continent, and within a cultural tradition marked by a deep-seated ambivalence toward *both* East and West, he cannot help but employ a slightly different frame of reference, with different points of emphasis, different concerns.86 For many occidental writers, the non-Western other serves to articulate political, cultural, and social positions. Belyi—Symbolist by literary affiliation, more spiritual than practical by temperament—inscribes within this Orientalist-Africanist discourse the same apocalyptic fervor that animates so much of his work. While depictions of Africa in the works of others may similarly reflect the era’s overall concern with “apocalypse and atrophy,” as Simon Gikandi observes, for Belyi this preoccupation attains a piquancy, a stridency of tone, which is absent in the African treatments of his Euro-American contemporaries.87 To a significant degree, his eschatological sensibility defines and shapes his experience in Africa. The writer’s travelogues reveal how his visit there provides him with new racial subjects onto whom he can graft the familiar Symbolist conception of Asiatic peoples as harbingers of an impending End. In his travel writing, as in *Petersburg*, the clatter of hooves signaling the approach of horsemen from the eastern steppes seems synchronized with the incomprehensible *khakha-a-khakha* of Egypt’s fellahin; with the *tam-tam* of the black African drum, punctuating some of the most apocalyptically charged moments of his narrative; and with the guttural *dkharbabah* of the Arabic tongue, itself likened to a drumbeat (*TV*, 178–79). Heard throughout Belyi’s work, these rhythmic rumblings suggest at once destruction and catharsis.

86While it would certainly be possible to compare Europe’s scramble for Africa with Russia’s own imperial projects in the Caucasus, northern Persia, Central Asia, and the Far East, this analogy does not appear to have occurred to Belyi.

The Russian Army and the Jews: Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence during World War I

ERIC LOHR

Although the number of Jewish civilians singled out and forced from their homes within the borders of the Russian Empire between 1914 and 1917 remains speculative, estimates range from half a million to a million.¹ This makes it one of the largest cases of forced migration up to World War II, yet despite its importance, the case has received remarkably little scholarly attention. In fact, many of the basic features of the expulsions and the wave of violence which accompanied them remain obscure.² Making use of archival sources now available on the topic, this article examines the course of official Russian policies toward Jewish civilians within the boundaries of the empire during World War I. Contrary to the accusations of many Russian and Jewish contemporaries, who often blamed the civilian

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¹Altshuler cites a figure of 500,000–600,000 Jews deported and expelled during the war. Frankel estimates that one million Jews were expelled by the end of 1915. See M. Altshuler, "Russia and Her Jews: The Impact of the 1914 War," The Wiener Library Bulletin 27, no. 30/31 (1973): 14; and Jonathan Frankel, ed., Studies in Contemporary Jewry: An Annual, vol. 4, The Jews and the European Crisis, 1914–1921 (Bloomington, 1988), 6. One way to estimate the total number would be to take the total number of registered Jewish refugees. Unfortunately, only a small fraction of deportees and refugees were registered by Jewish aid organizations. For example, the Jewish Committee for Aid to the Victims of War only had 118,500 individuals registered as deportees and refugees on 1 January 1916. The compilers of this chart noted that the data was far from complete, and only included the fraction of the total who registered with the committee. See Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskiy arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1546, op. 1, d. 156, ll. 3–4 (Statistical tables on the composition of refugees, n.d. [1916]).

²The best study remains [Maxim M. Vinaver, D. O. Zaslavskii, and G. M. Erlikh], "Iz 'chernoj knigi' rossiiskogo evreista: Materialy dlia istorii voyny 1914–1915 g.;" Evreiskaiia starina, 1918, no. 10:195–296. The Collegium of Jewish Social Activists, an interparty group of leading Jewish politicians and Duma deputies, collected copies of military and civilian deportation orders as well as reports from individuals and communities affected. This mass of

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government for the policies, this article argues that the army drove policies of deportation and violence, at times against the strong opposition of leading civilian officials. The army was able to do so because of the vast, nearly unlimited powers it was granted on the outbreak of the war.

This article distinguishes four distinct phases in army policies and shows how these policies—ostensibly based on security concerns—allowed socioeconomic and national tensions to become important factors in the emergence of radical violence by Cossacks, soldiers, and local populations against Jews throughout a broad part of the empire, stimulating the deterioration of basic legal and social norms and contributing in several ways to the emergence of a revolutionary situation in the empire.

Several broad historical changes contribute to an explanation of why the army acted as it did. The shift of warfare from a struggle between professional armies to a clash of citizenries, which began with the French Revolution but only reached its full development during the First World War, was extremely important. Military leaders began to look upon civilians as part of the struggle in a way they simply had not previously. As early as the 1870s, with the introduction of universal conscription, Russian military planners began to disaggregate the population into “reliable” and “unreliable” halves. Of all the empire’s populations, the Jews most consistently appeared in the “unreliable” category in these plans. As war evolved toward total war, military leaders began to expect all members of the population not just to passively accept their duties, but to be fully committed and fully part of the nation in arms. The long tradition of restrictions on Jewish residence, mobility, and occupation entrenched ideas that Jews were outside of this concept of the fighting nation. The failure of the Russian Empire to embrace a liberal form of civic or national belonging, even in the semiconstitutional post-1905 era, preserved this fundamental problem.

information, which has not survived in full, served as the basis for the publication of selected documents in "Dokumenty o presledovanii evreev," Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii 19 (1928): 245–84. See also the memoir of a Jewish religious activist who participated in relief efforts for Jewish deportees, Iz a. G. Frumkin, "Iz istorii rossiskogo evreista," in Kniga o russkom evreiste ot 1860-kh godov do revoliutsii 1917 g., shornik stotei (New York, 1960), 74–110. All other discussions of the wartime deportations are based primarily upon these three sources. See American Jewish Committee, The Jews in the Eastern War Zone (New York, 1916); and E. R. A. Seligman, The War and the Jews in Russia (New York, 1916). The Jewish newspapers Evreiskaia nedel'ia and Evreiskaia zhizn’ occasionally provided news about deportations, although they were prohibited from directly criticizing the military’s role, and usually from even mentioning the deportations. The best recent studies are Daniel William Graf, “The Reign of the Generals: Military Government in Western Russia, 1914–1915” (Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, 1972), 118–35; Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, Reaction and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772–1917 (Chur, 1993), 323–84; and Sergei Nelpovich, “V poiskakh ‘nutnennogo vraga’: Deportatsionnaia politika Rossi (1914–1917),” in Perviaia mirovaja voina i uchastie v net Rossi (1914–1918), pt. 1 (Moscow, 1994), 59–61. An important new collection of documents from Ukrainian archives has recently been published which includes some relevant sources: Volodymir Sergiychuk, Pogromy v Ukrainii: 1914–1920: Vstuchnutkh stereotypiv do girkoi pravdi, prikhozhankam v radian'skekh arkhivakh (Kiev, 1998), 57–164. Alexander Prusin (University of Toronto) is currently writing a dissertation which will provide much new detail on policies toward Jews in Galicia.

3 Michael Howard, War in European History (New York, 1976), 93.


5 For an argument that the Russian Empire actually was finding a liberal civic means of including Jews see Christoph Gassenschmidt, Jewish Liberal Politics in Tsarist Russia, 1900–14: The Modernization of Russian Jewry (Houndmills, 1995).
If one takes the explicit justifications of army commanders in their internal correspondence seriously, then the overriding concerns in the early stages of World War I were security and strategy. Army commanders themselves seem to have sincerely believed that they were acting in the interest of the state—especially in the early stages. Most of the deportation orders included claims that the Jews were an "unreliable element" and that they were engaged in spying on a large scale. A survey sent to all the major army commanders asking for their opinions on the "reliability of the Jews" brought back nearly universal condemnations of Jews as prone to spying and treason, as an element "hostile to the Russian state." As evidence, the commanders cited figures showing that more Jews tried to avoid military service than the norm for the empire as a whole and claimed that Jews were overrepresented among those officially suspected of spying. The fact that most deportations occurred in areas within the immediate front zone further suggests that the concern had a large military-strategic component. Later, when the army command launched its policy of taking hostages (založniki) in May 1915, it did so with the stated purpose of preventing spying and treason through collective responsibility of communities for the actions of their members.

Moreover, the army's simultaneous mass deportation and internment of "enemy subjects" supports the idea that security and strategy drove army deportation policy in the early stages. This program started with males holding passports from enemy countries, and it was initially based on security concerns—that male enemy subjects would end up in enemy armies or engage in sabotage if allowed to remain free. Likewise, the army deported over a quarter million Russian-subject Germans from rural areas under military rule—initially based on similar security arguments. However, as these two mass-deportation programs evolved, they became increasingly bound up with socioeconomic and nationalist factors. For enemy subjects, the policy aim evolved from a focus on them as a security threat to the aim of permanently transferring their property to Russians and "reliable" population groups. The army and police eventually included women and children in the deportations and internments affecting roughly three hundred thousand enemy subjects resident within the country. For the Russian-subject Germans, the focus likewise quickly shifted from the deportation of males to the deportation of the whole rural population in order to permanently shift their land to Russians and other "reliable" populations.

This paper argues that army policies toward Jews followed a similar trajectory. As one moves from the stated goals of top army commanders to evidence on the violence and pogroms which accompanied official policies, it quickly becomes apparent that the property of the Jews became a major motive. Once the army created a legitimized framework for

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6For a collection of the correspondence see Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (RGVIA), f. 2005, op. 1, d. 155 (Reports of members of the State Duma and commanders of fronts on relations of military authorities toward the Jewish population in regions of the military theater, 18 February 1915–19 February 1917).
7For prewar debates over army allegations of Jewish attempts to avoid service and disproportionate involvement in spying see Joshua Sanborn, "Drafting the Nation: Military Conscription and the Formation of a Modern Polity in Tsarist and Soviet Russia, 1905–1925" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1998), 285–96; Voina i evreі (St. Petersburg, 1912); and M. L. Usov, Evreі v armii (St. Petersburg, 1911).

7On these deportations see Eric Lohr, "Enemy Alien Politics Within the Russian Empire During the First World War" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1999), chaps. 2–3.
anti-Jewish violence, Heinz-Dietrich Löwe’s argument becomes a powerful one for explaining the actions of troops and the general populace. The analysis of anti-Jewish violence later in this paper supports his claim that anti-Jewish violence can be largely explained by the socioeconomic position of Jews as a commercial diaspora. The impression—and to a significant degree the reality—that Jews held positions in commerce, banking, industry, small business, insurance, and trade in numbers far exceeding their proportion in the population as a whole added a serious socioeconomic dimension to already existing anti-Jewish attitudes. In an era of rapid social change and rising national awareness, the competition of non-Jewish populations for these positions added a sharp new element to an old problem. The mobilization against Jews on economic grounds closely paralleled wartime campaigns against German and foreign commercial diasporas and their perceived economic “dominance” (zasil’e) over Russians. Together these campaigns can be seen as manifesting the wartime emergence of a broad type of Russian nationalist mobilization against “alien” diasporas within the empire.

The army was able to quickly develop its deportation and hostage policies into massive operations even while civilian ministers expressed dismay largely because of the War Statute of July 1914. The statute granted the army nearly unlimited control over civilian affairs throughout the entire area declared under military rule. It forced civilian authorities to implement all military orders throughout the area and it explicitly granted military commanders the right to deport individuals or groups.

The military most dramatically affected civilian affairs in areas close to the front, where troops were present. However, army rule expanded far beyond these narrow zones through a network of regional military district commanders who exercised ultimate authority under the War Statute over most of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic provinces, Poland, Finland, the Caucasus, Petrograd, and much of Central Asia and the Far East. Most significantly, nearly the entire area of legal Jewish residence (the “Pale of Jewish Settlement”) came under military rule (Fig. 1). The commander in chief (Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich until his replacement by the tsar in August 1915) nominally held the highest authority over civilian affairs within this area. But in practice, his assistant, the commander in chief of Army Headquarters, managed civilian affairs. Nikolai Ianushkevich held this crucial position until his replacement by Mikhail Alekseev in August 1915. Ianushkevich expressed an intense personal dislike of Jews and, according to Minister of Finance P. V. Bark, by the summer of 1915 had become “obsessed with the idea of spies and spying” by Jews, Germans, and foreigners within the empire. But Ianushkevich’s attitude was not extraordinary among leading generals. In fact, a survey sent to leading army officials found that nearly all of them (including Alekseev) shared a presupposition that Jews were disloyal and should be treated as spies. The War Statute deeply exacerbated a long-standing defect of

9On the campaigns against Germans and foreigners see Lohr, “Enemy Alien Politics.”
10Polezhyte o polevom upravlenii voisk v sovremene vremia (Petrograd, 1914); Graf, “The Reign of the Generals.”
11Bakhmetiev Archives, Columbia University, Bark Memoirs, chap. 14, p. 43.
12RGVIA, f. 2005, op. 1, d. 155.
the Russian political system, namely that different parts of the administration pursued conflicting policies without an institutionalized means to resolve their differences and provide a "united government."^{13}

^{13}On this problem see David McDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900–1914* (Cambridge, MA, 1992). The military had played an extensive role in civilian affairs for decades prior to 1914, especially when the government used it extensively from 1905 to 1907 as a police force to suppress rebellion. Ironically, according to William Fuller, the biggest complaint of the army against civilian authorities in the prewar decades was the use of the army for civilian police functions. The army showed little evidence of this attitude during World War I—at least with regard to its deportation policies. See Fuller, *Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881–1914* (Princeton, 1985), esp. chap. 5.
THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY POLICY TOWARD MASS DEPORTATION

Although there was no terminological distinction between “forced expulsions” and “deportations”—the term *vyselenie* was used for both—I use the two terms to describe functionally somewhat different practices. “Deportation” was generally more formal, involving larger territories, the use of trains, and the establishment of defined and usually distant destinations for the deported individuals. “ Forced expulsions,” on the other hand, were less organized and usually involved orders to leave a town or area without specifying where the residents were to go and without providing transportation. Expelled and deported individuals were both referred to as *vyselentsii* to distinguish them from refugees (*bezhlentsy*), whose departure from their homes was more or less a matter of their own choice.

The first phase of army policy—from the outbreak of war in July 1914 to January 1915—saw a handful of forcible expulsions of Jews from the immediate front zone toward the interior and the first incidents of hostage-taking. There is little evidence that these scattered and uncoordinated actions were part of an official policy formulated at the highest levels of the military command, and by all indications they occurred under the orders of individual officers in the field. That said, the army command only very rarely took action to prevent forcible expulsions of Jews from towns along the front lines, or to punish lower level commanders for violence and hostage-taking during this early period.14

The emergence of a more systematic army policy toward Jews began in earnest in early 1915. This second phase saw the establishment of a coordinated policy of mass forced expulsion of Jews from towns near the front. On 25 January 1915, Ianushkevich took the first major step in this direction, sending a circular to army commanders throughout the front zone authorizing the expulsion (*vyselenie*) of “all Jews and suspect individuals” from the entire region of military activity where troops were present.15 In follow-up communications Ianushkevich made clear that he wanted his commanders to deport entire Jewish communities when they suspected any individual Jew of spying. Army headquarters reiterated this blanket approval at several junctures and did not retract it until 1917. As the Russian army retreated and advanced it passed through a significant part of the Pale, giving it broad scope to use (and abuse) its extensive powers over the Jewish communities that it encountered. Because the front lines shifted most dramatically during the “Great Retreat” from April to October 1915, the army’s encounters with Jewish civilians were the most extensive during that period.

Commanders in the field energetically applied the powers granted by the War Statute and specified by Ianushkevich. Shortly after Ianushkevich’s circular, General N. V. Ruzskii ordered the deportation of “all Jews and suspect individuals” from points near the front lines under his jurisdiction where troops were deployed. In the order, he stated that the goal was to prevent Jews from acquiring knowledge of military operations (which he assumed they would relay to the enemy).16 This order, potentially affecting up to fifty thousand

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14Iz ‘chernoi knigi,’” 233; Gosudarsvennyi arkhiv Rossiiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. 9458, op. 1, d. 145, l. 67–70; “Dokumenty o presledovanii,” 247–48.
15RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, l. 27 (Ivanov circular to army commanders, 28 January 1915); ibid., l. 35 (Danilov to Ivanov, 2 February 1915).
16“Dokumenty o presledovanii,” 250.
individuals, was only partially implemented due to the rapid loss of most of the territory to the Germans.\textsuperscript{17} However, during the last week of January, army headquarters and the governor general of Warsaw coordinated the mass expulsion of all Jews from forty towns in the vicinity of Warsaw, affecting roughly one hundred thousand individuals. As a result, over eighty thousand Jewish "refugees" appeared in the city of Warsaw within days.\textsuperscript{18}

In April and May 1915 the army briefly attempted to move to a third phase in its policy—toward much larger scale mass deportation operations. These projects differed from the unsystematic forced expulsions in two ways. First, they intended to systematically clear all Jews from large territories—on the scale of entire provinces—extending well beyond the narrow zones of troop deployment. Second, unlike the expulsions, deportees were assigned destinations in advance, trains were used, and civilian officials undertook most of the work in implementing the orders.

The commander of the Dvinsk Military District took a step toward such mass deportation on 17 March 1915, when he set a zone of Jewish deportation extending well into the interior of the area where troops were present in Vilna province.\textsuperscript{19} However, Chief of Army Operations Iu. N. Danilov halted this deportation three weeks later due to bottlenecks on the railways.\textsuperscript{20} The real deluge of mass deportation orders began shortly after the Austrian and German armies routed the Third Russian Army and broke through at Gorlitz on 19 April 1915. Four days later, the Kurland governor received orders from Army Headquarters to deport the entire Jewish population from areas where troops were present in his province.\textsuperscript{21} Army Headquarters quickly expanded this order to cover a much larger area, covering all points to the west of the line Riga–Bausk–Ponevezh–Vilkomir–Kovno. The deportations were remarkably thorough. The Kurland governor reported in early June that in seven districts of his province, 26,338 Jews had been deported and only 519 (less than 2 percent) allowed to stay.\textsuperscript{22}

On 3 May an even larger operation began—the mass deportation of Jews from Kovno province.\textsuperscript{23} According to D. O. Zaslavskii, approximately one hundred fifty thousand Jews were deported from the province within two weeks.\textsuperscript{24} Additional orders extended the mass operations to other areas in the northwest, and by 15 May the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Goremykin, told his colleagues that recent deportation orders would apply to three hundred thousand Jews.\textsuperscript{25}

However, this massive operation quickly failed, primarily because of technical barriers to its implementation, the continued existence of restrictions on areas of Jewish residence,
and because of strong opposition within the civilian government and from Russia’s allies. Shortages of railroad cars and personnel to conduct the mass deportations were among the key practical barriers to their full implementation, but the most serious problem quickly proved to be the continued existence of the Pale of Jewish settlement.26 The problem was that the military resisted allowing Jewish deportees to resettle in any area under military rule. Since most of the Pale was under military rule, this left only half of Poltava province and a small part of Ekaterinoslav province as valid destinations. Under pressure from the Ministry of the Interior, the army reluctantly allowed some additional areas under military rule to be designated as valid destinations for deported Jews. But the total area approved for Jewish resettlement remained quite small, incorporating only areas east of the Dniepr River in Ekaterinoslav, Mogilev, Chernigov, Poltava, and Tavrida (not including the Crimean Peninsula).27 Thus, according to the orders of April-May 1915, the cities and towns of this narrow band of territory (rural areas remained off-limits) would have to absorb the entire mass of Jewish deportees (see Fig. 1).

In early May some of the first trains of Jews from Kovno and Kurland provinces began to arrive in these provinces. On 8 May the Poltava governor wired the head of the Dvinsk Military District that eleven trains with 10,738 Jews had arrived in Poltava, and that more were on the way.28 The Poltava governor and others protested that there was no way they could house and feed such a number of impoverished Jews. Crammed into freight wagons with forty to sixty individuals per boxcar, mortality rates during the deportations were high, particularly because of the outbreak of typhus epidemics in the trains. Governors of the five internal provinces allowed for resettlement frantically appealed to the minister of interior to halt the deportations.

While the army conducted these mass operations, civilian authorities objected strongly to the army’s policies. Most importantly, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Goremykin wrote a memo to the tsar expressing the government’s opposition to further mass deportations of Jews. Goremykin asserted that the “punishment of an entire population for the previous actions of individuals was clearly unfair,” and added that it threatened many undesirable consequences. The concentration of deportees in the cities of a few provinces would worsen the impoverishment of Jewish communities, cause epidemics, depress wages in cities to which the Jews were sent, exacerbate Christian-Jewish tensions, and lead to pogroms. Most important, Goremykin continued, was the reaction the deportations were already creating in allied countries and West European financial circles, which, “as is well-known, are under strong Jewish influence.”29

Goremykin’s memo was only the highest-level example of a flood of complaints from civilian officials. Many, like the Vilna governor, complained that the deportations were devastating local economies with dire consequences not only for the local populations but

\(^{26}\)RGVIA, f. 2003, op. 2, d. 991, ll. 33–34.

\(^{27}\)RGVIA, f. 1759, op. 3, d. 1422, f. 7 (Dzhunkovskii to commander of Kiev Military District, 10 February 1915); RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, ll. 35, 40, 43 (Danilov to Tumanov, 2 and 8 February 1915); (Dzhunkovskii to Tumanov, 16 February 1915).

\(^{28}\)RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, l. 95 (Poltava governor to commander of Dvinsk Military District, 8 May 1915).

\(^{29}\)GARF, f. 1467, op. 1, d. 635, ll. 10–11.
also for the army. In particular, he complained that all drug store owners had been removed, causing a crisis in the supply of medicine, and that firms producing for defense were closing down due to the deportation of crucial skilled workers. The opposition of the civilian government to the army’s Jewish policies likely helped prevent even worse atrocities and played an important part in stopping the mass deportations.

But more persuasive for the army leadership was the dawning realization that the mass deportation of Jews was creating pressure on the Ministry of the Interior to abolish the restrictions on Jewish residence in order to find room for Jewish deportees. Faced with such pressures, the commander of the Northwest Front, M. V. Alekseev, partially acquiesced to pragmatism and the arguments of the Council of Ministers, sending an important circular to all the leading army authorities in his jurisdiction. Alekseev shifted army policies into their fourth phase, ordering that deportation be replaced with hostage-taking in areas behind the front, using mass deportation only as a threat and selective measure of punishment. The next day, Danilov informed military authorities throughout the Northwest Front that not only had the policy of mass deportation of Jews been abandoned, but also that Jews already deported were to be allowed to return to their homes. However, their return was only to be allowed under the condition that hostages be taken from each community. Already on 10 May the commander of the Dvinsk Military District, N. E. Tumanov, informed governors in his jurisdiction of the procedures to be used for hostage-taking. He requested that they draw up lists of potential hostages, choosing the most influential members of the community, including rabbis. Tumanov stressed that governors should ensure that the Jewish populations were well-informed that hostages would be hanged in the event of “even the smallest act hostile to the fatherland or generally, any assistance rendered to the enemy by any members of the Jewish population.”

In Kovno, the governor and commander of the Tenth Army quickly divided the province into three regions: one to be completely cleansed of Jews, one from which Jewish hostages were to be taken, and one in which no repressive measures were to be taken. Within weeks, army headquarters was consistently denying requests from lower level commanders for permission to deport Jews from their regions, ordering them to take hostages instead. Such was the case when General Grigoriev, a commander of a fortified region, wrote to Tumanov that his region contained important railroad lines, and thus, he found it necessary to “cleanse it of the unreliable element” (ochistit' ot nenadezhnogo elementa) by deporting all Jews without exception.

30RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, ll. 146, 211.
31For an account of the opposition of government ministers to army policies toward the Jews see Michael Cherniavsky, Prologue to a Revolution: Notes of A. N. Iakhontov on the Secret Meetings of the Council of Ministers, 1915 (New Jersey, 1967), 56–64; Sovet ministrov Rossiiskoi imperii v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny: Bumagi A. N. Iakhontova (Zapiski zasedani i perepiska) (St. Petersburg, 1999), 163–64.
32Such concerns were discussed by the Council of Ministers (Cherniavsky, Prologue to Revolution, 56–64).
33RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, l. 138 (Alekseev to commanders of 1st, 2nd, 5th, 10th and 12th Armies, Karlov, Tumanov, Engalychev, 8 May 1915).
34Ibid., 1, 141 (Danilov to army commanders and Warsaw governor-general, 9 May 1915). In practice, railroad administrators, local officials and the army all made it very difficult for deported Jews to return to their homes (ibid., ll. 269–72).
35Ibid., l. 183 (Tumanov to Kovno governor, 10 May 1915).
36Ibid., ll. 193–94 (Korenev to commander of supply for the armies of the Northwest Front, 8 May 1915).
Tumanov responded that mass deportation was no longer allowed (except from areas of troop deployment) and instructed him instead to take five or six hostages from each settlement, including all nonstate rabbis, as well as rich and influential Jews.\textsuperscript{37}

In a remarkable but brief switch of strategy Ianushkevich initiated a scorched-earth policy in selected areas of retreat, ordering the destruction of all seed grain and buildings and the deportation of the entire population to the interior except Jews. He explained that the Jews were so corrupting and burdensome that it would be better to leave them for the Germans. The policy, after causing great damage, was reversed three weeks later by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. In a similar decision about the same time, Ianushkevich briefly ordered that the deportation of Jews from occupied Galicia to the Russian interior be stopped and replaced by a policy of driving Jews across the front to the enemy side. This policy was only applied in occupied Galicia, and only for a few weeks at most.\textsuperscript{38} While these two policies were quickly abandoned, hostage-taking continued for months.

Hostage-taking was not completely unprecedented in Russian history. It was used at times in premodern Muscovite warfare and sporadically during the wars of conquest in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. But the practice was widely seen as anachronistic by 1914. The army first used hostage-taking during World War I in occupied Galicia in September 1914. According to Governor-General of Galicia Bobrinskii, “the policy was [then] extended to become a general measure [within Galicia] during retreat as an insurance against Jewish denunciation and spying.”\textsuperscript{39} While just over four hundred Jews were taken hostage in occupied Galicia, such actions paled in comparison to the systematic hostage-taking policy put into effect in May 1915. No summary statistics are available, but the First and Tenth Armies alone reported taking 4,749 hostages—nearly all Jews—by the end of May 1915.\textsuperscript{40}

The hostage policy was implemented largely by local civilian officials, usually in response to military requests. The staffs of provincial governors compiled lists of potential hostages, and when hostages were taken they were required to sign documents officially recognizing that they were to be executed if any acts of spying or aid to the enemy were uncovered among members of their communities.

One of the most remarkable army documents of the war, the “Rules on the Deportation of Jews from Military Districts of the Northwest Front,” laid out a comprehensive army policy toward Jews. Signed by Alekseev on 30 June 1915, it officially confirmed the right of commanders to order governors to deport Jewish populations from regions of troop deployment and outlined hostage-taking procedures in detail.\textsuperscript{41} Any Jews allowed to remain in areas of troop deployment were to be given such a “privilege” only if hostages were taken

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., II. 216–27 (correspondence between Grigoriev, Tumanov, and Ivanov, 24–25 May 1915).
\textsuperscript{38}RGIA, f. 465, op. 1, d. 13, l. 21; RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, l. 302; Sergiuchuk, Pogromi v Ukraini, 104–5; Dokumenty o presledovanii, 249–50.
\textsuperscript{39}RGVIA, f. 2003, op. 2, d. 539, l. 21 (reports of the Chancery of the governor-general of Galicia, 28 August 1914–1 July 1915). The practice itself has some analogues in the tradition of collective responsibility (krugovaya poruka) in medieval Russian politics and war, a fact which opponents pointed to as evidence of the “medieval barbarity” of the regime and illegality of its policies toward Jews (“Iz chernoi knigi,” 225–26, 264).
\textsuperscript{40}RGVIA, f. 2021, op. 1, d. 20, l. 9 (Vilna deportation stage [etapnyi] commander to the commander of the Northwest Front, 1 June 1915).
\textsuperscript{41}RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, l. 302.
from their communities as insurance against their hostile behavior. The document confirmed that hostages were to be held under police oversight in their own communities. But if the enemy was advancing and the army in retreat from an area, the hostages were to be arrested and deported under guard by civilian authorities. Subsequent deportation and hostage-taking orders often cited these rules, which remained on the books until February 1917.\textsuperscript{42}

Hostage-taking continued through the summer of 1915. Many of the hostages were sent under guard to prisons in Poltava, Kiev, Vilna, and other internal provinces. In August, under intense criticism from the Duma, the Council of Ministers convinced the army—now under the somewhat more reasonable Chief of Staff Alekseev—to draw back from this draconian policy. It allowed Jewish hostages to return to their original residences (unless they were under enemy occupation). However, although allowed to return, the hostages remained under police oversight and retained their designation as hostages to be executed if any army official suspected a member of their community of “hostility toward Russian troops or spying.”\textsuperscript{43}

The total number of hostages taken during the war is difficult to determine. If nearly five thousand were taken by only two armies already in May 1915, the total number taken during the war probably should be estimated in the tens of thousands. After an August 1915 decision that hostages were to sign documents and remain in their communities, the practice became very decentralized.\textsuperscript{44} The degree of decentralization was revealed in 1917, when the Provisional Government had great difficulty discovering the whereabouts and identities of all the hostages. The Provisional Government did not grant universal amnesty to Jewish hostages, even if they were Russian subjects, and the army successfully blocked the release of individual hostages for months after the February Revolution.\textsuperscript{45} While the total number of hostages taken remains unclear, the number of Jewish communities which had to live under the threat of their local leaders being executed at the whim of a local official or army commander was very large. Both deportations and hostage-taking declined in scale by the end of 1915, in part because Alekseev replaced Ianushkevich. However, this was less a policy shift than a result of the stabilization of the front lines; army commanders retained the power to expel Jews from the immediate front area and take hostages until the February 1917 Revolution.

**VIOLENCE AND POGREMS**

One of the most important and least-known results of the army's policies was a wave of pogroms and violence directed against the Jews that was concentrated in the period of the

\textsuperscript{42}For an example of one such form see “Dokumenty o presleovani,” 256.
\textsuperscript{43}GARF, f. 102, II deloprirozdovstvo, op. 71, d. 123, l. 4; RGVIA, f. 1759, op. 3, d. 1422, l. 22, 60--88; RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, l. 290.
\textsuperscript{44}In fact, no formal bureaucratic body to coordinate hostage-taking practices was formed until September 1915; once formed, it focused on hostages taken from occupied territories, mostly dealing with diplomatic correspondence on the issue rather than coordinating conditions of oversight and punishments for Russian-subject hostages (Arkiv vneshei politiki Rossiskoi Imperii, f. 323, op. 617, d. 83, l. 61; and ibid., f. 157, op. 455a, d. 238, T. 3).
\textsuperscript{45}RGVIA, f. 2005, op. 1, d. 80, ll. 670ob, 728; ibid., d. 28, l. 319.
Russian retreat from April to October 1915. This outburst can be distinguished from prewar pogroms by one fundamental feature: the role of the army. Several scholars have recently asserted that prewar pogroms were not approved at the highest levels of the government. This remained largely true during the war. The Council of Ministers and most other leading civilian authorities opposed pogroms. In fact, already on 15 August 1914 the Warsaw governor-general, describing an attack on Jews within his jurisdiction, warned the Council of Ministers that at the end of the war there would be a massive anti-Jewish pogrom. The governor-general stated that while he had taken all possible preventative measures, he already believed that local participation could not be controlled, especially if soldiers participated. However, with nearly the entire area of Jewish settlement under military rule, the civilian authorities could do little to stop army violence.

Prior to April 1915, records exist of only a few cases of extensive uncontrolled violence against both the person and property of Jews that could be classified as “pogroms.” However, economic motives played an important role from the very earliest expulsions. For example, on 14 October 1914, four thousand Jews were driven from their homes in Grozin (Warsaw province) and forced to make their way by foot to the city of Warsaw. They were denied access to carts for their belongings, and shortly after their departure local Poles took over their vacated businesses and properties. When a few of the expellees were allowed to return a week later, local authorities refused to intervene to return properties and apartments to their previous Jewish owners. As the expulsions increased in frequency in early 1915, the looting and takeover of Jewish property became increasingly common. The Council of Ministers expressed its concern at the blatant disregard for the most basic norms of private property, and imposed strict rules requiring all deportee properties (primarily German, enemy subject, and Jewish) to be sequestered by the Ministry of State Properties and protected by local authorities. However, while local authorities did manage to bring looting and uncontrolled seizure of deported Russian-subject German and enemy-subject properties somewhat under control, they were unable or unwilling to do the same for Jewish property.

When the deportation of Jews reached mass scale in April and May 1915, the looting and spontaneous takeovers of property shifted rapidly to full-scale pogroms against Jews during and sometimes before the actual orders for expulsion or deportation. In some areas Jews were rounded up, loaded onto railroad cars, and deported in brutal but orderly fashion; in many others, the process was extremely violent and chaotic. The experience of the town Shadovo in Kovno province typified the latter. This town had a population of five

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46For a discussion recent scholars’ findings on the issue of governmental responsibility for pogroms in the Russian Empire before World War I see John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza, eds., Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History (New York, 1992), 315. This article comes to conclusions similar to those of scholars of earlier pogroms (1881–84 and 1902–6), namely, that high-level civilian authorities neither ordered nor approved of pogroms as a policy.

47GARF, F 215, op. 1, d. 524, II, 2–3 (acting governor-general of Warsaw to Council of Ministers, 6 September 1914).

48Cherniavsky, Prologue to Revolution, 56–74; Soviet Ministrov, 169, 204–5, 211–12.

49Iz ‘chernoi knigi,’ 233; “Dokumenty o presledovanii,” 247.

50RGVIA, f. 2005, op. 1, d. 24, l. 305.

thousand, half of whom were Jews. The other half was mostly Polish and Lithuanian, with some Russian civil servants and railroad workers. In late April 1915 the Germans took the town for a week, retreating on 2 May. After their departure, Russian scouts and Cossack units entered the town and, according to the testimony of a Jewish resident, immediately began assaulting local Jews and looting their homes and stores. Several women were raped. One Jewish man’s eyes were gouged out when he could not pay what a group of Cossacks demanded. Cossacks turned over part of the loot to the local peasants and encouraged their participation in the pogrom. On the next day the entire Jewish population abandoned Shadovo and made its way to the town of Boik. There, another group of Cossacks arrived and began another round of violence. The entire population was driven out of the town and forced to leave the few belongings it had been able to cart out of Shadovo. The next day, 5 May, the group, already driven from their homes and their first place of refuge, received notice that within six hours they were all to be expelled further from the front. As no trains were provided, most went by foot to Panevezh.52 Dozens of towns like Shadovo in Kurland and Kovno provinces suffered similar ordeals in April and May. Indeed, for the rest of the war such violent episodes recurred in areas where troops were present, especially during the Russian retreat, which lasted until October 1915.53

The best available records of the pogroms were collected by a Jewish committee which received reports from its representatives in communities affected and among the displaced. Its collection of reports has not survived in full, but its published and unpublished records provide a large enough sample to allow for some generalization about the wave of pogroms from April through October 1915.54 The following discussion is based on reports of 19 pogroms in Vilna, 13 in Kovno, 7 in Volynia, and 15 in Minsk. In this sample of 54 cases, pogroms began only 3 times without soldiers present. The army clearly initiated the violence in nearly every case. More specifically, Cossack units appear to have instigated nearly all the pogroms. Over 80 percent of the reports identify the appearance of Cossacks in the area as the key event spurring the pogrom. In several instances, regular army units appeared in towns and nothing happened, often for several days. But when a Cossack unit entered the town, the looting and violence began immediately. This pattern became widely known throughout the front zones, and by August reports indicate that peasants would often appear on the edge of Jewish settlements when Cossacks were reported in the area, even if they had not yet begun a pogrom. According to the reports, the violence was predominantly linked to attempts to extort payments from the Jews. Rape was mentioned in a third of the reports.

The pogroms in these reports were not always linked to explicit orders to expel or deport Jews from the areas affected. However, Cossack officers often used their power to order expulsions of Jews as a means to loot. In some cases, officers ordered Jews to leave their towns within hours or minutes, denied them access to carts, and beat and robbed them as they departed. The shift of official security-based policies to outright sanction for

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52 GARF, f. 9458, op. 1, d. 163, l. 4–4ob. (Shadovo, Kovno province, n.d. [report submitted by a Shadovo resident to Duma deputy Bomash]).

53 Duma deputy Bomash’s files (GARF, f. 9458, op. 1) contain dozens of reports similar to the one summarized above.

54 The following is based on reports of this type found in GARF, f. 9458, op. 1, d. 163; YIVO, New York, Mowshowitz Collection, 13090–13245; and “Iz ‘chernoi knigi,’” 231–96.
looting and extortion was particularly apparent in the practice of hostage-taking. Initiated as a policy of collective responsibility, ostensibly to prevent Jewish spying, on the ground, hostage-taking often simply legitimated extortion. According to the reports, officers (primarily Cossacks) would take prominent Jews “hostage” and would threaten to kill them unless relatives or the community paid a ransom. In one case, a Cossack officer systematically went through a town’s residents, taking nearly every adult male “hostage” until he received ransom payments for the release of each.55

Where local populations joined in the violence and looting, nearly a fifth of the reports indicate that rumors of Jewish coin-hoarding provided an important background factor for the outbreak of violence. The perception that Jews were hoarding coins was based in small part on reality. Given growing inflation, both Jews and Christians had strong incentive to hold onto their precious metal currency and not exchange it for more rapidly depreciating paper banknotes.56 Local officials and newspapers spread rumors of Jewish hoarding, and a number of pogroms began when a Cossack, soldier, or local went to a Jewish store and was turned down when demanding to change paper currency for precious metal coins.57 Thus, throughout the front zones, wartime inflation sharply exacerbated Christian-Jewish relations, which had already been tense in the immediate prewar period. This was especially true in Poland, which had seen an intense prewar boycott of Jewish businesses by Poles, led by the Polish National Democratic Party. Similar developments were evident in the Baltic provinces, Ukraine, and Russian areas as well.58

In a number of cases, local peasants and townspeople, soldiers, and even Cossacks protected Jews from attacks. In cases when army officials made it clear that violence against Jews and their property would not be tolerated, pogroms did not occur—even if the coin-hoarding issue flared up and tensions between Jews and Christians were quite intense. An excellent example was in Riga, where General Rodkevich successfully prevented the outbreak of a pogrom, despite an intensely anti-Jewish atmosphere and many pogroms in the areas immediately outside his control.59 Only when the framework for the violence was in place and, almost without exception, only when Cossacks or regular troops instigated violence, did the attitudes of the local population come into play. However, the army’s policies encouraged popular participation in looting and violence and thereby contributed to the increasingly violent tenor of politics throughout the affected areas.

CONSEQUENCES

The army’s policies and the violence they evoked had serious consequences affecting more than just the Jewish community; in fact, they affected the larger contexts of the war and revolution in several ways. First, the campaign undermined Russia’s war effort. Not only

55Iz “cherenoi knigi,” 218–19.
56On the problem of wartime inflation, with some discussion of its impact on relations between nationalities, see Lu. I. Kir’ianov, “Massovye vystuplenia na pochve dorogovizny v Rossii (1914–fevral’ 1917 g.),” Otechestvennaya istoriya, 1993, no. 1:3–18.
57YIVO, New York, Mowshowitz Collection, 13197, 13200.
59YIVO, New York, Mowshowitz Collection, 13214.
did it cause enormous economic damage to local economies, but it also tied up the railroads and created expensive and chaotic conditions in the internal provinces to which Jews were sent. The destruction and plundering of local businesses also adversely affected the army, making it more difficult for soldiers to acquire supplies, including medicine.\textsuperscript{60} The scale of the damages is suggested by a survey conducted by Jewish aid workers of about twenty-three hundred Jews expelled to Poltava. According to the survey, the destroyed or stolen property of this small group alone exceeded a million rubles in value.\textsuperscript{61}

Second, the mass expulsions forced the regime to cut the gordian knot of restrictions on Jewish settlement (the Pale) that it had painstakingly enforced over the previous century and to reluctantly allow Jews to settle in provinces throughout the country. While the breaking of the Pale was in some ways a historic liberation that Jews had sought for generations, it had a dark side as well. The army and right-wing press encouraged the idea that Jews had been expelled from the front areas as suspected spies, and tensions between locals and the arriving Jews ran high. In fact, the massive wave of pogroms in 1918–19, conducted by all sides in the Civil War and leaving an estimated one hundred thousand fatalities, cannot be divorced from the conditions under which the Pale was broken. As Hans Rogger has pointed out, the geography of race riots and pogroms in several national and historical contexts reveals that violence tends to be concentrated in areas of large-scale and rapid immigration. It is likely no coincidence that some of the worst excesses of the 1919 pogroms occurred in provinces where the Jewish influx during the war had been the greatest.\textsuperscript{62}

Third, policies toward the Jews contributed in serious ways to the disillusionment of liberal and moderate parties with the tsar and his regime. Liberals, who had seen the war as a chance to consolidate national unity and advance a modern sense of citizenship against the foil of the external enemy, were appalled that the tsar and his generals did the exact opposite by targeting a large group of Russia’s citizens as internal enemies. In a crucial series of secret meetings during 1915, the liberal Kadet party discussed the Jewish question at length. The issue contributed substantially to the formation and radicalization of the Progressive Bloc, the broad coalition that did much to bring about the February 1917 Revolution.\textsuperscript{63} Even some anti-Semitic Russian nationalists such as Vasily Shul’gin were troubled by the fact that the army was deporting Russian-subject Jews whose sons, fathers, and brothers were dying at the front.

In a broader sense, one could argue that the Jewish policies showed how the multiethnic Russian Empire began to act like a “nationalizing state”—forcing its population into

\textsuperscript{60}RGVIA, f. 1932, op. 12, d. 67, ll. 24–27, 38 (Kurlov to Danilov, 27 April 1915); ibid., l. 166 (Kurland governor report, 7 June 1915).

\textsuperscript{61}YIVO, New York, Mowshowitz Collection, 13141.


"reliable" and "unreliable" halves, suddenly and forcibly transforming the national composition of its economy and of broad territories, and treating those it deemed to be outside the national community as completely outside the protection of its laws. By allowing and facilitating the destruction and transfer of Jewish property to others, the regime effectively removed the possibility that the wartime displacements would be temporary. When seen along with similar mass programs to permanently remove Germans and foreigners and force the transfer of their properties to Russians and other "reliable" populations, the Jewish policies appear to be part of a broad and revolutionary set of practices introduced by the old regime well before the Revolution.

The "nationalizing" impacts of the expulsion of Jews from the front zones and the destruction and transfer of their properties turned out to be somewhat ironic. While Cossack and Russian soldiers made off with much of the loot, it was usually local non-Russians who took over Jewish homes and businesses. In effect, the policies helped make Poland more Polish, Lithuania more Lithuanian, and so on. The expulsions also resulted in the influx of hundreds of thousands of Jews into predominantly Ukrainian and Russian provinces, importing a new nationality issue into core "Russian" parts of the empire. Finally, the mass displacements profoundly affected the Jewish minority itself. Through a proliferation of Jewish associations and their efforts to aid displaced Jews, the wartime events contributed substantially to the mobilization and consolidation of disparate Jewish communities into a more unified, democratized, and radicalized minority.

The events show how the tsar's generals, Cossacks, and regular troops began to turn the external war into a civil war, treating one of the empire's largest minorities like enemies of the people and stimulating the collapse of the most fundamental social norms protecting the sanctity of private property and the lives of the country's citizens. This turned out to be merely the first in a series of increasingly violent tragedies where populations were marked as enemies, and their person and property violated on a massive scale. As the evidence in this article has shown, the events did not spring primarily from the underlying religious, national, and economic hatreds of the population, nor from civilian government policies, so much as from the army's official policies, imposed from above, from its legitimization of mass violence by Cossack and regular troops, and from the tsar's failure to intervene on behalf of five million of his subjects. The comment of Minister of Interior Maklakov in a May 1915 discussion of army orders to deport three hundred thousand Jews from Kurland and Kovno proved quite prescient: "I am not a Judeophile, but I cannot approve. The danger is internal—of pogroms and feeding a revolution."67

65Such contradictory results make it difficult to see the program as an example of "ethnic cleansing." In fact, while Russian mass operations during the war had a large modern and ethnic component, they also went along older lines of estate (sasovtes), in an amalgam of old categories and new practices (Lohr, "Enemy Alien Politics," chap. 3).
67Sovet Ministrov, 163.