A COURSE IN RUSSIAN HISTORY
The Seventeenth Century

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were special taxes, which accounted for 16 percent of the total. Almost half of the money revenue was spent on military needs (about 700,000 rubles). The Tsar's palace absorbed about 15 percent of it, and less than 5 percent was allowed for social welfare, public building, and postal expenses—that is, public transport.

The record of 1680, however, gives only an approximate idea of the state economy of the period. Not all the receipts reached the central departments. A great deal of money was received and spent locally. The record shows a considerable credit account, but its real significance must be gauged by the fact that the annual estimates of revenue from taxes greatly exceeded actual receipts. Arrears that had accumulated up to 1670 amounted to more than a million rubles and had to be canceled in 1681. The people's taxpaying powers were evidently almost exhausted.

In reestablishing state order after the Time of Troubles, the Muscovite government did not intend to change it radically. It wanted to preserve the old foundations. It introduced only partial, technical changes, which it regarded as corrections and improvements. Its attempts to reform the system of administration, to segregate social classes, to increase economic productivity were timid and inconsistent. They did not follow any broadly conceived and practically worked-out general plan, but were apparently inspired by accidental suggestions of the moment. These suggestions, however, were all on the same lines, because they issued directly or indirectly from one common source—the government's financial difficulties. Reformatory measures inevitably tended, as compulsively as a physiological need, to remove these difficulties, and all came to the same sad end—all were failures. The administrative system, more tightly pulled together and strictly centralized, was not made cheaper or more efficient, and did not relieve the taxpaying communities of their heavy state dues. The more strictly differentiated class structure merely increased the discord between social attitudes and interests. Financial innovations led to the exhaustion of the people's resources, to bankruptcy and perpetual accumulation of
arrears. All this created a general feeling that things were not as they should be. The court, the representatives of the reigning dynasty, and their foreign policy increased that feeling to the point of profound popular discontent with the state of affairs in the country.

Under the first three tsars of the new dynasty the Moscow government gives the impression of having acquired power accidentally and undertaken a job beyond its competence. With three or four exceptions its members were men of high personal ambition but without talents to justify it, even without the governmental training that might have replaced talent, and—worst of all—utterly devoid of civic sense. An apparently accidental circumstance was partly responsible for the fact that men of such a type managed state affairs. It was as though the new dynasty were pursued by fate, which was determined not to let its representatives grow to manhood before coming to the throne.

Three of the first five tsars—Michael, Alexei, and Ivan—were enthroned while mere adolescents, one at the age of sixteen and two still earlier: Feodor was fourteen and Peter was ten.

The Romanov dynasty had another hereditary peculiarity. The daughters were strong and vigorous, sometimes manly and energetic, like Tsarevna Sofia, but the sons took after their progenitor and proved to be physically weak and short-lived. Even Tsar Alexei, in spite of his lively, blooming appearance, had a frail constitution and died at the age of only forty-six. No one can tell what Alexei’s younger brother Dimitri, who resembled in character his great-grandfather Ivan the Terrible, would have been like. If we are to believe Kotoshikhin, the ill-natured boy was poisoned by his father’s, Tsar Michael’s, courtiers so cleverly that everyone thought it was a natural death. Peter, too, must be left out of account. He was an exception in every way. A new tsar acquired a governmental environment before he was old enough to understand or wish to understand the character of the men around him, and his first associates gave color and direction to the whole of his reign.

This disadvantage was particularly noticeable in foreign affairs. Foreign policy, more than anything else, created financial difficulties for the government, and at the same time it was the field in which, after the territorial losses of the Time of Troubles, the new dynasty had to justify its election by the whole country. Tsar Michael’s diplomacy, especially after the badly planned and inefficiently conducted Smolensk campaign, still exhibited the usual cautiousness of the defeated, but under Tsar Alexei the knocks received by his father began to fade from memory. After long deliberation Moscow was drawn against its will into war for the annexation of the Ukraine, but the brilliant campaign of 1654–55 inspired it with confidence. Not only the Smolensk region, but the whole of White Russia and Lithuania were won almost overnight. The Muscovite politicians’ imagination ran far ahead of good sense. They did not reflect that the credit for such successes was due not to them, but to the Swedes, who at that time attacked the Poles from the west and drew upon themselves the best Polish forces. Moscow conducted its policy in the grand manner, sparing neither men nor money in order to demolish Poland and put the Russian tsar on the Polish throne, drive the Swedes out of Poland, expel the Tatars and the Turks from the Ukraine, and seize not only both banks of the Dnieper in its lower reaches, but also Galicia, where Sheremetev’s army was dispatched in 1660. All these intertwined designs were so bewildering and drained the country’s powers so thoroughly that after twenty-one years of exhausting struggle on three fronts, Moscow had to give up Lithuania and White Russia and the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, contenting itself with the Smolensk and Seversk regions and the Ukraine east of the Dnieper with Kiev west of it. Even the Crimean Tatars could not be induced to give Moscow a convenient steppe boundary or to abolish the shameful tribute annually imposed by the Khan or to recognize Moscow’s sovereignty over the Zaporozhie.

Discontent with the conduct of affairs increased together with the feeling that the heavy sacrifices made by the country had resulted in nothing but defeat. The general sense of unrest left by the Time of Troubles had prepared the soil in which that feeling developed, gradually engulfing the whole community, though manifesting itself differently in its upper and lower strata.
Among the masses it found expression in a whole series of rebellions, which gave a troubled character to the seventeenth century. It was an epoch of popular risings. Far more than the occasional riots flaring up here and there under Tsar Michael, the mutinies in Tsar Alexei’s reign show the intensity of the people’s discontent. In 1648 there were riots in Moscow, Ustiug, Kozlov, Solvychegodsk, Tomsk, and other towns; in 1649 a fresh mutiny of the self-pledgers began in Moscow, but it was stopped in time; in 1650 there were risings in Pskov and Novgorod; in 1661 there was another mutiny in Moscow on account of the copper coinage; and finally in 1670–71 came Razin’s great rebellion in the southeast along the Volga. It arose among the Don Cossacks but spread to the common people in general, who rose against the upper classes. In 1668–1676 there was a rising in the Solovetsky Monastery against the use of the newly revised church books. These mutinies sharply revealed the common people’s attitude to the authorities, which was carefully disguised by official ceremony and by clerical preaching. There was no trace of politeness, let alone reverence, toward the government, nor was there toward the actual bearer of the supreme power.

In the upper classes discontent took a somewhat different form. Among the masses it stirred the emotions, but among the top layers of society it awakened thought and led to an intensive criticism of the dynasty. The motive power in the lower strata was malice against the upper. The dominant note in the upper classes’ protests was that of complaint against the people’s backwardness and helplessness. Almost for the first time we find Russian thought on the hard and slippery path of public welfare, taking up a critical attitude to the social environment. Statements that bear witness to this were made as early as 1642 at the Zemsky Sobor and in 1662 at the conference between the government and Moscow tradespeople about the high cost of living. True to their political discipline and preserving a respectful tone, without indulging in loud denunciations, the delegates spoke with great feeling of the disorganized administration, of privileged persons breaking the law with impunity, of the contempt for public opinion shown by the government, which at the sovereign’s request questioned the tradespeople and asked them to write down what they thought and then did next to nothing about it. There were cautious collective statements of class needs and opinions. Personal judgments of individual observers were expressed more vigorously. I shall confine myself to a few examples to show how the country’s life was reflected in these early attempts at political criticism.

The first such attempt dates back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, to the Time of Troubles, and was no doubt inspired by it. As a young man, Prince I. A. Khvostovin, occupied a prominent position at the court of the first pretender, made friends with Poles, learned Latin, began reading Latin books, came under Roman Catholic influence, and venerated Roman icons equally with the Orthodox. As a punishment he was sent in Tsar Vasilii’s reign to St. Joseph’s Monastery for correction, and returned from there a thoroughly embittered and reckless man. He became a freethinker, rejected prayer and belief in the resurrection of the dead, “wavered in his faith, reviled the Orthodox doctrine, and uttered impious words about God’s holy saints.” At the same time he retained his interest in Slavonic church literature, was well versed in ecclesiastical history, showed irrepressible defiance in literary discussions, had a very high opinion of himself as a scholar, and “considered no one his equal in intelligence.” He knew how to wield his pen, too; in Michael’s reign he wrote a fairly good account of the times, though he talks more of his ideas than of people and events.

This mixture of heterogeneous tastes and opinions was scarcely welded into a firm and coherent whole, but it was distinctly opposed to the Byzantine Orthodox traditions and ideas and made Prince Khvostovin hostile to everything Russian. He regarded the rites of the church with defiant contempt, “did not keep fasts and Christian customs,” and forbade his house serfs to go to church. In 1622 he drank throughout Holy Week, and on Easter morning, while it was still dark, he got drunk before breaking the fast with Easter food. He did not go to the palace to exchange Easter greetings with the Tsar and had not been to
the midnight service. Such conduct and way of thinking completely cut him off from society. He wanted to ask permission to go to Lithuania or to Rome or to escape there without permission, and was already selling his Moscow house and family estates. The Tsar's decree, enumerating Prince Khvorostinin's misdemeanors, blames him with special bitterness for his sins against his compatriots. When his house was searched, all his manuscripts in prose and in verse, written in Polish syllabic meter, were confiscated. In these books as well as in his conversations he expressed his boredom, his longing for foreign countries, and his contempt for home-bred ways. He said many bitter things about Muscovites, denounced them for senselessly worshiping icons, and complained that in Moscow there were no people worth knowing, they were all stupid, there was no one to live with, and he could have nothing to do with them. By saying all this, the decree points out, "he dishonored all Muscovite people including his own parents of whom he was born, reviled them and accused them of foolishness, and would not even write the sovereign's title properly, but called him 'Russian despout' and not 'Tsar and autocrat.'" The Prince was sent away once more "for correction," this time to St. Cyril's Monastery. He repented there, was allowed to return to Moscow, was reinstated in his rank, and was admitted to the Tsar's court. He died in 1635.

Prince Khvorostinin was a curious type that appeared early in the history of Russia's spiritual development and much later became fairly common. He was not one of the Russian sixteenth-century heretics with Protestant tendencies whose minds were preoccupied with ritualistic and dogmatic doubts and interpretations—a distant echo of the Reformation storm in the West. His was a peculiar type of Russian freethinker on a Roman Catholic basis, full of profound antipathy to the arid Byzantine ritualism and to Russian life, which was saturated with it—a distant spiritual ancestor of Chaadaev.

It is rather surprising to find among the denouncers of domestic political disorder the supreme guardian of the home-bred moral and religious order, the Patriarch of all Russia. But he was not merely a patriarch—he was Patriarch Nikon. A simple peasant by birth, he rose to occupy the Patriarch's throne. He had tremendous influence on Tsar Alexei, who called him his "special friend." But later on the friends quarreled, and in consequence Nikon left his see in 1658 of his own will, hoping that the Tsar would humbly beg him to return, but the Tsar did not do so. In a passion of anger at the wound to his vanity, Nikon wrote a letter to the Tsar about the state of things in his realm. One cannot expect the Patriarch's judgment to be fair, of course, but the colors in which he chooses to paint the gloomy picture of the country's position are rather significant. They all emphasize the financial difficulties of the government and the people's economic distress. Nikon was particularly bitter about the Department of Monasteries, established in 1649, which supervised large estates belonging to the church and tried the clergy for secular offenses. The staff consisted of a nobleman and government clerks, and did not include a single representative of the clergy.

In 1661 Nikon wrote another letter to the Tsar, a letter full of denunciations. Hinting at the department he hated, he said: "Secular judges dispense justice and violate it, and through this you have gathered against yourself a great assembly on the Day of Judgment, crying aloud at your wrongdoings. You preach to everyone that they should fast, but there is scarcely anyone left now who is not fasting, because bread is scarce; in many places they fast to death because there is nothing to eat. No one is spared: the destitute, the blind, widows, monks, and nuns are burdened with heavy taxes. Everywhere there is weeping and misery. No one makes merry nowadays."

Nikon paints the financial position of the state in equally dark colors in a letter to the Eastern patriarchs that was intercepted by Moscow agents in 1665. Complaining that the Tsar has seized church property, he writes: "Men are taken for military service, bread and money are taken mercilessly. The Tsar has doubled and trebled the tribute laid on the Christian people—and all in vain."

Under the same Tsar another Russian attempted in rather
exceptional circumstances to describe the Muscovite social order and its shortcomings. Grigori Kotoshikhin was a junior clerk in the Department of Foreign Affairs, did unimportant diplomatic jobs, was unjustly treated, and in 1660 was beaten with sticks for having made a mistake in the sovereign's title. During the second Polish war, while attached to Prince Iuri Dolgoruky's army, he refused to carry out an unlawful order of the commander in chief and, to escape his wrath, ran away to Poland. Later on he went to Germany and eventually to Stockholm. In his wanderings he was struck by the difference between the foreign and the Russian ways of life, and it occurred to him to describe the conditions in the state of Muscovy. The Swedish chancellor, Count Magnus de la Gardie, appreciated Selitsky's (so Kotoshikhin called himself abroad) intelligence and experience and encouraged him to go on with his work. It was so well done that it became one of the most important historical records of seventeenth-century Russia. But Kotoshikhin came to a bad end. He lived in Stockholm for about eighteen months, became a Protestant, and formed too close a friendship with his landlord's wife. The husband grew suspicious and they had a quarrel in which Kotoshikhin killed him. He was beheaded in consequence. The Swedish translator of Kotoshikhin's work says that he was a man of outstanding intelligence. A Russian professor found it in Uppsala in the last century, and it was published in 1841.

In the thirteen chapters into which the book is divided the author describes the customs of the Moscow court, the courtiers as a class, the daily life of Moscow, diplomatic relations with foreign states, the organization of central administrative offices, the army, the urban and rural population, and finally the manner of life of the Muscovite upper classes. Kotoshikhin does not indulge in reflections, but for the most part describes in simple, clear, and businesslike language his native country's way of life. All through, however, the reader is conscious of his contemptuous attitude to the fatherland he had abandoned, and this attitude provides a somber background against which Kotoshikhin paints an apparently dispassionate picture of Russian life. Sometimes he makes direct statements, always unfavorable, denounc-
they have not the custom there, as in other countries, for a man to see his affianced and to speak to her."

It is interesting to compare the judgment of a Russian who had abandoned his native land with the impressions of an outside observer who came to Russia in the hope of finding there his second fatherland. Iuri Krizhanich, a Croat and a Roman Catholic priest, was a man of fairly wide education, something of a philosopher, a theologian and economist, a great philologist, and above all a patriot, or rather an ardent Pan-Slavist. His true fatherland was not any historically known state, but united Slavdom—a political dream hovering somewhere outside history. He was born a subject of the Sultan of Turkey and as a poor orphan was taken to Italy. He was educated in the theological seminaries of Zagreb, Vienna, and Bologna, and at last entered the Roman College of St. Athanasius, in which the Roman Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith trained special missionaries to the schisms of the Orthodox East. Krizhanich, as a Slav, was destined for Moscow.

He was attracted by that distant country. He collected information about it and submitted to the congregation complicated plans for its conversion. But he had his own secret plan. Missionary enthusiasm served the poor Slav student as a means for securing material help from the congregation. He regarded the people of Muscovy not as willful heretics or schismatics, but as Christians who erred through simple ignorance. Early in life he began to think and deeply to grieve about the calamitous position of the Slavs, enslaved and disunited, and it does credit to his political good sense that he rightly guessed the way to their unification. To make friends people must, first of all, understand one another, and the Slavs were hindered in this by having no language in common. And so Krizhanich, while still in the Latin school, tried not to forget his native Slav tongue. He diligently studied it so that he could speak it eloquently and did his best to free it from foreign idioms and local deterioration. He wanted to refashion it so that it would be understandable to all Slavs, and for this purpose he wrote grammars, composed philological treatises, compiled dictionaries.

He had a glimpse of another idea, even bolder than the first. Unification of the scattered Slav peoples had to be conducted from some political center, but at the time no such center existed. It had not yet become a historical reality; it was not even an object of political hopes for some and a bugbear for others, as happened later. Krizhanich solved the riddle as to where it was to be sought. He, a Croat and a Roman Catholic, sought this future Slav center not in Vienna or Prague or Warsaw, but in Orthodox Russia, which was regarded in Europe as a Tatar country. One might have laughed at his idea in the seventeenth century, and perhaps one may smile at it even now, but there were moments between that period and the present when it was difficult not to value it. It is because Krizhanich thought of Russia as the future center of Slavism that he called it his second fatherland, though he had not had a first one, except his Turkish birthplace.

It is hard to say whether it was the intuition of an enthusiastic patriot or political thought that inspired his guess. At any rate, he did not stay in Rome, where the congregation set him the task of carrying on polemics against the Greek schism; in 1659 he went off to Moscow without its sanction. There, of course, the idea of Roman Catholic propaganda was abandoned, and he had to conceal that he was a Roman priest, or he would not have been admitted to Moscow. He was received there simply as a Serbian immigrant, Iuri Ivanovich, who came to take up service under the Tsar like other foreigners.

To obtain a secure position in state service he suggested several things to the Tsar. He offered to be the Muscovite and Pan-Slavic publicist to the Tsar’s librarian, to write a “truthful” history of Muscovy and of all Slav people as the Tsar’s “historian and chronicler,” but in the end he was given a salary of one and a half and then of three rubles per day (in our currency) for doing his favorite work on the Slavonic grammar and dictionary. After all, he had gone to Moscow with the purpose of working there for the linguistic and literary unification of the Slavs. He himself admitted that he had nowhere to go with his idea of a Pan-Slavic language except Moscow, “because from
childhood he had devoted himself wholeheartedly to a single cause," to the correction of "our distorted, or rather of our ruined, language, and to the improvement of my own and all the people's minds."

In one of his works he says: "They call me a wanderer, a tramp; this is not true. I have come to the sovereign of my race, I have come to my people, to my fatherland, to the only country where my labors may find application and be of use, where my goods may have value and find a market—I mean dictionaries, grammars, translations."

But after a little more than a year he was for some unknown reason banished to Tobolsk, where he spent fifteen years. Exile, however, did nothing but help his literary activities. He received sufficient money for his keep and had complete leisure, which he found positively irksome, complaining that he was not given any work, but was well fed, like cattle fattened for the slaughter. In Siberia he wrote a great deal, and there he finished his Slavonic grammar, over which he had taken so much trouble and, as he says, had thought and worked for twenty-two years.

At last Tsar Feodor let him return to Moscow, and there he obtained permission to return to his own land, no longer concealing that he was a Roman Catholic priest. In 1677 he left his adopted fatherland.

The above account of Krizhanich's life has a certain interest, for it throws light on the circumstances under which his judgments about Russia were formed. He expressed them in the longest of his works, also written in Siberia, Political Thoughts, or Conversations about Politics. It consists of three parts: in the first the author discusses the economic resources of a state, in the second he discusses its military resources, and in the third he speaks about wisdom—that is, about spiritual resources, including most diverse subjects, chiefly of political character. This voluminous work is a political and economic treatise showing the author's wide and varied knowledge of ancient and modern literature and even some acquaintance with Russian writings. What is of chief importance for us is that the author constantly compares conditions in the western European states with those in Muscovy. Russia is here for the first time put face to face with western Europe. I shall summarize Krizhanich's main ideas.

The treatise has the appearance of rough sketches written now in Latin, now in some peculiar Slavic language of his own devising, with corrections, additions, and disconnected notes. Krizhanich firmly believed in the future of Russia and all the Slavic people. They stood next in the order of succession in the world process of cultivating wisdom and handing down arts and sciences from one nation to another in turn. A similar idea about the rotation of learning was expressed later by Leibnitz and Peter the Great.

Having described cultural achievements of other nations, Krizhanich writes: "Let no one say that we Slavs are debarred by some heavenly decree from acquiring knowledge. I think it is precisely now that the time has come for our race to begin studying. Now God has raised in Russia a Slav empire more powerful and glorious than our race has ever had, and such empires usually foster enlightenment. Accordingly, we too must study, so that under the honorable rule of the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich we may rub off the mildew of our inveterate uncouthness, acquire learning, begin to improve our communal life, and attain a happier condition." (This is written in the Pan-Slavic language with which Krizhanich was so much concerned.) "Two afflictions from which all Slavs suffer stand in our way: an insane passion for everything foreign, and as a consequence, the burden of a foreign yoke."

A vindictive note sounds in Krizhanich's words whenever he touches on this subject. His imagination provides him with a lavish supply of repulsive colors and images to depict the hated tyrants, especially the Germans. "Not a single nation under the sun has ever been so injured and humiliated by foreigners as we Slavs by the Germans. We have been flooded with aliens. They fool us, lead us by the nose, sit on our backs, and drive us like cattle, call us dogs and swine, regard themselves almost as gods and us as fools. All that is wrung by oppressive taxation and harsh treatment out of the tears, sweat, and enforced fasting of the Russian people is devoured by foreigners, Greek
merchants, German colonels and merchants, and Crimean brigands. It is all due to our insane worship of everything foreign: we marvel at it, praise it, extol it to the skies, and despise our own way of life."

Krizhanich devotes a whole chapter to the enumeration of the wrongs and humiliations inflicted by the foreigners upon the Slavs. Russia is destined to save the Slavic peoples from the evils with which it is itself beset. Krizhanich addresses Tsar Alexei with the following words: "It has fallen to your lot, most honorable Tsar, to take care of all the Slavs. You alone, Tsar, have been given us by God to help the people beyond the Danube, the Czechs and the Poles, so that they should understand the shame of foreign oppression and begin to throw off the German yoke."

But when in Russia Krizhanich became familiar with the life of the Slavs' saviors, he was struck by the many defects and vices from which they suffered. He attacks most of all the Russians' conceit, their excessive attachment to their own customs, and especially their ignorance; that was the chief cause of the people's bad economic condition. Russia was a poor country by comparison with western European states because it was incomparably less civilized. In the West, Krizhanich writes, people are quick and keen.

There are many books about agriculture and other industries, there are harbors, a flourishing maritime trade, farming, various crafts. There is nothing of this in Russia. It is closed on all sides for trade by inconvenient seas, by deserts, or by savage tribes. It has few commercial cities, no valuable and necessary merchandise. The people's minds are slow and dull, they are not skilled in either commerce or agriculture or domestic management. They will not invent anything of themselves, but must be shown how to do things. They are lazy, unenterprising, do not want to do what is good for them unless they are forced to it. They have no books either about agriculture or about other industries. Merchants do not even learn arithmetic and foreigners always mercilessly cheat them. We do not know history, do not know our own part in it, and cannot carry on any conversation about politics, and foreigners despise us for it. The same mental sloth is responsible for the unattractive style of clothes, our general appearance, our housekeeping, and our whole manner of life. Unkempt hair and beards make a Russian repulsive, ridiculous, a kind of forest goblin. Foreigners blame us for our dirty habits. We hide money in our mouths, do not wash dishes; a peasant will hand to a guest a full tankard of drink, dipping both thumbs in it. It has been said in foreign newspapers that if Russian merchants enter a shop, no one can come in for an hour afterward because of the stench. Our dwellings are uncomfortable. The windows are low. Peasant huts have no chimneys and no ventilation, so that people go blind with the smoke.

Krizhanich also notes many moral failings in Russian society: drunkenness, lack of spirit, of noble pride, of enthusiasm, of the feeling of personal and national dignity.

In war Turks and Tatars may run away, but they will not be slaughtered unresisting; they will defend themselves to their last breath. But if our "warriors" start running away, they never so much as look back. Hit them and they will fall like ninepins. Our great national failing is lack of moderation. We cannot preserve a sense of proportion or follow a middle course, but always tend to wander off and walk on the edge of a precipice. In some of our countries the government is utterly lax, arbitrary, and disorderly, and in others too firm, strict, and cruel. In the whole world there is no state so disorderly and anarchic as the Polish, and none so stern and oppressive as the great Russian state.

Krizhanich was so grieved by all these defects that he was ready to prefer Turks and Tatars to the Russians, whom he advised to learn from them sobriety, justice, courage, and even modesty. He obviously did not shut his eyes to the Russian people's faults and perhaps actually exaggerated them. Evidently Krizhanich too, being a Slav, could not observe a sense of proportion and look at things simply and fairly. But he did not merely complain; he also reflected and suggested means of healing the ills he bewailed. He worked out a whole system of reforms, which is of greater importance to us than the mere
leisurely reflections of a Slav visitor to Muscovy in the seventeenth century. He suggested four means of improving the Russians' position:

1. Enlightenment, learning, books—inanimate but wise and truthful advisers.

2. Government regulation, action issuing from those in authority. Krizhanich believed in autocracy. In Russia, he says, the Tsar has complete autocratic power, and by his order everything can be set right and everything useful introduced, while in other countries this would be impossible. He writes to Tsar Alexei: “You, Tsar, hold in your hands the miraculous rod of Moses by which you can work wonderful miracles in the administration; you have unlimited power.” Krizhanich puts great faith in this means, though he suggests rather peculiar ways of using it. For instance, if a tradesman does not know any arithmetic, his shop should be closed by a special decree until he learns it.

3. Political freedom. Under an autocratic regime there must be no administrative cruelties, no imposition of crippling taxes and levies, no “fleecing” of the people. To ensure this, certain liberties, political rights, corporate self-government, are essential. Tradespeople must be given the right to choose their elders and have their own law courts; artisans should be united in guilds; all industrial workers should be given a right to put their needs before the government and ask for its defense against the local rulers; the peasants must have freedom of labor secured to them. Krizhanich regards moderate liberties as a rein restraining the rulers from “evil lusts,” as the only shield to protect the people from the officials’ malpractice and safeguard justice in the state. In the absence of liberties, no prohibition, no penalties will prevent rulers from pursuing their greedy designs.

4. Spread of technical education. For this purpose the state must authoritatively control the national economy. It must establish technical schools in all the towns and open girls' schools of needlework and housekeeping. A bridedroom should have to ask his bride elect for a certificate stating what she had been taught. Bondsmen who had learned crafts involving special technical knowledge should obtain their freedom. German books on commerce and industry should be translated into Russian, and German master craftsmen and capitalists should be invited to teach Russians handicrafts and commerce. All these measures ought to be directed toward intensive compulsory exploitation of the country’s natural resources and a wide increase in new industries, especially in metallurgy.

Such was Iuri Krizhanich’s program. It was quite complicated, as we can see, and not altogether coherent. A good deal in it was inconsistent or at any rate obscure. It is difficult to understand how he reconciled the various means he suggested for reforming the faults of Russian society. For instance, where did he draw the line between the autocratic government's directives and the activity of communal self-government, and how did he hope to save Slavs from Germans “astride their necks” by translating German technical books and importing German craftsmen, and how did he combine his xenophobia with the conviction that Russia could not manage without skilled foreigners? But reading Krizhanich’s program, one cannot help exclaiming, “Why, this is Peter the Great's program!” It has the same defects and inconsistencies, shows the same naive faith in the creative power of government decrees, in the possibility of spreading education and commerce by means of appropriate German textbooks in Russian translations or by temporarily closing the shop of a tradesman who has not learned arithmetic. It is precisely these similarities and contradictions that make Krizhanich’s judgments especially interesting.

Of all the outside observers of Russian life, he is unique, quite unlike the numerous foreigners who came to Moscow accidentally and wrote their impressions of it. They regarded the characteristic features of Russian life as curious peculiarities of an uncivilized people, amusing to an idle observer—that was all. Krizhanich was in Russia both an alien and a native: alien by origin and education and a Russian in his racial sympathies and political hopes. He came to Moscow not simply to observe but to preach, to proclaim the idea of Pan-Slavism and to fight for it. This purpose is clearly expressed in the Latin epigraph to Conversations: “In defense of the people I want to push out all the
foreigners. I call to battle all the peoples along the Dnieper, Poles, Lithuanians, Serbs, all Slavs of warlike spirit who will fight together with me!"

It was necessary to count the forces on both sides, to make good one's own deficiencies after the pattern offered by the opposite side, to study it and borrow everything in which it was superior. This accounts for Krizhanich's favorite method of exposition. He constantly makes comparisons, contrasting the same kinds of facts among the Slavs and in the hostile West, and proposing to preserve some things unchanged and to remodel others in the Western way. Hence his apparent inconsistencies. They were inherent in the life he was observing and were not due to the observer's mistakes. We had to borrow from foreigners, to learn from our enemies. Krizhanich sought and willingly recorded everything in which Russian life was superior to other countries, he defended it against the foreigners' slanders and mistaken imputations, but he did not want to delude either himself or others. He expected miracles from autocracy, but in his Conversations he described more forcibly than any prejudiced foreigner the destructive effects of the harsh Muscovite rule on the people's morals, welfare, and relations with other countries. He was not an admirer of power as such, and thought that if the question were put to all the monarchs, many of them could not explain for what purpose they served. He valued authority as an idea, as a means for introducing culture, and he had a mystical faith in Muscovy's "rod of Moses," although he had probably heard of the Terrible Tsar's terrible staff, as well as of Tsar Michael's invalid's crutch.

The final result of Krizhanich's comparisons was by no means favorable to his compatriots. He admitted that foreigners were decidedly superior to them in intelligence, knowledge, morals, orderliness, and all their ways of life. He asked what place, then, did we Russians and Slavs occupy among other nations, and what historical part was assigned to us on the world's stage? Our people stood midway between civilized nations and Eastern savages, and therefore should become an intermediary between the two.

Krizhanich's thought ascends from trivial observations and detailed programs to bold generalizations. The Slavo-Russian East and multiracial West represent for him two sharply differing cultural types. In one of the conversations introduced into his treatise he rather wittily compares the distinctive characteristics of the Slavic, chiefly Russian, people and of the western Europeans. The latter are of handsome appearance and therefore proud and daring, for beauty breeds daring and pride; we are neither good- nor bad-looking, but of middling appearance. We are not eloquent and do not know how to express our thoughts, but they have ready tongues, are bold in their speech and quick at making caustic, wounding, abusive remarks. We are simple-hearted and slow-witted; they are full of wiles. We are not thrifty, but inclined to be prodigal, we keep no accounts of income and expenditure and are wasteful with our goods; they are stingy, grasping, and night and day think only of stuffing their moneybags more tightly. We are lazy about work and study; they are industrious and will not waste in sleep a single profitable hour. We are dwellers in a poor country; they are natives of rich, luxurious lands, and entice us with the alluring produce of their countries as a hunter baiting his trap for prey. We think and speak simply and we act simply, quarrel and make peace again; they are reserved, dissembling, unforgiving. They will not forget an insult to their dying day. Having once quarreled, they will never be sincerely reconciled, but after making peace will always seek an opportunity for revenge.

Krizhanich's works deserve a special and prominent place among our historical sources. For more than a hundred years we find nothing in our literature to equal his observations and judgments. His observations provide the student with new material for picturing Russian life in the seventeenth century, and his judgments serve to verify the impressions given us by its study.

Neither Nikon's letters nor Kotoshkhiin's and Krizhanich's works were widely known at the time. Kotoshkhiin's book had not been read by anyone in Russia till the forties of the last century, when it was found by a Russian professor in the library of Uppsala University. Krizhanich's book was in the palace, in
Tsar Alexei's and Tsar Feodor's possession. Influential supporters of Tsarevna Sofia, Medvedev and Prince V. V. Golitsyn, had copies of it. Apparently there was a proposal to publish it under Tsar Feodor. Krizhanich's thoughts and observations might have increased the supply of reformatory ideas swarming in Muscovite statesmen's minds at that time. But in any case the opinions of these three men are of great importance to students of the seventeenth century, since they reflect the mood of the Russian society of that period. The sharpest feature of that mood was discontent with the general situation. Krizhanich's testimony is particularly valuable in this respect, for he describes with obvious regret unpleasant facts it grieves him to find in a country that from a distance seemed to him a mighty support for the whole Slavic race. This discontent was an extremely important turning point in the life of seventeenth-century Russia. It was followed by innumerable consequences, which form the main content of Russia's subsequent history. The most immediate of these consequences was that Russia began to feel the influence of western Europe. I want to draw your attention to the origins and first manifestations of that influence.

Chapter XIII

Russia and the West

Before starting to discuss the beginnings of Western influence in Russia, it is essential to define the exact meaning of “influence.” In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Russia already knew something about western Europe, did a certain amount of business with it, diplomatic and commercial, borrowed the fruits of its enlightenment, extended invitations to its artists, craftsmen, physicians, and military men. That was intercourse and not influence. Influence begins when a society comes to recognize the superiority of the culture that influences it, the necessity of learning from it, of morally submitting to it, and of borrowing not merely its practical achievements, but the actual principles of social order, views, ideas, customs, public relations. This sort of thing began to appear in Russia only in the seventeenth century. It is in this sense that I speak of the beginnings of Western influence at that period.

At this point we turn to the origins of the different trends in our history that continue to this day. Why did not this influence, this moral and spiritual subordination, begin in the sixteenth century? Its source lay in discontent with one's life, one's situation, and this discontent sprang from the difficulty in which the Muscovite government found itself under the new dynasty,
and which affected more or less painfully every class of the community. The difficulty lay in the fact that it was impossible to satisfy the essential needs of the country by means of domestic resources available under the prevailing regime. It was recognized that the regime had to be reorganized to provide the resources the state lacked. There was nothing new about the situation. The difficulty had occurred before. The need for reform was not being felt for the first time by the Muscovite society. But it had never before led to such consequences as now. From the middle of the fifteenth century onward the Muscovite government was more and more aware that it was impossible to rely upon the resources of the appanage period in dealing with the new tasks created by the unification of Great Russia. It began to build a new state order and gradually to demolish the old. It was building the new order without outside help, according to its own lights, out of material provided by the national life, and under the guidance of former experiences and lessons of the past. It still believed that the spiritual heritage of its native land could provide a firm basis for the new order. Accordingly, the reconstruction merely increased the prestige of the past, confirmed the builders' faith in the country's powers, and nourished national self-confidence. In the sixteenth century Russians actually came to regard Moscow, the unifier of the Russian land, as the center and mainstay of all the Orthodox East.

But now things were different. The obvious defects of the existing social order and the unsuccessful attempts to improve it suggested that its very foundations were rotten and made many people think that the people's creative powers and native good sense were exhausted, that the past held no useful lessons for the present, that nothing more could be learned from it, and that therefore there was no reason to cling to it. It was then that a profound change began in the Muscovite people's minds. Among the ruling circles and in society at large there appeared men oppressed by doubt as to whether the past had bequeathed to the country sufficient resources to ensure it a prosperous future. They lost their former national complacency and began to look around, to seek instruction and direction from strangers, from western Europe, in the growing conviction of its superiority and of its own backwardness. The vanishing faith in the traditions of the past and in national strength gave way to dejection and distrust of one's own powers, and this opened the door wide to foreign influence.

It is hard to say what caused this difference in the course of events in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and why we had not noticed our backwardness sooner and renewed our forefathers' creative attempts at reform. Was it that the Russian people of the seventeenth century had less staying power and were spiritually weaker than their sixteenth-century ancestors? Did the moral and religious complacency of the fathers undermine the children's spiritual energies? Most likely the difference was due to the change in attitude toward the Western world. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries great centralized states were built there on the ruins of the feudal system. At the same time the people's labor broke away from the narrow sphere of the feudal agricultural economy to which it had been forcibly confined. Thanks to geographical discoveries and technical inventions, a wide field of activity was opened to it. Intensive work began in new areas and with new capital, which successfully competed with the feudal, landowning capital. Both these facts—political centralization and urban bourgeois industrialism—resulted in considerable achievements: developments in administrative, fiscal, and military techniques, the organization of standing armies, new systems of taxation, new theories of communal and state economy. Economic technique was developed, merchant fleets were created, trade and commercial credit were organized.

Russia had no part in all these achievements. It was spending its powers and resources on external defense and on the upkeep of the court, the government, and the privileged classes including the clergy, while they did nothing and were incapable of doing anything for the people's economic and spiritual development. That was why in the seventeenth century Russia proved to be more backward in comparison with the West than at the
beginning of the sixteenth. The Western influence gained ground as we recognized our material and spiritual poverty, brought out more and more clearly by wars, diplomatic relations, and commercial transactions with other countries. Comparison with the resources of the western European states made us aware of our own backwardness.

As the Western influence penetrated into Russia, it met with another influence—Eastern, Greek, or Byzantine—which had so far been predominant in it. There was a great difference between the two, and I shall compare them in order to show what one of them had left in Russia and what the other was bringing in.

The Greek influence was introduced and propagated by the church and was directed toward moral and religious ends. The Western influence was initially introduced by the state to meet its material needs, but it did not remain within set boundaries, as did the Greek. The Byzantine influence by no means extended to the whole sphere of Russian life. It was only a religious and moral guide to the people. It supported and embellished the supreme power of the state, but gave little guidance in state administration. It introduced certain norms into civil law, specifically those concerning family relations. It was faintly reflected in everyday life and still more faintly in the national economy. It regulated the way people spent their leisure and behaved on holy days, at any rate till the end of the liturgy, but it did little to increase the amount of positive knowledge and left no perceptible trace on people's everyday customs and ideas, leaving all this entirely to their creative imagination and primeval ignorance. But without dominating the whole of a man's life or depriving him of his national characteristics and individual peculiarities, within its own sphere it affected the whole community from top to bottom, penetrating with equal force into every class. It was this that made ancient Russian society a spiritually integrated whole.

Western influence, on the contrary, gradually came to dominate every aspect of life. It changed ideas and relations and affected both the state regime and public and private everyday life. It gave rise to new political ideas, civic demands, and social relations. It opened up new fields of knowledge, changed the Russian people's manners, customs, and attire, altering their outer appearance and remodeling their mentality. But though it gained possession of the whole man as a person and a citizen, it failed to gain possession—up to that time, at any rate—of the whole community. It powerfully affected only the thin, ever shifting, and restless top layer of our society.

And so the Greek influence came from the church, and the Western from the state. The Greek extended to the whole community but did not affect man's whole personality; the Western affected the whole of it, but did not extend to the community as a whole.

The encounter and struggle between these two influences gave rise to two tendencies in Russian society's intellectual life, two ways of looking at our national culture. Growing increasingly complex, changing their coloring, names, and forms of expression, these two tendencies run through our history like parallel streams. Disappearing at times and coming to the surface again like rivulets in a sandy desert, they enlivened the sluggish public life directed by the obscurantist, oppressive, and rapid governmental activity—a life that, with a few bright intervals, dragged on till the middle of the nineteenth century. Both tendencies first found expression in the second half of the seventeenth century, in the dispute about the exact moment of the transubstantiation of the Holy Gifts and, in connection with this, about the comparative value of studying Greek and Latin. The opponents might be called respectively Hellenists and Latinists. In the second half of the eighteenth century the apple of discord was thrown by the literature of the French Enlightenment, in connection with disputes about the significance of Peter's reforms and independent national development. The nationalists called themselves Russophiles, and nicknamed their opponents "Russian semi-Frenchmen," Gallomaniacs, freethinkers, and most often Voltaireans. Some seventy years ago the adherents of the two camps were respectively called Slavophiles and Westerners. At this last stage the substance of both parties' views might be expressed as follows.
The Westerners said: Our culture is basically European, but historically we are younger than our brothers of western Europe, and we must follow in their footsteps, assimilating the fruits of their civilization.

Yes, the Slavophiles replied, we are Europeans, but eastern ones. We have our own original life principles, which we must work out by our own efforts, not in the West’s leading strings. Russia is not a pupil or a companion or even a rival of Europe—it is its successor. Russia and Europe are two contiguous historical realities, two successive stages in the cultural evolution of mankind, and western Europe, scattered with monuments—if I may slightly parody the Slavophiles’ somewhat grandiloquent tone—is a large and spacious graveyard in which the great dead men of the past sleep under ornate marble monuments. Russia, with its steppes and forests, is a dirty rustic cradle in which the world’s future uneasily tosses about and cries helplessly. Europe is coming to the end of its life, Russia is just beginning to live; and since it has to survive Europe, it must learn to live without it, by its own resources, by its own principles, which are to replace the moribund principles of European life and bring new light into the world. And so our historical youth lays upon us the duty not to imitate, not to borrow the fruits of other nations’ cultural efforts, but to work out independently the basic principles of our own historical life, which are hidden in the depths of our national spirit and have not yet been worn threadbare by mankind.

Thus the two theories do not merely express different conceptions of the historical position of Russia and Europe, but suggest different paths for future development. This is not the moment to pass judgment on these theories, to discuss Russia’s historical fate and ask whether it is destined to be the light of the East or to remain merely a shadow of the West, but we can cursorily remark on the attractive features of both. The Westerners were noted for their clear thinking, love of exact knowledge, and respect for scholarship. The Slavophiles displayed a fascinating breadth of ideas, lively faith in the nation’s potentialities, and a streak of lyrical dialectic that pleasantly concealed slips in logic and gaps in erudition.

I have set out both views in their final forms, complicated by various local and extraneous admixtures in the course of the two preceding centuries. My task is to determine the moment when they first appeared in their original undressed condition. It is a mistake to date them from Peter’s reforms. They were conceived in the minds of the seventeenth-century people who had lived through the Time of Troubles. Perhaps the first appearance of those tendencies was noted by Ivan Timofeev, a government clerk who at the beginning of Michael’s reign wrote an account of the times, beginning with the reign of Ivan the Terrible. He was a very intelligent observer with definite ideas and principles. In politics he was a conservative. He attributed all the miseries of his time to the people’s forsaking the old customs and breaking the ancient rules; that was why Russians began to spin round and round like the spokes of a wheel. He bitterly complains of the lack of manly fortitude among them, of their inability to prevent arbitrary or unlawful innovations by concerted effort. Russians do not believe one another. They turn their backs on each other; some look to the East, others to the West.

I cannot say whether this was an accidental remark or a subtle observation. In any case, in the twenties of the seventeenth century, when Timofeev was writing, “Westernism” was a foible of individual eccentrics like Prince Khvorostinin rather than a responsible social movement. In every society there always are to be found sensitive people who, without knowing why, think and do earlier than others what all will think and do later on, just as there are abnormally sensitive people who feel a coming change in the weather, and normal ones who often fail to notice it after it has come.

Let us now consider the first manifestations of the Western influence. In so far as it was felt and encouraged by the government, it developed step by step, gradually increasing in scope. The process was slow because the government wanted, or rather
was obliged, to compromise between the country's needs, which urged it to learn from the West, and the people's psychology and its own inertia, which resisted foreign influence. To begin with, it turned to foreigners for help in its chief material needs—armaments and national defense. In this respect the country's backwardness led to particularly painful consequences. The government took from abroad military and later other technical achievements, but it did this reluctantly, without looking far ahead to the possible results of its endeavors, without inquiring by what efforts the Western mind had attained such technical success and what view of the world and of the purpose of life had inspired those efforts. Russia needed cannons, guns, machines, ships, various industries. It was decided in Moscow that all these things presented no danger to the salvation of the soul, and that even the study of these cunning devices was in itself a harmless and morally neutral occupation. Even the rules of the church allowed, in case of need, departure from canonical directions on the details of daily routine. But in the sacrosanct domain of feelings, beliefs, and ideas, where the higher guiding principles of life reigned supreme, not an inch of ground was to be surrendered to foreign influence.

Thanks to this cautious concession, important innovations were introduced into the Russian army and Russian industry enjoyed its first successes. More than once bitter experience had shown that our mounted militia of servicemen could not stand up to trained Western infantry provided with firearms. At the end of the sixteenth century the Muscovite government already began to add foreign military units to its army. At first it was proposed to make direct use of Western military technique by hiring foreign mercenaries and importing armaments. From the first years of Michael's reign the government sent detachments of mercenaries on campaigns with its own army. One of them was commanded by an Englishman, Lord Aston. Later it dawned on the government that it would be cheaper to learn military art from foreigners than to hire them, and Russian servicemen were sent to be trained by foreign officers so that we could have properly organized and disciplined regiments of our own.

This difficult transformation of the Russian militia into a regular army was begun about 1630, before the second war with Poland. Long and elaborate preparation for that war was conducted with the caution of those who had suffered defeat. There were plenty of volunteers in western Europe for Muscovite service. In countries directly or indirectly affected by the Thirty Years' War, many military men were wandering about, seeking employment for their swords. It was known that the Delulino armistice between Russia and Poland was coming to an end and that there would be war. In 1631 a mercenary, Colonel Leslie, contracted to collect an infantry detachment of five thousand volunteers in Sweden, buy arms for them, and engage German technicians for the new artillery factory founded in Moscow by a Dutchman named Coet. At the same time another contractor, Colonel Fandam [Van Dam?], undertook to hire in other countries a regiment of 1,760 "good and trained soldiers," and also to bring German bombardiers and experienced instructors to teach Russian servicemen the art of war.

Foreign military technique was a considerable expense to Moscow. Recruiting, arming, and providing a year's keep for Fandam's regiment cost 1.5 million rubles in our currency. The commander of the infantry regiment hired by Leslie was to receive by contract a yearly salary of 22,000 rubles in our currency.

At last in 1632 an army of 32,000 men with 158 guns was sent to Smolensk. This army included six foreign-trained infantry regiments commanded by hired colonels. In these regiments there were 1,500 hired Germans and up to 13,000 Russian soldiers trained in the foreign fashion. A contemporary Russian chronicler remarked with surprise that there had never been in a Russian army so much infantry with firearms—Russian infantry trained in soldiering. The failure at Smolensk, in spite of all these preparations, did not stop the reorganization of the army; we already know its further development. Instructions for teaching foreign military arts to servicemen were drawn up under Tsar Michael and printed under Tsar Alexei in 1647.

The establishment of a semiregular army naturally raised the
question of providing arms for it. Military equipment was imported from abroad. Before the war of 1632, Colonel Leslie was ordered to purchase in Sweden 10,000 muskets with ammunition and 5,000 swords. During the war tons and tons of gunpowder and iron cannonballs were imported from Holland, and heavy duty had to be paid on them. This was expensive and troublesome, and the idea gained ground that we might make our own weapons. The need to do so drew attention to the country’s mineral wealth. We used to obtain iron from local ore in the neighborhood of Tula and Ustug. The metal was made into nails and other household articles in domestic furnaces, and in Tula they actually made firearms. But all this did not satisfy the needs of the War Department, and iron was imported by the ton from Sweden. To do metallurgical work on a broad scale the help of foreign skill and capital was needed. Intensive search for ore of every kind was begun, and mining engineers and craftsmen were called in from abroad. In 1626 free entry into Russia was allowed to an English engineer, Bullmer, who “through his training and knowledge could find ore of gold, silver, copper, and precious stones, and knew where such places were.” With the help of foreign experts expeditions were organized to discover and mine silver and other kinds of ore at Solikamsk, on the northern Dvina, Mezen, Kanin Nos, Igorsky Shar, beyond the Pechora, on the river Kosva, and even at Eniseisk. In 1634 a commission was sent to Saxony and Brunswick to hire coppersmiths with the promise that there would be plenty of work for them in Muscovy. Evidently abundant supplies of copper ore had been discovered.

Foreign capitalists to run the industry were also found. In 1632, just before the Polish war, a Dutch merchant named Andrew Vinius and his partners obtained a concession for establishing metalworks near Tula on condition that they provide the state with cannon, cannonballs, gun barrels, and steel articles of every kind at low rates. That was the origin of the Tula armament factories, which were eventually taken over by the state. To secure a supply of workers for them, a whole volost belonging to the crown was attached to them. This was how the class of factory peasants was created. In 1644 another foreign company, with a Hamburg merchant named Marselis at its head, obtained a twenty-year concession for founding iron-smelting works on the rivers Vaga, Kostroma, and Shelsna and in other places on the same conditions. Under Tsar Michael there was in Moscow itself, by the river Neglinny, a foundry in which foreign workers made a large number of cannon and bells. The Russians too learned the craft fairly well. The owners had strict injunctions to teach their Russian apprentices everything, and not to conceal from them any useful craft.

Workshops for making glass, potash, and so on were established at the same time as metal foundries. Following the mining engineers, all kinds of craftsmen began coming to Moscow at the government’s invitation—weavers of velvet, goldsmiths, watchmakers, hydraulic engineers, masons, painters, and so on—always on condition that they teach Russians their crafts.

Even European scholars were in demand. In 1639 Adam Olearius, a master of arts of Leipzig University, who had been to Moscow several times as secretary of the Holstein legation and had written a remarkable description of the Muscovite state, received an invitation to enter the Tzar’s service. The invitation was worded as follows: “We, the Great Tzar, have been informed that you are highly learned and familiar with astrology and geography and the courses of heavenly bodies and geometry, and with many other useful arts and sciences, and such a scholar would suit us.” Hostile rumors spread through Moscow that a wizard who could foretell the future by the stars would soon be coming, and Olearius declined the invitation.

In western Europe, countries and individuals grew rich through lively maritime trade carried on by numerous fleets of merchant ships. As early as the middle of the seventeenth century the Muscovite government began thinking about a navy, harbors, and maritime trade. There was an idea of hiring Dutch shipwrights and men who could navigate seagoing ships. Vinius, the merchant whom we have mentioned before, offered to build a fleet of galleys for the Caspian Sea. In 1669 a ship named Orel was built on the river Oka for the Caspian by shipwrights
imported from Holland. The ship and a few small vessels cost 9,000 rubles (about 125,000 in our currency) and reached Astrakhan, but in 1670 this firstborn of the Russian fleet was burned by Razin. Muscovy had harbors on the White Sea at Arkhangelsk and at the mouth of the river Kola at Murmansk, but these were too far from Moscow and from western European markets and were cut off from the Baltic by the Swedes. The government had the peculiar idea of leasing foreign harbors for the future Muscovite fleet. In 1662 the Moscow ambassador, on his way to England, had lengthy discussions with the chancellor of Kurland as to whether Muscovite ships could somehow be stationed in Kurland harbors. The chancellor’s answer was that it would be more fitting for the Tsar to build ships near his own town of Arkhangelsk.

Amidst all this concern about mines and factories, the Muscovite government seems at last to have become dimly conscious of an idea it had found particularly hard to grasp. Its financial policy always had as its sole object profit for the Treasury, and completely ignored the question of the national economy. When the government was faced with a new expense that could not be met out of current revenue, it had recourse to its usual financial arithmetic: it counted the number of registered taxpayers, calculated the total amount to be collected from them, and commanded that the payment be made under threat of penalties, either as a special levy or as a regular tax, leaving it to the taxpayers to settle among them what each was to pay and to find the money as best they could. Arrears and persistent complaints of inability to pay were the only restraints on such a casual financial policy. While increasing taxes, the government did nothing to increase the people’s capacity to pay them. But observation of the foreigners’ industrial skill and commercial resources, as well as insistent reminders from its own tradespeople who had also observed the foreign ways, gradually introduced Moscow financiers to a hitherto unknown range of politico-economic ideas and relations, and widened their field of vision against their will. Thoughts that the rulers found hard to assimilate were forced upon them. They saw that an increase in taxation should be preceded by an increase in the productivity of labor, which must be directed to new and profitable industries, to the discovery and exploitation of the country’s latent wealth, and that this required experts, training, knowledge, proper organization. Such thoughts were aroused in the Muscovite government by the Western influence, and they found an echo among the people as well.

The government’s new concerns, the search for ore, for ships’ timber, for suitable sites for saltworks, the building of sawmills, inquiries addressed to the local inhabitants about the natural wealth of their districts—all this created hopes of new earnings and of reward from the Tsar for giving useful information. Men who pointed out a profitable place for mining ore were promised a reward of 500 rubles, or 1,000 or more rubles in our currency. If a report reached Moscow that there was a large alabaster mountain on the northern Dvina, an expedition headed by a German would be dispatched from Moscow to investigate and describe the mountain, to settle with the tradespeople at what price a pound of alabaster could be sold abroad, and to hire workmen to break up the stone. Rumors spread that the Tsar rewarded all who made useful discoveries or inventions.

When a striving is engendered in people in response to some essential need, it gains possession of the community as does a fashion or an epidemic. It excites the imagination and in the more impressionable types gives rise to morbid fancies or risky enterprises. The organization of Muscovy’s external defenses and the discoveries and inventions serving to improve them acquired vital importance after the defeats and humiliations inflicted upon the country by foreigners at the Time of Troubles. In 1629 a certain priest named Nestor in the city of Tver submitted a petition to the Tsar, telling him of “a great work that God had not yet revealed to any man either in our land or in other states, except to him, the priest Nestor, to the glory of the Tsar and the deliverance of our distressed country, and to the dismay and amazement of its enemies.” The priest Nestor promised the Tsar to build for him at low cost a small movable redoubt in which men at arms could defend themselves as in a real im-
movable fortress. In vain did the boyars beg the inventor to make a model or a draft of his movable fortification so they could show it to the sovereign. The priest declared that unless he could see the Tsar in person he would not do anything, for he distrusted the boyars. He was banished to a Kazan monastery and kept in chains for three years because "he boasted of a great work, but would not say what it was, and apparently did it just to make trouble, as though not in his right mind."

And so the Muscovite government and the community at large came to feel the vital need of western European military and industrial technical knowledge, and were actually prepared to try to acquire it. Perhaps such technical knowledge was all that the state really needed at the time. But once a social movement is set going by some particular impetus, its course usually comes to be influenced by other forces that draw it far beyond the limit originally fixed for it.

Increased demand attracted to Muscovy a multitude of foreign technicians, officers, soldiers, physicians, craftsmen, merchants, factory owners. As early as the sixteenth century, under Ivan the Terrible, western Europeans working in Russia formed a "German Settlement" on the outskirts of Moscow, on the river Iauza. The storms of the Time of Troubles destroyed this foreign nest. When Michael came to the throne, more foreigners arrived at the capital and settled wherever they liked, buying houses from local inhabitants. They opened taverns and built their chapels in the city. Close contacts between the aliens and the natives, resulting conflicts and annoyances, complaints of the Moscow clergy about the chapels' being next door to the Russian churches perturbed the city authorities, and under Tsar Michael a decree was issued forbidding foreigners to buy houses from the townspeople and to build chapels in Moscow.

Olearius describes one of the incidents that made the government take steps to separate Muscovites from foreigners. Many of the German officers were married to daughters of foreign merchants living in Moscow. These ladies looked down on ordinary tradesmen's wives and wanted to sit in front of them in chapel, but the latter would not give in, and one day their altercation with the officers' wives degenerated into an open fight. The noise could be heard in the street and attracted the attention of the Patriarch, who by ill luck was driving past the chapel. Having learned what was happening, the Patriarch, as guardian of church order irrespective of denomination, commanded that the chapel be demolished, and it was razed to the ground that very day. This must have happened in 1643, when it was decreed that all old chapels in Moscow be demolished and sites for new chapels were given beyond the Zemlianoi Val [Earthen Ramparts].

In 1652 the foreigners scattered throughout Moscow were moved beyond the Pokrovka to the river Iauza, to the place where the Germans had lived in the old days. There they were given plots of land in accordance with their rank and occupation. That was how the new German or Foreign Settlement was founded. It soon became a well-ordered little town, with straight and wide streets and pretty wooden houses. Olearius reckoned that in the first years of its existence the settlement had a thousand inhabitants. Another foreigner, Meyerberg, who visited Moscow in 1660, speaks of a great number of foreigners living in the settlement. There were four Protestant chapels in it, and a German school. The thriving population, distinct in language, race, and rank, lived in cheerful contentment, free from all interference with its customs and ideas. It was a corner of western Europe sheltering in an eastern suburb of Moscow.

It was this German Settlement that helped to transmit European culture to such spheres of Muscovite life as had nothing to do with the essential material needs of the state. Craftsmen, capitalists, and officers imported by the government for the external defense of the country and for its internal economic needs brought to Moscow, together with their military and industrial skill, European ideas of comfort, domestic amenities, and amusements. It is interesting to see how eagerly the Moscow upper classes seized upon foreign luxuries and attractions imported from the West, forsaking their old prejudices, tastes, and
habits. External political relations undoubtedly encouraged this predilection for foreign comforts and amusements. Embassies frequently coming to Moscow from abroad made the Russians wish to be seen at their best by foreign observers and to show that in Moscow too people knew the proper way to live. Besides, Tsar Alexei was for a time considered as a candidate to the throne of Poland, and he tried to organize his court life on the Polish pattern.

When Russian envoys were sent abroad, they were bidden to observe carefully all the appointments of foreign courts and their amusements. One can see from diplomatic dispatches what importance these envoys attached to court balls and especially to theatrical performances. A certain Likhachev, sent on a diplomatic mission to the Duke of Tuscany in 1659, was invited by the Duke to a hall and a play, and in his dispatch he described this play in great detail; evidently Moscow took an interest in such matters. The envoys were anxious not to miss a single scene.

A hall was shown, and after a time it sank down, and this happened six times; and in the same hall there appeared a sea with moving waves, and in the sea there were fishes and men riding on fishes, and above the hall there was the sky and people sitting in clouds. . . . And there came down from the sky a gray-haired man in a carriage, and from the opposite side a beautiful maiden, also in a carriage, and the horses pulling the carriages were as good as real horses and moved their legs. And the Duke said it was the sun and the moon. . . . And in another scene about fifty men in armor appeared and began fighting with sabers and swords and shooting with pistols, and it looked as though they had killed three or four men, and many marvelous young men and maidens dressed in gold came out from behind the curtain and danced and did many wonderful things.

In describing the life of the Muscovite upper classes, Kotoshikhin says that “the people of Muscovy live in poorly arranged houses, without particular comfort and adornment.” A drawing by Meyerberg, whom we have already mentioned, shows a bishop driving in a clumsy sledge, and the Tsaritsa’s windowless closed carriage. Now, following other countries’ example, the Tsar and the Moscow boyars took to driving in ornate German carriages upholstered in velvet, painted and fitted with glass windowpanes. The boyars and rich merchants began building brick houses instead of humble wooden ones, and furnishing them in the foreign fashion. The walls were covered with “gilded leather” of Belgian workmanship, the rooms adorned with pictures and clocks. Tsar Michael, who could not take exercise because of his bad legs and did not know what to do with his time, developed such a liking for clocks that he lined a whole room with them. Music was introduced at festive meals. In Tsar Alexei’s palace at supper “a German played the organ, trumpets blew, and cymbals clanged.”

Foreign arts were called in to adorn native crudeness. Tsar Alexei presented Boris Ivanovich Morozov, his friend, former tutor, and subsequently a relative by marriage, with a wedding coach covered with gold brocade, lined with expensive sable fur, and plated with silver instead of iron. Even the heavy bindings on the wheels were of silver. (In the rebellion of 1648 the mob pulled this coach to pieces.) At the supper party with German music to which we have just referred, that same Tsar regaled his guests, including his father confessor, till they were all drunk. The party went on till the small hours of the morning.

Muscovite envoys were instructed to try while abroad to engage for the Tsar’s service the best and most skilled trumpeters “who could play dance music on the highest register.” The court and the nobility developed a passion for theatrical performances. They had some religious scruples about indulging in this amusement, which strict guardians of true piety regarded as “the devil’s game and a spiritual abomination.” Tsar Alexei consulted his confessor on the subject, and the confessor allowed him to attend theatrical performances, following the example of Byzantine emperors. The plays were acted at the palace by a dramatic company hastily recruited from among the children of foreign soldiers and merchants and trained to some extent by the pastor.
of the Lutheran church in the German Settlement, Master Johann Gottfried Gregory. In 1672 the Tsar, overjoyed at the birth of Tsarevich Peter, commanded a play to be produced. For this purpose a theater was built in the suburban village of Preobrazhenskoe, in later years Peter's favorite playground. There at the end of 1672 the Tsar watched a play about Esther, staged by the pastor, and liked it so much that he presented the producer with sable furs worth 1,500 rubles in our currency. In addition to Esther, Pastor Gregory staged Judith, a gay comedy about Joseph, a "pitiful" play about Adam and Eve—that is, about the Fall and Redemption—and other plays.

In spite of the biblical subjects, these were not medieval mystery plays with a moral, but plays of a new type, translated from the German, impressing the spectators with terrible scenes of executions, battles, and cannonades, and at the same time introducing (except in the tragedy of Adam and Eve) a comic element represented by the buffoon—an inevitable appendage to the cast—with his crude and often indecent sallies. Russian actors were also being hastily trained. In 1673 Gregory was already training for the stage twenty-six young men recruited in the Novomeshchansky suburb of Moscow. While there was as yet no elementary school to teach reading and writing, a theatrical school was founded. Plays on biblical subjects soon gave way to the ballet. At Preobrazhenskoe in 1674 the Tsar with his family and the boyars watched a play about Artaxerxes and his orders for the hanging of Aman, and after that, Germans and the servants of Matveev, the Foreign Affairs minister, who were also being trained by Gregory in theater arts, "played viols, organs, and other instruments and danced."

All these novelties and amusements, I repeat, were luxuries for Moscow high society, but they developed in it new and more refined aims and requirements unknown to the Russian people of former generations. Would it rest content with simply enjoying the things it had so eagerly borrowed?

In western Europe the amusements of daily life and elegant amusements had their source not only in the fortunate economic position of the well-to-do leisured classes and in the capricious fancies of sophisticated taste; centuries of spiritual effort on the part of individuals and whole communities helped to create them. External adornments of life went hand in hand with the development of thought and feeling. Man strives to build up for himself an environment that corresponds to his tastes and to his view of life, but to achieve this correspondence he must seriously think about his tastes and about life in general. In borrowing another people's environment we unconsciously and involuntarily assimilate the tastes and ideas that created it. Otherwise the environment will seem to us tasteless and incomprehensible.

Our seventeenth-century ancestors thought differently. They imagined that in borrowing European achievements, they would not have to acquire other nations' learning and ideas and renounce their own. That was their simplehearted mistake—a mistake made by all overcautious and belated imitators. In seventeenth-century Muscovy, the people, while eagerly seizing upon foreign attractions, gradually became dimly aware of the spiritual efforts and interests that had created them. They came to love those interests without first ascertaining how they tallied with home-grown ideas and tastes—to love them, to begin with, as another fresh amusement, as a pleasant and novel exercise for minds that had pored too long over prayer books.

While borrowing foreign "artifices" and inventions for entertainment, the upper strata of Moscow society apparently began to develop intellectual curiosity, interest in learning, a desire to reflect upon subjects that in the old days lay beyond the Russians' field of vision and were unnecessary for their daily life. A circle of influential men, admirers of European culture, was formed at the court. It included Tsar Alexei's uncle, the gay and kind Nikita Ivanovich Romanov, the richest man in Russia next to the Tsar and the most popular of the boyars, a patron and admirer of the Germans, a great lover of their music and fashions, and a bit of a freethinker; Boris Ivanovich Morozov, the Tsar's former tutor and his relative by marriage (he had allowed his foster child to wear German clothes and in his old
A considerable part of Orthodox Russia was forcibly united to the Polish Rzecz Pospolita by political bonds. The religious and national struggle of the Orthodox population against the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish state compelled the Russian champions to take up the weapons their opponents wielded so successfully—schools, literature, the Latin language. In this respect western Russia was far ahead of eastern Russia by the middle of the seventeenth century, and it was an Orthodox monk trained in a Latin or Russo-Latin school who was the first representative of European learning to be invited to Moscow.

The invitation was issued by the Muscovite government itself. In Moscow the Western influence met with a movement coming from the opposite direction. When we come to study the origin of the Russian church schism, we shall see that this movement was called forth by church needs and was partly directed against Western influence, but the opponents were united by one common interest, enlightenment, and temporarily joined hands. In ancient Russian literature there was no complete and fully adequate version of the Bible. Church hierarchs, who raised a dogmatic storm of almost ecumenical proportions about such matters as the sequestration of monastery estates and the number of times “alleluia” should be sung, had for centuries managed unperturbed to do without a full and exact text of the Holy Writ. In the middle of the seventeenth century (1649–50) the Muscovite government commissioned three learned monks from the Kiev Academy and the Pechersky Monastery—Epiphani Slavinetzky, Arseni Satanovsky, and Damaskin Pototsky—to translate the Bible from the Greek into Slavonic. The Kiev scholars were paid at a lower rate than the hired German officers. Slavinetzky and Satanovsky each received a yearly salary of about 600 rubles in our currency, free board and lodging at the Chudov Monastery, plus two glasses of wine and four mugs of mead or beer sent daily from the palace. Later their salary was doubled.

In addition to the main task entrusted to them, the Kiev scholars had to satisfy other needs of the Muscovite government and society. At the wish of the Tsar or the Patriarch they com-
It was in this way that Moscow society came to feel the need of book learning and scientific training, and to develop schooling as a necessary means to them. The need was kept alive by the more and more frequent contacts with western European states, the conditions and mutual relations of which the Moscow diplomats had to study. Both the government and private persons attempted to establish schools in Moscow. Greek hierarchs had more than once pointed out to the tsars of Muscovy that a Greek school and printing press ought to be established in Moscow. Moscow asked for teachers for that school, the Greeks offered to send them, but somehow nothing came of it. Under Tsar Michael the school was almost organized. In 1632 a monk called Joseph was sent by the Patriarch of Alexandria and was prevailed upon to stay in Moscow. He was commissioned to translate Greek polemical books against Latin heresies into Slavonic, and also “to teach small children the Greek language and reading in the schoolhouse.” But Joseph’s early death put an end to the work.

The idea of founding in Moscow a school that would serve as a fountainhead of learning for the whole of the Orthodox East was not abandoned, however, either by the Russians or by the Greeks. Close to the Patriarch’s court at Chudov Monastery a Greco-Latin school was established under the leadership of a Greek, a certain Arseni. He came to Moscow in 1649 but was soon banished to the Solovetsky Monastery on suspicion of heresy. Both Epiphani Slavinetsky and Arseni Satanovsky had been invited to Moscow to teach rhetoric, among other things, but it is not known whether any pupils were found for them. In 1665 three assistant clerks from the Palace Department and the Department of Secret Affairs were commanded to learn Latin from a Kiev scholar, Simeon Polotsky. For this purpose a special building was added to the Spassky Monastery in Moscow and named “School of Grammatical Learning.” You must not think that these were regular, properly organized schools with a definite curriculum, a syllabus, a permanent teaching staff, and so on. All it meant was that temporary and accidental commissions were
given to this or that visiting scholar to teach Greek or Latin to young men who were sent to him by the government or came of their own accord.

Such was the original form of state schools in Russia in the seventeenth century. It was a direct continuation of the ancient Russian method of teaching, whereby members of the clergy or special teachers took children as pupils for a specified payment. In some places private persons or perhaps communities erected special buildings for the purpose, so that something like a permanent public school was established. In 1683, in the town of Borovsk, close to the marketplace and next door to the municipal almshouse, there was a "school for teaching children" built by a local priest. Textbooks, which began to appear about the middle of the seventeenth century, were probably intended to serve the needs of either home or school education. Thus in 1648 a Slavonic grammar by Meleti Smotritsky, a scholar from western Russia, was published in Moscow, and in 1649 a short catechism by Peter Mohila, rector of the Kiev Academy and subsequently metropolitan of Kiev, was reprinted from the Kiev edition.

Private persons competed with the government in promoting education. Most of them belonged to the governing class themselves. The most zealous of these champions of learning was Tsar Alexei's trusted adviser Fedor Mikhailovich Rtischev. He built the Andreevsky Monastery on the outskirts of Moscow and in 1649 installed there at his own expense as many as thirty learned monks from the Pechersky Monastery in Kiev and other Ukrainian monasteries, who were to translate foreign books into Russian and to teach Greek, Latin, Slavonic grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, and other literary subjects. Rtischev himself became a student in this free school. He sat up all night after night talking to the masters, learned Greek from them, and persuaded Epiphani Slavinetsky to compile a Greek and Slavonic lexicon for the school. The Ukrainian scholars were joined by some of the Moscow learned monks and priests. Thus there was formed a fraternity of scholars, a kind of free academy of learning. Taking advantage of his position at the court, Rtischev made some of

the young men in government service go to the Kiev scholars at the Andreevsky Monastery to learn Greek and Latin.

In 1667 the parishioners of the Moscow church of St. John the Divine (in Kitay Gorod) decided to found a school in connection with it. It was not to be an elementary parish school, but one for general education in which "grammatical art, Slavonic, Greek, and Latin languages, and other free subjects" would be taught. They sent a petition about it to the Tsar and another to a certain "pious and honorable person," asking him to intercede for them with the Tsar. They asked the Patriarch of Moscow and the Eastern patriarchs who happened to be in the city in connection with Nikon's trial to give them their blessing. At last the Moscow Patriarch, chiefly out of respect for the persistent entreaties of "the pious and honorable person" who inspired the idea of the school (probably it was Rtischev again), gave his blessing "so that industrious students might rejoice in the freedom of research and the wisdom of liberal studies and gather together in the gymnasium to sharpen their wits with the help of skillful masters." It is not known whether the school was actually opened.

Members of the upper class did their best to provide home education for their children and engaged monks from western Russia and even Poles as resident tutors. Tsar Alexei himself set the example. He was not content with the elementary schooling that his elder sons, Alexei and Fedor, received from the official Moscow teacher, but had them taught Latin and Polish, and to complete their education he summoned Simeon Sitanovich Polotsky, a learned monk who had studied at the Kiev Academy and had experience of Polish schools as well. Simeon was a pleasant teacher who presented his subject matter in an attractive form. His verses give a short summary of his lessons. He touched on political subjects too, trying to develop in his royal pupils a responsible attitude toward politics.

It is fitting that rulers should know
How public welfare can be made to grow.
He taught his pupils that the ideal relation of a tsar to his subjects was that of a good shepherd to his sheep.

This should be the object of a ruler's care:
His subjects' burdens he should manfully bear.
He should not despise them or treat them like dogs,
But love them as a father his children loves.

The study of the Polish language, taught by private tutors, awakened an interest in Polish literature in translation and even in the original, and penetrated into the Tsar's palace and the boyars' houses. As I have just said, Tsar Alexei's elder sons were taught Polish and Latin. Tsarevich Feodor also learned the art of versification and collaborated with Simeon Polotsky in putting the Psalter into verse. He made a rhymed version of two psalms. It was said of him that he loved the sciences, especially mathematics. One of the Tsar's daughters, Sofia, was also taught Polish and read Polish books. According to Lazar Baranovich, archbishop of Chernigov, in his time the Tsar's family and friends "did not despise the Polish language but enjoyed reading Polish books and stories."

Some members of Moscow society sought to acquire Western learning at first hand, the more so because it came to be considered necessary for success in state service. Artamon Sergeevich Matveev taught his son Latin and Greek. His predecessor at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ordin-Naschokin, surrounded his son with Polish prisoners of war, and these inspired the young man with such love for western Europe that he emigrated to Poland. The first Russian ambassador to Poland, Tiapkin, had his son educated at a Polish school. In 1675, sending him to Moscow on a diplomatic mission, the father presented him in Lvov to King Jan Sobieski. The young man addressed the King with a speech in which he thanked him "for bread and salt and schooling." The speech was delivered in the scholastic jargon of the day, half Latin and half Polish, and Tiapkin reported that his son spoke so clearly and expressively that he did not stumble over a single word. The King presented the young man with a hundred złotys and fifteen arshins of red velvet.

And so the people of Muscovy came to want foreign art and amenities of life and later on to want education. They began with foreign officers and German cannons and ended with German ballet and Latin grammar. The Western influence, called forth by the essential material needs of the state, brought with it things that were not required by those needs and could have waited.

\(^{1}\) A unit of measurement equivalent to thirty-two inches.