns, particularly Paris. There was as yet no industrial development in France equal to providing them with work. Paris in 1848 had nearly 65,000 industrial undertakings, of which only 7,000 employed more than 10 workers. It is probable that the standard of living of the urban populace had deteriorated drastically since the eighteenth century. The government, dominated by laissez-faire ideas, as well as by class interests, made no attempt to improve conditions.

In the third and fourth decades of the century many writers, a class in which the social conscience seems to have been more lively than in others, were acutely aware of the conjunction of extreme wealth with dire poverty. They were passing over from humanitarian sympathy to aggressive criticism of the social order and positive proposals for a new and better one. Thus Lamennais, under the Restoration a leading Catholic apologist and offered a Cardinal’s hat which he wisely declined, found after 1830 that there was no room for his liberal ideas inside the Church. His Paroles d’un croyant marked the breach with Rome and he then moved on from religious heterodoxy to political liberalism. The people was the new Messiah, and Lamennais wrote passionately of its sufferings in Le Livre du peuple of 1841: ‘They have said you were a flock and that they were your shepherds; you, the beasts; they, the men. Thiers, therefore, your fleece, your milk, your flesh. Pasture under their crook and multiply, to warm their limbs, quench their thirst, and satisfy their hunger.’

Lamennais himself did not offer any remedy for social injustice other than liberal democracy, though he was one of the founders of Catholic social reform. But this was a period of intense and original social speculation, in which socialist ideals first burgeoned. The greatest name to be mentioned in this connexion is that of the comte de Saint-Simon, of ancien régime nobility, who had fought in the war of American Independence and became an ardent revolutionary in 1789. His enthusiasm was not lessened when he made a fortune by speculating in nationalized property. An extravagant way of life under the Directory ruined him and he turned to plans for social regeneration. Among his collaborators were the young historian Augustin Thierry
and the founder of positive philosophy, Auguste Comte. These fell away, but when Saint-Simon died in 1825, he left behind him a small band of disciples, including Hippolyte Carnot, future minister of the Second Republic, Michel Chevalier, the economist and later advisor of Napoleon III, and the Péreire brothers, the financiers of the Second Empire. The leadership of the group, which was rapidly developing into a Saint-Simonian Church, was taken over by the 'père' Enfantin, who turned it into one of the many nineteenth-century religions of love, and whose practical exercises in that direction brought him into conflict with the law. The real importance of the ideas of Saint-Simon was only to appear under the Second Empire.

Another social theorist whose writings pre-date 1830 was Fourier, in whom, as in the whole movement of which he is not the least eccentric representative, the influence of Rousseau is marked. The evils of civilization and the inability of government to remedy them are traced to property; the emphasis has now shifted from politics to economics. The social compact is seen as guaranteeing the rich the enjoyment of their wealth and impunity for their crimes. Fourier's solution was based - and this again indicated a new century - on new psychological principles, in which the passions were more important than the reason. He saw human nature as based on the papillome or principle of variety, and to cater for this each man should take many jobs, not merely in his life but in each day. Fourier's new society was to be organized in Phalanges - self-contained communities which were to produce, on a principle of co-property, all that they consumed. The practical significance of these ideas was slight. Fourier, like nearly all the socialist or utopian writers of the period, was not as mad as he sounds, but he was planning for a pre-industrial world.

Among others, Buchez, the co-editor of the forty-volume Histoire parlementaire de la révolution française combined Christianity and cooperation in the name of science. Pierre Leroux, a former Saint-Simon, developed the idea of a religion of humanity. Cabot, who was influenced by

Owenite ideas from England as well as by a Rousseauist faith in the goodness of human nature, described a Utopian community in his Voyage en Icarie, and subsequently tried to realize it in America. Louis Blanc, a journalist, produced the idea with the most immediate appeal. His Organization du travail, in 1839, was a simple but effective assertion of the 'right to work', and proposed to put it into practice by state intervention on the labour market. The most influential of all these socialist writers in the long run, as well as the most striking personality, was the working printer Proudhon, who became the bête-noire of the bourgeois by his work Qu'est-ce que la propriété? (1840), in which he gave the answer to his own question - 'C'est le vol'. But his great influence on the French labour and socialist movements came later in the century.

The social thought of the period is a remarkable mixture of sense and nonsense, of a realistic appreciation of social evils combined with the proposal of sometimes fantastically utopian solutions. The element of escapism that is to be detected in this literature is also to be seen in the novels of adventure that proliferated at the time, exploiting the new medium of newspaper serials. Alexandre Dumas ransacked history for picturesque periods; Eugène Sue found mysteries in Paris; Mérimée and Balzac combined romantic themes with realistic details. Béranger played a part, by his popular lyrics, in turning the propaganda of the First Empire into a Napoleonic legend.

Yet even in the hey-day of the Romantic movement there were signs that it would not last. Stendhal's Le Rouge et le Noir and La Chartreuse de Parme are packed with romantic detail, but the spirit of their author was closer to that of the eighteenth century. Gautier's Madame de Montpensier belongs to the same perverse genre as Les Liaisons dangereuses. In 1838 a young actress, Rachel, played Racine in a way that swept the trivialities of romantic drama off the boards. And already, while the romantic wave seemed to be engulfing everything, signs of a new attitude were appearing. Théophile Gautier, whom Lanson has described as the
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pivot of French literature in the nineteenth century, proclaimed the new gospel of 'art for art's sake' as early as a preface of 1832. Gérard de Nerval looked back to the *illuminés* of the eighteenth century and forward to the symbolists. That literature was not unaffected by the current preoccupation with the social problem can be seen in the novels of Hugo, Balzac, Sue, George Sand; and the first attempt at a scientific treatment of it brought the beginning of sociological thought, particularly in the work of Auguste Comte. He began as a teacher of mathematics and a disciple of Saint-Simon, but soon broke away and devoted the remainder of his life to developing the school of Positivism, which by an equal misconception of the nature of science and of religion, offered a new secular religion of science to those who had lost their traditional faith but could not manage without an inspired teacher and at least one form of certainty. More distinguished thinkers, like Renan and Taine, experienced strongly the influence of Comte's positivism, which has continued to exercise a spell over the French mind.

However wild or *a priori* much of the social thinking of the first half of the nineteenth century in France was, at least men were speculating about the problems of society. But between this thought and the policies of government there was an almost impassable gulf. The men who ruled France were not economically minded, and their electorate, as has been said, was largely one of landed proprietors. Hence the ruling élite was not likely to be interested in industrial development; and the comparative backwardness of French social conditions and economic development, for which the social structure of the *ancien régime* and the diversions of the Revolution and the Empire were in part responsible, continued under the so-called bourgeois monarchy.

A glance at some figures will easily substantiate this statement. The horse power at the service of French industry in 1832 was under 1,000; by 1848 it had multiplied by nearly seven times, but in Great Britain six times as much horse power had already been employed in the twenties. In 1790 French production of coal was about one-twentieth of that of Great Britain. Its production increased by about three times under the July Monarchy, but it was still not sufficient to satisfy even the modest needs of France. The amount of iron ore mined more than doubled; but behind a high protective tariff the price of iron was far higher than in Great Britain and production far lower. Modern methods were only gradually introduced in smelting. The last charcoal furnace in France ceased production in the course of the First World War.

More progress was made in transport but adequate capital for its development was lacking. There was a historical reason for this. The provision of highways and bridges in France had always been the prerogative of the public service of the Ponts et Chaussées, and it was traditional for the state to finance them. Under the July Monarchy the nation demanded improved means of transport and the government was in fact prepared to go a long way towards meeting this demand. It could only do so, however, by government expenditure; and as fast as the announcement of a programme of public works aroused support, the finance necessary to pay for them aroused opposition. Moreover, since the wealthy class which formed the narrow electorate also included those who contracted for the works, suspicions of corruption, which were often too well founded, were naturally aroused. Some progress, of course, was made. A law of 1836 on the construction and upkeep of local roads was of considerable benefit to the rural population; and the length of canals in use doubled under the July Monarchy.

Railways were developed very slowly and with a good deal of discouragement from above. When a line was projected from Paris to Saint-Germain, Tlieurs declared it might be worth constructing as an amusement for the Parisians; and the scientist Arago warned against the menace to human health involved in travelling by rail. Private capital was unwilling to risk itself in the construc-
tion of railways; while the Charter blocked the spending of public money on them. In 1842 a compromise was reached by which the state should buy the land, and plan and lay out the lines, while private capital supplied the actual rails and rolling-stock. There followed, from 1844 to 1845, the first French railway mania. It was of short duration and was followed by a collapse of railway shares and a financial crisis. Too many of the new lines, indeed, had been constructed to serve the interests of local politicians rather than economic demand. In 1848 many of the little local lines were bankrupt, and France had 1,921 kilometres of railways, compared with 3,424 in Prussia and 6,349 in Great Britain.

The first half of the nineteenth century in Great Britain has been described as the period of the race between population and industrialization. In France, while population was increasing only slowly, the level of production was rising even more slowly. Inevitably the standard of living fell and the material for a social revolution piled up, at least in the large towns. A bad harvest or a slump in business would produce a critical situation. Economic factors do not make revolutions by themselves, however, and to understand how the Orleanist régime met its fate we must turn back to politics.

For all the apparent strength of the Guizot administration, it was attacked with increasing vehemence from both left and right – this should not have surprised a régime which claimed to represent the juste milieu. The attack from the right took the form of a challenge to its educational policy. The quarrel was bound to become acute with the progress of both religious and state systems of schools. The achievement of the Restoration in education has seldom been adequately appreciated. A decree of 1816 laid it down that there should be a school in every commune and that education should be free for the children of parents who could not afford to pay. This represented an ideal rather than a fact, but by 1820 out of 44,000 communes there were schools in 24,000, a great advance on the previous situation.

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The last government of Charles X issued an abortive law reorganizing the teaching service. Guizot, in 1833, repeated the effort in a law which has been called the first charter of primary education in France. Each commune, or group of neighbouring communes, was to have a primary school, and each department, or group of departments, a training college for elementary school-teachers, the écoles normales primaires. Between 1830 and 1848 the number of écoles normales grew from 12 to 47. Secondary schools were obligatory in the chief towns of each department, and in all towns with more than 6,000 inhabitants. These schools were either conducted by lay instituteurs, teachers who had to have a certificate from a training college, or by brothers of a religious order who were exempted from the requirement. This privilege of the religious schools of course ensured that the state schools would gradually come to be educationally superior. At the same time, by putting the teachers under rigid local and central control, the law of Guizot ensured that they could only escape from the control of the Church by falling under that of the state.

The importance of the role of the teachers in inculcating law and order and a proper respect for the powers that be was recognized from the beginning, recognized that is in principle, but not in material recompense. Guizot's circular to the teachers in 1833 was engagingly frank on this point. 'A profound sentiment of the importance of his work must sustain and animate the teacher,' he wrote; 'the austere pleasure of having served mankind and contributed to the public weal must be the worthy payment which his conscience alone gives him. It is his glory to use himself up in sacrifices and to expect his reward only from God.' This was true to the facts, if tacit; but a class of underpaid teachers, with at least more instruction than the petty local tyrants of Church and State who rendered them fully conscious of their social and financial inferiority, was not in fact likely to provide a cement of society.

Of course the more schools there were, the more intense became the competition between Church and State for the
control of them. The July Monarchy had started off, as we have seen, to the accompaniment of a violent anti-clerical reaction against the clericalism of the Restoration. The affiliations of the Church, moreover, were naturally with the divine-right monarchy and therefore with the legitimists. By 1841, when the new Archbishop of Paris, Mgr Affre, paid an official visit to the king, relations between Church and State seemed much ameliorated; but a strong faction in the Church, led by the clerical journalist Louis Veuillot and the *Uniores*, persistently agitated against what was called the 'University monopoly' of education. The parties of the left retaliated by reviving the Jesuit bogey. In 1843 Michelet and Edgar Quinet published jointly the courses they had given at the Collège de France, under the title *Des jésuites*; but the clerical campaign, organized by the Catholic writer Montalembert, was the more effective.

The government offered a new law on education in 1844, making various concessions. Quinet's lectures were suppressed. Guizot brought himself to declare, in 1846, that children belonged to the family before the State, and that the State did not claim the exclusive right of education: religion also had its rights. Unfortunately clerical ambitions had grown with the success of the clerical propaganda, and it turned out that the new educational law proposed by the government, because it provided definitions where there had previously been laxity, threatened to make the situation of clerical education worse instead of better. Moreover the anti-Jesuit campaign had unexpected success. Montalembert and the party of 'liberty of education' were dissatisfied. Legitimism, which was also practically invariably ardently Catholic, remained unconciliated to the rule of Louis-Philippe. Religious opinion was in no state of mind to support the régime in an emergency, if one occurred.

On the other side, the left, so badly defeated in the early thirties, had been continuing its apparently hopeless opposition in the press and at the polls. The *National*, edited by Armand Marrast, denounced the corruption of the political system uneasingly, though it only called for moderate and peaceful reforms. Those for whom it was too moderate, inspired by the eloquent young lawyer, Ledru-Rollin, the rising hope of the more advanced reformers, founded, in 1843, the *Reformes*, as an organ of more democratic opinion. The radicals were now rallying their forces for the first time since the disaster of 1834, and in the demand for universal suffrage they had found a principle on which to unite.

Though Ledru-Rollin, surprisingly, given such a narrow franchise, secured election to the Chamber of Deputies, the parliamentary opposition as a whole had really more quarreled with the personnel than with the system of government. In 1845, Odilon Barrot and Thiers, tired of seeing another minister instead of themselves in office for the unexampled space of nearly five years, joined forces on a programme of electoral and parliamentary reform. It seemed the only way to shift Guizot, and it gave them the opportunity to join in the cry, always popular in France, of corruption.

In 1846 Guizot appealed confidently to a satisfied electorate, which hardly needed the nips and nudgings of the prefects to be gathered safely into the fold. The government machine could congratulate itself on a notable triumph when, after the elections, the address from the throne was accepted by a vote of 248 to 84. The majority was indeed almost too large for its own good. There were too many 'progressive conservatives', like de Tocqueville, in its ranks - enough in fact to elect an opposition candidate as vice-president of the chamber. The awkward subject of parliamentary reform and the extension of the franchise reappeared, though the government produced the - to it - decisive argument that if the country - that is the existing privileged class of electors - had wanted the franchise to be extended, it would have shown this in the election. Guizot revealed behind the demand for the extension of the franchise the terrifying shadow of universal suffrage, and made the classical pronouncement, 'Il n'y aura pas de jour pour le suffrage universel.'
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The cry of corruption was still the most effective weapon that the opposition had, and though there is no reason to suppose that the Guizot régime was any more corrupt than those which preceded or followed it, circumstances enabled this cry to be exploited effectively at what was to be a critical time. A criminal trial in 1847 brought out in evidence the correspondence of a former Minister of War, which revealed large payments, for the purpose of securing industrial concessions, to the then Minister of Public Works, Teste, now President of the Appeal Court and a peer of France. Teste was prosecuted and attempted suicide. Both of the former ministers were condemned to civic degradation and three years in prison.

This was followed by the affair of the duc de Praslin, who battered his wife to death for love of an English governess. Brought to trial before the peers, he succeeded in committing suicide with arsenic. Together these cases were taken as a revelation of the manner of life of the governing class, which itself had its confidence sapped by such apparent justification for the continual denunciations of corruption to which it was subjected.

Meanwhile, the parliamentary opposition, seeing how hopeless the situation was in the Chamber, determined to carry the campaign to the country. In July 1847 it organized the first of a series of political banquets, at which leading orators denounced the government, made much play with corruption, and called for parliamentary reform. Thiers, who abstained from the banquets, was himself conducting an unrestrained campaign of speeches in the Chamber against the foreign policy of Guizot. The minister and the king, confident in their parliamentary majority and forgetting how little it really represented in the country, did not weaken before the verbal attacks from all sides. In January 1848 they prohibited further banquets, and the opposition, now becoming a little alarmed at its own boldness, but unwilling to lose face by yielding too obviously, made a private arrangement with the authorities. Its supporters were to assemble for the banquet, but to accept a police order to disperse peacefully, and the case would then be tried in the courts. This was very reasonable for it was really only a squabble between different factions in the small governing class. Banqueters do not come from the ranks of the disinherited, and the opposition only wished to exert sufficient pressure to put themselves and their friends in, and Guizot and his friends out.

But while the parliamentary leaders were preparing to retreat, their followers were pressing forward. The two journals, the National and the Réforme, were the centres of a more determined agitation. They called on the people of Paris to take up the struggle that the deputies had abandoned. This was to introduce a factor into the situation which on all sides had been curiously ignored. It is a striking comment on the class structure of France that the governing class, engaged in its political rivalries, does not appear to have thought that the condition of the people was anything that needed to be taken into consideration.

A bad harvest in 1846 and potato blight had affected most of Western Europe. An industrial crisis also brought widespread unemployment. The slump had perhaps touched bottom in 1847 and the curve of economic activity was beginning to rise again, but those who were suffering from it, with little attempt at relief from public or private charity, could hardly be expected to appreciate this fact. Again, as in 1787-9, and to a lesser extent in 1830, a political agitation coincided with an economic crisis, and those who had started the agitation found that it led them much farther than they ever intended or expected. As in 1830, the basic fact was the refusal of the king to be parted from his minister until it was too late, and in his fall the minister dragged the king down with him.

In place of the abandoned banquet of 22 February 1848 there was a popular procession of protest through the streets. The government felt the need for a counter-demonstration, and though the king had not reviewed the National Guard since 1840, it was summoned to his defence. Unwillingly it assembled on the morrow at the mairies of the
different arrondissements, but as its members made their way to their appointed places they called out ‘Fais la Réforme!’ presented a petition at the Palais Bourbon, where the Chamber of Deputies sat, sang the Marseillaise, prevented the troops of the line from controlling the crowds, and shouted ‘À bas Guizot!’ Unwillingly Louis-Philippe, after a fatal delay, through the veils of aged self-satisfaction and obstinacy appreciated that something unusual was happening, and asked for the resignation of his minister.

Now it was seen that there had in fact been some point in his clinging to office, for the whole system disintegrated when the man who had been the key-stone of the arch fell. Indignation among those who had staked their whole political future on the survival of the régime, was followed by a sous-qui-peut. The politicians began to look for an alternative, and in the streets the crowds were getting out of hand. The king appointed Molé to succeed Guizot, and Bugeaud, who had mastered Paris in 1831 and 1834, to the command of the army. The dismissal of Guizot took some of the edge off the crowds ranging up and down the boulevards, and it still seemed that the situation might be saved. But then, late on the evening of 23 February, occurred the incident which turned a riot into a revolution. Victor Hugo gives a vivid description of the episode. He writes, ‘The crowds which I had seen start cheerfully singing down the boulevards, at first went on their way peacefully and without resistance. The regiment, the artillery, the cuirassiers opened their ranks everywhere for their passage. But on the boulevard des Capucines a body of troops, both infantry and cavalry, was massed on the two pavements and across the road, guarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its unpopular minister, M. Guizot. Before this impassable obstacle, the head of the popular column tried to stop and turn aside; but the irresistible pressure of the huge crowd weighed on the front ranks. At this moment a shot rang out, from which side is not known. Panic followed and then a volley. Eighty dead or wounded remained on the spot. A universal cry of horror and fury arose: Vengeance! The bodies of the victims were loaded on a cart lit with torches. The cortège moved back amidst curses at a funeral pace. And in a few hours Paris was covered with barricades.’

On 24 February the king replaced Molé with Thiers, ordered Bugeaud to withdraw his troops, and spent the day in political negotiations. Paris was now in the hands of the mob, which had captured the Hôtel de Ville and advanced on the Tuileries. After the disaster of the previous day there seems to have been no serious thought of an appeal to the army, though it was still loyal and had its links with the dynasty. The sons of Louis-Philippe were closely associated with the army. The duc d’Aumale had fought in Algeria, where he was now governor-general; the duc d’Orléans was popular in military circles because of the interest he had always taken in the army. Nevertheless, outside Paris, and once the riots had triumphed there, not a shot was fired in defence of the dynasty.

On the afternoon of 24 February, collapsing in senile despair, Louis-Philippe abdicated in favour of his grandson, the little comte de Paris. It was the end of a régime that had been so lacking in principle that it could only be known by the name of the month of its founding, as the July Monarchy.