THE INDIAN MUSLIMS

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Who are the Indian Muslims?

Whoever they may be, and wherever they may be in India, the Indian Muslims take themselves for granted. This is true of all periods of Indian Muslim history, and it is true even now, when a division of the country has taken place on a basis that does not appear to be justified by history. But the Indian Muslims have taken themselves for granted in many different ways, and a precise definition of who and what they are becomes very difficult. The principle of the census, that anyone who is an Indian and calls himself a Muslim is an Indian Muslim, obviously gives no indication of what it is to be an Indian Muslim. If we apply any of the criteria on ground of which individuals can be considered to constitute a community, we are faced with the problem of classifying masses of people whose unity comprehends many diversities the significance of which can be understood only in the light of their historical development.

This book is an attempt to portray the life of the Indian Muslims in all its aspects, beginning with the advent of the Muslims in India. Its account, to be perfectly valid should, therefore, have been based on a series of complete records covering about twelve centuries. What we have, however, are chronicles of political activities and events, and accounts of travellers and observers at particular periods. The political histories are generally poor material from which to draw conclusions in regard to the sociological structure and character of the Indian Muslims during the whole course of their history. The accounts of travellers and observers are illuminating, but they are of value only for the time with which they deal and the aspects of life in which the writers were interested. In the Imperial Gazetteer of India, compiled towards the end of the last and the beginning of the present century we can, however, obtain information about Indian Muslims all over the country. This information is given piecemeal. The District Gazetters had necessarily to be compiled by different officers. They did not have the same approach and some give evidence of antipathy, of preconceived ideas or of the
superficioussness natural to those who considered themselves culturally superior. But the Gazetteers have the great value of being comprehensive, and can serve very well as an indication of the complexity of Indian Muslim life, specially of beliefs and practices, of the time with which they deal. They also indicate certain trends of growth in numbers and of developments in culture which are problems for the historian as well as for the student of contemporary life.

Educated Indian Muslims have had their particular way of looking at their community. Islam has, in all countries, promoted urban life, and Muslim civilization has everywhere been essentially urban in character. This has not prevented Muslim society from taking root in the regions where Islam was propagated. But the standards of life and culture have been urban: the ideally good life has been life ‘among men’, in habitations where the variety of habits, tastes and conditions has provided sufficient opportunity for cultural and spiritual experience. Educated Indian Muslims have, therefore, thought of their community as consisting primarily of city-dwellers, and judged themselves as a people setting up and conforming to standards of city life; the uneducated, unformed population of the countryside has not been given the consideration to which it is entitled by the very fact of its existence. This is understandable, because almost the whole contribution of the Muslims in manners, in literature, in art, is seen in the cities. But no study of the Indian Muslims can be objective, and, of course, no information about them can be complete, unless we consider both the urban and the rural population.

Let us first form an idea of the diversity of beliefs on the basis of random samples from the Imperial Gazetteer, fixing Delhi as the centre, and proceeding in different directions, one after another.

In Karnal, not far to the north of Delhi, a large number of Muslim agriculturists were, till 1865, worshipping their old village deities, though as Muslims they repeated the kalima, the Muslim profession of faith, and practised circumcision. In the Panjáb, the North-West Frontier, and Jammu and Kashmir State, most of the uneducated and many of the educated were superstitious and disposed to running to dead and living saints for the fulfilment of their desires or for relief from suffering. They were spiritually dependent on miracles and magic to a degree incompatible with genuine belief in an omnipotent God.

In the south-western direction from Delhi, in the native states of Awar and Bharatpūr, lived the Meōs and the Mīns. They had purely Hindu names or tagged on Khán to a Hindu name. They celebrated not only Diwān and Dasehā which, though Hindu festivals, had acquired something of a national character, but also

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1. Gōta means a family group having the same surname.
3. A heavy, broad, curved blade.
4. A steel knife.
5. Gazetteer of Śautā, p. 512.
as the Mahdi had already come, there was no further need for repentance from sins or for praying for the souls of the dead. They were organized in da'irahs or circles, under spiritual heads, whom they called Sayyids, and they married only within their own sect. In the same area were Kolis, Biis, Sindhis, and Thakurs, whom conversion to Islam had not weaned away from criminal practices or the superstitions of the aborigine.

Across the deserts, in Sind, while there were people of unimpeachable orthodoxy, like the Sufis, the beliefs of the vast majority of the population were more or less tainted with credulity, an inordinate reverence for living and dead saints and Sayyids, and practices which looked like survivals of the worship of trees and rivers. The essentially Sindhi cults are based on the two principles of a male fertilizing element in River and a female producing element in Nature or vegetation. There was the cult of the river Indus, a river god, who emerges as an armed saint, Tahir, in Nature or vegetation. There was the cult of a camel, and whose shrine was visited on appointed days by a large number of betrothed men and married women. He was called Uderolal, just outside the boundaries of the modern district, just outside the boundaries of the modem Ghorbari district, in what is now the State of Uttar Pradesh, Patna District Gazetteer, p. 10.

Near the river Ghazi Miyil's fair, the followers of the Mahdi, had set up their Mar'i, and a paste of flour, sugar and ghal was offered to her. The Dhikris and Da'is of Makran in Baluchistan, the followers of the Mahdi, had set up their Ka'bah at Koh-i-Murad, near Turbat, and went there on pilgrimage at the same time as the orthodox Muslims went to Mecca.

Eastwards from Delhi, in what is now the State of Uttar Pradesh, and in the central part of Bihar, south of the Ganges, there were sects and sectarian differences, and a belief in the miraculous powers of saints, living and dead. In some areas, there were fairly large semi-converted 'neo-Muslim' tribes. Ghazi Miyil's fair, held around the tank of Manir, might be quoted as an example of a greater lapse from orthodoxy than the numerous sars, or death anniversary celebrations at the tombs of the saints. Here, in summer, a mock marriage procession, starting from the town with music and men carrying the banners of Ghazi Miyil, went to the tank. Eunuchs performed the duties of the parents of the mock bride and groom. At a shrine on a mound near the tank women and girls supposed to be possessed by evil spirits prostrated themselves, fell into a trance and danced hysterically. The fair was also an occasion for consuming large quantities of toddy. This, however, was a popular aberration rather than an expression of belief.

North of the Ganges, in the district of Purnea, while there were educated and orthodox Muslims also, the dividing line between the religious beliefs and practices of the lower class Hindus and Muslims was very faint indeed. In every village could be found a Kali-asthan, a shrine dedicated to the worship of the goddess Kali, and attached to almost every Muslim house was a little shrine called Khuda Ghar, or God's House, where prayers were offered in which the names of both Allah and Kali were used. A part of the Muslim marriage

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5 Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Baluchistan, P. 30.
6 Patna District Gazetteer, p. 69.
ceremony was performed at the shrine of the goddess Bhagvati. Goats, fowls, pigeons and the first fruit of trees and crops were offered to purely Hindu deities, in particular the village godling, who was generally supposed to live in the most convenient tree. The most popular deity, among both Hindus and Muslims, was Dvaita Mahārāja, with his doorkeeper, Hathi. His abode and temple consisted of nothing more than a bamboo planted in the ground, from which were hung an old winnowing basket, a bow, an old fishing net and a hook. The ‘Bengali’ sub-caste of Muslims living in the Kishanganj sub-division built little shrines for Hindu deities, generally for Baishāhari, the snake-goddess. They explained this by saying that according to the custom of their forefathers they had both a Kīmilī-Ghār (God’s house) and a Baishāhāri-Mā-Ka Ghār (house of Mother Baishāhari)13.

In the Barāt and Bashirāt sub-divisions of the 24-Parganas the Muslim woodcutters and fisherfolk venerated Mōbrāh (Mubarak) Ghāzī. He was believed to be a jāgār who had so oversaw the wild beasts of the jungle that he went about riding on a tiger, and the Zamindār or Rājā of the area in consequence ordered that every village should have an altar dedicated to him. These altars were very common in villages in the vicinity of the Sundarbans, and woodcutters never went into the jungle without invoking Mōbrāh Ghāzī’s protection. There was a regular ritual for this, performed by jāgārs claiming descent from the Ghāzī. The jāgār would go with the woodcutters to the spot where they had to work, clear a bit of jungle, and mark out a circle, repeating charms and incantations. Within this circle he built seven small huts with stakes and leaves, the first one dedicated to Jagbandhū, the friend of the world, the second to Mahādeva, the destroyer, the third to Manās, the goddess of snakes. Next to this would be erected a small platform in honour of Rāpari, a spirit of the jungle, and beyond this came the fourth hut. This would be divided into two compartments, one for Kālī and the other for her daughter, Kālimayā. Then would come another platform, on which offerings were made to Īrpari, a winged spirit of the jungle, and after that another hut, again divided into two compartments, one for Kāmūsvarī and the other for Bhrī Thākhurī (Old Thakur, or Landlord’s Wife). Next came a tree, called the Rasbāhā Chandī (another name for Kālī), the trunk of which would be smeared with vermilion, but to which no offerings would be made. The sixth and seventh huts, which followed, would have flags flying over them. Each of these had two compartments, the first dedicated to Ghāzī Śāluh (Mubarak Ghāzī) and his brother


Kālī, the second to his son, Chāwal Pir, and his nephew, Rām Ghāzī. The last deity to be propitiated was Bāstū Dvaitā (the Earth), to whom no hut or platform was erected. Offerings were placed on the ground in plantain leaves. When everything was ready, the jāgār had a bath, put on a dhotī provided for him by the woodcutters and smeared his hands and forehead with vermilion. Then, with hands folded before his face, he went down on his knees, bowed his head to the ground, and remained in this attitude for a few seconds before each of the deities in succession, offering prayers to them14.

In the Chittagong District, Pir Badar was venerated as their guardian saint by Hindus as well as Muslim sailors. When they started on a voyage by sea or river, they invoked him, saying, ‘We are but children, the Ghāzī is our protector, the Ganges is on our head. Oh Five Saints, O Badar, Badar, Badar!’ It has been suggested that Pir Badar is the same as Khwājah Khiṭīr, who is believed to reside in the seas and rivers and to protect mariners from shipwreck15.

Southwards from Delhi, around Indore in central India, Muslim Pāήls and Mirdhās14 had Hindu names, dressed exactly like the Hindus and some of them recognized Bhavīnī and other Hindu deities. The Nāyātas of Khajrānī, a rural population looked down upon by Muslims in the towns, were the descendants of Pīrīfārī freebooters and the prisoners whom they had converted. They had amalgamated completely with their Hindu neighbours15.

The Gujarāt region has been, it seems, a melting-pot of races and beliefs. It would not be correct to say that heterodoxy in various degrees was the characteristic feature of Muslim beliefs in Gujarāt, but there were forms of it which were not so evident elsewhere. Apart from the Khājīs and the Mahdawīs (or Ghair-Mahdawīs, as they were called), who have been mentioned already, there were a number of tribal or sectarian groups whose beliefs and practices could not be fitted into any Islamic pattern. Among the tribal groups, the outstanding were the Śīls, the Mūlīs, the Kafūsīs, the Rājīs and the Ghānīs; among the sectarian groups were the Husāini Brahmins, the Maḍāris, the Shāikhās or Shāikhs, and the Kamālīyās.

The Śīls were the descendants of Africans, imported as slaves, mainly from Somaliland. Among them were professional singers and
dancers who held their instruments, the jamālā or rattle and the drum in great veneration. The jamālā was sacred to Mānā (or Mother) Misrah, the drum to Father Ghar, and it was believed that they would punish anyone who touched an instrument while ceremonially impure. The Mūslims, Rāṯhās and Kasbāts were segments of Rāṯhā tribes who, while accepting a new faith, had given up as little as was possible of their old beliefs and practices. The Mūslims not only observed Hindū festivals but worshipped Hindū gods17, the Rāṯhās claimed to be Sunnis but did not perform the daily prayers or read the Qurʾān. Some of them kept the pictures of Śvāmnārāyana in their houses and worshipped them. They inter-married with Hindūs and Muslims, which was characteristic of the Kasbāts also.18 The Ghānūčs, found mainly in the Panch Mahals (Godhrā), described themselves as followers of a certain Maṃśā. They were believed to abhor all other Muslims and to be well inclined towards Hindūs19.

Among the sectarian groups, the Ḥusainī Brahmans called themselves followers of Aṭhavāvāda and derived their name from Ḫusain, the grandson of the Prophet. It could be said that they were not really converts to Islam, but had adopted such Islamic beliefs and practices as were not deemed contrary to the Hindū faith. Except beef they ate secretly all other kinds of meat. The men dressed like Muslims, but put the ṭūl, or browmark, on their foreheads. They did not practice circumcision, their marriages were performed by a priest of their own class, and they buried their dead in a sitting posture. At the same time they fasted during Rāmaḍān. They were not really converts to Islam, but had adopted such Islamic beliefs and practices as were not deemed contrary to the Hindū faith. Except beef they ate secretly all other kinds of meat. The men dressed like Muslims, but put the ṭūl, or browmark, on their foreheads. They did not practice circumcision, their marriages were performed by a priest of their own class, and they buried their dead in a sitting posture. At the same time they fasted during Rāmaḍān and followed other Muslim practices. They held the saṅkta, Ḥwājījī Muʾnuddīn of Ajmēr, in special reverence. The Madāris proclaimed themselves believers in the celibate saint, Badiʿuddīn Maḍār Shāh, whom they held to be alive in his tomb at Makarpūr, near Kanpur. They worshipped Hindū gods as well as Muslim saints.

The Ṣahlīkās, or Shākīs, were devotees of Bābī Muhammad Shāh, one of the minor saints buried at Pirnā, near Ahmadābād. They were not circumcised, they put the ṭūl marks on their foreheads and did not eat with the Muslims. Many of them, in fact, belonged to the community of the Śvāmnārāyana. But in marriages they adopted both the Hindū and the Muslim ritual, employing the services of a faqīḥ and of a Brahman, and buried their dead like the Muslims.

16 Ibid., Vol. IX, Part II, p. 69 and 64.
17 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 216.

INTRODUCTORY

Of the Māmās the Mirʿal-i-Aḥmadī says, 'In the sub-district of Chunval, forty miles to the north of Ahmadābād, in the village of San Khānpūr, under Pasṭān, is a temple wherein is no idol, but a niche which is named after Bahāsharā, one of the names of the goddess Bhavā. The worships are divided into two classes, the Āvaṭārīs (sumachs) and the Kamalīyās. The Kamalīyās are men of the military profession who always bear the emblem of Bahāsharā, which is a trident. Both classes are Musulmans. . . . They sacrifice buffaloes at Bahāsharā's shrine and mark the forehead with the victim's blood. They did not circumcize, and except that they buried the dead (after branding the breast), all their ceremonies were Hindū. All these sectarian groups followed begging in some form as their profession.'

The Māmās of Cutch professed to belong to the Shiʿah sect of the Muslims, but were quite like the Hindūs in their habits, feelings and general mode of thinking. They did not associate with Muslims, did not eat flesh, did not practise circumcision, did not perform the daily prayers or keep the fast in Rāmaḍān. On the sixth day after the birth of a child a cross was made on the ground with a red powder, called gullāt, and at the end of a month a Sararswat Brahman was called to name the child.20 Vows to the river-god were common among the Bādālis, who claimed to be Sunnis.21

In the district of Nīmar, and having its centre at Bāhūapūr, was a sect known as Pirzādā. It was founded about 250 years ago by a saint, Muhammad Shāh Dullāt. He adopted as the supreme deity the tenth incarnation of Vishnu, which was to come, and was known in the sect as Nishkalankī, or the Sinless One. He accepted Vishnu in all his other incarnations, but disowned all other Hindū deities. A number of Hindūs, chiefly Kunūbūs and Gūjās, who became his followers were allowed to remain in, and follow the rules of, their respective castes. The heads of the sect, the spiritual successors of Muhammad Shāh, presided over an annual assembly of the followers at the tomb of the founder; a book compiled by him, consisting of selections from the religious literature of the Hindūs and Muslims, served as the scripture. The heads are said to have considered themselves as orthodox Muslims and not to have believed in Nishkalankī. They also admitted that their followers were, to all intents and purposes, Hindūs.22

Of the Muslims living in the rural areas of what was formerly known as the Central Provinces and Bīrār, and in the districts of
Thanā, Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur, it could be said generally that they were more than three-fourths Hindū. The Muslim Bihārs, or cotton-carders, practised in all seriousness what was a parody of the prescribed manner of killing a fowl for food. The formula they repeated was: 'Father and Son, Shaikh Faridullah, kill the fowl. It is the order of God that the fowl should die by my hand.' The egg was also killed ceremonially. While slicing off the top of the egg, the bīlmā would say:

'White dome, full of moisture, I know not whether there is a male or a female within. In the name of God, I kill you.'

Some Deshmukhs and Deshpandés of Buldānā professed the Muslim religion, and employed Brahmins in secret to worship their old tutelary deities. The Qaṣī's of Thanā, Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur had strong Hindū leanings. They abstained from beef-eating to such an extent that they would not eat even a beef butcher, and they avoided mixing with Muslims, though a qājī was engaged for marriage ceremonies and funerals. In Ahmadnagar, the Qaṣī's or Baqar Qaṣāb and the Pinjārās still worshipped Hindū gods and had their idols in their houses. In Bijāpur, in addition to these two communities, the Bāgbhāns (gardeners), Kānjārs, poulterers, rope-makers, pindhrās and grass-cutters, though professing to be Muslims, had such strong leanings towards Hindūs that they did not associate with other Muslims and openly worshipped Hindū gods. The Chhaparbands, who were originally highwaymen, also continued to worship Hindū gods in spite of their conversion.

Southern India presents a curiously different picture. Here Islām came directly from Arabia through Arab traders, and in matters of doctrine the Muslims remained very largely unaffected by the environment. On the other hand, in dress, in food, in manners and customs and in the laws of inheritance their assimilation with the non-Muslims has been quite considerable, specially along the seacoast. The South does not, of course, form a homogeneous unit, the Muslims of Mysore and Bangalore being much closer culturally to those of Haidarābād than to the Mōghuls and Navāyats of Kērala, who are geographically much nearer. But the divergence is in manners and customs, which we shall deal with later, and not in belief.

This is an assortment of the religious beliefs of mainly uneducated Indian Muslims, chiefly of the lower classes or the rural areas, towards the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

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29 Ibid., Vol. XXIII, p. 482.
30 Ibid., Vol. XXIII, p. 296.
Mughal (or Turk) and Pathan. Families that became prosperous, or prosperous communities that became converted to Islam, but were racially non-descript, fitted themselves in the four accepted racial categories by means of historical fictions. But they remained distinct. Often they did not themselves want to intermarry as a matter of course with other families within the same category. Maintenance of the purity of the family stock has all through been an important consideration with those who claimed to belong to the 'noble' class, and their attitude was regarded as a sign of respectability. Communities belonging to the lower classes did not, on being converted, discard or grow out of their inherited ideas of caste, and sometimes even maintained caste distinctions tenaciously. We have noted some instances of such Muslim communities avoiding other Muslims socially. But almost all over the country the upper classes have been a unifying factor, no matter which of the four 'racial' categories they may have belonged to. And the type of exclusiveness we have noted is local, unusual, and without much significance. Muslims generally recognize or can be made to recognize it as an obligation to sit and eat together. Not only prayer in the mosque but even the generality recognize or can be made to recognize it as an obligation of the doctrine that all Muslims are equal. The claim of the Muslim to the hospitality of a brother Muslim has been so openly and universally recognized that it could be regarded as one of the basic characteristics of Indian Muslim society.

Like the Hindus, or in fact like the people of any other country, the presence of the Muslims in India can be traced to three different sources, conquest, immigration, and conversion, with the mingling of different stocks taking place in a manner that was beyond social or political control.

Let us first take conquest. Muhammad bin Qasim's conquest of the Sindh valley, Mahmud of Ghazni's plundering expeditions and his annexation of territory up to the Ravi, and the invasions of Shihabuddin of Ghur, which led to the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, are matters of political history. The Sultanate expanded rapidly along the trade-routes, and the southernmost limit was reached with the establishment of the short-lived kingdom of Madurâ. But conquest meant the victory of the Muslim over the opposing armies. In case the ruler of a territory submitted, there would be very little change; if he did not submit, he and the ruling class would be replaced by Muslims or by pro-Muslim natives of the territory. The armies of the Arabs and Turks to whom we trace the political changes that took place in India were very small indeed, and the expansion of the Delhi Sultanate meant only a change of government—and often enough not even that—in the territories which its armies overran. The addition of a Muslim element to the population was due to other causes. Conquest only provided opportunities.

The first Arab settlements on the eastern and western coasts of south India were the result of the development of trade, and the traders did not, like the European adventurers of the early modern period, enjoy the support of a home government interested in promoting commercial activity. But settlement and immigration of Muslims did follow the conquests of Sindh and of northern India. The immigrants came from Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, West Asia and the eastern coast of Africa. They came because of unsettled conditions in their native land or in search of adventure and opportunity for achievement. But this was not migration in any considerable numbers. It was rather a slow and spasmodic infiltration of families and individuals. From the tribal territory of the north-west frontier, however, there were migrations of clans and groups of clans, and it is for this reason that Pathans form a substantial part of the upper strata of Indian Muslim society almost all over the country where the number of Muslims is at all considerable. There were also migrations from one part of the country to another. The Arijins of the Montgomery district claimed, according to the Gazetteer, to be Sardarwali Rajpoots originally settled around Delhi; the Turkish Janjars of Rampur in Uttar Pradesh believed that they had come from Multan, and the Rampur State Gazetteer mentions a group of Shikhs families who first settled in Jalaun and then made their way south-eastwards to Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut, Bijapur, Muradabad and Badayun. These may be regarded as typical cases. After the establishment of Muslim rule in the Deccan there was both immigration from abroad and migration from the north. A small element of the Muslim population of Kârâl consists of immigrants from the Deccan. Sometimes such migration and settlement has been under political pressure, as when Muhammad bin Tughlaq attempted to send families of nobles and scholars to Daulatbâd, mainly it has been due to a search for livelihood and opportunity. But, however significant such migration may have been culturally or economically, its numerical value was small.

The vast majority of the Indian Muslims are converts. Their conversion may be assumed to have been due to one or more of several causes. Force was used on occasions, but the existing historical evidence does not enable us to estimate either the scale or the
effectiveness of such conversions. Also, the risks involved in a policy of conversion by force should not be underrated. Islam was adopted by families or groups of families who were regarded as outcasts in Hindu society because of their profession, or because they had lost caste through association with Muslims in some type of civil employment under the government. Service in the army was an attraction, especially for tribal groups with war-like traditions, and this service would inevitably make them outcasts. Persuasion played its part also. The Khujas, the Bohras and the Memans are examples of the conversion of whole communities by missionaries. Most of the Muslim communities who appear to have been only partly converted must have changed their religion because of beliefs of the miraculous powers of particular saints. The communities practising trades that made them outcasts in the Hindu social system would have adopted Islam because of the obvious advantages, and because they were urban communities or depended on the towns for their livelihood, their conversion was also more thorough.

The main agency for conversion were the mystics, and most of the large-scale conversions seem to have taken place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But legend and fact have become so mixed up that hardly any such event can be precisely dated.

In view of the manner in which Indian Muslim society was gradually constituted, it becomes necessary to determine the forces that kept its diverse elements together. Political interest, as we shall see, was not the interest of the community as a whole, but of ruling classes and cliques. It did, no doubt, create a kind of solidarity by providing opportunities for employment, for the acquisition of wealth and influence and the promotion of literature, art and cultural activity. But in spite of the formation of large and powerful states as the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire, the general tendency was towards division of the Indian Muslims into many potentially and often actually hostile political units. We do not see any common economic interest either. Those engaged in professions and trades depended on the patronage of the ruling classes, but the economic order was seldom affected by a change of rulers. Tradition and custom, professional ethics and the system of the biradari or 'brotherhood' provided the cohesive force within the professional and the productive classes. Normally, the exclusiveness or the self-centredness of these classes and communities would militate against

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26 This does not, of course, apply to the age of imperialism and the industrial revolution.

the creation of social solidarity. The only unifying factor among Indian Muslims was common allegiance to Islam.

This allegiance created the sentiment of belonging to a community, and this sentiment has been the point at which religion, the instinct for self-preservation, political interest and social traditions can be said to meet. This sentiment can remain latent or dormant for generations, but it can also be roused to fever pitch within an incredibly short time. It has brought the joy of release from normal social restraints and inhibitions. It has supported movements for reform. Under normal conditions, its most characteristic expression is the emotional response to a stranger introducing himself as a Muslim, and the realization that comes with it of all the Muslims of the world being one vast brotherhood. This sentiment has not generally overcome sectarian prejudices or material interests. It has not been a generally active political force. But if we have to define the Indian Muslims, we can only say that they are Indians who call themselves Muslims, who believe in the unity and fraternity of the Muslims as a religious and social community, and are capable of showing in practice that they act in accordance with this belief, however they might differ in doctrine and observances.

This does not mean that the Indian Muslims have been amorphous as a community. On the contrary, the diversities within the community, which reflect the wide variety in the Muslim way of life all over the world, have only served to exalt the idea of unity. Modern definitions of nationalism, particularly where the body politic is composed of heterogeneous elements, rely upon the will to political association and unity as the decisive factor. Because of the latent desire for unity it was all too easy to confuse the identity of the Indian Muslims as believers in Islam with their identity as a distinct body politic, as a nation, which they never were and never wanted to be.

The differences in origin, the social structure, the beliefs and practices of the various constituent elements of the Indian Muslims as seen in the early twentieth century could be assumed to have characterized them in varying degrees from the very beginning. Their ideal was to be a well-knit, egalitarian community, believing in Islam and expressing this belief in their daily life. It was only an ideal that, being Muslims, they were automatically a political community. Political power, as we shall see, was something extraneous, and not an organic fulfilment of their community life. The attempts to attain a definite and common religious character produced different kinds of reactions, some inclining elements of the Indian Muslim community towards rigidity in belief and practice, others, which could best be called adventures in self-realization.
opening the way for adjustments that would enable the inclusion within the Islamic fold of people among whom the doctrines of Islam had barely found a foothold. The Indian Muslims have seen themselves, and been seen by others, only in parts. To see their community as a whole we must look at all the aspects of Indian Muslim life throughout the course of its history. This will enable us to appreciate the variety of forces at work among the Indian Muslims, to isolate the elements of their weakness and strength, to understand their past and throw light upon their future. The ambition to maintain an objective attitude is nowhere common, and the judgements of the Indian Muslims about themselves have been either inspired by self-praise or self-pity, by an idealization of themselves as the embodiment of religious truth and political wisdom or, with equal lack of balance, by a condemnation of themselves as a people unworthy of those ancestors who spread the word of God throughout the world and set the highest example of social and political justice. Both these extreme viewpoints are misleading. They are also simplifications which effectively prevent that understanding of history and contemporary life which is essential for healthy development. A third form of judgement, which is an aspect of the apologetics of the last hundred years, is that of comparison and contrast. The defects of the western way of life and of the manners and customs of the Hindus are picked out to show that, however bad the Muslims may be, there are others who are worse. This form of vilification is not characteristic of the Muslims only, and sometimes it may be necessary, in the interests of truth, to compare institutions, attitudes and practices, so that those which are the subject of study may be shown in the correct perspective. In this book, while sentimental and a priori judgements have been avoided, comparisons and contrasts that would modify any criticisms made have been left to the fair-mindedness of the reader. It is the author’s firm belief that the Indian Muslims have, in their religion of Islam, and in the true representatives of the moral and spiritual values of Islam the most reliable standards of judgement, and they do not need to look elsewhere to discover how high or low they stand.

In conclusion, it is necessary to clarify the method of treatment followed in this book. Indian Muslim history has been divided into an early, a middle and a modern period, and the various aspects of life and activity have been discussed under orthodoxy, statesmanship and administration, religious thought, sultanism, poets and writers, architecture and art, and social life. As the purpose of writing is to help in understanding rather than to provide all the information available, only typical and significant ideas and personalities have been discussed. This has involved the risk of judgements in selection and omission which might appear defective or prejudiced. Some readers will, perhaps, find only a cursory mention or even no reference at all to ideas, policies, persons or works which, in their opinion, might be more representative and important than those selected. But this risk had to be taken in order to keep the length of discussion within reasonable bounds and to prevent the book from becoming merely an assemblage of facts. Another risk, perhaps inevitable in a study which aims at the analysis and evaluation of the various constituent elements of Indian Muslim religious, political and social life is that the reader may mistake the evaluation of any one factor for an evaluation of the whole. For instance, because orthodoxy has been dealt with separately, a judgement of the orthodox attitude in matters of religion may be taken as a judgement of the orthodox position as a whole, where the author’s intention is to evaluate only one aspect of belief and practice. During the modern period an active and effective section of the orthodox, while not abandoning their traditional views in regard to innovations in matters of religion, were nationalist and progressive in their political attitude, and it would be a grave misunderstanding of the author’s intention if his observations on their religious views or social behaviour obscured his appraisal of their contribution to political progress. The three periods into which Indian Muslim history has been divided for purposes of this study in fact form one unit, but the reader is requested to suspend his own judgement in regard to the author’s presentation of the problems and persons of any particular category until he has a picture of the period, whether early, middle or modern, as a whole.

There will no doubt be readers who will condemn the author for holding or not holding a particular point of view, and scholars who will consider the plan of the book ill-conceived or its execution faulty and the study of the sources partial or inadequate. But there is as yet no work that attempts to present in an organized fashion the various aspects of the whole of Indian Muslim history, and one of the hopes with which this book has been written is that it will provoke scholars and lead to a richer and fuller presentation of the subject.
ORTHODOXY AND THE ORTHODOX

THE SHARI’AH AS LAW

The Indian Muslims have regarded themselves as a community, and primarily a religious community. In theory, if not always in fact, their judgement in regard to beliefs, political policies, social customs and the way of life generally has been influenced by a concern to act as strictly as possible in accordance with the teachings of Islam. This is the basis of their orthodoxy, which they have held to be the embodiment of both the worldly and the spiritual good, the ideal framework within which life should be lived. It seems most appropriate, therefore, to begin with a discussion of orthodoxy and the orthodoxy during each of the periods into which this study has been divided.

We may define orthodoxy in general terms as the principle and system of maintaining uniformity in belief and practice by determining what is true or desirable, by discouraging deviation, and applying appropriate social and legal sanctions to enforce conformity. Orthodoxy reflects the tendency of adhering to tradition, of accepting the results of what is held to be valid thought and experience and of the orthodoxy of sects, not of the believers as a whole.

Differences in regard to doctrines and practices and interpretations of the law began among the Muslims soon after the death of the Prophet. These differences were not so much disagreements as the inevitable results of efforts to make the shari’ah of Islam complete in every respect. The absolute validity of the Qur’an as the source and basis of the shari’ah was assumed and has never been questioned. In specific cases, where the Qur’an was not explicit, the choice lay between finding what the decision or the view or the action of the Prophet had been or, where no known act or opinion of the Prophet could serve as a relevant precedent, relying upon one’s own judgement or opinion (ijtihād) or ijma’ (consensus of opinion among those entitled to give an opinion). As no source other than the Qur’an possessed absolute validity, the development of Muslim jurisprudence, called fiqh, depended upon assigning the proper degree of validity to the other sources. The hadith (Traditions), and all details regarding the actions of the Prophet, comprehended in the term sunnah, were collected and their authenticity continuously examined. Ijtihād was also made use of. As Islam was held to be based on an integration of the spiritual and the worldly life, a harmonization of religious observance, morality and law, it was necessary that doctrines, ritual and law should be integrated within a system. Islam does not permit the constitution of a church or of any body to give a final or binding opinion in matters of doctrine, ritual or law. Muslim jurisprudence is the sum total of independent, personal opinion, the validity of which was based on the number of adherents a particular opinion or a comprehensive body of opinions happened to obtain. The degree of validity, therefore, also varied. But the ideal was that all Muslims should follow the sunnah, the example of the Prophet, and should constitute one united community; that they should be, to use the technical phrase, ahk-i-sunnah wa l jam’ah. So far as jurisprudence was concerned, four schools of thought (madhahib), the Malik, the Hanafi, the Shafi’i and the Hanbali, came to be recognized as equally authentic. For a time it was permissible to consult the opinions of all the four schools, but then for various reasons it became the rule to follow one particular school. This rule gradually came to be regarded as bind-
ing, and was called taqlid. In other words, orthodoxy came to be regarded as strict adherence to one of the four schools of fiqh. The particular fiqh followed was naturally regarded as comprehending the manifold aspects of the shari'ah.

When the Turks established their power in India, the Muslim world stretched from the banks of the Beas and the lower Indus to the shores of the Atlantic, and northwards to the Caspian and Aral seas. Samarqand and Bukhara were centres of learning which exercised the greatest influence on the Turks. The standard of orthodoxy came thus to be based on works of fiqh whose authority was recognized by the learned men of central Asia, and as these learned men generally followed the Hanafi fiqh, orthodoxy in Muslim India came to mean taqlid of the Sunni Hanafi fiqh as presented by the central Asian scholars of the eleventh and the twelfth centuries. The standard work being the Hidayat of Burhanuddin Abul Hasan 'All Marghinani, written in the twelfth century. This orthodoxy received official recognition and support, and constituted the shari'ah of Islam which it was the duty of kings to maintain. With rare exceptions, only scholars who had studied the Hanafi fiqh were appointed to the post of qadi or sadr, though they could, at the request of litigants, decide cases in accordance with the fiqh of other schools. The Hanafi fiqh was the core of the instruction given in all educational institutions. Commentaries on the Qur'an and collections of hadith were also prescribed and studied, but mainly as the academic counterpart of the fiqh. The urge to study the Qur'an and the whole corpus of hadiths in order to form an independent judgement was discouraged, and scholars devoted their attention instead to writing commentaries upon or preparing adaptations of the recognized and prescribed books. Indian Muslim jurists did not permit themselves the exercise of independent judgement even in matters of detail. But it was inevitable that Indian Muslims should be influenced by their environment and, in practice, gradually make those adjustments which appeared necessary. It was also evident that those who were converts would not give up all their established customs and habits. The legal categories of 'urf and 'adalah provided

1 There have been Shi'ah sects in India from the close of the eighth century, and among the Sunnis also there have been theological differences. But the Hanafi Sunnis have always formed the vast majority, and it was because of them that orthodoxy became a significant and potent influence.

2 'Urf is a term used for custom, for customary law, for laws made or procedures adopted by the ruler, for that which upon minds have agreed because of the evidence of reason, and in believing which men of all dispositions concur', etc. 'Urf cannot, in principle, override the shari'ah; in practice, it has often done so. 'Adalah is a prescriptive right, an established practice. See Levi, The Social Structure of Islam, Ch. VI, and Encyclopædia of Islam, 'Urf and 'Adalah.

opportunity for a realistic co-ordination of religious law with existing fact. But no advantage was taken of this. Muslim jurisprudence, therefore, remained an extraneous element, envisaging conditions that were largely, if not entirely, hypothetical or irrelevant to the actual conditions of life. It could not but be as rigid as any system which is purely logical is sure to become.

The method generally adopted to ensure conformity was to ask for the opinion (fatwa) of the learned on any matter under discussion. In appearance this method was democratic, as the community would be able in this way to find out the opinion of the majority of those entitled to give an opinion on the basis of their knowledge. In reality, it was a kind of inquisition which any member of the community could initiate. To take, as an instance, what has actually been a subject of controversy. Is it permissible to listen to music? Any of the 'ulama could be asked this question. If he declared it was not permissible or held that it was or even if he declined to give an answer, he would have to show on what authority he based his opinion or attitude. This led inevitably to a discussion of the relative validity of the various authorities; and those who relied on the Qur'an or the hadith could not close the discussion, because even when quoting the Qur'an and the hadith they could be accused of deviating from an opinion held by the majority of the community for many generations and, therefore, of creating dissension. So, even though there were few points apart from the basic doctrines on which the recognized works of fiqh themselves gave categorical judgements, the safest course for a scholar was to avoid controversy by confining himself to the study and exposition of accepted opinions. Practice could not be controlled, but formal expressions of opinion on questions of dogma and practice were subject to a scrutiny the consequences of which could not be foreseen. Determined advocacy of opinions unacceptable to the 'ulama possessing authority led to the destruction of the 'innovator' or, if he was successful in collecting a sufficiently large number of determined followers, to the formation of a sect.

As Muslim jurisprudence developed and became more and more a specialized study, a distinction had begun to be made between the figh, or jurist, the religious thinker and the sad'ah. Technically, and also in fact, they were all 'ulama. They studied the same books and relied on the same sources. But the jurists, concerned mainly with the application of the law as officers of the state, devoted their entire attention to matters of law and believed in following the opinions of recognized jurists as the most valid precedents. The religious thinkers regarded the shari'ah as an indivisible body of doctrine and practice. They kept aloof from kings and courts and the administration of the
state. For them the Qur’ān and the hadith were the main and the immediate as well as the ultimate sources of guidance. The šāyfi‘s claimed to follow the sharī‘ah but, as we shall see later, their belief and conduct was governed by what they considered to be the requirements of the truly spiritual life. The jurists gave opinions in matters of law as muftis, administered the law as qādis, as judges of all ranks, and the highest among them would be religious and legal adviser to the ruler, recommending appointments, promotions and transfers of qādis, and generally also supervising the distribution of charities, which could take the form of grants of land and endowments or cash payments. The dependence of the jurists on the ruler and the administration was obvious. It was equally obvious that the jurists had to support the administration because they were supported by it, and it was likely that in matters of controversy they would be guided more by political policy than the sharī‘ah or their own conscience. They were not above casuistry, and could use the legal formulation of a religious injunction both as a means of enforcing as well as of evading it. Conscientious theologians were obliged to condemn the whole system of sulṭān and qādī and legalistic interpretation. But they could do so only in certain ways and within certain limits. For, apart from the fact that the jurists could withhold patronage and reduce the theologian to utter dependence on charity, it was the jurists who ultimately decided what was a wrong or a right view in matters of religion, and their decision would be enforced by the political authority. The independent ‘ulāmā retaliated by calling the jurists’ believers in externals, ‘ulāmā-i gābir, worldly men who could not attain righteousness. Thus, while the jurists represented and enforced orthodoxy, they were not regarded as truly religious men, while the independent ‘ulāmā, however high the honour in which they may have been held, could not obtain general acceptance for what they held to be the true orthodoxy. The šāyfi‘s were even less inclined to endure subjection to a narrow, legalistic interpretation of the sharī‘ah. So we find that although orthodoxy was recognized as obligatory, it could not be stated with any confidence by the Muslims of any period after the

Pious Khalifas as to who among their contemporaries were the orthodox men whose opinions were to be accepted and whose example followed as a matter of course. The believing Muslim felt no real respect for the qādī who, he was told, belonged to the category of worldly men, even if he was honest in his dealings. But he saw that the views of those who lived a genuinely spiritual life could not prevail against the idea of orthodoxy which had the approval of the government and the jurists. The protests of the religious-minded continued to undermine the moral foundations of the political organization of the Muslims and to create a mental embarrassment and unrest within the community which served to counteract tendencies towards the sealing up of its mind.

II

The Muslim community has been a political as well as a religious society. Both these aspects have been regarded as inseparable, because Islamic teaching insists upon the integration of the worldly and the spiritual life. It ordains that the religious and the worldly life should be organized on the basis of the same values, that equality before God should be given a social and political expression in the form of legal and political equality, that the bai‘ al-mā‘l, or public treasury, should be regarded as a means of promoting public welfare. In political affairs, while authority is to be entrusted to the most righteous, the individual member of the community, by virtue of his obligation to enjoin what is known to be good and forbid what is evil, becomes entitled to judge personal behaviour and public policies and actions and to condemn what is wrong. The integration of political and religious values was obvious in the life and thought of the Prophet himself and of some of his Companions, but could not become organic except through actual practice over a period of time sufficient to establish precedents and constitutional procedures. During the life time of the Prophet, questions of constitutional procedure did not arise. After his death, and with the expansion of the Muslim community, they became all-important. Authority had to be vested in someone worthy to be called his successor, who would have the spiritual and moral qualities desirable in an Imam, a religious head, and at the same time be a capable statesman and administrator. How could this be done? One possible method was some form of election or selection, another the acknowledgement of a hereditary right, both in the spiritual and the physical sense. But questions of principle became obscured in the struggle for power among Arab tribes and families, and the profession of allegiance, known as bai‘ ab, was made to legalize the possession of power. The Muslim community
remained both a religious and a political society, but after the Banū Umayyah had established a system of personal rule, it came to be assumed that peace, stability and prosperity depended on an effective administration controlled by a monarch.

The examples of the Prophet and the Pious Khalifas make it fairly clear what the spirit and the general policy of a ruler and an administration following the principles of Islam should be. In matters of doubt the method of consultation could be adopted, which meant that the opinion of the majority would be followed. But the stability of a political organization depends on discipline as well as the right and duty to oppose what is patently wrong or unjust. There are sayings of the Prophet which make obedience obligatory. He is reported to have taken the following promise from 'Ubūdah ibn 'Arāmah: 'We offer bai'ah (alliance) with the conditions that we shall submit and obey both when we are pleased and when we are displeased, when we are in ease; also when others are preferred over us. We offer bai'ah also with the condition that we shall not enter into dispute with the officers of the government ...' 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ūd relates that the Prophet told us that after him we would see injustices and undesirable acts committed (by the rulers). The Companions asked, 'What do you command us to do under these circumstances?' The Prophet replied, 'Give to these rulers what is due to them and ask God for what is due to you'. It has been reported by Ibn 'Abbās that the Prophet of God said that if anyone sees his ruler commit an undesirable act, then he should be patient, for whoever moves away by a hand's span from (the path of) obedience to the Imām, will die the death of the jāhilliyah (Age of Ignorance). 'Abdullāh bin Yamān has related that the Prophet (Peace be on him) said, 'After me there will be Imāms who will not do as I have instructed and will not follow my sunnah, and shortly there will become prominent among these rulers men whose hearts will be like the hearts of devils in the bodies of men'. I [Hudhāifah] submitted: "O Prophet of God, if I see this condition, how shall I act?" The Prophet said, "You must obey your ruler even if you are beaten, for your property is taken away even then you must obey him". Taken out of their historical context, these Traditions seem clearly incompatible with the fundamental doctrines of Islam, and inconsistent with the Prophet's sense of justice and his solicitude for his community. We should, therefore, consider them along with those Traditions which make obedience conditional. "Ubūdah bin Sāmitt reports that the Prophet asked for bai'ah with the condition that he would be obeyed under all conditions and circumstances, that those placed in authority would not be challenged, save in cases where they committed patent acts of kufr and there was evidence in the Book of God to show that these were acts of kufr. "Your best rulers are those for whom you have love in your hearts and who have love in their hearts for you; for whom you pray that God should bestow His favours on them and who do the same for you. And the worst Imāms are those for whom you have enmity in your hearts and who have enmity in their hearts for you, those whom you curse and who curse you". The Companions said, "O Prophet of God, should we not oppose such men?" The Prophet said, "No, not so long as they maintain salāh (prayer) among you". "It is not permitted to obey man in what is sinful; obedience is only in righteousness. Listening and obeying is (obligatory) on the Muslim in all matters, whether pleasing to him or displeasing, save when he is commanded to do what is sinful. So if he is commanded to do what is sinful, listening and obeying is not (obligatory)". "Help your brother [Muslim], whether he is unjust or being subjected to injustice". The Companions said, "We understand what it means to help those subjected to injustice, but how shall we help the unjust?" The Prophet replied, "Help to the unjust is this, that you hold his hand and restrain him from committing injustice". If any of you sees any evil, he should remove it with his own hand. If the circumstances are such that he cannot remove it with his own hand, he should declare publicly that it is evil. If circumstances do not allow even of that, he should consider in his heart that it is evil. This is the lowest form of faith. There are theological opinions given later that repeat these principles. According to the Fath al-Bārī, 'People should not rebel against the sultan until he commits patent acts of kufr, but if he does commit such it is obligatory to attack him'. The most definite and encouraging authority for disobedience is the
The historian Jusuf ibn al-Jazuli notes that revoking a sultan's authority is no advantage in deposing him. But if he does not possess power, he can be deprived of authority corresponding to the obligations he incurs. And Jusuf ibn al-Jazuli as a religious duty on the Muslim to judge the actions of the sultan, it is a religious duty on the Muslim community. We shall illustrate the basic inconsistencies in its political doctrines with a few examples. The historian Barani, for whom orthodoxy seems to have been the supreme value, quotes from a sermon stated to have been given in the court of Iltutmish (1211-1236) by a renowned— and, presumably, dreaded— preacher, who was also Sayyid Nuruddin Mubarak Khaznawi:

"Whatever kings do as an essential requirement of the affairs of kingship, the way they eat and drink and robe themselves, the way they sit and get up and ride on horseback, and seat the people and make them prostrate themselves; the way they maintain, with their heart and soul, the manners and customs of the kings of Iran and Byzantium, those rebels against God, the way they deal with God's creatures in all their affairs on a special basis is opposed to (the example of) the Prophet, is an assumption of the attributes of God and a ground for punishment in the life to come."

Barani repeats the same view in his Fatwa-i-Jahangiri:

"There is no verse of the Qur'an and no hadith of the Holy Prophet permitting the pomp, ceremonies, manners and customs of kings, or all those actions of pride and power by which the terror of kings is engraved on the hearts of the subjects, both far and near, and which are a means of securing the enforcement of their orders. Also, from the words and acts of the Pious Khalifahs, which are worthy of being adopted by kings of the Muslim faith, no precept has come down to us."

The same historian reports a conversation between Al-iuddin Khalji and Qadi Mustawfi of Bayanah, in which the qadi tells the king, that from books on law and religion which he has read, it is clear that the magnificent and the expenditure of the court, the excessive punishments, the appropriation of the booty obtained from Dagestani are all against the shari'ah. In fact, the methods of monarchical and despotic rulers were never accepted as permissible, and were the subject of continuous admonition and condemnation. Drinking and immorality, vices common in most kings and courtiers, were even more frequently censured.

Barani, op. cit., p. 47.


Barani, op. cit., p. 293-4.

12 Mishkâl, p. 227.
13 Barani, p. 372.
14 There are examples in Indian Muslim history of courageous refusal to serve tyrants and to co-operate with them in any way except by admonition and spiritual guidance. An instance is given later in this chapter (p. 74). See also The Rajâlah of Ibn Battuta, translated by Dr. Mahdi Hussain, Gawkad's Oriental Series, No. CXXII. P. 86-88.
15 Our 'ulama say that a person can become a sultan on the fulfilment of two conditions. First, the people should offer bai'ah (allegiance). It must be understood that the bai'ah of the nobility and the leaders of the people is to be considered valid. Secondly, his orders should be capable of enforcement because of the terror and overwhelming nature of his power.
16 If the people offer bai'ah to someone and his orders cannot be enforced among his subjects because he lacks pom and magnificence, he shall not be considered sultan. If the people offer bai'ah to a sultan, and thereafter he begins to practise cruelty, then, provided he possesses power and pom, he shall not be deposed, as he will again become sultan because of his power and superiority, and there is no advantage in deposing him. But if he does not possess power, he can be deposed'. Fatwa-i-Qâdi Khâbur, Vol. III, p. 184.
But the power of the kings had to be maintained. "Enjoining what is known to be good and forbidding what is evil" is the obligation of every Muslim, but it was not extended to include resistance to patent injustices or acts of cruelty or violations of the shari'ah committed by kings, who were answerable only to God for their actions.

'If a body of Muslims rise (against the Imam)\textsuperscript{19}, then we must first discover the reason. If the reason is the injustice and cruelty of the sultan, then these people will not be called rebels, and it be-VOl. II, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{19} Imam here means ruler, sultan.

\textsuperscript{20} At-Fath\textsuperscript{21} al-Baz\textsuperscript{22}i\textsuperscript{23}Jah\textsuperscript{24} of Shaikh Imam Hafizuddin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Shihab, known as Ibn al-Baz\textsuperscript{25} al-Mard\textsuperscript{26}i\textsuperscript{27} al-Hasan\textsuperscript{28}, compiled in the ninth century of the Hijrah, 15th century A.D. Printed on the margin of the Fath\textsuperscript{29} al-\textsuperscript{30} Alamgir\textsuperscript{31}, published by Nifta\textsuperscript{32} al-Kub\textsuperscript{33}r, in Egypt, 1310 A.H. Vol. II, p. 133.

This casuistry makes it clear that, without condemning rebellion unconditionally, it was made impossible for any large or small body of Muslims to urge the commandments of God to live righteously, to persuade others to do the same, and to resist injustice and evil as a valid reason for revolt, disobedience or even collective expression of disagreement. The ruler could be forced to listen to admonition, but all discussion of the circumstances under which righteous Muslims could unite to compel a ruler to act according to the shari'ah seems to have been avoided.

The power of the king in the sphere of religious law was extended by his control over the q\textsuperscript{ds}. According to the Fath\textsuperscript{21} al-Baz\textsuperscript{22}i\textsuperscript{23} Jah\textsuperscript{24} the q\textsuperscript{ds} should be appointed only by the Khalifah, or by the sultan, if the Khalifah has given him the power. If the sultan is the appointing authority, he has the right to depose a q\textsuperscript{d} when there is no reason for suspicion or when there is a cause. If the sultan appoints an improper person as q\textsuperscript{d}, then the sin will be on the head of the sultan. Rectitude is not an essential condition for adopting and transmitting commands (of the law or the shari'ah), therefore the decisions of an immoral person will be obeyed and enforced, but an immoral person should not be made q\textsuperscript{d}. If a person becomes immoral after being made a q\textsuperscript{d}, he deserves to be deposed; but unless the sultan deposes him, he cannot be automatically considered as deposed merely on the ground of his immorality\textsuperscript{31}. This surrender to the sultan in the name of legality is prefaced with the pious remark that 'According to the authorities of the f\textsuperscript{iq}, it is better for a person not to accept the office of q\textsuperscript{d}'. But this piety is neutralized by the statement that if a person—and what could such a person be but a hypocrite—believes honestly that no one but he can fulfill the obligations of this office, then it is his duty to accept it in the interests of the safety of the Muslims\textsuperscript{32}.

The ruler could maintain and enforce the shari'ah only through the q\textsuperscript{ds}, the muha\textsuperscript{33}al\textsuperscript{34} and the jurists, as he himself had no authority in matters of religion. The q\textsuperscript{ds} and the jurists had no means of inducing people to accept them and their theological credentials except through the king\textsuperscript{35}. There was thus an alliance between them based on the particular interest of each party. As we shall see later, the religious thinkers and the mystics had much to say about the evils of this alliance, and the official 'alam\textsuperscript{36}, both to maintain their self-respect and their social status, found a psychological compensation in the glorification of those sentiments of self-esteem which are common to most peoples, and in creating such a gulf between the Muslims and the non-Muslims that the Muslims would be forced to aim at domination, and expose themselves to exploitation by the vested interests of kings and noblemen.

There was never any doubt in the minds of the Muslims of their right to spread over the earth. An objective view of this attitude would require a consideration of the historical forces underlying their expansion from the seventh century onwards. The Muslim Turks who established their rule in India were off-shoots of nomadic tribes forced to exploit opportunities of conquest and migration. There are several instances in pre-Muslim Indian history of the conquest of

\textsuperscript{21} Al-Fath\textsuperscript{22} al-Baz\textsuperscript{23}i\textsuperscript{24} Jah\textsuperscript{25} of Shaikh Imam Hafizuddin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Shihab, known as Ibn al-Baz\textsuperscript{26} al-Mard\textsuperscript{27}i\textsuperscript{28} al-Hasan\textsuperscript{29}, compiled in the ninth century of the Hijrah, 15th century A.D. Printed on the margin of the Fath\textsuperscript{30} al-\textsuperscript{31} Alamgir\textsuperscript{32}, published by Nifta\textsuperscript{33} al-Kub\textsuperscript{34}r, in Egypt, 1310 A.H. Vol. II, p. 133.


\textsuperscript{23} The king or his deputy's permission was necessary even for leading the Friday prayers. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 143.
parts of northern India by tribes squeezed out of their home-land, and the irruption of the Muslim Turks was a continuation of this process. The urge and the courage required for the conquest and occupation of alien and unknown lands cannot be the result of philosophical detachment or defeatism. Conquerors have always had some deep conviction that justified their policies. The Muslim Turks found the moral justification for their advance into India in the injunction to propagate Islam. As this could not, in the opinion of kings and warriors, be achieved without the subjugation of the non-Muslims and the occupation of their territory, the propagation of Islam became identical with war and conquest. This view is presented in the Persian chronicles with a tedious and jarring persistence as some deep conviction that philosophical detachment or defeatism. Conquerors have always had the moral justification for their advance into India in the injunction to propagate Islam. As this could not, in the opinion of kings and warriors, be achieved without the subjugation of the non-Muslims and the occupation of their territory, the propagation of Islam became identical with war and conquest. This view is presented in the Persian chronicles with a tedious and jarring persistence as some deep conviction that structural detachment or defeatism.

The treatment to be meted out to the Hindus in India was a corollary to the principle of jihād. The obligation to be the refuge of the faith cannot be fulfilled until they (the kings) have utterly destroyed infidelity and unbelief, polytheism and idolatry for the sake of God and the protection of the true religion. If they cannot wholly extirpate polytheism and infidelity because they have taken root and (exterminate) the infidels and polytheists because of their large number, it will not be less meritorious if, for the sake of Islam and of affording refuge to the true faith, they use their efforts to insult and humiliate and to cause grief to and bring ridicule and shame upon the polytheistic and idolatrous Hindus, who are the bitterest enemies of God and the Prophet of God. . . . They should not, for the sake of the glory of Islam and the honour of the true faith, permit even a single unbeliever and polytheist to live as a respectable person . . . or be set in authority over a community or a group, a province or a district. These are not the views of a jurist but of a fanatical preacher of the court of Iltutmish, when the Delhi Sultanate was struggling to establish itself. They are repeated, with much less political reason, by Qāḍī Mughalī, Qāḍī Mughalī, *Hidāyah, Kitāb al-Siyar wa'l-Jihād.* Maṭbah al-Tabāk, Delhi, 1331-32 A.H. Vol. 1 and 11, p. 539.

41 For example, *Sira* al-Tanzih, 5.

"Keeping the Hindū in a humble position is one of the essentials of true religiousness."77

Technically, the Hindūs were dhimmis, non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim state. The orthodox position in this matter has been a source of grave provocation at all times and appears now to be an exhibition of religious arrogance and fanaticism. It is also a position which was adopted without regard for history and historical precedents. We should, for the sake of an objective judgement, review briefly the different circumstances in which the relationship between the Muslims and the non-Muslims had to be determined.

Islam was first preached among a people swift to resort to violence, bitterly persistent in their feuds and reckless of life. The Prophet suffered patiently the persecution of the Meccans for as long as was possible without his little community being exterminated. After the migration to Madinah, the Muslims came into contact with other communities and a basis of relationships had to be evolved. Agreements had to be entered into with communities of Jews and Christians. Their terms range from mutual guarantees of help and protection to guarantees of protection given by Muslims to non-Muslim communities willing to integrate themselves with the Muslim body politic. These guarantees represented a form of legal recognition of the right of the non-Muslim community to maintain its organization and its way of life (shari'ah), and gave a substantive form to tolerance and co-existence.

The precedents of the days of the Prophet were followed with a judicious regard for moral principles as well as actual circumstances by his first two successors. Tribes and towns of non-Muslims which became integral parts of the Muslim body politic were given full religious liberty, with only such restrictions as would prevent the exercise of this from causing friction between communities. The cross could be taken in procession but not through Muslim crowds or localities inhabited exclusively by Muslims. The *wāqīs* could be rung at any time except the Muslim times of prayer. In dress and general appearance a certain distinction was maintained, as also in the kind of saddle to be used. These were days when the non-Muslims were superior to the Muslims in all the outward forms of culture, and though it would be proper to object to the insistence on any form of distinction being ordained by law, the motive could not have been to show that the non-Muslim was inferior in appearance. Such details, however, do not appear important if we appreciate the fact that the term *dhimmī* implied that the Muslims took over the re-

78 A kind of wooden gong.
possession of looking after the non-Muslims within their jurisdiction. Their lives and property were secured and equal justice was meted out. The jizyah was levied as a tax to cover the cost of military protection provided for the dhimmis. Those who undertook or were asked to undertake military service became exempt. Dhimmis, in need were entitled to support from the public treasury on the same basis as the Muslims, 'for it is not just that we should derive income (i.e. jizyah) from them when they are young and abandon them when they are old.'

This may not have been an ideal policy, but it was not unjust or unreasonable. The ḥudūd, however, were carried to the other extreme. The dhimmis as a polytheist when offering prayers, even if they happened to be a stranger, could be asked to undertake military service became exempt. Dhimmis in need were entitled to support from the public treasury on the same basis as the Muslims, 'for it is not just that we should derive income (i.e. jizyah) from them when they are young and abandon them when they are old.'

These rules could not have been strictly or continuously observed. Political circumstances, economic needs and social and religious tendencies working in a contrary direction prevented their enforcement. Orthodoxy was more evident in other spheres of the individual Muslims' life. Preachers as a rule exercised their imagination and rhetorical ability in describing the horrors and terrible punishments of hell, the ordeal of the grave and the awful occurrences of the Day of Judgement. True belief was the simple safeguard against all the terrors of the unknown, and true belief was reduced to the recitation of the kalimah declaring that there is no god but God and Muhammad is His Prophet. A feeling of supreme confidence was created by dilating on the virtues of the Prophet and the glories of the wars during his life time and the rule of the four Pious Caliphs. With this was contrasted the decline of morals and the disregard of religious duties evident during the contemporary age. This incredibly simple pattern of thinking seems to have had an amazing quality, as it remained unchanged for centuries without losing its power.

One reason for this may have been that it was continuously reinforced by political and economic conditions. The noblest occupation for a Muslim was jihād, and the most praiseworthy occupation of his life was martyrdom on the field of battle. In terms of everyday life, this meant that military service provided the best career, and it was the business of kings and commanders to see that every war was a jihād and the practice of the military profession identical with the fulfilment of a religious duty. When that could

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17 Fathul-Amīr, Vol. V, p. 346-8, quoting as authority earlier works.
18 Ibid., Vol. V, p. 349, quoting as authority Al-Akhīṣrār Shāh al-Mukhātar, In the Rūjū al-Umūm and the Hujjāj 'Alī al-Baǧīgh, jihād is not mentioned among the professions.
19
not be done, the soldier could fall back on his professional pride in achievement or manly courage in bearing the consequences of defeat. Military service became government service also for those who possessed the necessary talent, and was thus the best means of getting on in the world. These beliefs and calculations of benefit were fully exploited by the rulers, and buttressed the political doctrines of orthodoxy with all the strength of a deep and far-flung vested interest. The soldiers and commanders depended entirely on the king. The merchant depended on the king and the noblemen—who were mainly successful soldiers. The three together exploited the agriculturist and the craftsman.

VI

Orthodoxy was sometimes and in some ways irksome, but generally an advantage for the rulers. From the tenth century onwards, even though the 'Abbāsid Khalifahs had lost all power, it was considered meritorious and, therefore, essential for an independent ruler of any status to get his title to the throne acknowledged by the Khalifah. Even the imperious Makhāmīd of Gāhāni was forced to observe this formality. The sultāns of Delhi maintained this practice. The orthodox concept of political order required that the name of the ruler of the territory concerned and of the reigning Khalifah should be mentioned in the khutbah read to the assembled Muslims before the Friday prayers, and there are numerous instances of the name of the Khalifah and the reigning sultan both being embossed on coins. Allegiance to the Khalifah nominally linked up all Muslim states in a kind of supra-political unity. It did not affect the authority of the independent rulers and legalized their actual possession of power. It was, therefore, a distinct advantage to exchange gifts and obtain a title from the Khalifah.

It was also useful to observe forms prescribed by orthodoxy. But the manner of observance varied from ruler to ruler. It was normally expected that the king would not openly indulge in what was forbidden, that he would show respect to men of learning and desire their company, that he would attend the Friday prayer and occasionally visit a person of acknowledged spiritual eminence to listen to his admonitions. Munificence in gifts to the learned and the poor was regarded as particularly meritorious. If the sultan exhibited the proper degree of prejudice towards polytheists, Shi'ahs, and heretical sects, he was sure to win the hearts of the pious.

But if he did not do all this, he would still remain king and command obedience, provided he had the power. He was not possible to anyone and could behave like a mad elephant if he was elephant enough. But kings who were in general even moderately balanced and sober would retain their popularity if they gave occasional evidence of holding orthodox views. It was considered legitimate for them to suspect even religious people, and be on guard against them. The chief qādī, called Ṣādūq al-Ṣiddīq during the Sultanate period and afterwards, was a minister and adviser, and could not ask for special consideration to be given to his views. The kings could inflict what punishments they thought fit in the interests of their own security, and it was assumed that they would be relentless towards opponents and rebels. Taxes over and above those allowed by the sharī'ah could be levied if the king had the power to do so. Criticism, if any, came from the independent 'ulamā' or the ẓāfiṣ, seldom from the official representatives of orthodoxy. But all criticism and murmurs would be silenced if the king knew how to exploit sentiment, to wage a successful war, to persecute heretics and proscribe heretical literature, in short, to discover some religious' interest common to himself and his people. The orthodoxy found excuses for praising and obeying the king if only they got the chance, knowing all the time that almost everything the kings did as persons and as rulers was repugnant to the sharī'ah and impossible to justify.

Of the sultāns of Delhi, Iltūnīsh (1211-1236) seems to have deserved the high opinion held of him by the orthodoxy as well as the ẓāfiṣ. Balban (1266-1286), screening himself behind an unimpeachable personal orthodoxy, raised the status of the king to a position totally incompatible with the sharī'ah, and in the interests of security inflicted savage punishments on innocent women and children. Jalāluddīn Khilji (1290-1296) was weak, but he allowed to be killed without trial a person known to be a ẓāfiṣ on the suspicion that he was involved in a conspiracy against him. 'Alīuddīn (1296-1316) is reported to have brought all the issues between his policy and the sharī'ah into the open, and to have declared roundly that he would do as he thought fit, and not what was required by the sharī'ah. I do not know whether such commands are permitted or not by the sharī'ah. I command what I consider to be of benefit to my country.

See p. 66 above.
and what appears to me opportune under the circumstances. I do not know what God will do with me on the Day of Judgement. 186

All rulers could not be as frank as 'Alâ'uddîn, because they did not possess as much power. But no ruler could give priority to orthodoxy over reasons of state. If we consider the period of the Sultanate and look for the highest common factor in the policies of the kings, it would perhaps be judicious non-interference in matters of religion. This policy could be practised by all the parties, the 'ulamâ' associated with the administration, the righteons 'ulamâ', the şâfts. But it was also possible for accidents to occur to that would raise fundamental questions of jurisdiction and rights. Then it would appear that the whole system depended on the observance of certain conventions, and could be morally damaged if these were disregarded even on minor issues.

Ghiyâthuddîn Balbân heard of the knowledge, piety and integrity of Maulana Kamâluddîn Zâhid. The sultan desired that Maulana Kamâluddîn should become his Imam (i.e. the Imam of the chief mosque of the city which the sultan attended). For this reason he summoned Maulana Kamâluddîn to appear before him. When the Maulana appeared, the sultan said, 'We have complete faith in the perfection of your knowledge, integrity and uprightness. It will be extremely kind of you if you agree with us and accept the office of our Imam. We shall then be convinced that our prayer is acceptable to the Glorious God'. The Maulana replied, 'There is nothing left to us except our prayer. Does the king now wish to take this also away from us?' When the Maulana gave this reply out of the firmness of his faith, the sultan was silent, and he understood that this revered person was not acceptable (to his proposal). He apologized profusely and sent him away. 187

This is one of the instances, unfortunately not frequent enough, where a scholar and theologian of repute expressed complete disapproval of kings and kingly rule. During the reign of Jalâluddîn and 'Alâ'uddîn Khilji, Qutbuddîn Mubârak and Ghiyâthuddîn Tughlq, Shaikh 'Abdûr-Rahmân Ash-Shaikh, Shaikh Prof. A. H. Hâfiz, 188

The high officers and the 'ulamâ', on their side, professed what amounts to absolute obedience.

Whereas God the Almighty, the Exalted, the Holy, and His Prophet (Peace be on him) have followed the method of oath and solemn promise, and from ancient times men, both high and low, have, for the expression of their fidelity and also for the attainment of Moslem offered allegiance to the truly religious sultans, so I, the humble one, own (this allegiance) of my own desire and inclination, and state with truthful intent and pure intention that I swear by the Lord of the Universe, the God of Heaven and Earth, the Possessor of Emanence and Power ... that I, the humble one, have taken the oath, here and now, and confirmed it with those things the breach of which is kufr, that in my submission and obedience to the Lord of the World, Vice-regent of the Amir as-Mulim, Khalifah of the Father of the Two Worlds, Sultan of sultans, strong in the support of the Merciful God, Abu Muâifar, Firuz Shâh, Sultan (may God preserve his kingdom and his government for all time and elevate his power and his glory)—who is the possessor of absolute power and submission and...
publication are not given. That Dihli kl Madhhabi Ruj'hanat.

Dr. K. A. perhaps it would be most even further, and hired a woman to accuse self an effective preacher, was not above making preposterous were fiercely jealous of each other. Minhajuddin were mainly those who used their knowledge for terms and conditions, may I be considered one who breaks faith with God, and may my fate be as the fate of those in regard to whom was revealed this verse of the Qur'an, 'These people break faith with God', and as (the fate of) one who abhors the doctrine of the Unity of God, who abhors "these people are not provided with words."

Inskii'-i-MillhrU, Imam, of the Unity of God, who abhors "these people are not provided with words."

However, he seems to have indulged freely the particular type of pugnacity which has been criticized his commentary on the Qur'an as pedal and verbose. He sent his commentary on the

Siyar-al-'Arifin, called orthodoxy and the orthodox

orthodoxy and the orthodox

76 The Indian Muslims

The jurisprudence of this period—the Chief Qädi, Shaikh al-Islâm, qädis—were mainly those who used their knowledge for worldly ends, and were fiercely jealous of each other. Minhajuddin Siraj, though himself an effective preacher, was not above making postmortems against another preacher of his time, perhaps because he was more liked by the people. Shaikh Najmu'ddin Sughrä went even further, and hired a woman to accuse Shaikh Jalil Tabrizi of adultery, and had the mortification of seeing his ugly plot exposed. Perhaps it would be most fair to take Qädi Shihabuddin Daulatbâdî as the representative 'ulamâ and jurist of the period. He was born at Daulatbâdî in the reign of Firuz Tughlaq, and died at Jaunpur in 1445. He studied at Delhi under a famous divine, Qädi 'Abdul Mu'qtadar (died 791/1389). His teacher thought very highly of his intellectual gifts, saying that he had knowledge in his skin, in his bones and in his marrow. But during his student days, Shîhâbuddîn got some gold from somewhere, and instead of giving it away after the manner of the truly religious, he consulted with his mother as to where he should bury it. When his teacher saw him immediately after he did this, he said, 'You are thinking of where you should bury your gold. How will you acquire knowledge?' Still, Shîhâbuddîn made remarkable progress.

When Timur attacked Delhi, Shîhâbuddîn migrated to Jaunpur and settled there. Sultan Ibrahim Sharqî (1402-1436) made him his Qädi and gave him a gilded chair to sit on in his court. 'Although there were many learned and wise men in his time, none attained the fame and eminence which God bestowed on him.' He wrote a commentary on the Kafiyah, which was widely read and appreciated. His Irshad, a work on nabuw, became a text-book. He wrote on rhetoric, a commentary on a part of Basâlî, a commentary on the Qur'an in Persian, called Bahr-Mawâdî, and many small books and pamphlets in Arabic and Persian. On the other hand, he engaged in a bitter controversy with Shaikh Abul Fath Jaunpuri on the question whether the saliva of a cat was clean or unclean, and the two abused and cursed each other. Shihabuddin also quarreled with a Sâyîd over the question of precedence in the court, and wrote a pamphlet to prove that a man of common origin who was learned possessed a higher status than a descendant of the Prophet who was ignorant. Qädi Shihabuddin's teacher was deeply hurt when he heard of this. Qädi Shihabuddin then went and offered his apologies to the Sâyîd, promised not to do anything of this kind in the future, and wrote a book on the virtues of the Prophet's descendants.

Some aspects of Qädi Shihabuddin's personality are evident from this account. He was afflicted with self-esteem and he seems to have indulged freely the particular type of pugnacity which has been regarded as a quality inevitable in the official 'ulamâ. Shaikh 'Abdur 'Haq Mu'addîdî has criticized his commentary on the Qur'an as pedantic and verbose. He sent his commentary on the Kafiyah to Qädi Nasîruddîn Gumbadî, a scholar devoted to study and prayer, with the request that he should use it as a text and thus help to popularize it. Qädi Nasîruddîn, 'either because he was immersed in the affairs of his own soul or to avoid discussion and controversy, glanced through the book and said it was well-written and did not need to be used as a text by him'.
A high value is placed on orthodoxy everywhere, because it maintains the identity of a community as against other communities and prevents an assimilation that could lead to the community disintegrating and being absorbed by others. It is also a force that works for integration and stability. How far did Indian Muslim orthodoxy fulfill these functions in the early period?

We have mentioned the tendency of the orthodox to represent the military successes of Muslim rulers and the acquisition of power over non-Muslims as additions to the glory of Islam. This may have stimulated ambition during the period of expansion, but its inconsistency became obvious when the vast majority of the subjects of the Muslim state were non-Muslim and their loyalty became essential for the proper governance of the state. We have seen in our own times imperialist governments ruling over subjects whom they despised. But the Muslims who had settled in India, or Indians who had been converted to Islam could not maintain the same attitude. The imperialist governments of our times ruled through their representatives—civil servants, businessmen, teachers—who were together able to maintain an exclusiveness and social superiority because they possessed or were provided with the means of doing so, and their condemnation of those who 'turned native' and disregarded the rules of behaviour through which the superiority of the imperialist power was maintained was generally effective. The Indian Muslims were of all types and classes, those actually possessing wealth and power being a very small minority. Claims to inherent superiority could be maintained only by artificial cultivation. This orthodoxy succeeded in doing. The virtues of Islam could be recited endlessly and convincingly, and the Muslim could be so assured of a privileged position in this world and of salvation in the next at the lowest possible price—the profession of faith by repeating the kalimah—so much that the orthodox 'ulamā' had made the Faith dependent on the study of a few books and the remembering of a few words. They had reduced the Faith to something trivial. In fact, there is perfection, there is beauty in the Faith. The 'ulamā' say that all one needs in prayer is to know which prayer it is. Concentration on God (according to them) is a condition of excellence, not of normal performance. Orthodoxy maintained the identity of the Indian Muslim community by condemning the unbelievers in the inherited theological phrases, but demanded from the Muslims little beyond conformity at the lowest religious and ethical level.

Its concept of integration in matters of doctrine was confined to the assertion of the principle of taqlid. Anyone who challenged this principle was an enemy; anyone who expressed an independent opinion in matters of doctrinal or ritualistic detail was a still greater enemy. But rulers and those in power were not criticized. No protests were made against infliction of punishments severer than those laid down by the shari'ah, or against the levy of taxes not permitted by it. The pattern of the good life remained a sacred hypothesis. Answers were given only if questions were asked. The duty of maintaining the shari'ah was a part of the ruler's function, and the responsibility for any contravention of the shari'ah also lay on his shoulders. The orthodox 'ulamā' did not consider it an obligation to insist on the right thing being done. Even those who followed practices contrary to the shari'ah were left alone, so long as they did not attempt to justify these practices on theological grounds. In fact, the 'ulamā' were concerned mainly with criticizing and denouncing each other, and this made the principle of taqlid itself less a means of integration than a source of discord.

That orthodoxy had not succeeded in creating any degree of stability was evident whenever the government was shaken by a revolution. The 'ulamā' never gave a lead to the Muslims as a political community. They waited till something decisive occurred, and then came out to confirm the decision. When, in 1320, Qutbuddin Mubarak was murdered by his favourite, Khursan Khan, who was, or was suspected of being a Hindu, the Muslims of Delhi were not asked to come together as Muslims to make a bid for the continuance of Muslim rule. There was horror and panic, but no evidence that the Muslims had a religion or political and moral values and standards to safeguard. Ghazi Malik Tughlāq saved the situation for the Muslims, but Khursan Khan had a sufficient number of supporters, among them many who would otherwise have

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been classed as orthodox Muslims, to marshal forces for a battle. An orthodoxy which permitted everything to depend on the chances of war could not claim to have achieved or even systematically worked for stability. It could not establish the *shari'ah* as the normative principle; instead, it made religion a poor dependent of politics, and converted a source of moral nourishment into a parasite.

This may appear a harsh judgement. But the judgement of history has to take into consideration not only the circumstances of a period but also the effects on future generations of what is done or not done. It cannot be maintained that this period was lacking in men of courage and genuine moral aspirations, or that political circumstances precluded social experimentation of any kind. The *shari'ah* did not lose its power or dignity, but this was due to the religious thinkers and the *ulamā*, who should have been the link between the state and the representatives of purely spiritual and moral values, chose to become the creatures of the state and to afflict all that came within their reach with meanness and sterility. The religious thinkers and the *ulamā* were forced to avoid them, as they were forced to avoid kings and courts. Shāhī Gūsā-n-dārūz said on one occasion that if questions were discussed in the proper way, it would become apparent that there was no real difference of opinion between the orthodox *ulamā* and the *ṣūfīs*, but as it happened, the only way the *ṣūfīs* could obtain deliverance from this group was to call themselves a part of it. Even so they would be dubbed ignorant, irreligious and atheistic.\(^{45}\) The result of this attitude of the orthodox *ulamā* was that the state, the religious thinkers and the *ṣūfīs* could not discover a basis for cooperation or work for a common goal. The *Muslim* community was not integrated by orthodoxy; it was taught to maintain its identity not through the spiritual and social values which it represented but through the cultivation of prejudices and claims to inherent superiority. Laying such foundations was worse than laying no foundations at all.