The Strange & Beguiling Relationship of Pakistan & India

Vinay Lal

Contours of a Familiar Narrative

There is a familiar narrative of Pakistan and India that for some years has gripped the common imagination around the world and has recently become virtually unassailable. If mainstream Hindi cinema, now known by the designation “Bollywood,” has hogged much limelight while the cinema of Pakistan—is there such a thing, some would ask—remains almost entirely unknown, then it is particularly apposite that this narrative should perhaps be captured by one of Bollywood’s most enduring motifs. Countless films have embodied this narrative, none so brilliantly as Yash Chopra’s Deewar (1975): two brothers, Vijay (Amitabh Bachchan) and Ravi (Shashi Kapoor), arrive in Bombay from the Indian hinterland with their mother and spend their childhood on footpaths. Vijay labors so that the younger Ravi can join school; as they graduate into adulthood, Vijay drifts into the Bombay underworld and rises to become a mafia don. Ravi finds himself on the other side of the law: in him, a policeman who respects the dignity of his uniform, the nation-state is incarnate, and as fate would have it he is charged with apprehending Bombay’s noted criminals.¹

Some have even thought that this narrative is much older than Hindi cinema, indeed nearly as old as Indian civilization itself. Mohandas Gandhi, for one, was always inclined to view the fraternal conflict between the Pandavas and the Kauravas,

Vinay Lal teaches history and Asian American studies at UCLA, and he is Director of the University of California Education Abroad Program (India), 2007–2009. His most recent books include Fingerprinting Popular Culture: The Mythic and the Iconic in Indian Cinema, co-edited with Ashis Nandy (Oxford, 2006) and The Other Indians: A Political and Cultural History of South Asians in America (UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press and HarperCollins, 2008).
recounted at immense length in the *Mahabharata*, which is an archive unlike any other of Indian civilization, as an allegory of the struggle between the good and the bad within each self. Be that as it may, the epic struggle of India and Pakistan, not exactly twins but nevertheless birthed as nation-states from the same fount of an Indo-Islamic culture, has been cast in the similar mold of two entities that have fallen on either side of the law.

In the sixty years since India attained independence and the rupture of a bloody partition that led to the creation of Pakistan, the two countries are viewed as having followed widely divergent paths. Though for a short period in the mid-1970s Indian democracy may have been imperiled, and India might have fallen prey to the same authoritarian or despotic tendencies which have characterized the histories of most countries in the Global South that were emerging from the ruins of colonialism in the second half of the twentieth century, no one doubts that India’s robust experiment with democracy is one of the most enduring successes of world politics since the end of World War II. The world’s “largest democracy” may sound little more than a cliché, a banality that disguises gross violations of human rights and class inequalities, but India has held general elections, each time a mammoth and unprecedented electoral exercise, regularly since 1951. The imposition of an internal emergency and the suspension of constitutional safeguards in 1975 ended with a colossal defeat for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi less than two years later. Nearly every election held since 1977 has seen the ruling party being thrown out of power; and what is more encouraging, the last three decades have witnessed a phenomenal growth of politics from below, the awareness of the impoverished and oppressed that the political arena is theirs to claim and win, and the emergence of new and unusual political coalitions.

Many observers also agree that the press, which flourishes not only in English but also in two dozen Indian languages, has remained a vital cornerstone of Indian democracy. India is supposed to have been (in Marx’s phrase) “vegetating in the teeth of time,” exhibiting a kind of “Oriental” stasis, but the rapid growth of the economy since the country’s acceptance of neoliberalization policies in 1990–1991 has brought India into the orbit of the global economy, given rise to what is often described as a middle class of 200 million or more, and supposedly made it into one of the powerhouses of the twenty-first century. “Shining India” was the embarrassing slogan on which one political party ran its
election campaign in 2004, and India seems to have become the byword for success in numerous spheres of life, from its reputation in information technology and business process outsourcing (BPO) industries to its association in many minds as a great generator of literature in English and such cultural and spiritual “products” as yoga, ayurveda, and vegetarian cuisine.

The fact that this narrative of an ascendant and resplendent India is easily ruptured is less important than the contrast, sometimes implied and more often stated as a bland proposition, with Pakistan. What appears to have brought Pakistan into the news over the last few years is suicide bombings, the apprehension of Pakistan-trained terrorists in the U.S., United Kingdom, and elsewhere, and political murders—and lately, following the recent assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the feeling that the country is falling apart has become more pronounced. The convention that the dead should not be criticized took hold of the world media, and suddenly Benazir, twice removed as Prime Minister of Pakistan on charges of corruption and extortion, was being lionized as the best hope of Pakistan—now cruelly extinguished. Her interior minister in her second term of office (1993–1996), Major-General Naseerullah Babar, is known to have played an instrumental role in securing a political foothold for the Taliban; and, allegedly, it is at her behest that Pervez Musharraf, then Director-General of Military Operations, arranged for Osama bin Laden to be brought to Jalalabad from Sudan. Her dismissal from office by the President of Pakistan in 1996 might be attributed to the exceedingly fractious and capricious nature of politics in her country, but one still marvels at the irony that the dismissal should have been at the hands of a man whose election she herself engineered. So should one suspect that the apotheosis of Benazir owes something to the fact that, for all her sheer opportunism and nurturing of the Taliban, her populism was the closest that Pakistan could come to as an expression of democratic sentiments?

The differences between the two countries are sometimes said to boil down to just one word: democracy. Pakistan has witnessed several coups and it is incontestably true that no democratically elected civilian regime has ever been permitted to complete a full term. Pakistan is frequently likened to a “failed state,” but over the last few years it has earned several other unsavory sobriquets. It is increasingly described in various international fora and reports as the epicenter of Islamic jihadi
movements, and The Economist, the conservative British magazine which speaks with unalloyed confidence as the voice of enlightened reason, has recently anointed Pakistan as the “world’s most dangerous place.” The country’s lawless territories on its western border with Afghanistan are thought to harbor Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders, and “its jihadi academies train suicide-bombers with global reach.” The editorial sums up views that are on offer in countless publications and media shows: not only is Pakistan torn apart by ethnic tensions, the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias, an insurgency in Balochistan, and the increasing Talibanization of civil society, but it is also custodian of the Islamic bomb. Once there was “the evil empire,” then “rogue states” and the “axis of evil”: and now, judging from George Bush’s final “State of the Union” address, terrorists “are fighting” to deny the choice of freedom “to people in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Palestinian Territories.” We need not pause to stop and ask if Bush makes any sense, a fruitless exercise at any time; but what is important is how Pakistan is clubbed alongside certain other places where evidently an ideological battle is being fought between terrorists and the lovers of freedom.

In this commonsense understanding of India and Pakistan, then, the two countries are shown as having drifted apart. The narrative might even stress the proximity of the two countries, dwelling not merely on their contiguous borders but on myriad customs in common and the shared linguistic universe of Pakistan and north India, but it pins much on the fact that India persisted with democratic traditions while Pakistan allowed its army a decisive role in politics and failed to carry through the reforms that would have transformed the country from a feudal state into a modern democratic polity. If one could be permitted a touch of exaggeration, it might even be possible to aver that India is a state with an army, but Pakistan is an army with a state. But can this predominant narrative be sustained, and if not, can one eventually complicate it so that one arrives at a more dialectical and dialogical understanding of the relations that bind the two countries together in something more than a deathly embrace?

The Asymmetry of a Relationship—and its Anxieties
The asymmetry of the relationship of India and Pakistan is obvious though not always an object of commentary, but this asymmetry extends to far more than the disproportionately large size
of India, its huge population and linguistic diversity, and other like factors. There was an India before there was a Pakistan, and one can speak of a remote Indian past as one cannot do so with respect to Pakistan. There is, similarly, an Indic civilization, and much of Pakistan’s recent history can also be read as an attempt by its elites to disown their own location and investment in that civilization. There are, of course, many other registers in which this asymmetry can be read. Notwithstanding the fact that the creator of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was himself a man of secular aspirations and sensibilities, Pakistan from the outset came to be identified as, if not an Islamic state, a country that would constitute a distinct home for the subcontinent’s Muslims. However, Pakistan can scarcely claim to be the authoritative spokesperson for the Muslims of South Asia: not only are there as many Muslims in India as there are in Pakistan, but the Muslims of what was then East Pakistan themselves rebelled at the notion that Islam was to take priority over all other identity markers, including ethnicity and language. The secession of East Pakistan, which following the 1971 war of independence became known as Bangladesh, dealt a decisive blow to Pakistan’s claim to be the principal custodian of Islamic history and culture in the Indian subcontinent. Whatever the merit of the argument that Pakistan constitutes the epicenter of worldwide jihadi activity, Pakistan is certainly not the main seat of Islamic learning in South Asia. Pakistan is not even, if one may be so bold to say so, on any tourist map of the world, though the acquisition of Kashmir, which has sent countless number of conquerors, travelers, and poets into a tizzy, would do much to remedy that deficiency.

Constantly ranked by what I have described as a fundamentally asymmetrical relationship, Pakistan has sought to achieve parity with India through strategic geopolitical alliances, by forging a particular military identity which itself owes much to a colonial sociology of knowledge, and by disproportionately large investments in an arms race. One of a handful of countries that was at the helm of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War, India deprecated the Pakistani tilt towards the United States and was in turn seen as being suspiciously close to the Soviet Union. Even more so than the end of the Cold War, it is the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, which the mujahideen (freedom fighters) sought to repulse with ideological and material support from the United States, which introduced new geopolitical complexities in South Asia.
The Soviet occupation, which aimed at lending support to the beleaguered Communist regime that had usurped power in Afghanistan in 1978, coincided with the initiation of the policy of Islamicization which Pakistan’s new military ruler, General Zia-ul Haq, was determined to pursue with vigor.

According to the received view, the United States fought one monster, communism, only to give rise to another, Islamic terrorism. The ignominious Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union: all this would appear to signify the dawn of a new era and the promise of freedom. Yet in Afghanistan, now bereft of interest to the U.S. and other Western powers, a ferocious civil war would eventually culminate in the political ascendancy of the Taliban, Muslim rebels and ideologues trained mainly in Pakistan and wedded to a rigorously puritanical conception of political Islam. Pakistan conferred respectability on the Taliban by recognizing them in 1997 as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan; however, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Pervez Musharraf, who had engineered a coup and installed himself as the military ruler of Pakistan in 1999, pledged that Pakistan would reverse course and become America’s loyal ally in its war to weed out the Taliban from Afghanistan, hunt down bin Laden, and eradicate all sources of support for Muslim extremists. Musharraf sought with brilliance to position himself as America’s “indispensable” ally: even as Bush had declared that the U.S. was committed to bringing democracy to the Muslim world, Musharraf was also adept at reminding the Americans, by whose own admission Pakistan had quite possibly become “ground zero” in the war on terror, that his fall would openly bring Muslim fundamentalists to power.

If Pakistan has long sought to leverage itself into global politics through strategic alliances, it is equally true that the army has played a critical role in shaping the contours of Pakistani state and society. The country has been governed by military rulers for more than half of its existence, but even its civilian leaders, unlike those in India where the assumption that the military must steer clear of politics has never been in any jeopardy and is indeed an article of faith for all political parties, must negotiate the military leadership at every turn. The army, not to put too fine a spin on the matter, runs the country: the nexus between army officers, politicians, bureaucrats, feudal landlords, and increasingly corporate houses runs very deep, and military men
also operate petrol stations, import-export businesses, transportation networks, and manufacturing industries. Yet, whatever the ample material benefits wrought in the civilian domain by the army, there can be no doubt that Pakistan’s investment in the militarist ethos has other dimensions. Hindu India, if one may put it this way, has long been seen by Pakistani elites as an effete culture: this is not merely a way of disowning the unique place of Mohandas Gandhi as the chief architect of independence in not only India but what would become Pakistan, but is also a ringing endorsement of the colonizer’s framework of knowledge. The restructuring of the army of British India in the mid-nineteenth century was predicated on a distinction between “martial” and “non-martial” races, and the British were inclined to accept that most Hindus, barring certain groups from mountainous tracts, were effeminate and more disposed to cerebral activity. It has always been supposed in Pakistan that, if given a choice, Hindus will choose inaction over action, negotiation over aggression; and the centrality conferred on the army in Pakistan becomes a marker of difference from Hindu India.

Rewriting the Script

Less than three years after India had compelled Pakistan into abject surrender in the war of 1971, India conducted a “peaceful nuclear explosion.” Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was not fooled by the humbug and is reliably learned to have remarked that if India were to make a nuclear bomb, Pakistan would be prepared to “eat grass” but it would make its own bomb. In this respect, one can understand why even some ardent defenders of the idea that India should exercise complete military dominance over Pakistan were critical of the nuclear testing by India in 1998 by means of which the country that gave birth to the Buddha and Mohandas Gandhi gate-crashed into the nuclear club. Pakistan cannot compete with India in a conventional arms race; but possession of the nuclear bomb confers parity on Pakistan, perhaps even giving the country an edge over India. Assuming that there was a “limited” nuclear war between the two countries, India would stand to lose much more than Pakistan. So, not surprisingly, a mere two weeks after India went nuclear, Pakistan followed suit; and emboldened by its new-found strength, confident even that its possession of the bomb permitted it the luxury of military adventurism, it soon thereafter sought unsuccessfully to appropriate Indian territory in the frozen heights of Kargil.
In seeking to emulate India and achieve parity as a nuclear state, Pakistan has signaled to the world its belief that no country that fails to abide by zero-sum politics can hope to survive or win the respect of other nation states. In so doing, Pakistan has, so to speak, relinquished its own best defense—for the realities of both Pakistan and India are far more complex than is commonly supposed. India is much less the democracy than it is supposed to be (as is transparently the case with the United States), and contrariwise politics in Pakistan furnishes many hopeful signs of dissent and a vigorous affirmation of the democratic propensities of the bulk of its citizens. Suicide bombings and political assassinations are leading commentators to ask if Pakistan will survive, but such questions have been posed before—not only apropos of Pakistan, but also even of India. Many people might suppose that the suicide bombings in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Pakistan point to Islam’s supposed failure to pass strictures against the perpetrators of such acts, but they might usefully be reminded that the strategy of suicide bombing as a political act was pioneered by Tamil secessionists in Sri Lanka—and that one of their most spectacular feats, and this too nearly twenty years ago, was the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the hands of a female suicide bomber.

Similarly, one should also call to mind the dark foreboding with which the future of India was viewed in the mid-1980s when insurgencies in the Punjab, the political assassination of Indira Gandhi, the savage targeting of Sikhs and Muslims as a partial demonstration of the political masculinization of Hinduism, and widespread ethnic strife in northeast India seemed to spell the extinction of India as a secular democratic republic. If one should be fatally tempted into thinking that India has largely outgrown political turbulence and recidivism, for no other reason than the market’s hostility to all activity that puts profits in peril, it will suffice to take note of the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat, one of India’s most developed and urbanized states, that left over 2,000 Muslims dead and close to 200,000 of them homeless. So little has Gujarati middle class society been chastened by these genocidal events that it rewarded the state’s Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, whose enthusiastic encouragement of the killings is widely documented, with another term of office months after the killings, and again in late 2007—only a few weeks before Benazir Bhutto’s assassination was declared to have shown the depths to which Pakistan has allegedly fallen. Indeed, India would appear
to have little or no authority to chide Pakistan for the decline of “law and order,” considering that the Naxalites, whom Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has defined as the biggest threat to the country’s unity and integrity, have time and again shown their unchecked ability to mount military operations against the state. Forty years after revolutionary Maoism, which gives succor to the oppressed but has also invited repression on account of its arduous embrace of violence, was born in the Naxalbari district of West Bengal, the writ of the Naxalites still runs large in nearly 160 of India’s some 600 districts.¹⁴

Supposing, then, that the political shine can be taken off “India Shining,” is that the only cheer for Pakistani democracy? Or, if I may paraphrase E. M. Forster, are there other reasons to cheer for Pakistan? The Constitution of 1973 proclaimed that “Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan” (Part 1, Art. 2). However, contrary to what might be described as the “common sense” about Pakistan that circulates in political thinking, Pakistan is far from being a theocratic state, at least if the electoral support religious parties receive is any kind of reliable guide. Typically, such parties earned about 5 to 7 percent of the popular vote, and it is only in very recent years that their electoral support base has grown to the point where, in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, they came to form the government before finding a place for themselves in the National Assembly. Leaving aside the political machinations of Musharraf, who publicly fancies himself as something of an Ataturk of Pakistan but has never displayed any reticence in instrumentalizing religion, it is more than likely that the electoral mobilization of Islam in Pakistan cannot be divorced from the perception among Muslims that their religion is widely viewed as a liability in the just conduct of human affairs. In secular India, the avowedly Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was even able to forge a winning coalition and rule the country for six long years (1998–2004), but in Pakistan the resistance to Islamic parties has been deep-rooted. The recent elections of February 18, 2008, which have seen the electoral support for the religious coalition of parties called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal decline drastically from fifty-nine seats in the National Assembly to just three,¹⁵ vindicate the view that voters in Pakistan emphatically reject the ideological leanings of Islamic parties.

That voters in Pakistan did not gravitate in excessively large numbers towards the Pakistan People’s Party, despite many
predictions of a “sympathy vote” for the party following the assassination of its “chairperson for life,” Benazir Bhutto, is itself a sign of the maturity of the electorate. The numerous clichés attached to Benazir—a daughter of the East who rose to become the President of the Oxford Union and the first female head of a Muslim state—cannot controvert the other public memory of Benazir, more prevalent in Pakistan, as someone who, more than anything else, was born to a life of politics. Voters are not likely to have forgotten that her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who has now been voicing pious sentiments about Benazir’s sacrifice “for the future of a democratic, moderate, progressive Pakistan,”\(^{16}\) earned (and not without reason, judging by some of the evidence accumulated against him in various courts in several countries) the nickname of “Mr. Ten Percent” during her first term of office—this a reference to the commission that he is alleged to have extracted from every contract involving the government. The split, indecisive vote is itself a sign of the stirrings in civil society—and there are many more such signs, perhaps none so instructive and inspiring as what has been described as the “lawyers’ agitation” against Musharraf. The removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary from office in March 2007, his extraordinary reinstatement on July 20 following countrywide protests, and the promulgation of an Emergency in November, the first consequence of which was the placement of Justice Chaudhary under house arrest, suggest that both Musharraf and the legal establishment had come to the awareness that political authoritarianism cannot wholly triumph where the spirit of the law still flickers. The judiciary may not always be the last best hope of humankind, but in Pakistan the higher reaches of the judiciary have displayed an exemplary willingness to check some of the excesses of an overreaching executive and give some semblance of hope to people whose civil rights have been abrogated.\(^ {17}\)

The script of the narrative that describes the relationship of Pakistan and India will thus have to be rewritten. This is a strange and beguiling affair between the two countries, where all the received political terms—democracy, electoral democracy, theocracy, among others—mean something rather more, and different, than what has been supposed. The struggles taking place in Pakistan are critical, but they cannot even be recognized for what they are if the struggle to recuperate Pakistan for discourse is not given its due. A “failed state,” “theocracy,” and the “most dangerous place on earth” are handy tags, but handy for whom? And whom do they describe? One would be within reason to
think that they describe, perhaps, the principal author of such epithets: the United States of America. Having bombed a number of countries into near extinction, the United States has pressed forth with conviction its candidacy for the designation of the “most dangerous place on earth.” Its Commander-in-Chief has described himself as a devotee of the philosopher Jesus, and its subjects, as repeated polls have shown, are not only avid churchgoers but, by a substantial majority of 64 percent, believe in the Creationist account of the origins of the earth and human life. In all modesty, it must be admitted that the people of Pakistan, in decisively rejecting both the religious parties and the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), the political party to which Musharraf is allied, in the recently concluded elections, have shown greater wisdom than the educated electorate of the richest and most powerful country in the world.

I had commenced with a popular narrative of India and Pakistan and turned to mainstream Hindi cinema for its insights, and in particular to the film *Deewar* (1975). It would be something of a stretch, some might argue, to suppose that Bollywood had in mind the question of a “failed state,” but the temptation cannot be resisted. Ravi, the all-too-pious policemen, fatally falls his brother Vijay with a bullet. Though the moral order is restored, and Vijay receives his just dues, it is very unlikely that any viewer’s sympathies lie with Ravi. The nation-state triumphs, but only in a wooden, mechanical way: “law and order” prevails, but the state is unable to win the affection of its subjects. Is there a nation-state, Bollywood seems to ask, partial (at least in this respect) to neither Pakistan nor India, that has not failed its people?

Notes

1. The term “Bollywood” is much more complicated than is commonly assumed, operating on at least two, and possibly three, distinct registers. It has had wide currency since only the last decade. Outside India, especially, Indian cinema and ‘Bollywood’ are treated as virtually synonymous, though Hindi-language or Bombay cinema is only one of many Indian cinemas. If in its widest canvas Bollywood stands in for Indian cinema, whether in Hindi, Tamil, Malayalam, or any other language, film studies in India chooses to designate by Bollywood not something still as capacious as the Hindi-language or Bombay cinema, but rather a certain strand of middle-class Bombay cinema which began to emerge in the early to mid-1990s and is associated with such banners as Yash Raj and Karan Johar. I have elsewhere argued that the transformation of Hindi cinema into Bollywood required something more, for example the evisceration of the village from Hindi films, the emergence of the autonomous individual as the romantic subject, and a greater awareness of the Indian diasporic presence in the United States. See Vinay Lal and Gita Rajan, “Ethnographies
of the Popular and the Public Sphere in India,” *South Asian Popular Culture* 5:2 (Oct 2007): 87–95.


3. For example, in a piece entitled “Meaning of the Gita” (1925), Gandhi wrote: “But whom does Dhritarashtra represent, and likewise Duryodhana, Yudhisthira, or Arjuna? Whom does Krishna represent? Were they historical personages? . . . Personally, I believe that Duryodhana and his supporters stand for the Satanic impulses in us, and Arjuna and others stand for God-ward impulses.” See *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 100 vols. (New Delhi: Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1969): 33–48. Five years later, as Gandhi commenced a series of weekly letters on the Gita, he described the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* as “not historical works” but rather more akin to “treatises on religion. Or, if we call them histories, they narrate the history of the human soul, they do not tell of what happened thousands of years ago, but depict what takes place in the heart of every human being today. Both the works describe the eternal war between the God and the demon in man—between Rama and Ravana.” *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 55, 32-33.

4. The notion of a middle class exhibit, at least in India, a notorious elasticity and imprecision. The fact that the middle class is described, depending on the commentator’s criteria and predilections, as numbering somewhere from 125 to 300 million people is even less important than the consideration that commentators almost invariably deploy the idea of consumption to define the middle class. The emergence of a middle class in the societies of the West, however, was associated with general civic improvements across wide sectors of civil society, with the enhanced role of the state in the arena of social services, and so on. Many of those termed “middle class” in India would fall well under the poverty line in the industrialized economies, even allowing for purchasing power parity.


7. India and the Soviet Union signed a “Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” treaty in August 1971. East Pakistan was then under martial law, millions of refugees from East Pakistan had flooded India, and relations between India and Pakistan had deteriorated. The United States first began arming Pakistan in 1954 during Dwight Eisenhower’s Presidency, and declassified official U.S. documents made public in 2002 show clearly the extent of U.S. support for Pakistan in 1971 and the contempt in which Nixon and


11. The first semi-official admission by the Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of its orchestration of Gandhi’s assassination came only two years ago: see, for example, “Rajiv Assassination ‘Deeply Regretted’: LTTE,” The Hindu (June 28, 2006). Though the word ‘remarkable’ is inapposite in this context, no terrorist organization can remotely match the perverse brilliance and daring of the Tamil Tigers: from their use of the internet and child soldiers to their military strategies, aerial attacks, money laundering, and political assassinations, they have led the way—with very little of the huge publicity garnered by al-Qaeda and bin Laden. A full-length, first-rate study is still awaited, but John Richardson, Paradise Poisoned: Learning About Conflict, Terrorism and Development from Sri Lanka’s Civil Wars (Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Center for Ethnic Studies, 2005), will suffice.


13. See, for example, the special issue of Tehelka 4:43 (November 2007), on Gujarat, also accessible online at www.tehelka.com, or the chilling Genocide issue of Communalism Combat 8:86 (March–April 2002), available online at http://www.sabrang.com/cc/archive/2002/marapril/index.html (accessed March 7, 2008).


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