THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA

General Editors

DENIS TWITCHETT and JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Volume 9
Part One: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>xi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 The Social Roles of Literati in Early to Mid-Ch’ing</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by BENJAMIN A. ELMANN, Princeton University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literati Education, Elite Society, and Civil Examinations Emperowide</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Classical Literacy before 1800</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Changing Intellectual and Social Context in Eighteenth-Century China</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transformation of Literati Roles by 1800</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Women, Families, and Gender Relations</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by SUSAN MANN, University of California, Davis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Unique Conditions of Ch’ing Rule</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Ming and Early Ch’ing Continuities</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families and Gender Relations beyond the Family</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Social Stability and Social Change</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by WILLIAM T. ROWE, Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and Prosperity</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratification and Social Mobility</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissentment and Scrutitude</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Relations</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns and Cities</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organization</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Economic Developments, 1644–1800</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by RAMON H. MYERS, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and YEH-CHEN WANG, Academia Sinica, ROC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Economic Developments</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Ch’ing Economy Path Dependence</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Imperial State and the Market Economy</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>xi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 The K’ang-hsi Reign</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by JONATHAN SPENCE, Yale University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Brief Chronology of the K’ang-hsi Reign</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The K’ang-hsi Emperor’s Accession to Power</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Reunification of the Realm</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Consolidation of Ch’ing Borders</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factional Politics</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Politics of Administration</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Patronage of Learning and Culture</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 The Yung-cheng Reign</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by MADELEINE ZELIN, Columbia University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usurper or Rightful Heir?</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary Inquisitions</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rulership under the Yung-cheng Emperor</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform during the Yung-cheng Reign</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extending the Reach of the State</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing the Yung-cheng Reign</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 The Ch’ien-lung Reign</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by ALEXANDER WOODSIDE, University of British Columbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: Placing the Reign in Chinese History</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Politics and Economics of Ch’ien-lung’s Wars</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ch’ien-lung Emperor and the Scholar Elite</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Theory, Ideology and the Corruption and Poverty Problem</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 The Conquest Elite of the Ch’ing Empire</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by PAMELA KYLE CROSBY, Dartmouth College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function and Identity in Formation of the Empire</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Wave of Conquest, 1635–1700</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Wave of Conquest, 1700–1800</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fading Functions and the Caste of Identity</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

Enhancing Society's Wealth 592
Centralizing Tax Revenue Collection 604
Upbuilding the Ideal Confucian Society 606
Private and Hybrid Economic Organizations 609
Economic Crops and Handicraft Industries 617
Hybrid Economic Organizations: Salt Production and Distribution 624
The Money Supply and Financial Organizations 626
Transaction Costs, Transformation Costs, and Externalities 630
Conclusion 641

Bibliography 647
Glossary-Index 715

TABLES AND GRAPHS

Ch'ing Rulers to 1800

Table 2.1 Princes of the Blood (with dates of birth and death where known) page xxv
Table 2.2 Princes of the Blood in 1643, by age, with Banners they headed 75
Table 2.3 Ages of Princes of the Blood in 1649 with Banners they headed 79
Table 2.4 Ages of Princes of the Blood in 1653 100
Figure 6.1 Rank holders by category, as percentages of all rank holders, c. 1644 and c. 1670 112
Figure 6.2 Ratio of each category of rank holders in comparison with that category's percentage among all bannermen 332
Figure 6.3 Trends in relative percentages of each category in all banner registration, 1644, 1651, and 1723 333
Table 7.1 The format of provincial and metropolitan civil service examinations, 1646-1756 340
Table 7.2 Chart of civil examinations and degrees during the Ming and Ch'ing 367
Table 7.3 Reformed format of provincial and metropolitan civil service examinations, 1757-1787 379
Table 7.4 Reformed format of provincial and metropolitan civil service examinations, 1793-1808 409
Table 10.1 Distribution of population and population density by developmental areas, 1786 413
Table 10.2 Population density groups in European countries (1750) and China (1786) 568
Table 10.3 Trend of population, cultivated land, silver stocks, and rice prices in China, c. 1650-1920 570
Table 10.4 Natural calamities, tax exemption, and disaster relief in the Ch'ing period
CHAPTER 6

THE CONQUEST ELITE OF THE CH'ING EMPIRE

Pamela Kyle Crossley

The conquest elite of the earlier Ch'ing underwent marked changes as expansion transformed the geographical contours, cultural content, and political dynamics of the empire. Prior to the Ch'ing invasion of north China, a Ch'ing elite already existed, but its qualities and its proportional components were deeply altered between 1644 and the end of the century. From the time of the conquest of north China to the completion of Ch'ing control of south China, the conquest forces were contained in or under the control of the Eight Banners, the Ch'ing accoutermance organization. Within the Eight Banners, "Manchu" (itself a complex matter of definition) constraints composed only a modest percentage of the conquest force, in absolute numbers somewhere between 110,000 and 140,000. It also included a large number — perhaps as

1 Many historians of the Manchus are functionally histronic of the Eight Banners (and the reverse is also true). The foundation modern study is Meng Xi-sen, "Paecho Ch'ing-pei pan-chih shih". "Kan si Ch'ing-pa pan-chih shih, Li-chieh ju-p'ei pai-shih ch'ih hsiao-ku te, No. 5 (1979), pp. 532-811, and there has been important research on individual banners or on entire Manchu banners by Chi-ku Wai-ka, Chi-hua Hsu-shih, Li Chi-shih, and others. For more general studies see Soo Yool Yi, "Sinch'i-i chin Manchuria" (Soo Yool Yi, "Sinch'i-i chin Manchuria"). I am grateful to the London School of Economics Library for the loan of this book. The London School of Economics Library, 1975. Kuo Tung-ho, "The rise and decline of the Eight Banners government in the Ch'ing Period (1644-1911)" (diss. University of Chicago, 1941); Wang Chuan-chou, ed., Man-chieh ti shih chi-shih tao-shih (Peking, 1980); Yang Shao-shang, Ch'ing tea-p'ei shih (Peking, 1980); Pamela K. Crossley, 'Manchu monarchies and the end of the Qing World (Princeton, 1992). The Manchus (London, 1997). A monograph review: history and identity in late imperial China (Berkeley, 1996) and Mark C. Eliscu, The Manchus today. The Eight Banners and ethnic identity in late imperial China (Quarto, 1995). The origins of the same "Manchu" concept is probably on the basic of documentation known at this time, but the components I take as here have to do with who is indicated by the term "Manchu." The references for the change of name are far more likely to have been related to the creation of the Qing empire in 1650 than to anything or name that, if sticky enough, could not be disregarded with so much memory, if one were keen, certainly explains this context. See also Crossley, On the Way to the West, pp. 16-7; Jennifer S. Rawski, The last emperors: A social history of Qing imperial power (Berkeley, 1995); p. 128; and Crossley, A Manchu memoir, pp. 191-3. Adding to the complexity, the term "Manchu" (man-chiu, man-chiu-tung, man-chiu-tung-pee and "barbarians") (Qian wei-wen) has been used by the Chinese, sometimes being read interchangeably and sometimes used distinctly. See Crossley, On the Way to the West, pp. 16-7; Crossley, Manchu Takemoto, P. 590, n. 1; Crossley, The Manchu, pp. 79-9, and Rawski, The last emperors, p. 6.}

many as 340,000 at the time of the conquest of Peking in 1644 — of surnames, agricultural or commercially employed residents of Liao-tung and Chi-chin who were referred to, with greater or lesser precision, as Han-shih bannermen. In the conquest elite were members of the populations of eastern Mongolia, northern Liao-tung, and western Chi-chin who became the foundation of the Mongol Eight Banners and certain former Ming officials who joined the Ch'ing. As the venues, methods, and pace of Ch'ing conquest shifted again in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the effects were soon seen in the function and fortunes of the Ch'ing conquest elite. The nineteenth century saw the massive displacement of a major portion of the remnant conquest elite, with comparatively few aristocratic survivors.

The components of the conquest elite consolidated slowly, and in stages. Earliest of these stages was the formation of a governing group under Nurhaci between 1582 and 1626. Next came the rise of temporal power under Hsun Taiji between 1627 and 1645, in which segments of the elite were institutionalized, brought under the regulation of the central government, and ranked in general relation to their role in the expansionist policies of the new empire. This was followed by the dramatic and best-known passage in the early empire, the conquest of China and eastern Mongolia during the latter half of the seventeenth century. That conquest partly overlapped with a second-order expansion into western Mongolia, Turkestan, Tibet, and attempted conquests in parts of Southeast Asia, which came to a gradual halt during the latter half of the eighteenth century. During these phases, the various segments of the conquest elite not only continuously altered their positions relative to each other, but also experienced some degree of change in composition, denomination, and political function. 

1 This term needs to be distinguished from the English term "Chinese" and at the same time, it recalls the specifically "Chinese" connotations the term carries in Manchu and in Chinese. Therefore I have allowed the literal connotation "Chinese-centric," see Crossley, "The Manchus in two worlds," "The Qing empires on the Chinese-modern (Manchu-haters)," (On the Way to the West, pp. 44-5 and 93-4), where back the connotations of the terms and the expectations of having it set aside. But see also Mark C. Eliscu's use of the terminology "Han-oriented."
By the end of the eighteenth century, then, the conquest elite stood as a functional group with a more central population (the imperial lineage, Manchu and Mongol titled families, eminent lineages of the Han-dian, commended ranks of the Eight Banners and the garrison throughout the empire, certain high-ranking Chinese civil officials) and a more marginal one (common families of the Eight Banners, virtually all members of the Hunting and Fishing Banners, and those Chinese civil officials instrumental in the incorporation of new territories but who had not firmly secured the confidence of the emperors). Whether more central or more marginal, components of the conquest elite were subject to mechanisms of attrition that helped keep their numbers in check and in some instances forced a more accelerated diminution than attrition itself would have effected. In the earlier period of expansion in China, for instance, Manchu and Han-dian bannermen who were natives of Liao-tung or Chi-lin could request to return there, which in practice meant discharge as lifelong soldiers. The court encouraged bannermen to pursue forms of civil education that would enable them to become self-supporting outside the banner. 1 Members of the Aisin Gioro (Ali-han Chi-ho) imperial lineage, or collateral Gioro affines, were subject to dismissal from the rolls if found guilty of crimes, or if their degree of relationship to the direct imperial line became too distant. By these and other methods, the Ch'ing court of the seventeenth century attempted first of all to avoid being crushed by the burden of financial support of this elite, and in the eighteenth century to accelerate the transition from a conquest posture to one of governance and defense. Neither of these goals was attained, and in the event the conquest elite fell victim to the more distal forces of impoverishment, political displacement, and social marginality.

The emergence of privilege in no way diminished the historical importance of the conquest elite. This was not merely because the relative power, cultural cast, or financial independence of the elite were barometers of elemental changes in the empire, but also because even extraordinarily dominant rulers such as the K'ang-hsi, Kang-cheng, and Ch'ien-lung emperors—all famous for their augmentation of imperial power against the venerable aristocrats among the Manchus—were in many ways subject to both the strengths and deficiencies of the elite. When elite groups were rich and powerful they had to be guarded against; when they were poor and powerless they had to be supported and encouraged. When the elite were competent the conquest progressed, when they were incompetent it lagged. The court, in short, never saw itself free to demolish the conquest elite or cast it aside, even if individual members were to be totally deprived of their belongings or

---

1 Crosby, Dykas warriors, p. 55.
Among the Ch'ing founders, members of Nurhaci's family were uniquely elite, which is to say their status and prerogatives were distinct from those of any other members of the conquest elite. Whether members of the lineages descended from Nurhaci's ancestors constituted an "aristocracy" is moot, since no true counterpart of the European aristocracy existed in the Ch'ing empire. What is important is that the imperial lineage (after 1612 officially known as the Asin Gioro) was a class unto itself. It was, moreover, a well-regulated class, with its most peripheral appendages systematically stripped away. In its earliest form, the imperial lineage had included the sons of Nurhaci and his brother Wanhai, and from them were drawn the earliest governors of the empire—the hulu bele, or cardinal princes, and owners of the Eight Banners. It is probable that Nurhaci originally intended this group of men to provide him with co-rulers and civil administrators as he prosecuted his military campaigns. In these hopes he was continually disappointed, and perhaps as a result of his disillusionment he slowly switched his system of rewards from direct land grants to prizes, awards, stipends, and material grants-in-trust. After Hsun Taiji formally became the second khan of the Chin in 1627, he distrusted the relatively low status of the cardinal princes, and finally proclaimed the Ch'ing empire with himself as emperor in 1635-1636.

The descendants of the original cardinal princes retained high titles and for a time considerable wealth. The land-grant system was never completely abrogated, and to the end of the Ch'ing empire some lineages continued to retain direct land revenues in the Northeast. Each new generation of imperial princes tended to displace further the older cardinal princes in residual political influence. Contention among the imperial princes could be perilous for an emperor, as illustrated by the well-known succession dramas of the late K'ang-hsi years and early Yung-cheng years. From roughly 1650 to 1730, successive Ch'ing rulers pruned the remaining rights of political participation, discretion over distribution of wealth, and military command that the imperial princes had enjoyed.

In the Ch'ing court, it was the custom for the emperor to be advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

The Ch'ing empire was a hereditary monarchy, and the emperor was typically succeeded by his eldest son. The system of primogeniture was strictly adhered to, and succession was never contested. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.

In the Ch'ing empire, the emperor was the ultimate authority, and he was advised by a number of high officials, each with his own special function. The most important were the Grand Secretaries, who were in charge of the imperial chancellery, and the Grand Censor, who was responsible for the administration of justice. The emperor also had a chamberlain, who was responsible for the maintenance of the imperial household. These officials were appointed by the emperor and were usually members of the imperial family or close friends of the emperor. The emperor was also advised by a number of other officials, such as the Grand General, who was responsible for the defense of the empire, and the Grand Treasurer, who was responsible for the administration of the imperial finances.
the name "Manchester" (Manchester) to remonitize the diverse Jurchen groups, who would afterward enjoy uniformity of status, legal obligation and privilege, and of imposed history. Beyond this obvious incentive for a change of name, little about the name "Manchester" itself can be definitively stated on the basis of contemporary records. The origin and meaning of the name are not specified in extant documents (they may have been common knowledge at the time), and though scholars from the eighteenth century on have proposed several plausible derivations, this is possibly an insoluble issue.

The new name marked a social transformation that was well underway by 1653-1656. Previously, Nurhaci had worked with military units based on village and lineage organizations, with the headmen incorporated as officers who retained rights of hereditary leadership over the unit. Gradually the formalization and integration of these units composed the Manchu Eight Banners. By that time, the conquerors in the Northeast and Mongolia were advanced, and war against Ming China in western Liaotung was entering its final stages. In the ensuing century of Ch'ing conquest and occupation of territories in China and Mongolia, the social organizations upon which the banner had been founded were changed nearly beyond recognition. The hereditary claims to capancencies were now administered and adjudicated by departments within the imperial government, and stipends (once granted only during periods of military mobilization) were made regular and graduated according to rank. Most profound, the Manchus were no longer agricultural producers, hunters, fishermen, or traders as their Jurchen forebears had been, but became salaried policemen, foot soldiers, scribes, teachers, porters, and accountants in the segregated urban garrison communities of the empire.

In the period between about 1610 and 1660, the Chin and then Ch'ing regimes proscribed a series of invasions and occupations against the hunting and gathering peoples of the general region of the Amur River. These campaigns originated in Nurhaci's struggle against his eastern enemy, Ula, but they later intensifed as the Ch'ing competed with the Romanov empire for the right to control and tax the populations of the Amur basin, and Hung Taiji determined to quash resistance from the Ewenki under Bombough, who was executed at Mulliden in 1640. The result was the partial absorption of local populations into the Eight Banners, a process that is sometimes referred to as their "Manchification" or "Manchization." 11 A small portion of the Amur peoples, largely concentrated in the Evenk and Daur groups who had

---

11 For secondary works on acculturizations of the Northeastern peoples, see Geoffrey Mallow, The history of the Northeastern peoples, XVIII & XIX (Moscow, 1744), pp. 10-11; Meng Hui, "Man - Tung hsia wu tung ma wei - che hou han". Han fa-wei pei-pei, 13 (1906), pp. 50-61.
earliest and most frequent contact with the early empire and some segments of the Sibos, were enrolled in the Manchu Eight Banners. A greater portion were registered in the Hunting and Fishing (yabu) Banners, created in order to allow them to remain in their localities and in their occupations while being officially incorporated into the Ch’ing realm, with small segments of their populations sent to other parts of the empire for battle or for support of the imperial hunt. In the late seventeenth century these groups tended to be identified in official documents as “New Chincas” (si men), a term that had little staying power outside the administrative lexicon. Still other Amur peoples were never joined formally to the Eight Banners, and by the eighteenth century were regarded as tributary barbarians, all colorfully depicted in the court-commissioned catalog of such exotics, the Hwang Ch’ing chah-kung ku.11 These latter groups were clearly part of the Ch’ing elite, and though the New Chincas were formally a part of the conquest elite, they were marginal and never heavily represented in the command ranks.

Titled families of the Mongol Eight Banners were on a par with the titled families of the Manchu Eight Banners. The roots of many of these families lay not in what would now be considered Mongolies, but in northern Liao-tung and Chü-hin. This spectrum had been long occupied by groups who were probably of Chincan origin, but in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries became involved with the growth of the Mongol empires under Chinggis and his successors in ways that stamped them with an enduring association with the languages and cultures of eastern Mongolia. An example is the name, Uriangkha. Many distinguished Mongols of the Chinggisid period bore Uriangkha as a variant as a lineage name, and several federations from widely dispersed areas of Mongolia used the name in some form. It was, however, far more common as a federation and a lineage name in northern Liao-tung and Chü-hin. The three great Chincan federations at Ili-nihsien in the late fourteenth century all on occasion referred to themselves as Uriangkha. What is important to note here is that the ambitions of the Uriangkha were characteristic of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Liao-tung and Chü-hin. Both Nurhaci and Hung Taiji exploited these ambitions, and only well after the conquest did the Ch’ing court seek to construct a history of both Manchuria and Mongolia that would establish certain peoples as unilaterally “Mongol.”

In the earlier part of Nurhaci’s career as a unifier, the peoples of the Chincan federations of this northern region, primarily Chincan in descent and speech

---

11 This collection, produced in the middle Ch’ing long period, was replicated several times with both line and minor differences. It is now easily available in the edition recently transcribed and translated by Chung Chi-ku, ed. and trans., Hwang-ch’ing chah-kung ku, Moscow: Tsu shao shu lei (Tsingta, 1980).
Khoshu. After Nurhaci's death in 1626, Hung Taiji continued the war against Lüghelan. He defeated Lüghelan decisively in 1634, then convinced Lüghelan's son Erek Khoshu to surrender and became a prince of the first degree by marrying one of his daughters. This began the remarkable process that between 1634 and 1636 ended both the Chajkur and the Later Chin khanates, amalgamating them as the Ch'ing empire.

Hung Taiji's design for a rapid expansion of the Ch'ing bureaucracy was from the first predicated upon offices for communication with his Mongol component of government and management of their economic and cultural affairs. The most important of these institutions was the Court of Colonial Affairs (Ma. t'ale 'i gols de daac-u jügan; Chin. li-fa shan), which began life in 1636 as the "Mongol Department" (Ma. mong-juu javar; Chin. Mong-hu shan). One of its chief duties was to track the titles awarded to Khochun, Khazhun, and Khalkha nobles who declared allegiance to the Ch'ing. In the case of the leaders of the three large divisions of the Khalkhas—the Tushiyii khan, Jurekii khan, and Jathkii khan—the "Mongol Department" had not only to record their domains and the details of their estates, but also to record their entourage by Hung Taiji as first-degree princes.

From Nurhaci's time on, it was common for the Ch'ing rulers to comment on the prowess of Mongols with the bow and the horse, and to use the concept of Mongols as model warriors to both flatter the Mongol barons and attempt to infuse the competiveness of the Mongol. The incorporation of "Mongol" as a component of the conquest elite also furthered an important political idea. Nurhaci's original title of "khan" (hon), Hung Taiji's claim that the Ch'ing were the heirs of the Mongol Great Khans, and the developing pretension to Buddhist monasticism by the earlier Ch'ing emperors were all dependent upon the demonstrated subordination of the Mongols to the Ch'ing rulers. In more immediate terms, this core population of the Mongol Eight Banners played a distinctive role in Ch'ing expansion into western Mongolia, Turkistan (Sinkiang), and Tibet. The third founding group of Eight Banner elites were the Han-chia (often referred to as "Chinese") baronesses. We are following here a convention of

The Mongol population (khan) were somewhat elusive. They were enumerated in connection with Ch'inggii Khoshu early during the conquest of the Chahar region around Kalgan in the campaigns of Millaw against the Chin in 1211-1212. This remains the territory most consistently associated with the Chahar. The meaning of the term is unclear, but may be associated with the Turko-Cicic or Geshin (also known as Tschulul) meaning "horse." In Lüghelan's time, the political institution of the Chahar banner was regarded as continuous from the Khoshu and Mongol Khans of the latter thousand-year century.

See also Chiu Xi, "The Li-fa Yüan," and Criddle, A mongol source, pp. 313-15.

For an early instance see Koide Nobutsu et al., Beak, Mongol chia (Tokyo, 1955-56), T'u-t'ang-Minh (Abdi foliaug), to (1658), 216.

Ch'ing historical narrative in referring to the Han-chia as "third" in the elite after the Mongols, but it is not well founded in the facts. The surnames used by the Han-chia in the military realm were in fact of much earlier high standing in Nurhaci's regime than any of the Mongol contingents. The surnames of the Ch'ing historical expression after 1636 placed the Han-chia at the bottom of the tripartite Banner complement, an indication of how the modeling and remodeling of status within the conquist elite reflected critical developments within the imperial order.

The Ch'ing court insisted in the mid-eighteenth century that the Eight Banner Han-chia populations were Han Chinese who had joined the Ch'ing cause and remained loyal to it. At a categorical statement this is false, since many Han-chia lineages can be demonstrated to have had Jurchen or Korean origins, and in a large number of cases the facts are too sparse to be able to determine the precise provenance of the male ancestor from whom the lineage was conventionally traced. For understanding the position of the Han-chia, it helps to remember that before the late eighteenth century the Ch'ing court consistently recognized divisions within the Han-chia that roughly accorded with their geographical origins. That is to say, sinophone populations (referred to in Jurchen as nikan) captured after the beginning of the war between Nurhaci and the Ming in Liaotung in 1618 were not regarded as identical to Chinese speakers who had gone eastward earlier (ynus, decades, or centuries earlier) into the Jurchen territories of Ch'ih-lin. Similarly, the groups captured from Fuscian and other cities in the early part of the war were not regarded as identical with those who were captured or capitulated later, between 1629 and 1643, in western Liaotung. The great consolidation of the Liaotung Han-chia was stimulated by the conquest of northern China, when new, more dramatic divisions were observed between those resident in central or southern China, and those whose affiliation with the Ch'ing empire had begun in Liaotung or even further east.

The rapid evolution of the social and legal definitions of Nian groups after 1616 marked a watershed both for the non-Jurchen Northeastern natives living under Jurchen control and for the new state. Establishment of the Nurhaci khanate in 1616 fostered a more institutionalized status for the Nian population and for the military service sector that would emerge from
it. From the beginnings of Nikan involvement with the Jurchen regime, there was an important distinction between those assuming military roles and those going into labor service. A considerable and indistinguishable portion of the Nikan population functioned as Nurchu’s bodyguards and in his personal troops in time of battle. Sometimes after the founding of the khanate in 1651 Nikan soldiers, still wearing their black flags, appear to have been referred to as “cherished soldiers” (ezen oshu). In 1653 the ezen oshu unit, still represented under a black banner, was split into two; in 1653 the two became four; and in 1654 the eight Han-dian Banners, flying the colors of the previously commissioned Manchu and Mongol Banners, were created.

Following the conquest of Liaotung, all Nikan capillitators were put under the khan’s personal jurisdiction. As had been the case with the Hulun, the peoples of eastern Mongolia, and the peoples of the Amur region, strategically important Nikan were treated in a manner suitable to their function in the developing relationship between the monarchy and the traditional, regional elite. They were granted estates composed of the forcibly extracted property of Jurchen nobles. Nurchu’s law was that there should be no material distinctions between natives and newcomers (including the sons of indigenous and diasporic Nian). The Nikan were required to show their submission to Nurchu by shaving their heads in the Jurchen style, adopting Jurchen dress, and performing the cortége, all of which were extensions of Nurchu’s insistence that invidious distinctions among the khan’s population should be avoided. The ostensible homogeneity of political culture in Nurchu’s social code was also a strong advantage in his competition against Ming authorities for the loyalty, or at least the neutrality, of the Liaotung population. It was designed both to win the affection of those who were not rich, and also to undermine the power of old Jurchen elites. The latter development, which became more strongly apparent in the Hung Taiji period, is a reminder of the role played by Nian, the extension of that role

in the early Ch’ing state, and their ultimate definition as a distinct population during the centralization of power, minimally under Nurhaci and intensely under Hung Taiji. Many Nikan contributed to the ability of the emerging state to create new capacities for documentation and control of matters that had previously been discretionary to the Jurchen lineages. The elevation of the Nikan classes was strongly connected to the enhancement of monarchical power.

The legal distinction between Nians and Jurchens was slow in coming, and was originally made along lines of culture and function. The story of Enedi is significant in this regard. As recounted in the Manchus annals, that case captures the dynamic interactions among state-building, institutional function, and identity in this early period. Though Enedi is best remembered as one of the purveyors of inventions of Jurchen-Manchu script, he was also prominent in the Nurchu state as a judge, a diplomat, and a military commander. Like many of the leaders of the Nurchu phase, Enedi’s origins are difficult to characterize. He had a Mongol name and certainly could write Mongolian; he may have been a native of a Mongolian-speaking region. The early Manchu records suggest that he was also expert in Chinese, and the detailed account of Enedi’s trial for hoarding ill-gotten wealth in 1653 gives every evidence that he functioned as a Nikan civil official, that he was represented by Nians exclusively when trying to appeal to Nurhaci, and that his Nikan staff was punished for his crimes. The resolution of Enedi as a “Manchu” does not come until 1654, as the history of the Manchu language and script, and the early state, was being adjusted and clarified. In life, Enedi lived the culturally complex life that was characteristic of the Nians. Many lesser-known men of Nian or Korean origin with the same cultural traits as Enedi appear in the Manchu records contemporaneous with him — important among them Aishan and Dagui. Their descendants were eventually registered in the Manchu Banners, though their origins in these cases are not different from those of many who were later registered as Han-chins.

During the campaigns for western Liaotung in particular, the definition and manipulation of the status of Nian servants, whether of old families or newly submitted groups, was a cornerstone of strengthening monarchical rule. This was consistent with policies to force the Jurchen chieftains to redistribute a large portion of their wealth to Nikan capillitators. The unique association of the Nians with the extension of imperial privilege in the early decades of the Ch’ing empire was preserved in the institution of the “bond-
servants” (hao-shih) companies within the Eight Banners. Bondservants, who were a superficially anomalous group within the conquest elite, included a majority of apparent Nihon provenance and a minority of Jurchen. Bondservants were organized into companies and registered with the Han-chin banners during the Hung T'ai-chi years, and nomenclature preserved their distinction from the regular Han-chin bannermen. The description of the bondservant companies was rooted in the function of Chinese specklers at Nurfah's settlements in the late sixteenth century, when they oversaw the provisioning of the household, the behavior of servants attached to the household, and the management of certain of Nurfah's properties, possibly including his agricultural villages (jokot). The attachment of the bondservants to the Imperial Household Department (kai-tou fa) represented their peculiar relationship to the imperial lineage. The Imperial Household Department was the bureaucratic representative of the imperial patrimony—the lands, herds, industries, and vending monopolies that were the private property of the imperial lineage. Not surprisingly, bondservants displayed nuances from many functions the latter had filled in the Ming period. High-ranking bondservants were the created and generally rewarded managers of the imperial properties, and, as in the cases of Li Hui and Tezao Yins, could amass wealth and influence.

The state further increased the facility with which it could isolate and objectify Nihon status with the creation of the Civil Departments. (nran-kwan)


This term needed to be translated into Chinese official documents as hao-shih, or hao-shih. This is an adjective that can be translated as "hostile" or "hostile". This term is possibly more commonly used as a rendering of words in Chinese that can be translated as "enemies" or "enemies". Though in Nurfah's classificatory system, hao-shih (and a number of whom were Buddhist) had been of equal status with others they were thereby to be greatly favored by the crown. (see Croxall, A transition society, pp. 101–2) and may have been more easily in status, listing the "servants" (shih) part of their classification not entirely by accident. Particularly after 1620, it was convenient to establish permanence in the bondservant status of apparently prominent men, through common knowledge of all categories contained in the "servants" (shih) category. For example, the name Hung T'ai-chi is now commonly used to refer to both the crown and the bondservant who was founder of the lineage. (see Terker, The Imperial Household Department, p. 104. For a discussion of bondservants as contained to classes, see Jonathan D. Spence, Tien Yen and the Kang-hsi Emperor: Bondservant and order (New Haven, 1966), p. 13–17; and Kamiya, Tai bi-shun, pp. 166–71.)

The apparently complimentary Ch'ing phrase, "those who made a contribution in every name" (shi yu lao-lu) that was sometimes applied to the old Nihon families of Liao-tung, originally may have been a way of referring to the Nihon bondservants of Nurfah's company and their descendents. If so, the phrase may be an allusion to the Mongol phrase shi yu lao-lu, which also is the "Secret History" of the Mongol in reference to domestic classes of the imperial lineage. See also Croxall, A transition society, p. 104. On early Chinese or Japanese masters of han-shi, see A transition society for the description primarily drawn from material in the first third of Liu Chong-li's report on his visit to Nurfah in 1595.
before the Chi'ing approached either central Mongolia or northern China. The court would find, particularly in the Kang-hsi period, that distinctions among the conquest elite were of great use in maintaining stability and inhibiting a lurch of power into the hands of one group or another. In the eighteenth century, the strategic value of distinctions persisted, and was supplemented by new and less tangible interests.

THE FIRST WAVE OF CONQUEST, 1630–1700

A policy of Nurhaci’s had been that those serving him would be level in identity (figuratively, as slaves), but not in status. Within this identity there was hierarchy. Military commanders were distinct from officials, interlocutors, or accountants, who were all distinct from farm laborers, household servants, and traders. It was suggested earlier that equality of identity was severely strained by the conquest of Liao-tung. The response of the Hung Taiji years was to institutionalize some new distinctions among the conquering, conquered, and transitional populations, while putting greater emphasis on the ability of the emperors to articulate them all. This articulation was not itself done in a monotheistic, universalist, or even generalized way. Rather, distinct forms of appeal and authority were devised for the emerging sectors of the empire. The process was long in being refined, as long, perhaps by necessity, as the century and a half of conquest in which the Chi’ing empire engaged.

The Chi’ing found on entering China that the numbers of their forces swelled rapidly. Major resistance to the conquest was marked though not exclusively a characteristic of the struggle for the Yangtze delta. The decades of kidnapping populations or paying handsomely for the willing submission of Liao-tung elites had perhaps left Chi’ing rulers ill prepared for the challenges of incorporating and organizing waves of relatively willing new adherents. In the earliest years of the occupation of Ming China, the court relied heavily upon the Han-chin to govern the newly acquired territories. The policy was considered unsuitable for several reasons. One was that it concentrated unusual power in the hands of a group that, as of 1650, was largely of very recent adherence. It was, moreover, a group that outnumbered the Manchus heavily and the Mongols overwhelmingly. The Kang-hsi court in particular preferred that power be distributed among elites of various categories—in civil government, among literati from disparate provincial backgrounds; in the banners, among groups of various registrations. Indeed, one might suppose that had the Kang-hsi emperor not found regional or “ethnic” differences to divide his conquest elite, he might have been disposed to invert them.

CONQUEST ELITE OF THE CH'ING EMPIRE

The decade of the 1680s was a critical one in stabilizing the empire. With respect to the conquest elite the Chi’ing court had already designed a plan for a professional class that would be, in the words of the court at the time of the plan’s promulgation in 1687, balanced between new (civilian) and old (military). The court required garrison officers to ascertain that candidates (whether Manchu, Mongol, or Chinese) were in some degree proficient in horsemanship and archery before being admitted to the entry-level examination. The plan was evidently to educate a banner elite which would be prepared to act in any and all capacities in the service of the empire. They were to be educated in the Chinese classics, and to know the histories of the Liao, Chin, and Yuan empires. They were to know mathematics and astronomy, and the established literature on medicine. They were also to be expert horsemen, archers, and fighters with the sword and spear. By reading classics on the art of war as well as the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms (in either Chinese or Manchu), they were to be educated in the strategic arts (including meteorology). And they were to accomplish these studies in at least two of the three imperial languages of Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese. The sources of recruits for this banner elite were limited to hereditary ranks of the Manchu, Mongol, and Han-chin banners. In later decades some negligible number of Albasian Chinese (sometimes referred to as “Russian,” though better described as Cosack) and Muslim officers was also included. The basic plan was to give a select group a broad function. That function was to perform any task necessary to further the ends of conquest and occupation, which meant mastery of not only martial skills but the technology of occupation and eventually of government.41

This plan did not succeed, primarily because the court never found a way of matching franchises, incentives, and rewards that would fuel it. The Chi’ing habitually engaged in what would now be called “unfunded mandates,” relying upon the localities of the empire and upon the Eight Banners themselves for responsibilities for education, defense, and in many cases simple stipendiary support. This disposition was no doubt reinforced by the strain on the imperial coffers from the enormous costs of the conquest in the late seventeenth century. The thought in the early decades of the Chi’ing period may have been that opportunities to demonstrate combat merit and gain its

Manchu, Mongol, or Chinese. Elaboration of the examination system, which was fundamental to development of the bureaucracy, thus proceeded along with other developments to produce new distinctions among the conqueror elite.

It appears that few bannermen believed that examinations afforded real opportunity. Even if they had great interest in preparing for the examinations, the failure of the government to provide schools outside of Peking, and the inadequate facilities for the education of commoners even there, would have prevented bannermen from being able to afford an education. The absence of study was not guaranteed to pay off. Officer appointments in the garrisons were diminishing in number in the late seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century were sharply curtailed. "Inspecting" officers who had qualified in the examinations had to await employment, and in general marginally solvent bannermen in the provinces could hardly have seen the rewards of the examinations as worth the trouble. By the end of the century, not even the court was actively promoting the education plan of 1687; it instead attempted to deal with various economic crises in the garrisons, and to use differential policies to accelerate comparative advantages and disadvantages among the bannermen. This was partly related to economic pressures on the state budget, but was also affected by dramatic political events of the 1660s that deeply divided the Han-chin commoners, in particular, from other parts of the conqueror elite.

Though Nurhaci had hoped his close kinsmen would provide him with talented and energetic co-rulers, Hung Taiji had ended substantial roles for imperial kinsmen (other than regents) in normal governing. The imperial lineage was a bureaucratized institution by the middle 1650s. The court maintained its own offices for birth and death records, legal affairs, economic affairs, and military outfitting of members of the Aisin Gioro lineage. As a group, they managed to insulate themselves slightly from the smallpox epidemic of the 1652/1653 (though the Gushun-chin emperor probably died of the disease), and they grew dramatically in number. By the turn of the century they numbered over ten thousand individuals, and the number was triple by the middle of the nineteenth century. These numbers should be considered in light of the measures taken by the court to limit growth of the Aisin Gioro lineage.4 Distance from the imperial line, refusal of military duty, poor

---

1 The name Oirat (Oyrats) is probably both in original cursive and in transcription. It apparently derives from a Mongol adjective (ii-yot) (probably) meaning "congregation, people who come together," and is close in meaning to the Chinese "G'I'-nian" (the "Hans""). The term's association with the Mongols was made obvious by the fact that the head of the Oirat confederation included shamanistic elements. Although Mongol speakers, the Oirat (Oyrats) were not incorporated into the Qing imperial system. In post-Yuan times, the "Oirats" seem to have been considered a "Chinese" group, and their seats (the Khalkha and Chahar) translated as "Khiyaks and Chahars." Translation of the same name can be a proper name, and used to translate "Chinese" or "Manchus" with no reference to ethnicity. More specifically, there are several named ethnic groups in the region, including those in Qing dynasty, including the Oirats (Oyrats) and the Manchus. This would provide the term "Oirat" as a name, as well as a Chinese "G'I'-nian." It might well grant Oirats or Oyrats, which seems to be more back-contraction of Chinese "Oirat," but such re-construction occurs in Manchu sources of the eighteenth century. See also Cribb, A random name, pp. 314-15.

2 The origins of the Aisin Gioro (the "Golden"") Gioro have been discussed in Chu Hsien-tao, Hsin Hsiao chieh hsii shih hsi (pp., 1930) Chou Shou-li, Ch'ing-shih hsi-shih, Wang, The lost immortals, and Cribb, A random name. The "economic foundations of the imperial lineage were not in Tibet. The Chinese Imperial Household Department, pp. 83-85, and Chang Jo-chung, "The economic role of the Imperial Household (Hsi-an hsi) in the Ch'ing Dynasty," JAF, 51, No. 2 (February 1973), pp. 235-72). A minimal
performance in academic or military studies, or confirmed criminal activity were all common reasons for expulsion from the lineage. The large number of remaining members all enjoyed a stipend from the court (a very modest one for the lower ranks), and were entitled to distinctive robes, belts, and headgear that set them apart from other denizens of the capital. The court's modest success in limiting the total number of Asin Giros and Giros was probably the single most important factor in the relatively small number of hereditary rank holding among the imperial lineage, for though Asin Giros rank holders as a percentage of the percentage of Manchu bureaucrats among all bureaucrats was high (see Table 6.1 and 6.2), rank holders among all Asin Giros averaged only about 10 percent. Emperors tolerated the large Asin Giros population as symbolic of the success of their ancestors, and possibly as a pool for the selection of able property managers. Many of the members of the lineage who lived at leisure in walled compounds in Peking played a role in consolidating relations not only with the titled Manchu families and Mongol princes who composed their primary social groups, but also with Chinese painters, poets, and scholars whom they patronized. Nevertheless, the emperor remained wary of the competition among the Asin Giros for wealth, prestige, and influence, and considered an overlarge and undeterred Asin Giros population to be fertile ground for factionalism, corruption, and potential coups d'état.

The titled Manchu families were frequently to be found in high court positions into the nineteenth century, and just as frequently as the companions of the Asin Giros leisure class at Peking. Though a majority were not actively engaged in the progress or consolidation of the conquests in southern China, Mongolia, and the Northeast of the middle and later seventeenth century, distinguished soldiers and most garrison officers came from these social ranks. The Kangxi emperor, impressed by the difficulties he had undergone in wrenching power from Oboi and Eshen, was ever alert to attempts by these families, who as a whole tended to be more closely involved with the Eight Banners than were the Asin Giros, to exploit distractions or weaknesses in imperial affairs to shift power to themselves. They were heavily pressed for contributions of their time and wealth to undergird new campaigns of expansion, and in return they retained their rights to residence in some of Peking's choicest spots, close attendance at imperial ceremonies, and in suitable cases roles at the top of the military hierarchy.

The ranks of garrison officers, drawn heavily from the more remote lines of the Asin Giros and the various degrees of lineage in the titled Manchu families, were the functionaries of conquest and occupation. A substantial minority had completed some portion of the ambitious educational plan, and many relied their entire lives on family income to support themselves. On the surface a garrison commander's pay was substantial. It compared in most cases with that of a county magistrate, and was ten to twenty times that of a common soldier in the Eight Banner garrisons. But, like a magistrate, a garrison commander was expected to support a large staff, household, personal guardian, second household (if his family had not accompanied him), and all his animals from this salary. Without "contributions" (of the sort magistrates were also likely to seek), a garrison commander could barely survive his tenure, let alone grow wealthy in service. Moreover, within two decades of the 1644 invasion, support from the central government for many garrison officers had become undependable. The garrison officers were often required to make up the shortfalls from their own resources, to solicit local Chinese literati for the means to improve or repair garrison walls or buildings, to manipulate their bookkeeping by diverting funds from armaments to grain, and to effect private reciprocities with local civil officials to mollify or suppress unruly bureaucrats. Other than in the Yangze delta, a commander's life in the late seventeenth century was usually harried. Few commanders served long as in two years in a post, and even in the middle officer ranks five or six years was considered a marathon tenure.

During the shift of Ch'ing conquest away from the Northeast toward Ming China, stresses caused in part by the unstable balance between members of the elite and commoners within their own banners contributed to the generation of new policies by the court that were designed to ameliorate a top-heavy in some registration categories. The Manchu ranks were severely afflicted by this imbalance. While many policies distinguished between Asin Giros and Manchus (for instance, education, criminal law, taxpaying law, and some marriage regulations), stipends often supported Asin Giros and Manchu rank holders in one category. Figure 6.1 in comparison to Figure 6.2 represents the ways in which Asin Giros and Manchus among the titled ranks of the early Ch'ing far outweighed the proportion of Manchus in the Eight Banners. At the time of the conquest of Peking, Asin Giros repre-
CONQUEST ELITE OF THE CH‘ING EMPIRE

Figure 6.1 Rank holders by category, as percentages of all rank holders, c. 1644 and c. 1670 (totals of four groups = 100%).

Figure 6.2 Ratio of each category of rank holders (see Figure 6.1) in comparison with that category's percentage among all bannermen (in Figure 6.3). For example, the ratio of the nearly 25% of the rank holders in 1644 who were Mongols is more than three (3:1) times the nearly 8% of all bannermen in 1644 who were Mongols.

The data relating to rank holding among the imperial forces from the perspective of the genealogical interest is presented in Li Szu-mi, "Ch‘ing ti hsiung-t’u" (long-ch‘i yu jei tsan-yu ch’i-ku), pp. 134–50, with some emphasis on the role of marriage and familial connections, on the average age of soldiers, and on the provisions allowing sons to join among the imperial forces after the Shun-ch‘i period.

Permanent seizure of land to support the garrison was reduced from 1659 to the end of the seventeenth century, and at its height probably encompassed well over 1 million acres. The tax liability was in
ticularly in times of intense military expansion at the frontiers, where there was a higher priority on keeping active bannermen armed, fed, and sheltered. Though regulations provided for monthly stipends in rice and silver, the latter was often in short supply, and bannermen were used to being paid in copper cash. Moreover, officials at both the central and provincial levels were able to convert one medium to the other for paying stipends. The result was that bannermen tended to get rice when the price of copper or silver was high, and copper cash when the price of rice was high. Banner officers often aid garrison lands to meet payroll shortfalls, or to line their own pockets, so that an increasingly larger percentage of the food for the garrisons had to be purchased. By the end of the seventeenth century a substantial number of bannermen had no hope of purchasing expensive items such as weapons, ammunition, or good horses (which, in any event, would have had no grazing lands). In a few cases adequate housing had never been constructed, in others it was deteriorating and not being repaired. When driven to the edge, bannermen did not take privation calmly. Records of the 1660s through the 1680s suggest frequent protests, strikes, and riots by bannermen impatient with the incompetence and, in many cases, corruption of their superiors.

The crisis caused by inconstancy in the delivery of supplies is highlighted by the fact that at any given time only a small portion of the garrison population was even entitled to receive support. By regulations there was an absolute maximum of paid positions that could be listed in the Eight Banners. The number was about 80,000 at the beginning of the Kang-hsi era. Those who were actively serving in these positions were, technically, the "bannerman." Each bannerman's stipend was supposed to be adequate to support a household of four or five, but in fact the population ratio of paid to unpaid within the garrisons ran much higher. Women were never eligible. Old men who had never served were not eligible for regular payments.

The few youth stipends established at the end of the seventeenth century were highly coveted. Nevertheless, banner regulations identified young men without paid positions, or who had been promised positions but not yet received them, as "sons and younger brothers" (tsu-tsah) of the Eight Banners. The hands of garrison officers, and in the weighting area of the country the land was rapidly cleared to enable more to reach officers who illegally sold the land. Both the Kang-hsi and the Yang-sheng emperors attempted to correct the breach, but the policies did not eliminate garrison holdings, which in turn eroded very rapidly over the course of the eighteenth century. See also Crosby, Opium war, pp. 47-8, 51-8.

15 On duties and additional requirements, including height, for bannerman status see Crosby, Opium war, p. 17.

16 Bannermen began the conquest period with only subsistence and material support, but for complex reasons this diminished rapidly, so that those who remained in the garrisons endured grinding poverty for generations. Garrison conditions began the conquest period well salaried, but were impoverished by the demands of supporting their staffs, providing adequate ceremonial dress for winter dissipation, and providing for the poverty-stricken and maternal among their own soldiers. Those who did not violate garrison regulations against additional employment, disregard of bullying positions, and graft were seen broken. For details see Crosby, Opium war, pp. 19-33, 47-58.
from groups who did not wish to join their neighbors in submission to the centralization and reorganization of the nascent Ch‘ing empire any more than they had wanted to submit to similar impositions by Liigatu. The problems persisted for the regime after the death of Hung Taiji in 1643. In the Hung Taiji and Shun-ch‘ih years the functions of the Court of Colonial Affairs were extended. It continued to manage matters associated with Mongol livelihoods, but increasingly oversaw the affairs of other regions as well. After the conquest of northern China in the 1640s, the Court of Colonial Affairs was brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Rites, the umbrella for foreign relations. It now assumed responsibility for governing other absentee societies and managing the interface between their semi-autonomous leaders and the Ch‘ing court. By the mid-eighteenth century these included the local headmen (li‘u-tai) of the populations of Szechwan, Yunnan, Kwei-chow, and parts of Burma, and the bī Đầu of Turkestan. These regions were governed through the Court of Colonial Affairs as military regions outside the civil, bureaucratic government, a model based upon the early Ch‘ing rule over the "Mongols," particularly the Khaba khan of eastern Mongolia. From the Shun-ch‘ih period, the Court of Colonial Affairs also became the locus of communication with Tibet. After the Ch‘ing conquest of Peking in 1644, the court entered into direct communications with the Dalai Lama. From the time of his visit to Peking in 1651, the Court of Colonial Affairs became the Dalai Lama’s bureaucratic arm as judge and arbitrator among the populations of eastern Mongolia and, after 1658, Kwei-chow. As the Dalai Lama was given delegated authority for the mediation of Mongol life, however, the Dalai Lama himself was brought increasingly under the observation and regulation of the Ch‘ing court, so that by the end of the Shun-ch‘ih era in 1661 the Court of Colonial Affairs was attempting to become influential in the selection of the Dalai Lama. It was one of many expressions of the complex intermingling of culture and politics of Mongolia and Tibet, which worked sometimes to Ch‘ing advantage, and sometimes not.

The three khans of Khalkha, who had established close ties with the Ch‘ing in the Hung Taiji reign, were willing in the early decades after the conquest of north China to have their territories incorporated into the empire. The young K‘ang-hsi emperor was eager to achieve this annexation, since control of Mongolia was an important part of his attempt to contain the Romanov empire. But the Obizoda to the west of Khalkha, and their leader Galdan, were opposed to Ch‘ing acquisition of the Mongol heartland, where the

---

Oyirid themselves sometimes took their lands when grazing lands were scarce. In the late 1670s and early 1680s, when the Khalkha khans pressed for a resolution of the issue, the Ch‘ing court was distracted by the Three Feudatories War. After resolution of that conflict in 1685, the K‘ang-hsi emperor turned his attentions to the Mongolia problem. Diplomatic negotiations with the Romanovs, a serious partnership with the Dalai Lama, and punitive rewards to the Khalkha khan resulted in a pact that would have brought submission of Mongolia to the Ch‘ing government. But Galdan intervened, attacking the Khalkha lands before they could complete the act. The K‘ang-hsi emperor personally led Eight Banner contingents with heavy guns into the field against Galdan’s Oyirid forces. In 1637 the Khalkha khan was received into the Ch‘ing khanate, and in 1657 Galdan had been defeated and destroyed.

The wars against Galdan served to bring Khalkha lands and population under Ch‘ing control, and the three khans of the Khalkha were formally included into the inner circles of the Ch‘ing aristocracy in 1644. As a group the Khalkha were not brought into the Mongol Eight Banners, but were organized into khustain (a fourth was added in 1706), "leagues" (aimak), "bannerets" (khūdān), and "companies" (yamn). As had been the practice in the days of Nurchi and Hung Taiji, the Khalkha nobles were given a high niche in the elite, and like others of their station took to living in Peking. By 1688, as many as 10,000 Mongols, mostly noblemen and their entourage, had established themselves in the city. Matters of land ownership and legal problems resulting from it, market and currency management, the welfare of the herds, and the opening of Urga to commerce were brought under the jurisdiction of the Court of Colonial Affairs. The khaihs of Khalkha were permitted by the Ch‘ing court to control regulations relating to the growing trade at Urga, and the attendant effects of economic development on the littoral. By all appearances the khaihs declined to exercise the powers that remained to them. Repeated appeals by Khalkha commoners for protection from inquirers, primarily civilian Han Chinese, who restricted land access, accumulated mining rights, and created financial combinations that extracted crushing interest on debts from herders and traders drew little response.

Acknowledged noblemen of the Mongol Eight Banners and of the Khalkha khustain lived much as Manchus of the Asin Gioro or the titled families. The relative size of the Manchu and Asin Gioro rank holders in relation to Mongol Eight Banner commoners was even more remarkable (compare Figures 6.1 and 6.2). At the time of the conquest of Peking, registrants in the Mongol Eight Banners as a proportion of all baronets were a meager 8 percent. But Mongol Eight Banner rank holders as a percentage of all rank

---

90 On the numbers of Ch‘ing military personnel, including baronets, in Turkestan in the mid-eighteenth century, see James A. Millward, Beyond the Past: Conversion, obedience, and empire in Qing central Asia, 1730-1814 (Stanford, 1996), pp. 77-9.
holders were 25 percent, more than three times the proportion of Mongol bannermen among all bannermen. The disparity between commoners and rank holders for the Eight Banner Mongols was roughly equal to the disparity between Manchus and Assin Ggreso combined rank holders. Like the pronounced difference in these proportions among the Manchus, these mismatched proportions among the Mongol Eight Banners were partly due to the relatively small numbers of Mongol Eight Bannermen in total. But they also reflect two pervasive issues of the early Ch'ing expansion. First, these figures relate to a period less than ten years after the creation of the Ch'ing empire through the melding of the Ch'in khanate and the Ch'akh khanate, and Ch'akh nobles incorporated into the Eight Banners were still being lavished with titles, stipends, and other imperial favors. Second, they reflect the critical role the leaders of the Mongol Eight Banners played in policing Ch'akh territories and initiating campaigns against the Khalkhas.

For Mongol commoners outside the Eight Banners, and particularly in the Khalkha territories (now the greater part of Inner Mongolia), the political reorganization of the khanates displaced a portion of the traditional leadership and bureaucratized political processes that had previously been socially negotiated, developments that Jurchen had experienced under Nurjashi and Hong Taiji. The policies contributed to the economic transformation and gradual impoverishment of pastoral Mongols in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In contrast, commoners of the Mongol Eight Banners, that is, genealogically identified Mongols who did not live as nomads, were perhaps the most privileged group within the garrisons. The court constantly pointed to them as examples of military prowess for Manchus and Han-ch'ien to emulate.

Though the Mongol bannermen as a group were never distinguished for success in the examinations, the blanketings heaped on them by the court for participation were at least equal to those given Manchus. Moreover, because those of Mongol registration within the Eight Banners were by far the smallest category, the quotas for Mongols passing the examinations were marked more generous than for Manchus, and overwhelmingly more generous than for Han-ch'ien. This was possibly a contributing factor in the over-representation of Eight Banner Mongols in the officer ranks of garrisons throughout the empire. But the distinction of Mongols in these capacities was also related to the many cases of vivid transition from conqueror to conqueree, as state-denominated Mongols were deployed to conquer and absorb newly targeted “Mongols.” Thus, the rebellions among the Ch'akher under T'i-tien Khan in 1648 had been suppressed by the Khorchen leader Minggada, and descendants of other Khorchen and Kharachen elite families were prominent in the campaigns of the late seventeenth century in Mongolia and Tibet.

From the failed cohabitation schemes of the early 1660s to the late seventeenth century, the Han-ch'ien were undergoing a process of continuous redenomination and rehumanization. Between about 1640 and 1680, the court tended to emphasize the integration and equality of the Han-ch'ien companies within the Eight Banners. In the “inner” (nari) and “outer” (nari) dichotomies of which the court was fond, the Han-ch'ien were “inner,” consonant with the empire's forceful program for creating conquerors from the conquered. But political dynamics of the conquest, and more acutely the danger — represented indirectly by the war of the Three Feudatories - of the Han-ch'ien gaining independent power within the conquest establishment — caused the court in the Kang-li period to curtail Han-ch'ien influence. This entailed the construction of a legal mechanism for making genealogy the primary criterion for membership in the Eight Banners and categorization within them.

But by 1650 the Han-ch'ien bannermen from the old families of eastern Liao-tung and even older sinophone families of Ch'iu-lin had been overshadowed within the Eight Banners by a new population, primarily from north China, that had none of the longstanding ties with the Ch'ing rulers that men from Liao-tung had forged. In total the Han-ch'ien bannermen were far more numerous than the Manchu or Mongol categories. It is possible that they represented as much as 40 percent of the conquest force in 1644. The bulk of these companies had been created after 1642. In the 1640s the number of Han-ch'ien companies continued to surge while growth in the number of Manchu and Mongol companies was negligible. Figures for 1649 show that all categories of Han-ch'ien (including the “bandoivem” companies of the Imperial Household Department) accounted for over 75 percent of the bannerman force. Ten years later, Han-ch'ien may have outnumbered the Manchu and Mongol bannermen by as many as four or five to one, though still representing only a small proportion of the total of Ming deserters brought under Ch'ing command. Incorporation of new adherents was curtailed in the late 1640s. By 1667, the Han-ch'ien percentage of the bannerman forces had fallen to under 70 percent, and continued to decline under the pressure of state policies thereafter (see Figure 6.3).

The numerical dominance of the Han-ch'ien in the Eight Banner forces is represented in the proportion of titled Han-ch'ien compared to the proportion of Han-ch'ien bannermen among all bannermen (compare Figures 6.1 and 6.2). In comparison to the marked high ratio of Assin Ggreso, Manchu, and Mongol Eight Banner elites, the Han-ch'ien constituted a proportion of the elite (about 18 percent at the time of the conquest of Peking) that was barely 25 percent.
of the proportion of Han-chinh bannermen among all bannermen. The reasons are both obvious and subtle. The historian would expect the overwhelming proportion of Han-chinh bannermen among all bannermen to dwarf the proportion of Manchus among all bannermen, and it does. A Han-chinh elite that was proportionate to the representation of Han-chinh bannermen among all bannermen would have been a formidable political force. But it was also the case that Han-chinh who held titles in this period tended to be transmuted into Manchu elites, either through their connections with the imperial lineage or because of political exigency. This mechanism fundamentally qualifies descriptions of Han-chinh as "servant" intermarrying with the imperial lineage or "servant" participating in certain imperial rituals. Han-chinh who did these things were re-registered and subsequently historiographed as "Manchu," to the degree to which Han-chinh may have participated in exclu-

---

Figure 6.3 Trends in relative percentages of each category in all banner registration, 1644, 1667, and 1723 (vitals of three groups of bannermen for each year in 100/81).

---

... in the early Ch'ing period is permanently obscured in the record. In view of these two factors, what is interesting is a slight stiffness in the tendency of members of the Han-chinh elite to remain elite even while Han-chinh commoners had to struggle to remain bannermen. By 1670, for instance, the differential between Asin Giter, Manchus, and Eight Banners Mongol rank holders relative to their banner categories decreased significantly from 1644, but for the Han-chinh the opposite was true. The ratio of Han-chinh rank holders as a proportion of all rank holders, against the proportion of Han-chinh bannermen as a proportion of all bannermen, increased (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). This can be explained partly by court policies directed to significant diminution in the total enrollment of Han-chinh bannermen, but it is also due to the lingering court reliance upon members of the Han-chinh elite in the governance of recently conquered territories in this period.

---

Because of the skills of Han-chinh bannermen in the Chinese language, the court was disposed to use them in bureaucratic appointments in the early conquest period. Many Han-chinh were indispensable in the establishment of the occupation governments in the provinces. During the Shun-chih reign, appointments were shuffled so that surrendering Ming civil officials who had been temporarily re-appointed to posts were supplanted by Han-chinh. In this way, natives of the preconquest Ch'ing order in Liao-tung were given control over consolidating the conquest in China. The court preferred that the occupation be in the hands of those considered Ming deserters, and the political effects of using men who spoke Chinese in these posts was considerable. There was some unhappiness in the leadership of the Manchu banner in this policy. But before administrative politics seriously discredited Han-chinh leadership in the provinces, the apogee of the three southern military governors, all from Liao-tung lineages of Han-chinh bannermen, occurred at the revolt of the Three Feudatories.

---

The predominance of Han-chinh in bureaucratic appointments during the early conquest period, which historians have noted for some time, reflects not only the political utility of the Han-chinh but also the biased numbers of their banner. Though the court was dependent on the Han-chinh for the first decades after the conquest, the treatment of Han-chinh bannermen was different from that of Manchus. This, too, is possibly a function of the numbers of Han-chinh bannermen, and is not clear evidence of discrimination.

---

See, for instance, Berndt's notation on Tung Kao-wei, who in 1684-5 participated in the Grand Sacrifice (li-tu) as a Han-chinh, and in 1694-5 as a Manchu. The last imperial, p. 131. On the question of Nihao marriage with the Nuchun lineage, see Cronk, A Toungchao source, pp. 136-7.

---

Figures for this were established in Lawrence Kohl, "Historic comparison of the provincial leadership during the Ch'ing Dynasty." JAS, 18, No. 2 (May 1965), pp. 139-210.
in these decades. The quotas, for instance, for banner studentships and garri-
sion appointments, which in this period tended to maintain a 1:1 ratio
between Manchus and Han-chin, were not generous in a situation where the
Manchu to Han-chin ratio was possibly as low as 1:4. The quotas there-
were a defensible expression of "parity" that is, the intention to produce
parity between "Manchus" and "Chinese." Han-chin commoners sent out to
the provincial garrisons often found that in cramped urban situations no
living space had been provided for them within the walls of the garrisons.
Where agricultural land was sparse, they were given no pastures for their
horses, and minimal burial grounds. In many cases Han-chin companies
were introduced into garrisons only years after the garrisons had been established,
when local hierarchies as well as land and hoisting allotments had already
been fixed. Where there was the chance, commoner Han-chin might enjoy
their untensable quotas, which at best would be "equal" to the Manchu quotas.
Where there was death, Han-chin often found the military commissioner
tightening their provisions. Whatever tensions might have been created by
provincial-level discriminations against commoner Han-chin bannermen,
they remained families - attempting to exploit
Chinese dependence, and common symbols of identity.

By the late seventeenth century the Han-chin began to acquire the hall-
marks of second-rank status within the banners, along with their graduated
official submersgence in the subject Chinese population. The court received
complaints from Manchu banner officials who felt that Han-chin were given
unequal preference in the appointment process. 36 Within some garrisons, con-
tinued enrollment of Han-chin households became an issue, since those who
had been marginalized in the original settlement process were most likely to
violate garrison regulations. More significantly, in the decades after the con-
quest there was a rapid differentiation of cultural development within the
Han-chin as a group, though this differentiation as a pattern can hardly be
distinguished from that seen among the Manchus in the same period. Many
fell away from military training and spoke local Chinese as their primary lan-
guage. Some Han-chin families intermarried exclusively with Manchus.
Others married only within Han-chin groups. Some did as many Manchus
had and illegally intermarried with the civilian population. Some petitioned
to be educated in Manchu and pursued military careers. Others had been edu-
cated in Chinese and tried the civil examinations. Some used Manchu names,
without surnames; others used Chinese names. Among many Han-chin
lineages, it was not unusual to alternate naming styles from generation to
genation, or even for a single generation of a single family to display dif-
ferent patterns. 37

The underlying tensions relating to imperial attempts to limit Han-chin
numbers, lessen their privileges, and discourage notions of great intimacy
with the court came to crisis with the outbreak of the war of the Three Feudal-
tories (1673-1681). The war was a struggle by some of the elite Han-chin to
wrest powers of independent decision making and revenue collection from
the Ch'ing court. This was the sort of challenge that Nishaci and Hung T'i-i
had faced from local Jurchen groups, from Amar peoples, and from eastern
Mongols. In later decades Ch'ing rulers dealt with similar problems among
the federated Mongol groups. Manchu princes could also prove unsteady in
loyalty, and major issues in Aisin Gioro rivalries as well as leadership chal-
enges in western Mongolia were unresolved at the end of the seventeenth
century. The Three Feudatories War was in many ways a similar pheno-
menon, but on a scale that threatened the continued existence of the empire.

As with other groups who had been incorporated into the Ch'ing conquest
elite and understood the opportunities, the leading lineages of the Three
Feudatories - the Wu, Keng, and Shang groups - returned to the Eight Banners by privileges, financial depen-
dence, and common symbols of identity.

The Ch'ing dynasty ruled with an iron hand. Their Zongzuo andXianfong
edicts were a model of their power. Their success was not without
cost. For example, the Manchu and Han-chin were not equal in the eyes
of the Ch'ing. The Han-chin were considered inferior to the Manchus.

36 See Chen, et. al., Ch'ing Fu-ch'ing Ch'ing-chih (1951) and Liao sheng, (1953), p. 158. For a
similar study, see also Crossley, Hearts of Servants, p. 80.

37 For examples and further discussion see Crossley, A Master's Mirror, pp. 131-2.
would be excluded from the banner quota system for grading. A separate
category was created for them. Han-chin also found that over time the quotas
allotted them were dramatically lowered, primarily by being exchanged for
the Mongol quotas. Prior to about 1680, the Manchu and Han-chin quotas
were generally set equal to each other, and the Mongol quotas set at half of
either of them. After about 1680 the Manchu and Mongol quotas tended to
be equal, and the Han-chin set at half of either. The circumstances relating
to stipends for students preparing for the examinations were similar. Han-
chins’ stipends had been awarded at a ratio of half the number awarded to
Manchus or Mongols in any given year, grossly out of relationship to the pro-
portion they constituted of the banner population.
The emperor also had to resolve his own familial involvement with Han-
chins’ lineages, particularly the T’ung line of Fu-shun, whose members
included the mother of the Kang-hsi emperor. The emperor’s uncles, T’ung
Kao-kang and T’ung Kao-wei, were at the center of the conquest elite. They
were the third generation of the family to be distinguished for service in the
most critical campaigns. T’ung Kuo-wei later became a martyr to the con-
quest when he was killed during the Mongol campaign of 1650. They
enjoyed the highest titles available outside the Aisin Gioro lineage. They par-
ticipated at the front during the annual Grand Sacrifice ritual. The reinven-
tion of the T’ung of Fu-shun in Manchuria between 1688 and 1741 also marked
the aggressive intentions of the court to newly codify official religion and to
mark it exclusively as the property of the court and its intimates, which now,
pointedly, did not include the Han-chin.14 The T’ung were not the only
lineage to represent the history and status of the old Liaotung Han-chin popu-
ation, but they were the best known. After 1683 their relation to the emper-
or made them the most problematic. This was a time when disputes
over status, titles, privileges, and registration were rife in all ranks of the con-
quest elite, and the government departments with responsibility for resolv-
ing them tended to rely upon genealogical documents—which sometimes
had to be manufactured—to resolve disputes. In the case of Han-chin ban-
termen generally, the new emphasis on genealogical criteria weakened their
claims to banner resources. New positions or payments frequently were des-
ignated as being for “Manchus.” Han-chin bannermen with documentation
could dispute their affiliation, though the government declined to make
registrations which would disturb the budget further or to invite massive
appeals for registra-

ded...
that many ministries and projects be overseen by boards equally divided between baronets (not necessarily Manchus) and civil officials. These positions were normally titular, and the work was done by a staff that was usually dominated by civilians, though hereditary members of the conquest elite could and did pursue civilian careers, sometimes brilliantly. Campaigns tended after 1690 to be focused in Turkestan, Tibet, southwestern China, and the borderlands with Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma. Active military officers were transferred to these areas, but remained closely connected with colleagues in the central government in Peking through banner affiliations and through the increasingly elaborate factional relations that thrived despite repeated efforts by emperors to frustrate them. Members of the hereditary elite who continued to function in the role of conquerors tended to be found in Peking or at the scenes of current action. Also in Peking were the accumulating social elites of the Manchu and Mongol banners, with a low level of professional involvement and a high level of indebtedness, but still strongly enough associated with the princely lineages to be influential in the cultural life of the capital.

The hereditary conquest elite was under constant pressure from the rising civilian, governing elite. By the end of the eighteenth century, they were also being displaced by baronets of lowly origin. The constant warfare of the eighteenth century helped promote resourceful and intelligent baronets into command ranks. Many campaigns under the leadership of men from the prominent lineages stalled, due to inability to deal with unfamiliar terrain, logistical incompetence, or corruption. By the 1770s the Ch'ien-lung emperor became impatient with such failures, and he prosecuted the culprits when he could identify them, which was not always possible as they were shielded by political networks. At the same time the emperor was eager to find Manchus, in particular, from the Northeast to promote into the command ranks. His cultural ideologies, to be discussed below, led him to believe that men from the Manchu homelands would in some way preserve the original martial spirit of the past century, and would be immune to corruption by the diversions and pretensions of Peking. In some of these choices he was fortunate, as with Hailancha, Fude, and Eldenbo. In others, he was unlucky. Ho-shen, who dominated court business in the last two decades of the emperor's life and oversaw a massive network of corruption, could count his rugged origins among his many charms.

The conquest elite, such as they were in the eighteenth century, were much affected by various forms of nostalgia. Much of this was connected to the ways in which the leadership adapted itself to the postconquest period by turning intense efforts to the shaping of its history, the characterization of its mission, and the establishment of criteria by which hereditary elites might retain their status. Many educated members of the conquest elite became in effect historians, translating the deeds of their predecessors and in many cases of themselves into chapters in the imperial narrative. The scope of such activities increased sharply after initiation of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's "Four Treasuries" projects, in which a great deal of new writing was ordered to fill gaps relating to the history of the Manchus, the Mongols, and some federated regions. In the same period, Manchus and Mongols were subjected not only to historical attention but cultural prescriptiveness in the present. The Ch'ien-lung emperor adamantly demanded that cultural behavior should conform to genealogical identity, and educational reforms were attempted in order to achieve this. The nostalgia did not come exclusively from the state. Prominent lineages of the Manchu and Mongol Eight Banners commissioned new genealogies, partly in response to imperial pressures tying genealogy to status in unprecedented ways, requested permission to construct new monuments to honor distinguished members of their lines, and helped underwrite the costs of banner, garrison, and in some cases county histories that would speak approvingly of their ancestors' achievements. The most striking expression of nostalgia of the period by a descendant of the conquest elite is China's best-known novel, Dreams of the Red Chamber (Hong lou meng). The author, Ye'ao Chan (Hsi-hsi-ch'ien), was a Han-Chin bannerman. He was a grandson of Ye'ao Yin, who had been born into the bondservant companies under the Kang-hsi emperor and distinguished himself as a commissioner in the imperial factories. Ye'ao Chan captured simultaneously the world of the conquest elite who were comfortably ensconced at the margins of the court in the past century, and the insularity, alienation, and despair of the same group in his own time.

By the early eighteenth century, the economic condition of many garrisons was critical. In some cases local conditions could be alleviated by transferring redundant men to new frontiers of conquest, in Turkestan particularly, but long-distance removals of troops from southern or central China were too expensive. Baronets on the payroll often languished while locals near the scene of battle were recruited for the frequently irregular conqueror forces. As in the seventeenth century, the court periodically created additional paid positions, but usually at the cost of lowering the amounts for the new salaries and discontinuing some command positions. This further decreased the ability to organize and even police the garrison communities. Land and debts
redemptions were also used, particularly in the earlier eighteenth century. An innovative plan, bannermen were invited to return to the Northeast and work on the state farms there. Few Manchus volunteered for this program, and an overwhelming majority of those who went fled within a year. In a more practical policy, garrisoners in a growing number of garrisons were being granted permission to live outside the military compounds, and implied in this was permission to pursue civil livelihoods. A number of garrison scribes and officers, who sometimes had a little capital, took advantage of this plan in the mid-eighteenth century to acquire land or to begin small businesses as horse or textile brokers, printers, and teachers. They laid the foundation for the small but distinct Manchu middle class that was prominent and often politically progressive at the end of the nineteenth century.

Through the eighteenth century the empire remained in need of competent soldiers for its ongoing campaigns, and despite repeated failures in remediating the financial difficulties of the garrisons, the Ch’ien-lung emperor still hoped to effect a revivification of the common bannermen. He felt that the way to do this was to insist upon education in the Manchu language, with special attention to speech, serious training and daily practice in riding and shooting, and deep immersion in the glories of Manchu history. The latter was available thanks to the efforts of the Kang-hsi emperor to create a historical geography for the Northeast, and particularly the region around Mr. Ch’ang-p’ei, the putative place of Manchu origins. The Kang-hsi court, like its immediate predecessors, had been keen to establish an ancestral link with this eastern boundary of the empire as part of a struggle to resist its annexation by the Romanov empire. Thanks to Ch’ing acquisition of the Amur lands as far as the Pacific coast under the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), threat of annexation was no longer an issue. The Ch’ien-lung emperor built upon the literary efforts of the previous century mostly for the purpose of consolidating the prestige of the Aisin Gioro and the Manchus as a newly conflated historical identity. The foundation myth of the Aisin Gioro ancestor Buluori Yinglong (actually a god-hero appropriated from the Events of the Amur region) legitimated the claim that the Ch’ing imperial lineage had for many centuries ruled the peoples of the Northeast, including the Amur.


45 On the education of imperial sons, see Rawski, The last emperors, pp. 177–80.

of the Great Khans, and were cultivated largely for that reason. Mongol noblemen of the Eight Banners lineages were present for even the most carefully guarded Shamanic rituals of the Aisin Gioro. They were represented on all military councils, campaigns, and history projects. Aisin Gioro princes learned Mongolian as well as Manchu, the better to maintain intimate connection with the Mongol nobility. At the same time, the court actively patronized education programs for the Mongols themselves. The Chahar and Khalkhas had extensive literary traditions, and since the sixteenth century had used Tibetan as their common written medium. Imperial printing houses produced both religious literature and poetry in Tibetan and Mongolian for them. In 1716 the Kang-hsi court printed part of the Geter epic (a Tibetan folk cycle becoming more familiar in Mongolia at the time) for the Khalkhas. The Ch’ien-lung court continued such publishing, but it more often desired to establish written Mongolian as the emblematic language of the Mongols, and so pledged Eight Banners Mongol in particular with educational and didactic texts that paralleled the cultural indoctrination program for the Manchus. These included language primers, narratives of historical origin (most based on “Secret History of the Mongols,” which the Ch’ing government first printed in 1665), translations of the dynastic histories of China, and religious liturgies and manuals. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, the Ch’ien-lung emperor was complaining that his written and spoken Mongolian was better than that of most Eight Banners Mongol with whom he had occasion to speak or correspond.22

The Mongol military elite was critical to the Ch’ien-lung court not only because of the historical claims with which they were associated, but also because of the role the emperor expected them to play in furthering the Ch’ing conquest in western Mongolia, Turkestan, and Tibet.23 This role was critical in the struggle for the territory of the portion of the Oirats known by the end of the seventeenth century as “Dzungaria.”24 Because of their loca-

---


24 A portion of this passage has been reprinted in Conquest, Oirats auxoria, p. 27, and a different portion has been translated in Jangg, "Mongolische Sprache auch," p. 90, from a report sent to his If a biography of the Kang-hsi period is available.


26 A valuable narrative in English based on Russian sources is Paul W. Breg's The Partition of the Steppe.
tion the Dzungars maintained strong connections with a variety of religious establishments in Tibet, including not only Buddhist but also openly Shamanist sects. Through their religious and trade connections, Dzungar leaders functioned over an extremely wide geographical range, including all Mongolia and Tibet, large parts of Central Asia, and the western portion of the Northeast. But the Dzungars were also thrown increasingly into contact and rivalry with the Muslim rulers of the oasis towns of Turkestan. On those occasions when peace could be concluded between Oyroid and Muslim potentates, the result was sometimes a marital alliance, with or without conversion by one or another of the parties. Oyroid moving eastward had been helpful in specific ways to the Nurhaci and Hzung Taiji regimes. They may have helped impress upon Nurhaci the uselessness of Buddhist imagery in political presentation, and there had been a small number of Oyroids among the first bureaucrats and examiners of Hzung Taiji’s bureaucracy at Mukden. It was most likely their influence that caused the Court of Colonial Affairs to classify Oyroid (who from about 1660 had a script slightly different from classical Mongolian) as a separate language. By the eighteenth century, the influence of the early Oyroid advisors on Hzung Taiji had been forgotten, and there was no delicacy at the Court of Colonial Affairs regarding whether the Dzungars were or were not Mongols. They were no-hui O-yoi-re Meng-ko, “the Oyroid Mongols went of the Gobi.”

The Ch’ing treatment of the Dzungars and their leaders in the eighteenth century is the benchmark of the limits of Ch’ing expansion. Goldin’s nephew Tievan Raskab, who had played a large role in Goldin’s undying, was himself ambitious. He defeated the Kyrgyz and dominated them as far as Lake Balkhash. He defeated and absorbed the Torguachs (once a branch of the Oyroid who had had a miserable sojourn in the vicinity of the Volga before returning to Mongolia to become victims of Tievan Raskab’s expanding regime). In the early eighteenth century, he was successful in controlling part of Tibetan territory and deposing the last secular king of the country. His expansion stalled in Tibet, where the Ch’ing fought tenaciously to establish a military outpost after 1718, and where Tievan Raskab was opposed by some Tibetan factions. He died in 1727 with the Tibetan situation unresolved, but

the reformed Yellow Hat sect from there. The overwriting of Daungharit identity with a Mongol label was enacted literally in the ensuing history of Turkestan, where Amursan made his last stand. China’s pacification of Turkestan was in one aspect not different from the quelling of Chahar rebellions against the early empire. Eight Banner Mongols, now denominated as Ziereng, Bandi, Changling, and others, were sent to suppress resisting “Mongols” of the frontier. For the remainder of the empire, Mongol aristocrats, all still nominally loyal to Chinggis Khaqan in his new incarnation as the Ch’ing emperor, were in the forefront of the military occupation of Turkestan, which became the Ch’ing province of Sinkiang in 1880.

The treatment of the Daunghars is a demonstration of the importance of understanding the composition and decomposition of the conquest elite in the Ch’ing expansion. With the defeat of the Daunghars and incorporation of Daungharia into the Ch’ing empire, the expansion was reaching its westward limits. Only a portion of Turkestan would be absorbed, and the installation of the garrisons there was as complete as it was going to be by about 1755. Daungharia/Turkestan was to remain the western frontier of the Ch’ing, and the symptoms of its excarnation as a cultural twilight zone were already fixed by the eighteenth century. The “Fragrant Concubine,” who inspired a host of erotic rumors that later became historical myths, was a powerful symbol of the region’s permanent alienation as a land of sensualism, brutality, and inhospitality to civilization, the obverse of the savage spirit that made its homes so highly prized.28 The peoples of the region were relegated to the “border barbarian” caricatures of the imperial tribute catalog. No Daunghars after Amursan were invited into the conquest elite. It is true that Daunghar leaders of the eighteenth century were often an advantageous buffer for the Ch’ing against possible Romano-Turkman encroachment in Mongolia or Turkestan, but these leaders were bargaining with and rewarded as other border chieftains were. Their cooperation was paid for, but they as individuals were never given conventional hereditary status in the conquest elite. The Daunghars were never converted from conquered to conquerors. That process of conversion ended at Daungharia/Turkestan because the general mechanisms that had powered Ch’ing westward expansion were desynchronizing. The social process that had created the conquest elite had been a function of that expansion. The expansion ended with the occupation of

28 See also Jonathan B. Lipman, Familiar strangers: A history of Muslims in northeast China (Seattle, 1997), pp. 86–112, particularly on Ch’ing-bargained characters, of Muslim wranglers and their interactions with local and frontier policy. On Hsinhu Jen as process and as symbol, see James A. Millward, “A Uighur Muslim in the Qing Court: The meanings of the ‘fragrant concubine,’” JAS, 33, No. 2 (May 1966): 167–78, and on the excarnation of Turkestan in the eighteenth century, see Millward, Beyond the pass, pp. 134–150.

29 The current population of Mongolia is about 3.5 million. See also Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia,” p. 38; Dorothy Boeij, “Economic implications of empire building: The case of Xinjiang,” Central and inner Asian Studies, 3 (1996), pp. 18, 36, and Creighton, A transcultural arena, p. 54.
khanates (je) of Khalkha. The addition of Ning-hsia, Kansu, and Tsinghai increased this to twenty-nine banners in five khanates. After suppression of the Dzungars, the regions of Hunan, Turfan, and the rest of Ch'ing-occupied Turkestan were described as having thirty-four banners in ten khanates. Thus, by about the middle of the eighteenth century, the centrally imposed political decentralization of Mongolia, Turkestan, and Tsinghai was built on a total of 149 banners, under 19 khanates. The trend continued to the end of the imperial period, when parts of Mongolia and Sinkiang were administered under thirty-eight khanates (je).

As the Manchus and Mongols undertook a process of historical invention and ideological representation in the eighteenth century, the Han-chin were subjected to the opposite: disavowal, and sublimation into the civilian Chinese population. Genealogical criteria had become fundamental to status throughout the empire by the later Ch'ien-lung era among both bannermen and civilians. As a legal and political matter, not as an historical issue, genealogy can arise as a buzz saw through the Han-chin populations, lopping off a majority of the branches of the conquest elite and casting them into the civilian, conquered population. As the time of the founding of the Eight Banners’ Schools in Peking in 1728, rules stipulated that 60 percent of all matriculants be Manchus (who by this time may have represented at most 40 percent of all bannermen), 20 percent Mongol (who may have represented 10 percent of all bannermen), and 20 percent Han-chin (who at the time may have represented as much as 50 percent or more of all bannermen). In subsequent years Chinese civilians and Han-chin bannermen were admitted to the academies in equal proportion. Han-chin continued to be enrolled in the Eight Banners to the end of the empire, but their numbers were small and their representation in the command ranks weak. Within the banners, higher ranks were with increasing frequency designated as being for Manchus (which could also mean Mongols). Many Han-chin took the hint and requested dismissal from the banners before they were excluded.

As in the period of the consolidation of the conquest elite, a complex of forces divided the banners into their “Manchu,” “Mongol,” and “Han-chin” categories, with the result that Han-chin became a marginal and distasteful presence. By the end of the seventeenth century, the financial burden of the garrisons required some means of limiting eligibility for stipends. The crisis of the Three Feudatories War had discredited Han-chin sufficiently to make them targets for exclusion. An additional motive for the court to convert the Han-chin a second time—from conquered to conquerors, now from conquerors to conquered—emerged as the empire recalibrated itself to perform less as a war machine and more as a government. Though it is not clear that the Ch'ing government made itself Confucian, as some have described it, in order to gain the acquiescence of civil elites to the conquest, it is certainly true that the K'ang-hsi court became attentive to a careful representation of itself in intercourse with civil elites that would be consonant with basic Confucian rhetoric.

The Ch'ien-lung emperor not only continued the policies of expression and representation established under his grandfather, but elaborated on them. The writing and rewriting of history was massively accomplished during his reign. In the narrative he favored, the Han-chin were a problem. Since they were part of the conquest elite before the Ch'ing incursion inside the Great Wall in 1644, their loyalty to the Ch'ing court was not very instructive. It was no different in motivation or practice from that of the Manchus or Mongols. The Ch'ien-lung view, put simply, was that there should be a difference. Han-chin should be represented as Chinese who willingly joined the Ch'ing cause because they appreciated the righteousness of the Atsin Gioro and they understood the mission of the Ch'ing to save civilization from chaos. The means by which this characterization was achieved were various, and were all within the grasp of the Ch'ien-lung literary enterprises. First, the prominent lineages of the old Nican families of Liao-tung who still remained in the Han-chin banners were transferred to the Manchu banners. Second, an extensive biographical review of the “twice-serving” officials who had changed loyalties from the Ming to the Ch'ing (in 1644 and 1645 primarily) made a strong distinction between the Liao-tung Han-chin and those who had been incorporated into the Han-chin banners during the conquest of north China. The latter were frequently condemned as traitors to the Ming who could not possibly have had real understanding of Ch'ing virtues and were serving not civilization, but their own petty interests. Third, these Han-chin who had earned their lives to suppress the Three Feudatories, underlining again the distinction between loyalty and opportunism, were lionized in newly commissioned historical and literary works. Most pervasively, the Ch'ien-lung emperor declared that the Han-chin had no origins other than Chinese, and that those who had joined the Ch'ing in Liao-tung were simply Chinese who recognized the legitimacy of the Ch'ing fight against the Ming. Flat assertions of this idea were inserted into the prefaces of new historical works, taken up and repeated in parallel publications, and by the nineteenth century were accepted as the irrefutable facts of Han-chin provenance. By excluding the Han-chin from historical intimacy with the conquest elite and casting them instead as dedicated

---

5 The biographies of those who served the Ming and then the Ch'ing have been an important source in the history of the Han-chin and in the process of Ch'ien-lung historiography of the Han-chin. See Frederick W. Wuthnow, Jr., The Great Enterprise: The Manchu reconstruction of imperial order in seventeenth-century China, 5-7, 166-79, 208, 355; and Crockatt, "The Qing Dynasty Retrospect on the Chinese-mongol (Manchu) Banners," trans., and A mandarin's answer, pp. 251-6.
Confucian acolytes and defenders of their Ch'ing superiors, the Ch'ien-lung emperor gained a powerful symbol of Ch'ing legitimacy as a permanent, civilized-oriented empire, whose rectitude had been energetically supported by Chinese from its earliest days.

FADING FUNCTIONS AND THE CASTE OF IDENTITY

There is little evidence that Nurhaci put much priority upon abstract and historically developed status or cultural characteristics of his prominent servants. This was consonant with his evident paramount goal, the enhancement of the fortune his family had accrued through domination of trade with Ming China and Yi Korea. The environment in which Nurhaci's regime emerged was one of subtly shaded cultural differences, most of which had little impact on an individual's political loyalties. As a corollary these differences presented minimal obstruction to the rearrangement of loyalties and authority that Nurhaci intended to accomplish. The ambiguities of Liaotung and western Chih-lin cultural life being as advantageous to him as they were, Nurhaci had every reason to allow them to remain ambiguous. This meant not only that hierarchies tended to be plastic, but that the rhetoric relating the strata to a legitimation of the regime, or prognostications on its mandate, was modest.

The period of Hung Tji's reign, in which the empire was created, had more extensive ideological needs. By 1666 the extent of the Ch'ing territory and its population multiplied, became better delineated in terms of spatial boundaries, and encompassed a number of previously recognized political entities. Organizational requirements alone demanded that the elite be better defined, more elaborately stratified, and that admission and accretion be made more systemic. Equally important, the establishment of an empire's suzerainty over diverse and historically well-defined areas meant that the imperial lineage, and Hung Tji himself, had to devise a rhetoric of legitimacy that would be adaptable to future as well as past conquests. That is, it had to transcend particulars of regional identity, entrenched patterns of social and political authority, or standards of privilege in the areas it controlled or aspired to control. The strategy for representing this transcendence was not altogether unlike that seen in other contemporary empires. The Ch'ing empire, through both its political and its historical authority, imposed a set of archetypal historical identities upon its populations, while institutionalizing a narrative of those identities submitting to and being represented by an universal emperorship.

The ideological implications of the graduated alienation of the Han-chibis from the Eight Banners and the relationship of these developments to the end stages of the conquest is evident. The dismantling of provisional conquest governments in the provinces and the establishment of civil governments demanded greater specialization in the roles of provincial military commanders (who were, increasingly, registered as Manchus) and of civil provincial governors (who were, increasingly, civilians Chinese). Abandonment of the liberal plan for development of a consolidated imperial elite meant the development, in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of more specialized programs for the cultural and professional preparation of the new segments of the elite and also for identification of common populations. The pressure to eliminate Han-chibis baronets from the active rolls was effective over the long term, to ensure that Europeans and Americans who observed the baronets for the first time in the nineteenth century saw the "Chinese" baronets remaining there as a small, odd, difficult-to-place group, an image that has persisted in modern scholarship on the Eight Banners.

As putative "Chinese" in this system were transformed to civil servants primarily, with suitable education in the political arts, so "Manchu" were subjected to the process of military professionalization, and what had once been institutions for the liberal preparation of a conquest elite became specialized schools for the training of baronets in riding, shooting, and speaking and writing Manchu. Concepts of status and identity were integral to the transition from a conquest empire to a largely civil government, and in general the same concepts can be seen to have been increasingly stabilized as the functions of the conquest elite diminished or disappeared. Though it would be anachronistic to call the resulting concepts of status and identity at the end of the eighteenth century "social," it is still fair to say that they were antecedents to the more rigid and volatile concepts of race and loyalty that more prominently came to light in the domestic and international struggles that wracked China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.