Tales of Violence against Religious Dissidents in the Orthodox Village

Heather J. Coleman

In early January 1911 the Cossack village of Batalpashinskaia came to blows over the burial of a Baptist. In a telegram to the Kuban district authorities, a local Baptist preacher wrote that the trouble began when the Baptists started to dig a grave for their deceased leader, Afanasi K. Iurchenko. A crowd gathered and refused to allow the burial. For two days the body was moved from place to place as the population spat on the corpse, threw cigarette butts into the coffin, and ridiculed the Baptists. Several of the believers were beaten. Finally, the Baptists were forced to bury Iurchenko on the estate of a wealthy Baptist family twenty verstts away.

Later that same month the Batalpashinskaia village assembly resolved to ask its leader, the Ataman, to appeal for the expulsion of twelve Baptists from the village in order “not to allow the sectarians completely to corrupt our younger generation and to relieve the village of great danger.” According to the resolution, “after the sectarians’ sermons, [the youth] absolutely refuse to respect their parents, the Ruler, [and] their religion, which is undesirable and injurious both for us Cossacks, as well as for the whole state. Furthermore, the sectarians dersolate the Orthodox religion and Orthodox sacred objects, which offends and troubles the religious feelings of truly Orthodox Christians.”

This episode was covered in newspapers, investigated by the central government in St. Petersburg, and touted by supporters of sectarians as an example of the plight of religious dissidents in the Orthodox village. Although the basic chain of events is relatively clear, the details vary with the telling. According to one report from the Department of Police in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, as the Baptists dug Iurchenko’s grave, a religious discussion began among the curious who had gathered to watch. The Orthodox reported that, when the Baptists were asked why they had not prepared a cross for the grave, they allegedly responded that “dogs just run to piss under your crosses.” By the time the Baptists left to collect the body, the Orthodox crowd, which had swelled to several hundred people, decided they would not allow the burial of “one of the blasphemers and insulters of the cross” and began to shovel dirt back into the grave. When the Baptist funeral procession arrived at the cemetery, the Orthodox crowd began shouting: “We don’t need apostates; we will not allow them to be buried on our land, get out of here.” The local Ataman, in an effort to calm the crowd, ordered that a section of the cemetery be set aside for Baptists. However, the crowd gathered round and threw the earth back into the grave as the Baptists attempted to dig. All the while yelling, “We won’t allow him to be buried on our land at any cost.” According to the police, when the Baptists finally gave up and carried the body away for burial on private land, Orthodox villagers accompanied them all the way, whistling and beating on empty buckets.

But who were the true instigators? Did the Baptists indeed make such derogatory comments about Orthodox graves? Or did the Orthodox remark, as reported in a local newspaper, that they would rather have a dog buried in their cemetery than a Baptist? And what about the people interviewed by the local police who remembered the crowd shouting, “Beat the non-Christians [niskhristel]” and “Go beat the Baptists”?: Were fists involved or only jeers? Did Iurchenko die from a heart attack he suffered during a violent attack on his congregation in their prayer house on New Year’s Day, as some sources claim, or did he die of natural causes, as asserted by the local police?: All we can be certain of is that the Cossacks of Batalpashinskaia considered the Baptists a sufficient threat that they took measures to expel them from their midst. Yet even the intentions behind this resolution are murky. Its wording was clearly designed to demonstrate the significance of the villagers’ local problem to the Orthodox Church and the Russian state. But did they have other, more practical reasons for wanting to rid themselves of the Baptists? After all, as Jeffrey Burds has shown, Orthodox families had all kinds of material motives for denouncing their relatives as religious dissidents to the religious and civil authorities. Certainly, similar appeals by Orthodox villagers for the expulsion of their religious dissidents were turned down precisely because the authorities believed that the complainants simply wanted more land.

Accounts of these cases are so common that undoubtedly persecution did occur, even if the details are often clouded. This essay explores several stories of religious violence between Orthodox and Baptist villagers in late imperial Russia, and examines how these stories were communicated to, and used by, observers in educated society. These tales meant one thing in the village and another as they were transmitted beyond. Orthodox peasants regarded conversion to the Baptist faith as a disruption to a community imbued with
traditional cultural and religious norms. Leaving the Church and performing
non-Orthodox rites in an Orthodox milieu aroused enmity within the family,
interfered with the administration of the village, and ruptured the ritual unity
of village life. Faced with this unwanted dissidence, peasants defended the
Orthodoxy of their villages with their fists, but also with complaints to local and
central authorities. In fact, both Baptist converts and their Orthodox opponents
constructed narratives of violence that would further their respective goals by
appealing to the sensibilities of various elites in church, government, and edu-
cated society. But they could not always control the reception of these stories,
for in late imperial Russia religious issues were a crucial element in the intense
debates about civil rights, the relationship between the state and society, and
the organization of public life. Baptist supporters appropriated these tales for
their own purposes, namely, to promote their particular visions of the nature of
the Russian community as a whole, and of the place of the Orthodox Church
and the suitability of freedom of conscience in Russian society.

Problems between Baptists and their Orthodox neighbors offer a fruitful
object of study both because of the Baptists' position in the Russian Empire
and because of their particular ability to publicize their legal problems. First,
the Baptist faith was the fastest growing non-Orthodox religious denomination
among the Slavic population of the Russian Empire. It was also highly contro-
versial within both educated society and the families and village communities
that confronted the challenge of conversions in their midst. In 1894 the Council
of Ministers forbade “shtundists,” an umbrella term for Russian evangelicals of
various types, to meet for prayer. As a result, during the 1890s, hundreds of con-
verts suffered arrest, imprisonment, or exile. Nicholas II’s decree on religious
tolerance of 17 April 1905 removed the legal prohibition on Orthodox people
converting to other Christian faiths and cancelled the anti-shtundist legisla-
tion. Thereafter the Baptists began to organize openly and rapidly to increase
their ranks. But although their legal position markedly improved, their dealings
with the police did not end, for it remained forbidden to convert the Orthodox.10
Moreover, what had been decreed in distant St. Petersburg was not necessarily
played out in day-to-day relationships.

The Baptists were good at making this fact known. From the 1890s right
up to the 1917 Revolution and beyond, one Ivan P. Kushnerov, a member of the
Kiev Baptist community, made it his mission to defend evangelicals brought
to trial for holding shtundist meetings, for publicly preaching non-Orthodox
teachings, or for other religious crimes. He systematically collected materials
dealing with the legal position of Russian evangelicals and used these to pester
government officials, also publicizing them relentlessly in the evangelical press
that blossomed after 1905. Newspaper writers and commentators interested
in religious affairs frequently relied on these reports as their source of infor-
mation.11 As a result, Baptist examples dominated press reports on violence
against religious dissidents. Finally, certain characteristics of the Baptist faith
may have contributed to the disproportionate number of reports of violence
against Baptists. These include the practice of public baptism by full immersion,
a strong evangelistic drive, and the rejection of traditional hierarchies embed-
ed in the Baptists' congregational church structure. All these features ensured
that conversion could not remain a secret for long. Indeed, several observers
commented on the particular frequency and severity of attacks on evangelicals
compared to other religious dissidents.12

Defining and Defending the Orthodox Community

Orthodox families were understandably troubled when one of their num-
ber abandoned the ancestral religion. Many such families would appeal to the
local priest or Orthodox missionary for help in bringing an apostate back into
the Orthodox fold.13 Numerous reports, in both government archives and the
Baptist and secular press, describe the friction arising from new Baptists’ refusal
to perform the everyday rituals of Orthodox life, such as contemplating icons
and crossing themselves. Sometimes this conflict led to violence within the
family. For example, at the khatov (village) of Balka Vasilev in the Don district,
where virtually all the inhabitants were Baptists, a man appeared at a meeting
brandishing a whip and proceeded violently to attack his wife and drag her
away.14 Such tension and violence arose not only over pressure on dissidents
to return to Orthodoxy but also because Orthodox families complained that
Baptist converts placed undue pressure, sometimes even of a physical nature,
on their wives and other relatives to become Baptists, too.15

The sectarianists’ refusal to reverence icons particularly offended the religious
sensibilities of their families and neighbors. In every Orthodox home, a display
of icons, illuminated by a burning lamp, presides from the corner of the room
and sanctifies the home. Moreover, each person would have had a personal
icon, received at baptism, which accompanied him or her through life’s rites of
passage and finally to the grave.16 By contrast, the Baptists rejected the use of
icons, affirming an unmediated relationship between the believer and his or
her God and a simple style of worship to complement this belief.

As a result, new believers faced the problem of deciding what to do with
their now superfluous icons. Some converts removed the icons from their houses
and laid them at the church door.17 Others were less reverent, as attested by the
many complaints about converts selling, burning, or even using their icons as
shutters.18 If all family members were not ready to part with their sacred images,
trouble might ensue: in 1909 in the city of Konotop, for example, a Cossack, Taras Khomenko, was tried by the district court and sentenced to three months' arrest at the police station (pri politii) for taking down the family's icons, smashing them, and burning them in the stove while his Orthodox mother and wife were at church. Of course, Orthodox family members could also get the upper hand in the battle over icons: in the village of Grishino, Ekaterinoslav Province, one woman's husband threw her out of the home for her refusal to revere the icon.99

Not only was the actual disposal of icons troublesome to family and friends, but so, too, were the Baptists' explanations of their actions. Baptists' condemnation of the contemplation of icons as "idol worshiping" did not endear them to their fellow villagers. Numerous complaints country-wide suggest that whatever words the Baptists actually used, Orthodox listeners heard blasphemous disrespect for their most sacred objects. Villagers throughout Russia told police and priests that Baptists had described their icons as "planks." In one case in Kiev Province in 1909, a young peasant, Filipp Grigor'evich Litvin, was sentenced to two weeks in jail for blasphemy after refusing to kiss the cross professed by the local priest during a pastoral visit to Litvin's Orthodox wife, Martina. Litvin allegedly pointed to the cross, and said: "To kiss it would be the same as kissing a plank." Litvin's defender, Kushnerov, did not deny that Litvin had compared the cross to a board but told the court that the statement should be seen as the blunt expression of a simple person trying to engage in discussion with a priest. Later, in a statement appealing his conviction (probably written by Kushnerov), Litvin claimed that the incident had never taken place, although he acknowledged having said in a public debate with the local psalmist that he did not kiss icons because he regarded them as "ordinary items made by the hands and will of a human."100

The practice of adult baptism also presented a direct challenge to Orthodox teachings and to notions of family and community. Scholars of the radical Protestant tradition have pointed out that social separation and conflict is implied in the very practice of baptizing (and especially re-baptizing) only adults. As John Bossy argues regarding the Anabaptists in the Reformation, "believers' baptism was a doctrine of division, and not just in the eyes of princely bureaucrats and unity-haunted municipalities; it provoked a growl from the average soul in defence of his conviction that through their baptism he and his children were living in Christianity."101 Likewise, in his study of Baptist history, William Henry Brackney contends that the congregational form of the Baptist community—the congregation as a covenant of converted adults—"represented an absolute break" with the established church because it "bypassed tradition altogether and made a compact with God Himself."102 For Orthodox peasants, baptism did not merely mark an earlier spiritual transformation, as the Baptists taught. Rather, the ritual itself conferred both salvation and membership in the community. Thus, when a fight erupted over the burial of an un-baptized Baptist baby in the cemetery of a village in Kiev Province, the Orthodox objected on the principle that they themselves did not inter un-baptized children in the graveyard.11 And, similarly, the secret police report into the funeral incident in Batalapshinskaya, described above, found that Orthodox families resented Baptist members who "insisted that their children not be baptized and that previously baptized children who had not yet switched to the sect were accustomed to the Orthodox faith be forced not to cross themselves and to forget completely about the cross and the Church."12

Sometimes those offended families took matters into their own hands. In 1910, for example, a young Baptist named Petr Kofanov from the Cossack village of Vladimirskaya, Kaban district, complained to the Department of Spiritual Affairs that, while he and his wife were away from home working on the steppe, his parents had persuaded the village priest to baptize their year-old daughter according to the Orthodox rite. He appealed for the baptism to be declared illegal and for his family's religious rights to be protected, correctly pointing out that, according to the law of 17 April 1905, when both parents transferred to another faith, children under the age of fourteen automatically followed them. An investigation ensued, and the local police took statements from all those involved. The results emphasize the importance of baptism for the Orthodox as a sign of membership in the community on earth and in heaven. The grandparents, left to care for the child while her parents were away, were distressed at the child's un-christened state. In the words of the grandfather, "looking at the child, who hadn't been baptized according to our Orthodox ritual, I felt sad in spirit." And so they asked the local priest to perform the ritual on the little girl, and he agreed. In his summation for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the local police chief reported that, when he told the villagers about Kofanov's claim that his rights were violated, they all took umbrage on the grounds that all Kofanov's ancestors had been Orthodox and that he alone had suddenly decided a couple of years earlier to become a Baptist.13 This case illustrates how Orthodoxy was an integral part of family and community identity, an identity that was sealed by infant baptism. In the neighbors' eyes, the heritage of the Kofanov infant superseded the parents' individual rights.

Conflict over ritual life and faith could spread beyond the walls of the family but to become the basis for village action. Villagers frequently sought to prevent new converts from being baptized. The Baptist practice of baptism by full immersion meant that their baptisms were mostly public events that attracted considerable attention. Sometimes this interest was relatively benign, but government files and the press were replete with examples of confrontation, often
violent, incited by the public spectacle of evangelicals' baptisms. For example, F. T. Kolmyk, from the village of Gostochaevskaya, Kuban region, reported to the journal Baptist that, in early 1910, his congregation had attempted to baptize three converts, but family and village sanctions had failed them. On their way down to the riverbank, the mother of one of the new converts ran up to her son and, with the words, "Where are you going, Maksim?" hit him on the head so hard with a stick that his face was covered with blood. As they waited for Maksim to wash his head, the Baptists knelt in prayer. A large crowd gathered and grew increasingly agitated, until finally Kolmyk announced that the baptism would not take place. Later, he reported, the Baptists learned that the river had been filled to overflowing with thorns and other prickly things. Similarly, during Easter 1911, the village of Romanovka in the distant Amur district was thrown into turmoil over local Baptists’ plans for an open-air baptism. As the pastor began to baptize the candidates in the lake, a crowd of Orthodox onlookers started to whistle, laugh, and make banging noises. Some women in the crowd even began to sing obscene songs. Then, as the Baptists headed back to their prayer house following the baptism, they were mocked by some of the Orthodox, apparently "in a state of drunkenness owing to the Easter holiday." A fight broke out: some attacked the Baptists, while others broke the windows of the prayer house. According to the liberal newspaper Riech” (Speech), the result was "a full-fledged pogrom."

Some villages, like Batalpashinskaya, attempted finally to resolve their dissidence problem by exercising their traditional right to turn over to the state undesirable elements for banishment. These cases show the extent to which peasant perceptions of morality, community, and legality were intertwined. For example, the Baptist missionary Vasilii Skaldin reported an incident in a settlement where a branch of his congregation had rented a prayer house. The village assembly had gathered and decided to expel the Baptists. When the Baptists arrived at their prayer house that Sunday, they found it surrounded by a mob of armed peasants who shouted, "We do not want you! to meet here or corrupt our families." To the Baptists' plea that they were practicing their faith by the will of the tsar and the permission of the governor, the uncompromising voice of popular justice responded: "We recognize nothing: we have our law and we passed a verdict to expel you and we want to know nothing more." Just as religious rioters during the Reformation regarded their violence as a legitimate defense of the doctrine the government had failed to uphold, so the villagers sought to restore the traditional boundaries of their community by rooting out heteresy. Thus Orthodox villagers made explicit the connection between family disruption and village politics that religious dissidence had aroused.

The communities that took action against their Baptist members had two broad complaints: that Baptist evangelizing was intolerable and that the Baptist presence interfered with village administration. As expressed in the minutes of one village assembly that tried to expel its Baptists in 1907:

[The Baptists] boldly appear anywhere with their propaganda, in the streets and in homes, and, in trying to make converts to their teaching, do not stop at any public sacrifice, any effrontery and even blasphemy against the Orthodox Church, holy icons, rituals, sacraments; their impertinence and the impertinence with which at every instance, upon every meeting with Orthodox people, they try to spread their teaching has lately become intolerable.

Local converts were bad enough, but many villages regarded Baptist missionaries as a particular nuisance. As one government official who interviewed both sectarian and Orthodox in settlements across the Steppe region reported, "The population especially does not tolerate wandering sectarian preachers, brands them with the nickname of 'corruptors [soblaznitele]' of the people,' and vigilantly ensures that this element does not penetrate its milieu." The Baptists regretfully confirmed this. In the annual report of their missionary work for 1907, for example, they described one missionary who was threatened with an axe and many cases where the village authorities had taken action to get rid of the religious intruders.

The other common complaint of communities about their Baptists was that, as one village put it in its appeal to the governor to exile a group of new converts, they "undermine the social structure of the life of our settlement." Not only did conversion shake up family relationships but religious dissidence wreaked havoc on a village system in which management of the religious aspects of life was closely woven into secular village administration. Although the village and parish communities were administratively and juridically distinct, the village assembly was "responsible for deciding on various collections to be taken within the community," including the compulsory "donation" from all villagers toward the construction and maintenance of the local church. Now the Baptists were refusing to participate in what their neighbors regarded as an inseparable part of village life, the Church. In February 1907 the Baptist legal defender, Kushnerov, reported in the evangelical magazine, Bratstvo istok (Brotherly leaflet), that, in various areas of Kiev Province, village assemblies were drawing up resolutions (obshchestvennye prigovory) "according to which our brother-Baptists are assessed taxes for the construction and repair of Orthodox churches at rates of 35 rubles, 68 kopecks, and lower. Despite their poverty and the harvest failure, this requisition is exacted from them by force, and their appeals to be released from torture and penalties are also left 'without satisfaction' by the governor." "Such a requisition," commented Kushnerov, "is not a 'voluntary donation,'"
The Baptists' refusal to participate financially in the religious life of the village was not the only factor that brought public enmity. Because Orthodoxy marked one's belonging in the village, indeed was integral to its shared institutions, the public performance of non-Orthodox rituals such as baptisms and funerals violated the very nature of the community. The police superintendent (ispravnik) of Konotop uyezd, Chernigov Province, underscored this situation in a 1910 report. He stated that the Baptists' public prayer and performance of rituals generated interest in their teachings but were also the main source of friction between them and their Orthodox neighbors. These practices, he reported, provoked "indignation and hatred among the simple people, who are firm in the Orthodox faith, [and] often entail clashes, particularly in instances...where, according to their understanding, the interests of the Orthodox Church are violated, for example—the burial of shiitists in Orthodox cemeteries." 79

That reports of community conflict over the burial of a local Baptist were common is not surprising, since the funeral brought together issues of religious legitimacy and questions relating to the allocation of space and resources in the village. For example, in the spring of 1910, in the village of Gurovtsy, Kiev Province, when the Baptists were heading to the local cemetery with the coffin of one of their number, they were met on the road by a crowd of peasants led by the priest bearing a cross. The priest declared that he would not allow the burial of a Baptist in the Orthodox cemetery. 80 The Baptists complained to the local police officer, who informed the priest that there was a new law allowing sectarians to be buried in Orthodox graveyards. The priest responded that he cared only about canon law. An investigation into this incident, initiated by the metropolitan of Kiev, suggested that the peasants had sought the assistance of their priest because they objected to the burial of a Baptist in their cemetery on two counts: the Baptists had not shared in the expenses of fencing off the cemetery; and they regarded the graveyard as a holy place, which would be desecrated by the burial of people who had rejected Orthodoxy. 81 Tales of angry crowds comparing Baptists' corpses to those of dogs, such as we saw in Batapleshinska, reinforce this idea that villagers believed that apostates had separated themselves from the human community. 82

Confrontations in Russian and Ukrainian villages over the presence and activities of religious dissenters certainly could have a basis in nonreligious motives. Just as often, however, such goals seemed to be secondary or nonexistent. Students of popular summary justice emphasize the way that both mockery and ritualized violence offer a means of shaming fellow villagers for stepping outside the accepted moral boundaries of the local community. 83 As Stephen P. Frank argues, rather than being meaningless, popular summary justice, or sanosud, was a "response to some threat against the community or a challenge to village norms and authority." 84 Similarly Natalie Zemon Davis suggests that religious violence is particularly intense, "because it connects intimately with the fundamental values and self-definition of a community." 85 Reactions to the apostasy of fellow villagers clearly show the centrality of religious norms in the definition of community and family.

Villagers feared the appearance of religious dissent in their midst. As one convert remembered, when sectarian walked through the village, "women tried to make the sign of the cross over all the places where they had walked. Some villagers said that they needed to find a daredevil who could unexpectedly put a cross around their necks, and then the Satanic specter would go away and they would again become like everyone else." 86 Rumors also circulated that the shiitists practiced blood rituals whereby the new convert had to sign his name in blood, or that the arrival of religious disidence in the village showed that the Antichrist had come. 87 Compounding this fear was a sense of shame. One man told his newly converted son-in-law to leave his house, saying, "because of you, I am ashamed to walk the streets." 88 These rumors and accusations expressed common people's perceptions of the limits of legitimate religious activity and the requirements for respectable membership in the community.

Conversing about Religious Strife in the Village

Orthodox Church authorities, government officials, the sectarian press, and secular observers of various political persuasions all took an interest in the problem of violence against religious dissenters in the villages. 89 Agreeing on what that violence signified was another story. For some, it was evidence that the Orthodoxy of the peasantry needed protection; for others, it pointed to the pernicious influence of Orthodox priests on the people. Some argued that improved civil rights for religious dissenters would solve the problem of violence, whereas others viewed that violence as a troubling sign—or even convincing proof—that the village was too backward for modern notions such as freedom of conscience. The practices of exiling and isolating religious dissenters had a long pedigree, but now state and society considered the new option of granting rights to these dissenters. 90 As Russian society faced challenging new questions about freedom of conscience, constitutional order, representative politics, and national identity in the late imperial period, analysis of the religiosity and the values of the people became crucial. Urban elites of various persuasions took up the stories they had heard from Orthodox or Baptist villagers and used them to advance their own views on these issues.

The Baptists worked hard to publicize these episodes both for reasons of internal community development and in order to draw the attention of Russian...
lawmakers to their plight. Publishing frequent—and no doubt embellished—accounts of violent encounters in the evangelical press that emerged after 1905 seems to have created a common identity as an unfairly persecuted people, one that drew strength from the example of the first Christians. At the same time Kushnerov and the editors of evangelical journals and newspapers also used these accounts to educate local believers about their rights. Descriptions often ended with statements to the effect that “the promised freedom of confession of faith still remains on paper, but in life, especially in the village, everything remains as it has always been,” and readers were exhorted to send in complaints, so they could be publicized and passed on to government officials. Indeed, local communities did borrow such storylines in their appeals to the central authorities for assistance. For example, in a 1910 petition to the Department of Spiritual Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a group of Baptist peasants from Voskresenskaia volost', Ekaterinoslav Province, complained that the township elder (starshiina) had ejected them from his office with the words, “We’ll beat you up so long as there are only a few of you!” And these petitioners asked: “Where on earth is the freedom of confession and conscience bestowed by our ruler if even the authorities pay no attention to it?”

Baptist leaders also ensured that writers interested in the cause of religious freedom heard about their troubles by personally informing them of incidents and by constantly reporting them in their own magazines, which often served as the source for later articles and investigations in the secular press. In early 1909 the Duma speaker and Octobrist deputy Nikolai Khomiakov reported that “news reaches us about the most savage reprisals in the villages. … When I was told about them, I could not believe my ears. After the priest gave a sermon that inflamed the passions, two peasants who had fallen away to the Baptist faith were taken to the village administration and, there, their father was forced, on threat of death, to flog his own sons with the prickly branches of a plum tree.” For Khomiakov, such incidents raised concerns about the possibilities for real legal change: “I don’t know,” he continued, “to what extent the law on freedom of religion, which we are now working out in the State Duma, can be implemented, if such barbarity takes place.”

Khomiakov clearly had his doubts about the ability of law to change popular behavior, but most of those who reacted with sympathy to accounts of religious violence did not share these anxieties. Long before such stories could be told in the Duma, participants in the burning debate of the late nineteenth century over freedom of conscience and religious questions in general were using them to show the necessity of legal, indeed constitutional, change in the Russian Empire. In the liberal journal Vestihi Evropy (Herald of Europe) in 1901, K. K. Arsen'ev recounted at length two violent attacks on Baptists in order to argue that “the beating of sectarian is one of the outward signs of the evil that will only be eliminated through enlightenment and religious tolerance.” Similarly the jurist A. M. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, a former assistant procurator of the Senate, arrived at similar conclusions in his years of reviewing appeals of religious cases, and pointed out in his well-known book on the legal status of sectarians that violence between shhitists and their communities showed the need to highlight the different interests of church and state in Russian legislation. Most clearly influential was a detailed review of legislation regarding sectarians that Varvara I. Iazychevich-Borodaevskaya first read to the Juridical Society at St. Petersburg University in 1903. In it she used various brutal cases of rural conflict between Orthodox and Baptists to demonstrate that the Russian state needed to withdraw from enforcing adherence to Orthodoxy. In early 1905 the chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Sergei Witte, had this document printed and distributed to his fellow ministers in the period leading up to Tsar Nicholas II's decree on religious tolerance.

The recounting of these incidents became even more prevalent after 1905 as a way to discuss the disappointment liberals and populists felt with the outcomes of the 1905–1907 revolutionary settlement, but also for struggling with the problem of whether the Russian peasantry was ready for democracy. Writing in 1908 and 1909, the well-known commentators S. Mel'gunov and A. Prugavin both made a direct connection between an alleged resurgence of popular attacks on Baptists and the change in the political fortunes of the liberation movement after 1907. As Mel'gunov argued in 1908, “Reaction is growing, and, along with it reports about the persecution of sectarians are becoming more frequent.” Prugavin connected this phenomenon to the revival of the old demons of village life:

Beatings of sectarians are starting up again in various parts of Russia. Attacks on Baptists and shhitists and incidents of fierce beatings are becoming increasingly common. In most cases these attacks take place, as in the past, with the favorable assistance, sometimes even the participation, of representatives of village authority, the police, and even the clergy; the initiative frequently belongs to the latter.”

This is one of many examples of how the Baptists' allegations that their popular mistreatment originated with the clergy struck a chord with many elements of the liberal and leftist intelligentsia. Such incidents reinforced the tendency of these observers to regard the clergy as intellectually and politically backward representatives of state power in the village. The Baptists were aware of these inclinations and exploited them to their advantage. Many of the beatings reported in petitions and in the press were alleged to have followed a
sermon criticizing the Baptists. For example, the Baptists in the village of Gurovsky, described above, complained bitterly that the village priest was responsible for stirring up enmity toward them and claimed that he had sparked a beating of Baptists by hitting a man named latsky in the chest and shouting, “Get out of here, Shundist!” A diocesan investigation of the case rejected this account of events and, instead, praised the priest as an energetic young pastor who had brought new life to a previously demoralized Orthodox parish. Like many other parish priests, especially after 1905, this priest had devoted great energy to countering Baptist inroads in his congregation by organizing public debates with the sectarian members in the parish school building and special missionary evenings. According to his bishop, it was the priest’s fear that his Orthodox flock might resort to violence against the Baptists that led him to support their appeal to have leading sectarians evicted.60

It is difficult to ascertain fully the role that priests and missionaries played in fomenting anxiety about the presence of religious dissidents, for the priests generally denied any involvement in—and often the very existence of—acts of brutality. There are certainly many allegations of priests standing by as villagers pummeled their religious dissidents.61 However, just as it is unclear what Baptists actually said that offended their Orthodox interlocutors, it is not always certain that a priest truly suggested attacks on sectarian members or whether this was the message villagers took from a sermon regarding Baptist theological errors. From a religious viewpoint, Orthodox parish priests had a pastoral responsibility to warn their flocks and protect them against what they no doubt genuinely perceived to be heresy. And clearly many families trusted the priests to perform this role when faced with the apostasy of a son or daughter.

Believing and emphasizing these accusations was necessary, in part, to retain the liberal and populist faith in the potential of the people. For example, when the liberal newspaper Riekh’ reported the incident of the crowd mocking the Baptists of the village of Romanovka when they attempted to perform a baptism, as described earlier, the reporter concluded that someone must have incited the “picture of a full pogrom” that ensued, as

our simple people usually relate very tolerantly to all non-Christian and non-Orthodox people. The sight of people praying, regardless of how strange the form of prayer, never arouses even simple mockery in the Russian person, not to mention enmity and violence. How indeed the celebrated “placidity” of the Russian peasant had to be turned upside down in order to lead him to such a pogrom! And they are leading them.62

“They” were the reactionary forces of the Orthodox clergy and their supporters in the radical right wing. Mel’gunov made a similar argument about the inherent
tolerance of the Russian people, in a 1908 article titled “Religious fanaticism and the Mission.” Commenting on the many recent press reports of crowds beating up sectarians, he protested the conservative press’s view of these incidents as proof of the population’s rejection of the idea of freedom of religious speech. Rather, he said, “thousands of facts bear witness to the full religious tolerance characteristic of the popular masses narodnaya massa.” To him, the cases showed that popular violence was the result purely of the “unculturedness” of the rural population and the malevolent actions of outsiders, in the form of the local police, the clergy, and Orthodox missionaries.63

For Iasevich-Borodaevskaia, these incidents revealed not only the inadequacy of the laws of 1905 and 1906 that had allowed sectarians publicly to organize congregations and gather to worship, while banning their proselytizing, but also the fact that even these inadequate laws had yet to be fully implemented. Writing after the failure of the Duma to pass freedom of conscience legislation in 1909–1910, she complained that the problem of violence would not be resolved until the legal rights of religious dissidents were guaranteed. She decried that their lives were governed by administrative decrees and circulars that could be withdrawn or changed, that official permission was required to hold their meetings, and that they remained subject to administrative exile at the whim of bureaucratic authorities.64 She concluded that so long as policy on sectarian remained a matter of administrative procedure rather than legal rights, confusion would reign and the dissidents would be unable to defend themselves. She did not despair, however. Equating the sectarian groups with the people narod), she argued that they could still look to their elected representatives for help:

The people have a mother-caregiver—the State Duma—which keenly listens to the moaning of the people, but not everything reaches her. At present, the delegates of the Duma have the great task of supporting the people, guarding the people’s rights, and directing all their creative energies to developing immovable laws for the people based on the principles of fairness.65

Gradually, inevitably, she asserted, freedom of conscience was becoming “an indestructible fact of reality and entering] into life not as a privilege for some estate but as an inalienable, legal right, to be enjoyed equally by all citizens of Russia.”66

Russian evangelicals actively assisted authors such as Iasevich-Borodaevskaia in their publicizing of persecution, but they could not always control how these ideas were used. For example, in 1913 a group of fifty Duma deputies, representing leftist and center-left parties, presented a complaint to the Duma regarding
persecution of religious dissidents. Speaking on behalf of the group were two Social Democrats, Petrovskii and M. I. Skobelev. Although they were careful to assert their atheist credentials, the speakers went on to take up the cause of religious sectarianism as a peasant movement unfairly persecuted by Orthodox missionaries. Skobelev compared the “vile attacks on sectarianism” described in the “objective research into the history of the sectarian movement of Bonch-Bruevich and Mrs. Iasievich” to the sufferings of the early Christians.” Soon after, an editorial in the evangelical weekly newspaper, Literaturnia zvezda (Morning star), applauded the Social Democrats’ initiative but also hastened to point out that religious sectarianism was not a political movement. “Sectarianism is not an estate [or] class movement; it is first of all a Christian, not a peasant [khristiansko, ne krestianskoe] movement, although most of its members are peasants,” the author declared. And he warned: “The involvement of sectarianism (as a whole) in the political struggle is a completely impossible matter—this must be understood.”

Members of the Orthodox clergy, especially its missionary wing, also evinced considerable concern about the violent encounters between evangelicals and Orthodox parishioners. In contrast to the liberals and leftists, they generally did so in order to bemoan the government bureaucracy’s alleged lack of concern for promoting Orthodoxy and protecting popular faith. For example, at a conference on anti-sectarian missionary activity in the Kharkiv diocese in 1896, participants warned that when administrative authorities refused to endorse village resolutions expelling religious dissidents tension intensified. “This situation,” the report declared, “excites the energy of the shuntists even more, and dispirits the Orthodox or even gives them an excuse for summary justice [samosud] and reprisals [samospravo].” This theme that the Orthodox layperson felt abandoned by the Russian state also dominated the widely read study of Baptists written by Bishop Aleksii (Dorodnitsyn), who had served as anti-sectarian missionary in Kherson and Ekaterinoslav dioceses in the last fifteen years of the nineteenth century. Describing the decision of a village in Kherson Province to expel its Baptists, he wrote: “It takes a lot to make our Little Russian intolerant and even more for an entire commune of Little Russian peasants to pull together for any sort of collective endeavor, and therefore it is very likely that the Baptists’ insults directed at the holy things of the Orthodox Church and their laughter at the Orthodox, so modestly referred to in the resolution, exceeded all measures of tolerance.” Although he bemoaned the peasantry’s tendency to resort to brutality, he excused it as a frustrated response to the civil administration’s failure to protect the peasantry from Baptist disturbances. The result, he wrote, was that “the Orthodox people, having lost faith that they will be defended from the sectarians’ violent actions, either peacefully

switch to shuntism or else unpeacefully switch from fists and rods to pitchfork and axe.” Dorodnitsyn’s goal in retelling the stories of Baptist blasphemy and Orthodox reprisals was to demonstrate the wisdom of the repressive measures of the pre-1905 era. Although he was writing several years after the 1905 revolution, the conclusion of his section on village conflict—and, indeed, of the entire book—was that only when Tsar Alexander III had taken a personal interest was the bureaucracy shaken out of its complacency and the law of 1894 instituted, which forbade the provocative public activities of the Baptists. Dorodnitsyn’s failure to address changes since then, let alone the current situation, reinforced the argument that banning the Baptists was the true solution to the problems they created. It was the tsar who solved problems, not the state bureaucracy and certainly not the Duma.

For the reactionary press and some right-wing Duma deputies, religious conflict and violence generally served as evidence that the state had abdicated its responsibilities to the Orthodox masses by proclaiming religious toleration in 1905. For example, a 1909 article in the Moscow newspaper Vieche (named after the medieval Russian popular assembly), titled “Fruits of ‘Freedom of Conscience,”’ described how the Baptists so “tried the tolerance” of the population of a particular village that the villagers felt forced to break the windows in the dissidents’ prayer house, bringing on a violent fight. Thus violence was the result of a state policy that did not defend the Orthodoxy of Russian society. The newspaper Kolokol (The bell), published by the reactionary Vasily M. Skvortsov, who also happened to be the editor of the anti-sectarian journal Missionerskoe obozrenie (Missionary review), reinforced this point by printing reports from villagers complaining that the Baptists used freedom of conscience to destroy village life. In one example, a “villager” from Spasskoe, Stavropol’ Province, wrote in that, as a result of Baptists’ abuse of freedom of conscience, his village had recently been forced to witness a “blasphemous parody of a baptism.” He then asked, “[W]ho will protect us from mass conversions?” Father Ganchzhulevich, a Duma deputy from Volynia, similarly declared, during the May 1909 Duma debates on freedom of conscience, that, until 17 April 1905, the shuntists, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox of his rural parish had lived peacefully, but after the toleration edict, the non-Orthodox had become belligerent and fomented discord.

Amid all these arguments about the meaning of violence in the village stood the Russian state, specifically the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These frequent reports of violence arising from religious dissidence produced a dilemma for policy makers in St. Petersburg who fielded appeals for help, actively followed press reports about sectarians, and regularly investigated acts of violence. On the one hand, as a result of all the rhetoric and violent incidents, officials began to associate Baptist activity with social disorder. For example, bureaucrats in the
Interior Ministry supported the decision of the Kherson governor not to allow Baptists in the village of Dobrovlichkovka to hold a public baptism, as it “could arouse the natural feeling of irritation among the Orthodox who see the public performance of the ritual as an abasement and insult to the Orthodox religion.” On the other hand, because the government was primarily concerned with preserving order, the authorities in St. Petersburg sometimes found themselves acting as the defenders of religious dissidents against the actions of their Orthodox neighbors. Officials charged with investigating complaints about persecution made by local communities and low-level government administrators often returned to the point that, since 1905, the laws on freedom of conscience were incomplete and contradictory, allowing Baptists to interpret them one way and local communities another. Writing on this theme in a 1911 report to Prime Minister Petr A. Stolypin, one bureaucrat recounted, on a recent fact-finding trip to the Steppe region, that “in almost all the settlements where Orthodox are the majority, numerous complaints were lodged by Baptists about oppression and persecution by their fellow villagers. In tears they told [me] about their cheerful existence, constantly in fear of being beaten, not daring to leave the house, to light a fire in the hut, without risking attack or outrage.” This situation, the official believed, in which laws were unclear, merely encouraged the Baptists to see themselves as martyrs.

Within the village, these discourses of religious violence were about defining the nature of the community and its limits. They also concerned change. In their reactions to outsiders or to those who set themselves apart from the traditional community and its mores, Orthodox peasants revealed their own values and the place of religious identity and ritual in their definition of community. But Russian villagers, whether Baptist or Orthodox, knew they had an audience. These incidents demonstrate the agency of both peasant communities and the evangelicals these communities rejected to use the perceptions of various elites to further their own collective goals. Just as the evangelicals made sure that their liberal and left-wing supporters heard of their plight and blamed the priests whom their supporters would assume had acted in an intolerant and brutal manner, so, too, was village assemblies eager to play on the beliefs of government and right-wing observers about the Russian peasant devotion to defending Orthodoxy or the relationship between Orthodoxy and political reliability. Once these stories were appropriated by their urban listeners, they became grist for the mill of intellectuals’ debates about the nature of the Russian soul, the suitability of Western European models of religious tolerance to the Russian milieu, and the political implications of religious change. Both their currency in these debates and the government’s struggle to address the disorder caused by religious dissidence reveals how pragmatic exigencies were intertwined with ideological ones in the process of pushing open the public sphere and expanding the possibilities for individual expression in late imperial Russia.

Notes

Some portions of this chapter are drawn from Heather J. Coleman, Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1903–1929 (Bloomington, Ind., 2005).

1. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter, RGI)/. f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 53. The director of the Department of Spiritual Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs launched his investigation based on this telegram (l. 52). It was reprinted in “Telegramma,” Vremia, no. 3 (23 January 1911): 3.

2. RGI f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 49–50.

3. RGI f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 38–39. This is a particularly well documented case; although it is impossible to know all the details of such incidents, there seems to be general agreement at least about the basic chain of events. See II, 38–9; 49–50; 52, 53, 55, 77, 78–81.

4. RGI f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 57, 61.

5. Report from the newspaper Terek, no. 3924, 1911, reprinted in V. I. Lashevich-Borodeevskaya, Borodino i vserossiiskii (St. Petersburg, 1912), 386–87; RGI f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 750b.


7. See, for example, RGI, f. 1284, op. 222 (1891), d. 89, II, 6–60b, p. 90b.


9. See Coleman, Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution.


11. See, for example: A. Prugavin, “Rosskii i biurokratii,” Viestnik Evropy 44, no. 11 (November 1903): 173–75; and S. Mel’gunov, Tserkov’ i gosudarstvo v Rossii. V prekhristianskom vremia. (Iu. i A. Viter, Storozhnaya strela (1907–1908) (Moscow, 1909), 107. There were, of course, reports of violence and conflict related to other dissenting groups. See, for example, Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, Narody Israella. Materiaya k istorii izuchenii russkogo sectantstva i staroobritychstva, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg, 1911), 385–95.

A disproportionate number of these accounts deal with Cossack and Ukrainian communities apparently because of the geographic concentration of Baptists in the Ukrainian and southeastern parts of European Russia, Kushnerov’s location in Kiev, and perhaps the elite’s perceptions of the periphery as particularly wild. Still, patterns of behavior did not differ significantly whether the protagonists were Cossacks or Russian or Ukrainian peasants.

12. Gosudarstvennyi muzei istorii religii (hereafter, GMR), f. 2, op. 16, d. 155, l. 18; Biuletyn no. 18 (23 March 1911): 102.
Tales of Violence against Religious Dissidents in the Orthodox Village

14. Examples include RGIA f. 821, op. 133, d. 194, ll. 450b-452b; and d. 195, l. 750b.
17. For example, RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 310, l. 1750b; RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 38; and Episkop Aleksii (Dorodnitsyn), Religioznoe-citatisticheskoe dvizhenie na evgez Rossii vtoroi polovinii XIX-ego stoletii (Kazan', 1909), 410.
18. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 194, ll. 12, 15.
20. GMIR, Koll. 1, op. 8, d. 13, ll. 1, 40b, 29.
23. RGIA, f. 128, op. 185 (1907), d. 39, l. 318.
24. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, ll. 38-38b.
25. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, ll. 20-270b.
26. See accounts in Baptist, no. 10 (1911): 79; no. 4 (October 1907): 15; no. 5 (November 1907): 15.
27. Baptist, no. 10 (1910): 79. Note that these incidents were not restricted to isolated villages. In the factory town of Bezhit, on the outskirts of Briansk, a congregation of Baptist workers drew the enmity of their Orthodox neighbors by walking through the streets of the town to the river Desna, singing psalms. According to the governor of Orel Province, this upset the Orthodox population and "frequently the boys of the workmen [molodez' masterostv] threw rocks at the Baptists when they started to sing in the street" (RGIA, f. 1284, op. 185 [1908], d. 83, l. 202b).
28. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 254, ll. 72-75. The elder also alleged that a struggle had taken place between the Baptists and a man who did not want to allow his wife to take baptism.
31. In this case, after the beating, Skal'dnik informed the police and the police staff both preserved the man, a policeman at the door to the courthouse, who protected them, was present for the incident, and were not involved. For other accounts, see RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 93, l. 45; Baptist, no. 5 (November 1907): 21; RGIA, f. 1284, op. 221, d. 75, l. 750b.
33. GMIR, f. 2, op. 16, d. 155, ll. 12-14. In this both the Batalpashkinskaya case, the governor refused to endorse the decision of the village assembly. But even after 1905, some cases were approved. See, for example, in the same file, ll. 17-18.
34. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 289, ll. 40b.
36. GMIR, f. 2, op. 16, d. 155, l. 3. In this case, again, the complainants drew attention to the resulting dangers to the state.
37. Vera Shevzov, "Popular Orthodoxy in Late Imperial Rural Russia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1994), 27-77.
38. Buhat' listok (February 1917): 36.
39. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 194, ll. 170b-16.
40. RGIA, f. 797, op. 80 (2 ord., 3 st.), d. 395, l. 90b.
41. RGIA, f. 797, op. 80 (2 ord., 3 st.), d. 390, l. 3. In the end, the Baptists were able to bury their dead in the ground alongside the cemetery fence. The Church authorities said that in his way the village was complying with the law requiring that a section of the cemetery be set aside for sectarians: the village had declared three nargy (1 nargy = 1.25 acres) of cemetery land but for financial reasons had only enclosed one nargy, but the land where the Baptist was buried was technically cemetery land. For similar problems with the interment of Old Believers, see Iazyev-Borodinskaya, Borodina 24 stery, 98-98.
42. RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 96b and Buhat' listok, no. 7 (July 1908): 8. Other evidence suggests that peasants regarded the bodies of suicides, sectarians, and un-baptized babies as dangerous after death (Frank, Crime, Cultural Conflict, and Justice, 201). Notably, in the same period, some French peasants, too, apparently objected to secular burials in their churchyards by making loud pig-like noises during the ceremony (Hugh McLeod, Secularization in Western Europe 1885-1914 [New York, 2000], 250).
44. Ibid., 263.
45. Davis, Society and Culture in Early Modern France, 186.
47. Skaldin, "O nevzhizhstvo k istinie," 421; N. I. Makarevskii, Storonik oobrazheniy na evgez'koe lit'ye (St. Petersburg, 1914), 30; GMIR, f. 2, op. 16, d. 190, l. 4.
48. Skaldin, "O nevzhizhstvo k istinie," 421. For another example, see Minaeva, "Rasskaz o svoev oobrazheniy," Drag molodez', no. 1 (September 1913): 10.
49. On the urban press's general fascination with incidents of village violence as examples of a retrograde and alien culture, see Frank, "Popular Justice," 257, 261. Innumerable accounts in the press describe popular beatings of Baptists; see, for example, Vladimir Bonch-Bruевич, "Presledovanie baptistov v Rossii," Viestnik Evropy 43, no. 6 (June 1910): 160-83; "Izbynie angliistov," Riech', 23 April 1908; "Presledovanie Odesskikh sektantov," Novai Rus', 21 May 1906; "Napadei na sektantov," Riech', 18 January 1911; "Naslite v mol'niei baptistov," Riech', 17 April 1913, 41; "Conenie na sektantov," Bizhenv czasnik, 2 June 1913; "Ubiezho sektantskogo propovednika," Riech', 16 June 1913; see also the clipping found in RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 3 ("Plody 'sbovosti soyevy' [i Tzupaal], Vielce, 20 August 1909).
51. Otchet Bapstistskogo, 19.
52. GMIR, f. 821, op. 133, d. 194, l. 42. In a similar example from Voronozh Province, a group of Baptist peasants claimed that after they were violently dragged to the village assembly (vsadzha) where, in the presence of the village priest and the older (starosta), they were "beaten half to death with sticks and kicks," they appealed to the village constable (triudnik) for protection and he told them: "You needed to be beaten up like that" (RGIA, f. 1284, op. 185 [1908]: d. 72, l. 49b).
In addition to Kushnerov, for example, the Baptist leader V. G. Pavlov was a major source of information and primary documents on Baptist life and persecution for the most prolific researcher of Russian religious sectarianism, the Bolshevik V. D. Bonch-Bruевич, in the late nineteenth century, when both were in exile abroad, and in the 1910s, when Pavlov was editor of Baptist in Odessa (GMIR, f. 2, op. 16, d. 62, l. 27).

I. Teneromo, “Religioznaya iskanlia nashikh dnei,” Mir, nos. 11-12 (April 1909): 48. The case appears to have been investigated (RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 301, l. 221, 275).

On this atmosphere, see Polovod, Pot vlasti, 47.


A. M. Bobrinchev-Pushkin, Suli i pada'nikiki-sektantsi (St. Petersburg, 1903), 47-65.


See, for example, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 185 (1907), d. 39, l. 151-520.

RGIA, f. 1284, op. 185 (1907), d. 39, l. 151-520; and f. 1284, op. 185 (1908), d. 72, l. 42.


Iashevich-Borodeevskaya, Bor'ba za vriena, 391.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.

Ibid., 392.