by other beliefs when these prove incompatible with the first ones? In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths. Truths have once for all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them. My belief in the Absolute, based on the good it does me, must run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs. Grant that it may be true in giving me a moral holiday. Nevertheless, as I conceive it—and let me speak now confidentially, as it were, and merely in my own private person—it clashes with other truths of mine whose benefits I hate to give up on its account. It happens to be associated with a kind of logic of which I am the enemy, I find that it entangles me in metaphysical paradoxes that are unacceptable, etc., etc. But as I have enough trouble in life already without adding the trouble of carrying these intellectual inconsistencies, I personally just give up the Absolute. I just take my moral holidays; or else as a professional philosopher, I try to justify them by some other principle.

If I could restrict my notion of the Absolute to its bare holiday-giving value, it wouldn’t clash with my other truths. But we cannot easily thus restrict our hypotheses. They carry supernumerary features, and these it is that clash so. My disbelief in the Absolute means then disbelief in those other supernumerary features, for I fully believe in the legitimacy of taking moral holidays.

You see by this what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator and reconciler and said, borrowing the word from Papini, that she “unstiffens” our theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field she is at a great advantage both over positivistic empiricism, with its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the abstract in the way of conception.

In short, she widens the field of search for God. Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact—if that should seem a likely place to find him.

Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experiences demands, nothing being omitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God’s existence? She could see no meaning in treating as “not true” a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement with concrete reality?
It is thus the spirit of English life that has made us the enemies of all as a nation. This is an old complaint, but it is not the least true. The English, in their character, are not only the enemies of all, but they are also the enemies of themselves. The English are a people who are content with nothing less than the best, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the worst. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the greatest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the least. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the noblest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the meanest. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the greatest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the least. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the noblest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the meanest. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the greatest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the least. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the noblest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the meanest. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the greatest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the least. They are a people who are content with nothing short of the noblest, and they are a people who are content with nothing more than the meanest.
social processes and the power of narrative

Jean L. Lardner

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Jane Addams (1860-1935) was one of the most influential and imaginative social reformers of her time. She was a founder of Hull House, a settlement house in Chicago, and a leading figure in the Progressive Movement, where she worked to improve living conditions for the poor and to promote social reform.

Addams was born in 1860 in the United States and grew up in a middle-class family. She attended Wellesley College and later earned a master's degree in sociology from Clark University. After working for several years in a settlement house in Boston, she moved to Chicago in 1889 and founded Hull House.

Hull House was a center for social reform and community organizing, and it became a hub for social workers, intellectuals, and activists of all stripes. Addams was a tireless advocate for the poor and a strong supporter of labor rights, women's suffrage, and anti-war movements.

In 1931, Addams was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in promoting social justice and human rights. She died in 1935, but her legacy lives on through the organizations and causes she championed during her lifetime.