The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China
To my parents and grandparents
## Acknowledgments

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Introduction

The beginnings of modern physical education came with the training of the Chinese army by the Germans several tens of years ago, and the introduction at that time of German gymnastics in the army, even among the officers. This was followed with a type of Swedish gymnastics—diluted by passing through Japan—which came with the introduction of the Japanese military system following the Russo-Japanese war. Both have stuck in the army, though in somewhat emasculated shape, ever since, and one still sees dignified army officers in uniform and boots mount the high bar and do the giant swing and a somersault. It has all taken on some of the flavor of the “Military Art” with the resulting deterioration of form and posture.1

—Charles H. McCloy, Physical Education in China, 1923

The First Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 ended with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which forced the Qing government to recognize the independence of Korea and de facto Japanese control over the Korean peninsula and to cede Taiwan to the Japanese Meiji Empire.2 This outcome of the war surprised and shocked most Chinese government officials and scholars, who experienced an unprecedented sense of crisis and insecurity. In the years to come, many of them felt like living in uncertain, “difficult and dangerous times” (shijiu jianweil) and in a world which was undergoing “drastic transformations” (shibiann).3 Prior to the war, both sides had invested in upgrading their military technology for decades but most observers in China, Japan, and abroad considered the Qing forces to possess the slightly more advanced weapons and battleships and recognized a much larger navy and army. However, due to the lack of training with new weapons, insufficient preparation, a lack of cooperation among various regional forces, and deficient logistics and
coordination, the Qing troops were defeated by the Japanese military and its superior navy, which was equipped with faster, more maneuverable ships and more quick-firing guns, compared to the Qing navy.  

In the contemporary perception, however, other factors played a more significant role. In the years that followed the Sino-Japanese War, members of the imperial court and civil officials, who constituted the Qing Empire's political and social elite, attributed the defeat to the cowardice, systematic incompetency, and widespread lack of morale among Qing troops. They diagnosed a culturally determined physical backwardness of Chinese men and criticized prevalent corrupt practices among the military forces of the Qing Empire, such as the abuse of office, embezzlement, negligence, obscure hierarchies, and a general lack of interest in war and military glory. An increasing number of members of the elite started to question “Chinese culture,” referring to societal customs, practices, and institutions. In particular, the late Qing society’s allegedly negative attitude toward its armed forces and martial values in general came under scrutiny. Intellectuals, government officials, and military leaders criticized the pacifist and civil orientation of Confucian high culture, which, in their eyes, had resulted in a lack of interest in martial deeds, valor on the battlefield, and military achievements among men in China. They viewed literature and art-oriented Confucianism as the reason for the tremendous neglect of physical culture and exercising, which had allegedly resulted in the bodily degeneration of the Chinese people and the effemination of Chinese men.

After the turn of the century, a few Chinese scholars and writers adopted the phrase “sick man of East Asia” (dongya bingfu), which foreign observers occasionally used to describe China as a backward country with an ailing and incompetent government. In China, however, the term began to refer to physically weak Chinese men, who lacked courage, military spirit, martial aspiration, and true masculinity. To be sure, this Chinese self-degradation was strongly influenced by contemporary European, American, and Japanese ascriptions. While women represented either sexually desired objects of conquest or civilizational backwardness, Chinese men counted as feeble, effeminate, and devious people, who lacked vigor, honor, and competitiveness. The physical bodies of both Chinese women and men became objects of mockery and exoticism. Governments and the public in Britain, France, or the United States viewed Chinese women with their bound feet and Chinese men with their long gowns, queues, and fingernails as unhealthy and diseased. The image of feminized men became representative of China as a whole, where oriental despotism suppressed men and robbed them of any sensitivity, morale, and maleness.

In order to set themselves apart from their formerly close neighbor, the Japanese adopted the European and American views about allegedly feeble and feminine Chinese men. Similar to hundreds of other woodblock prints that depicted the Sino-Japanese War from a propagandistic Japanese perspective, a picture by Mizuno Toshikata from 1895, for instance, showed the surrender of the Chinese military commander Ding Ruchang to the Japanese Admiral Ito Sukeyuki (Figure I.1). The depiction was fictitious as Ding himself never surrendered and committed suicide after being defeated in the decisive battle of the Sino-Japanese War at Weihaiwei Bay. Nevertheless, the woodblock print tells much about the perceptions and aspirations of both the Japanese and the Chinese during and after the war: broad-shouldered and long-legged Japanese officers, standing upright, wearing body-hugging European-style uniforms, flanked by well-disciplined soldiers presenting their rifles, were accepting the surrender of crouching Chinese military officials, who, to the non-Chinese viewer, looked more like civilian scholar-bureaucrats than soldiers. The Japanese men, on the other hand, had the appearance of European men, including both their facial features and their dress, triumphing over disarmed, gowned, queued, and emasculated Chinese men (and their European advisors behind them). This display of martial strength and manliness in pictures like the one by Mizuno Toshikata indicated the Japanese claim to be part of the family of great “Western” powers.

After the war, an increasing number of Chinese elites viewed restoring the martial spirit and military aptitude of Chinese men as the order of the day to face the humiliation of disempowerment. This book, therefore, deals with the military reforms in late Qing and early Republican China, and I argue that these reforms not only transformed military culture in a complex process of cross-cultural appropriation and adaptation but also led to the epistemological reconceptualization of both the physical body and masculinity in China.

Figure I.1 Woodblock Print by Mizuno Toshikata, 1895.
Introduction

In the course of the military reforms that started in 1895, new military organizations developed, and the self-understanding of military men, as well as the inclination of society toward its armed forces, changed profoundly. New ideas, representations, and practices related to the male body, as well as new notions about male identity, disseminated from the reformed army to larger segments of the Chinese population at the turn of the twentieth century.

The war was the final waking call and reform-minded officials, led by the influential scholars Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, demanded to follow Japan’s lead and “modernize” and “westernize” China’s political, legal, and institutional structures, the forms of social and economic organization, and even the systems of thinking and knowledge. They emphasized that Japan had thoroughly adapted to the “West” politically, culturally, and socially and was therefore able to defend Japan’s suzerainty against foreign encroachment and claims. They attributed the Japanese victory in 1895 to the superior coordination and organization as well as the better constitution, greater skill, and morale of Japan’s German-style military, compared to the Qing forces. Kang and Liang were ousted in 1898 for being too radical in their reform agenda but many of their ideas enjoyed a new lease of life after the turn of the century. Repeated foreign military intrusion during the Boxer War in 1900–1901 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 prompted the implementation of profound government reforms, which were called “New Policy” (Xinzheng) and tackled the political, administrative, legal, economic, educational, and military systems of the country. In many respects, these reforms were unfinished before the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Nevertheless, they were seminal for the further development of society and still affect China today, including the structure of the army, the role of military men, and perceptions and practices concerning the physical body.

Against this background of a “crisis of masculinity” and political reform, Qing officials started to establish military forces based on the German model, the so-called “New Armies” (Xinjun). Ever since the unification of the German Empire in 1871, the German army enjoyed, transnationally, the reputation of being the most advanced, most disciplined, best organized, and best managed military force in the world. Unsurprisingly, Chinese military reformers drew on this successful and reputable model. And although their focus of orientation switched to the Japanese military after the turn of the century, Germany retained its status as the archetypical “militarized country” (junguo) and repeatedly reappeared as a major military role model. The first of the New Armies were established under the direction of Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, who both hired German military instructors and prompted the production of military manuals and military regulations based on German examples. Yuan and Zhang were among the most important officials during the late Qing and were major actors in the entire New Policy reform process. Together with Yikuang, a member of the imperial clan and bearer of the title Prince Qing, they represented not only the most important figures in the military reform process in late Qing China but also the most powerful men in the empire. They established new model armies which became the nucleus of an entirely reformed military system, including a national army established in 1904, the Lijun (“Army”). And they adopted German- and Japanese-style schemes of organization, methods of training, military academies, administrative institutions, and command structures.

The purpose of this book is not to present in detail the extensive history of late Qing and early Republican military reforms, as previous scholarship has done, but to examine their specific, albeit central and hitherto neglected role for the history of body and gender in China. It deals with the straightforward question that preoccupied Chinese military reformers after the war against Japan in 1895: how to find a more effective way or art of governing soldiers (zhi bing zhi dao). In other words, the book is about military men as objects of governance. It addresses how, after the Sino-Japanese War, military reformers sought to overcome the alleged physical weakness and lack of martial spirit and military skill attributed to Chinese officers, soldiers, and men in general. How did they adopt foreign techniques to influence the conduct and motivation of men? How did they eventually focus on governing the entire population for military reform purposes?

The late Qing government longed for a more effective and competitive army, and for more military clout, compared to the foreign armies that increasingly frequented Qing territory. After 1895, military reformers realized that improving the technical skills of soldiers and the technological and organizational condition of the military were far from enough. The empire needed a new type of well-trained and well-disciplined soldier, as well as a professional, self-confident, and institutionally autonomous officer corps. Particularly young men from the wealthy, educated, and politically potent elite were called on to “throw away the brush and pick up the sword” (toubi congrong)—to pursue a military career instead of one in the civil bureaucracy and strive for martial glory instead of scholarly refinement. Military reformers sought to elevate the social status of officers and common soldiers as well as introducing a martial consciousness and positive inclination toward the army, physical education, and military values through all levels of society.

In the book, I argue that military reforms and the emergence of the New Armies after 1895 strongly contributed to the reconceptualization of the physical body and led to the introduction of new body practices in Chinese society. The New Armies propagated ideas of optimized, homogenized, physically strong, and well-regulated male bodies that eventually disseminated across society. Moreover, military reformers sought to govern soldiers and officers by promoting new ideals of male appearance and conduct, as
as characteristics such as professionalism, martial valor, and patriotism. The army reforms transformed both the identity of military men and their standing in society by recreating and propagating a version of masculinity that stressed martial values, military glory, and other attributes linked to war and service in the army. Eventually, the physical and masculine ideals of the New Armies were propagated through the iconic figure of the "citizen-soldier" (junguomin), which emerged after the turn of the century in the discussions concerning schools, education, and population governance.

Throughout the book, I examine various sources such as drill manuals, military regulations, laws and codes, textbooks for soldiers and cadets, readers for citizens and school students, instruction books for physical exercise and other daily physical routines, photographic volumes, general newspapers and periodicals, and professional military journals. The book consists of six chapters, which deal with the education of common soldiers, officers, and citizens-soldiers between the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the beginning of the civil war period in 1916. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the basic training and drill of military men and the techniques to discipline and align their physical bodies. Chapter 1 deals with the introduction of German military gymnastics and tactical drills, while Chapter 2 addresses the meticulous regulation of time and space with regard to the everyday life of soldiers, including aspects such as hygiene and punishment. In Chapters 3 and 4, I mainly examine the techniques to cultivate a new officer corps and type of "military man" (junren). The chapters deal with the ways of directly and indirectly appealing to the manliness of soldiers and officers and with the performance of military culture as a source of motivation. Chapter 3 tackles the introduction of German-style military uniforms, rituals, and etiquettes, as well as the height of late Qing foreign-style military pomm and circumstance. Chapter 4 is concerned with the construction of military masculinity through the promotion of traits such as professionalism, possessing a martial spirit, and the willingness to practice self-sacrifice. Chapters 5 and 6 address the military education of citizens, which reformers viewed as the basis for a fitter, healthier, manlier, obedient, more motivated, and militarily better-prepared population. In Chapter 5, I explore the link between military service and citizenship and discussions among military reformers about introducing universal conscription. Chapter 6 deals with the military and physical education of students, which had the purpose of preparing children for a life as citizen-soldiers.

In the remainder of this introduction, I will briefly discuss the role of military culture in China and the significance of the German-Japanese role model as well as the methodological, conceptual, and theoretical approaches of the book, including the concept of governmentality and ideas of masculinity in late imperial China. Finally, I will outline the military reforms and the establishment of New Armies between 1895 and 1916 in China.

THE CHINESE MILITARY CROSS-CULTURAL

The reorganization of the military and the emergence of the New Armies after the Sino-Japanese War not only affected the military as an organization but also the status of military men, martial values, physical culture, soldierly discipline, and warfare in society. In other words, the military culture of twentieth century China was very different from that of earlier periods, because of intense cross-cultural interactions with the military cultures of Europe, the United States, and Japan. The term military culture has multiple meanings: broadly speaking, it refers, first, to the military as an organization, including its value system, conduct, way of thinking, and "mission" or purpose as inherent in written and unwritten rules, laws, practices, rituals, and symbols. Second, military culture refers to strategic culture or the process of decision-making by both civilians and military personnel on the political level. The concept of strategic culture includes the formation of military doctrines and views on tactics, logistics, and principles of organization and operation among the armed forces. Third, military culture deals with the role of military organizations and perception of war within society, the relationship between civilians and the military, the acceptance or denial of military ethos and way of life, and the social standing of common soldiers and the officer corps. In particular, it includes the esthetic and literary production dealing with military events, battles, and army life.

Historically, military organizations, strategic cultures, or the perception and status of armies and military personnel in society change strongly. Isabell Hull suggests concentrating less on what military culture is and more on the question how military culture is produced in a specific context. Her aim is to make military culture a universal term that can be used for comparisons over time and space. Studying military culture is not just important for gaining knowledge about army organization, war, or the lives of soldiers, but for unfolding wider, historically changeable, social discourses and cultural practices, and uncovering the mutual interaction between civilians and the military. A military uniform, for instance, might imply discourses on discipline, gender, fashion, hygiene, or nation and community. The aim of this book is not to postulate the development of a "modern," "Western-modeled" Chinese military culture but to examine in detail elements such as physical culture and masculinity that governed the military culture of both the armed forces and larger segments of the civilian population in China at the turn of the twentieth century.

Historians and Sinologists, time and again, referred to a specific, singular Chinese military culture or "way of warfare." In 1939, the historian Lei Haeizong coined the term "a-military culture" (wu bing wenhua) and strongly reinforced the notion that Chinese culture is at its core
pacifist. His description, which resembles the post-1895 self-critique of Qing scholars and officials, was not merely an apologetic assessment made in the context of the Second World War, but originated in the political influence of the Confucian civil bureaucracy, particularly since the Song Dynasty (960–1279), and its power to define high culture and social values through its dominance over written records and texts. As a result, there is a lack of epic accounts celebrating military heroism and deeds on the battlefield. In the twentieth century, European and American scholars such as Max Weber adopted the notion of the Confucian civilian elite, arguing that Chinese culture essentially despised the military and only waged war as a last resort. Pacifist rituals, in this view, were much more important for rulership and state formation than military success. Both Chinese and Euro-American intellectuals frequently quote the proverb “emphasize culture, de-emphasize the military” (zhong wen qing wu), allegedly prominent since the Song Dynasty, as a proof. However, this is a serious oversimplification and never represented official state policy or the social norm.

The notion that the Chinese were pacifist people which was ruled through peaceful rituals by the most virtuous and honest persons, is cultural essentialism and was a “utopia” of Confucian scholars and officials. The civil bureaucracy in late imperial China successfully managed to control the military by centralizing the administration of military affairs, establishing an imperial monopoly on warfare, and by distributing command structures. However, neither the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) nor the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) were “landlocked,” hiding behind a great wall and minding their own business, as John Fairbank argues, but applied military force offensively to check enemies and conquer new territories. Warfare was never just a ritual affair and military strategy did not simply follow the doctrines of the eminent Art of War by Master Sun (Sunzi bingfa) and other military classics, which viewed military issues in the larger context of maintaining social order and mostly idealized avoiding battle. Moreover, although a number of academics sought to extract an essential “Chinese strategic thinking,” every dynasty adopted and adjusted its own agendas and premises. Joanna Waley-Cohen, for instance, has shown that military culture was fundamental for the Qing when building an Inner-Asian Empire. During the eighteenth century, Qing emperors not only conquered large areas but also strongly promoted military success, military rituals, and visual representations of martial heroism and glory. Arguing that the Qing were not Han Chinese but Manchu, who simply imposed their materially oriented nomadic culture and way of warfare upon the pacifist Chinese also misses the point: being “Chinese,” in the sense of a national identity, only really developed in the nineteenth century, and as much as the Qing absorbed cultural elements from the previous (Han-Confucian) Ming, they added elements of (Inner-Asian) religious practices, social organization, and political and military culture to the new empire. In other words, there was only a Qing military culture, which was the combination of both long existing and newly developing institutions, concepts, and practices, and which transformed itself over the course of two and a half centuries.

Moreover, the military sphere is a prime example of constant cross-cultural interaction and reinventions. Throughout Chinese history, constant security threats made it necessary to adjust the organization of armed forces, adapt to techniques of warfare, and import, copy, or invent new military technology and weapons. Richard Smith emphasizes that the “Middle Kingdom in practice had to make almost continual use of foreign military talents” and “this was true not only of conquest dynasties and periods.” At the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese military reformers sought to emulate foreign military cultures on a large scale, both by reorganizing the armed forces and militarizing society. William C. Kirby even states that, in the first half of the twentieth century, “Western militarism (in its Soviet, German and American national forms) was undoubtedly the single most successful cultural export from the West to China.” The central question, however, is not whether and to what degree late Qing and early Republican China militarized, but how military culture in China transformed through cross-cultural interactions, perceptions, selective appropriation and adaptation, and historical reinterpretations. In the medium and long term, it is more significant how cross-cultural entanglement in the military sphere affected systems of knowledge as well as social and cultural practices than how subsequent political regimes resurrected Chinese military strength and succeeded or failed to secure their own survival. The establishment of the New Armies did not prevent the abdication of the Qing, but notions of professionalism, physical culture, and masculinity had a lasting effect on the twentieth and twenty-first century.

After 1895, Chinese military reformers did not blindly adhere to one role model, but were up to date with current military-related debates and developments all over Europe, the United States, Japan, and other parts of the world. After the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905, they recognized that the Japanese Army was not just imitating the German and other European armies and navies but was actually a leader in fields such as military sanitation. Consequently, late Qing and early Republican military reforms were not limited to one single role model and the New Armies followed an alleged international standard and the example of “various countries” (geguo). Nonetheless, the establishment of the New Armies and military institutions followed what Chinese military reformers sometimes called the “German-Japanese rut” (de ri chenggui): established practices and rules in Germany and Japan that were viewed as actually setting the standard of “modern” (jindai) military organization and culture. Moreover, in order to successfully
appropriate foreign military cultural elements, Chinese military reformers often referred to an allegedly ancient Chinese military culture, to established military writings and theories, and to iconic military heroes. In combination with neologisms, which in many cases came from Japan, they used established language and terms to talk about military reforms and label the New Armies. Titles and nomenclature of the regular Qing armies, the Green Standard Army, and the Banner forces, for instance, were reused and given new meaning. And almost every military reformer and army officer acknowledged the significance of eminent, ancient military writers, and their strategic principles. However, they, usually implicitly, deemed these writing as insufficient to establish a truly “modern,” efficient, competitive army as they lacked the tactical, organizational, technical, and instructional depth of foreign military theory and practice.

The Franco-Prussian or Franco-German War in 1870–1871 and the resulting foundation of the German Empire established the German military’s reputation of being one of the best, if not the best, land armies in the world. Various governments and armies inside and outside Europe sought to emulate Prussian military organization, tactics, and training, including the leaders of the Meiji Japanese Empire. Already in 1871, the cosmopolitan Chinese literatus Wang Tao wrote a book titled Record of the Prussian-French War (Pu Fa zhanji), which deeply influenced late Qing military reformers and which established, in China, the good reputation of German weapons technology, military organization, and tactical and strategic skill. Moreover, Chinese official-scholars received the impression that the military pervaded every aspect of life among the German people.38 Subsequently, Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong, Yuan Shikai, and other powerful officials employed German military instructors and advisors, imported German arms, and encouraged translations of German military literature. By 1895, Chinese military reformers and officers considered the German army as epitomizing “modern” or “Western” military organization, war preparation, and conduct of war. The German army became the outstanding role model for army reforms in late Qing China, but also for reorganizing society along military principles: Chinese reformers viewed and described the German Empire as a young and vibrant nation that strongly adhered to military values and virtues, where virtually “everyone was a soldier” (jinmin wei bing).

The interest in the German military initially focused on purchasing weapons (particularly Krupp canons), strengthening coastal defense, and acquiring naval technology and ironclad battleships.39 Apart from the general admiration for the German army and German military technology, Li Hongzhang emphasized a number of political reasons for seeking German help for improving Qing military prowess: there were no German missionaries and merchants selling opium in China, and Germany was far away and thus not a threat for the Qing Empire.39 After 1895, the focus on German and other foreign military technology and ships was replaced by an interest in military culture, and Chinese military reformers systematically began to model the organization, drill, education, and regulation of new model armies on German principles.40 The German influence peaked between 1895 and 1899, when more German officers than ever before served as drillmasters in the New Armies and as teachers in the newly founded military academies. Between 1870 and 1914, Chinese military leaders employed around 130 Germans, who had a profound and lasting impact on military culture in China. None of these advisors and instructors, who came to China individually or as members of groups, was part of an official mission backed by the German government. Rather, they were privately hired soldiers of fortune, retired officers or officers on temporary leave, who went to China on their own initiative or on behalf of the Krupp Company.41

The influence of German military culture on the New Armies was not limited to military advisors; it was most tangible in translations as well as in books based on German originals, which were produced in increasing numbers after the Sino-Japanese War. Before the war, translations in the military sphere focused on instruction manuals for cannons and guns as well as on works on coastal defense, such as Victor von Shelia’s Treatise on Coastal Defense (Haifang xinlan). Generally, translations were produced by official facilities such as the Tongwenguan, a school for the study of foreign languages in Beijing, or at the Jiangnan and Tianjin Arsenals (see below).42 After the Sino-Japanese War, book translations started to be produced semi-officially by individual bureaucrats or privately with official approval. Instead of mere operating instructions, a large number of translations of German books and German-influenced manuals dealt with various, state-of-the-art elements of preparing for war, such as close unit drill, tactical formations, physical exercise, combined deployment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, logistics of organizing an army, or the use and maintenance of weapons and other equipment. Overall, German military books accounted for a large proportion of translations into Chinese at the turn of the century. Out of 160 books translated by the Jiangnan Arsenal, 33 were on military topics, including 19 of German origin.43 The historian Shi Duqiao states that the translations of “Western” military books, which increased dramatically after 1895, had a significant effect on military technology, thought, drill, and everyday army life in China. Shi counts 64 books produced between 1867 and 1894 and over 250 books between 1895 and 1911. After 1895, these translated military books as well as drafts or notes by foreign military instructors covered all kinds of military-related topics such as organization, education and training, military theory, and infantry drill and warfare. According to Shi, the translated literature was very comprehensive and detailed, concentrated
on the land army, originated mostly from Germany and Japan (before 1895: France and Britain), and introduced entire new fields such as logistics, engineering, construction, and geography. Numerous German military books were translated from the Japanese, including the famous work On War (Vom Kriege, Zhuanzhenglan) by Carl von Clausewitz, which was translated by the Baoding Army School in 1911 from a Japanese source produced in 1903.

A third channel for gaining knowledge and learning from the German military consisted of Chinese envoys, observers, and particularly military students, who were sent to Germany to study and receive a military education. Between 1876 and 1912, at least seven groups consisting of 47 men altogether, as well as a few individuals who probably went on their own, studied with the German army. One of the students sent to Germany from the Tianjin Military Preparatory School (established in 1885) in 1888 was Duan Qirui, who was educated in gunnery at the Military Academy in Berlin and at the Krupp Company in Essen. Duan later became one of Yuan Shikai’s most important lieutenants, subsequently holding various leading positions within the command of the New Armies. He was not only responsible for the artillery and armory of the Beiyang Army (the most powerful of the New Armies under Yuan’s command) but was also involved in creating drill and training regimes for soldiers. In 1906, he served as director of the officer college of the Beiyang Army located in Baoding. In 1912, he became minister of war and, after Yuan’s death in 1916, he served several times as prime minister.

A few military students went to other European countries, such as France, as well as to the United States because Chinese military reformers emphasized the importance of sending men there to “study the [respective] academic situation.” Potential cadets had to fulfill high intellectual and physical requirements, including minimums for weight and chest girth, fluency in the language of the respective country, or excellent knowledge of the Chinese language. However, the great majority of military students went to Japan. In 1899, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi sent the first two groups, consisting of 39 and 27 students, who mostly came from Hubei province. Yuan Shikai dispatched 35 cadets and officers to Japan in 1902, and, subsequently, the Beiyang Army became the biggest sponsor of military students going abroad. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, a veritable wave of enthusiasm for the Japanese Army developed in the Qing Empire and, in the following years, hundreds of students, who were either supported by official stipends or paid privately, enrolled at military academies in Japan.

The New Armies followed the general trend among late Qing reformers to emulate the Japanese Meiji Empire, which had reinvented itself as a "Western-style" nation-state. Chinese military reformers switched their focus to the Japanese army after the turn of the century because they realized that it was easier and quicker to gain the necessary knowledge via Japan and the Japanese army, which they considered as a German-style force. In their view, the Japanese army had already appropriated German military organization, tactics, and practices, and successfully adapted them to a quasi-Chinese social, cultural, and political environment. With the help of French and German advisors, Japanese reformers had created a successful European-style army from scratch during the early Meiji era (1868–1912). Whereas the French military mission in Japan started in 1865, the German engagement began only in 1884, after much struggling between pro-German and pro-French factions within the Japanese government and army. The German influence lasted less than a decade, until 1893, but it was very intensive and transformed the Japanese army significantly. In particular, the Prussian officer Jacob Meckel was instrumental in rebuilding the Meiji Empire’s Army according to German structures and preparing the Japanese successes in both the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War. Meckel was a specialist in tactics, logistics, and general staff operations, and, during his time in Japan, from 1885 to 1888, he effectively reorganized the Japanese Army’s command and administration structures, including the General Staff, War Ministry, and General Inspectorate. Under his guidance, the Japanese army introduced a flexible system of military divisions and organization, and implemented universal conscription. Furthermore, Meckel contributed to the overhauling of military logistics, mobilization schemes, and medical care structures and helped to create a national defense plan.

There were mainly two reasons for the practical reorientation of the Chinese military from the German to the Japanese army: on the one hand, issues with both the German advisors and the German government made a continuation of the cooperation difficult after 1900. The contracts of most of the instructors ended in 1899 and were not extended because the Germans had difficulties in adjusting to both Chinese soldiers and military leaders. Moreover, the German government seized control over Qingdao and the Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong province in 1898 and established a colony and naval base. On the other hand, as Zhang Zhidong emphasized in his widely circulated piece Exhortation to Study in 1899, Japan was culturally and geographically closer, instructors and learning materials were cheaper and better available, and the Japanese language was much more accessible for Chinese officers. It was much easier for Chinese cadets to study at military academies in Japan than in Germany or elsewhere in Europe or the United States, making the Japanese army the more reasonable choice as direct role model for the New Armies. After the turn of century, Japanese military instructors and teachers began to replace the Germans as the dominant foreign group in both Chinese military academies and the New Armies.

Yet, although the Japanese army replaced the German as a direct role model after the turn of the century, the latter still counted as an ideal. Many leading
Chinese military reformers, army generals, and political leaders continued to view the German army and German military culture as the very archetype of a “modern” military. They continued to admire the German way of governing an army and militarizing society, including military training, notions of professionalism, martial spirit, and the general military education of the male population. Consequently, German military culture received a new wave of attention in 1909, when the Xuantong Emperor and a group of germanophile Manchu princes ascended to power. The renewed enthusiasm lasted until the end of the First World War, before military failure, Allied propaganda, and the excessive display of German-style military culture in China by Chinese generals led to an increasingly negative view of German “militarism.” Miliary theorists and officers, such as the Nationalist Party military leader Jiang Jieshi, however, continued to admire the German military. The Nationalists resumed Sino-German military cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s, including the employment of German military advisors, the purchase of German weapons, and translations of German military literature, but this is beyond the scope of the current study.44

GOVERNING MEN AND THEIR BODIES

Chinese military reformers at the turn of the twentieth century sought to govern the bodies of men, aiming at deploying fitter, more disciplined, and more motivated troops. In 1904, the newly established Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu), declared that, together with national uniformity of organizational principles and equipment, training or “methods and rules for military drill and physical exercise” were the crucial goals of military reforms.55 Therefore, this book deals with the governance of the male physical body and the technologies to govern bodily practices. Rather than examining individual and subjective experiences, I ask how the physical body was imagined, represented, and produced through discourses and practices linked to the military reforms in late Qing and early Republican China.56 These reforms and the establishment of the New Armies were predominantly concerned with the bodies of men and boys (but not exclusively, as Chapter 6 will show), and not only led to the reconfiguration of notions about the physical body but also to the reconceptualization of masculinity. While the issues of body and masculinity in Chinese history are discussed in more detail below and in the individual chapters of this book, the paragraphs below offer some more general theoretical and methodological remarks and observations.

The human body is not a biological or anthropological constant, but is enmeshed in a web of cultural codes, images, experiences, norms, and representations, which vary strongly over time and space, by social class, and by gender. Even within one social and cultural environment, various ways of conceptualizing the body are possible. The way humans perceive, interpret, and act upon their bodies is not natural but constituted through social interaction and discourse, and through constantly repeated bodily practices and their presentation or “performance.” Bodily performance strongly contributes to the production of gender concepts of femininity and masculinity, which are inseparably linked to physical characteristics. In other words, body and gender are “done” through social practices and are fluid and relational categories.57

What are body practices and what or who governs and produces them? According to Marcel Mauss, different societies have their own “art of using the human body”: bodily practices and habits, which he calls body techniques.58 These body techniques, he argues, do not vary so much between individuals but between groups with different mental and physical dispositions, notions of propriety, fashion, or prestige, or social and educational backgrounds. The way we walk, sit, sleep, consume, reproduce, dress, exercise, and keep healthy and clean are shaped by our degree of education and training and differ according to age and gender. Mauss’ example is the variety of military marching styles, including, for instance, the German goose-step, which is viewed as “one of those idiosyncrasies”59 made up by the assemblage of psychological, physical, and social conditions.60

The ideas of body techniques later informed Pierre Bourdieu’s more elaborate concept of habitus, which he defines as a system of predispositions and permanent practices. Habitus (in plural) express certain worldviews and are internalized by education and upbringing, which depend on specific social structures. They are the outcome of collective and durable systems of socialization that are transmitted from generation to generation and produce the possible spectrum of perception and action of an individual. The physical body is essential in Bourdieu’s concept, because the habitus embodies or incorporates social structures.61 Although the body literally epitomizes habitus, Bourdieu mainly deals with knowledge and belief systems and less with the actual micro-techniques of the body, as Susan Brownell points out, or with the factors governing and producing body practices.62

Michel Foucault, in his life-spanning analysis of conceptualizing power in European history, addresses these factors in much more detail. Three concepts that are central in his thinking, disciplinary power, government, and biopolitics, particularly deal with the epistemological construction or production of the physical body. Disciplinary power is connected to the question of how to govern an individual, control its behavior, assess its qualifications, and increase its capacities and skills. Through institutions such as schools, factories, hospitals, asylums, prisons, and armies, disciplinary power acts
Foucault views discipline and government (or governance) as different forms of power. In his late years, he sought to merge these concepts into the theory of governmentality, loosely defined as historically and spatially specific conceptions, rationales, regimes, or arts of government. Studies in governmentality emphasize the question of how something is governed. In European history, according to Foucault, the triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and government (governance) aggregated without replacing each other to bring about a specific "modern" form of government or governmentality. Sovereign power, thought of as disposition of things and direct intervention by the state rulers and bureaucracy, was subsequently supplemented by disciplinary power and finally by government to produce a governmentality concerned with governing economic, social, psychological, and biological processes, with the aim of increasing the wealth, strength, health, or happiness of the state and its inhabitants. Direct state intervention was rapidly replaced by the actions of increasingly elaborate and complex institutions as well as by the knowledge production and professional guidance of scientific disciplines.

In particular, the administration and management of all aspects that affect the biological lives of all members of a community, and the regulation and control of the quantity and (subjective) quality, welfare, strength, longevity, or purity of entities such as the "population," "nation," "society," "citizenry," "race," or "species" became a central element of government, which Foucault calls biopolitics. As political strategy, it deals with the governance of issues related to health, hygiene, sanitation, nutrition, sexual behavior, reproduction, birth and death rates, and age patterns. It resorts to a variety of technologies of government such as statistics, census surveys, and cartography to govern the development of the population. The Birth of Biopolitics, as Foucault calls it, began in Europe with the recognition of the "population" as an economic and political concern. While discipline acts upon individual physical bodies, biopolitics acts upon processes concerning the bodies of the entire population. Together, discipline and biopolitics constitute biopower in Foucault's thinking. In this book, I use the theory of governmentality as an analytical framework, because the focus is on the question of how reformers governed soldiers, officers, and citizens. Military reformers sought to discipline soldiers by meticulously regulating their bodies. After the turn of the century, they were increasingly concerned with governing the entire population for military purposes. Arguably, the late Qing and early Republican military reforms mark the beginning of biopower in twentieth-century Chinese politics.

Military reforms and the newly introduced technologies to govern military men and their bodies affected the conceptualization of masculinity within the specific setting of military culture. Neither Mauss nor Bourdieu nor Foucault deals substantially with the issue of gender or analyze body
practices according to different genders. However, it is fruitful to broaden their approaches to include the category of masculinity for the purpose of understanding the impact of late Qing and early Republican military reforms. Despite certain specific concepts such as the “crisis of masculinity” or “hegemonic masculinity,” there is no strict boundary between men’s studies and gender studies and they share basic theoretical principles. Gender concepts are fluid and depend on ongoing, historically, socially, and culturally varying discourses, representations, and constantly repeated practices. Socially performed practices are constructed around the human body and its biological sex, which, according to Judith Butler, itself becomes indistinct because of the complex matrix of social perceptions and ascriptions superimposed on it. Gendered behavior is not genetically predetermined, and neither do people simply enact sex roles, which are socially imposed from birth and analog to the biological sex. People do perform roles but these are not immutable. “Gender,” Raewyn Connell remarks, “is social practice that constantly refers to bodies and what bodies do, it is not social practice reduced to the body.” Bodily practices and bodily experiences, as well as discourses about the body, are essential for the process of conceptualizing gender. In turn, gender concepts affect how individuals construe the physical body, and what they “do” with it. In summary, gender concepts are instable and depend on performativity or, in other words, on bodily practices in social interactions. “True masculinity,” Connell writes, “is almost always thought to proceed from men’s bodies—to be inherent in a male body or to express something about a male body.”

Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz suggest considering masculinity as a category that is “relational in multiple ways.” On the one hand, they argue, masculinity has to be understood in terms of gender arrangements and its relationship to femininity. Ideas about what is manly depend on the manifold social and sexual interaction between men and women, different role allocations, dualistic ascriptions, and the attribution of physical attributes. On the other hand, a given concept of masculinity exists through the differentiation from other concepts of masculinity. According to Connell, there is generally one hegemonic form of masculinity. Men who do not adhere to this dominant form or concept of masculinity are marginalized, socially segregated, and excluded from political authority and access to cultural and economic resources. Generally speaking, marginalized men are in a similar position to women in a patriarchal order.

Different concepts of masculinity or masculinities can coexist simultaneously within one social or cultural environment. Such masculinities often exist only as idealized and normative models, discursive representations, and iconic figurations that, in fact, influence the far more complex reality of individual behavior and identity. Take, for example, the Japanese soldiers and officers in Toshikawa’s woodblock print described above: the Japanese admiral represented martial masculine strength and triumph over the effeminate Confucian scholar-official, but he existed more in the imagination of the artist’s audience than in reality. Masculinity is only one aspect of identity formation, which is also constructed through similarly fluid but entangled factors such as social class, ethnicity (or an alleged “race”), sexuality or sexual orientation, religion, and locality. It is hardly possible, Martschukat and Stieglitz argue, to analyze all these relationships in one singly study.

In this book, I do not aim to deconstruct the complex amalgam of individual or collective identity formation but to examine the factors contributing to a self-perception and ascription of military men as truly masculine or “real” men. In particular, this book deals with the production of a masculinity concept from the perspective of governmentality and the idea of “conduct of conduct”: through their interest in reshaping the social standing and governing the bodily conduct, physical appearance, physically performed behavior, self-understanding, motivation, and attitude of military men, military reformers and army leaders facilitated the emergence of a new concept of masculinity. In the US, a perceived “crisis of masculinity,” military reforms engendered the recreation of a concept of martial or military masculinity informed by both foreign and historical “Chinese” representations of masculinity. Newly promoted ideals, concepts, and values that referred to the behavior and identity of men in a military setting, conformed into a concept of masculinity through bodily performance. The emulation, which was initially imposed on soldiers and officers by military reformers, and gradual internalization of new patterns of self-conduct and behavior influenced the formation of a specific, military habitus, which drew on European-style military cultures as well as on the repertoire of existing social structures and bodily practices.

**MASCULINITY AND THE MILITARY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA**

Masculinity in late imperial China was, in the first instance, defined in terms of patriarchy and the hierarchical difference between men and women (nan nü you bie, zhong nan qing nü). On the other hand, according to Kumar Louise and Louise Edwards, masculinity in China was also constructed around the two normative poles wen (cultural/civilian) and wu (martial/military), mirroring the deeply rooted relational and dialectical structure of early Chinese thought. Manhood could be expressed through either “culture” or “martiality,” but ideally wen and wu were harmoniously balanced, similar to the cosmological principles yin and yang. The ideal of an equilibrium between wen and wu was transferred to the state level, where governments and rulers were supposed
to apply and embody harmoniously balanced civilian and military qualities. The Qing emperors presented themselves as both scholar-kings and warrior-generals.77 This was the Confucian masculine ideal, described, for instance, in the Mengzi: a man possessed both wen and wu, which was emulated by the Japanese warrior elite, the Samurai. In contrast to the quintessential wen man, Confucius, Guan Yu embodied the archetype of ideal wu masculinity. Guan Yu was a general who lived during the Three Kingdoms period (ca. 208–280) and who became a legendary figure with superhuman features characterized by his height, strength, and a distinctive, bearded red face. He was deified in the sixth century and is, until today, often referred to as Chinese god of war. In the fourteenth century, he achieved great popularity through the popular novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi).81

Kam Louie further elaborated the wen-wu model and emphasized that wen, despite variations over the course of Chinese history, was mostly preferred over wu in intellectual discourse, expressing the claim to power of the educated civilian elite.90 Arguably, this exaltation of wen over wu contributed, at the same time, to fulfilling civilian dominance in late imperial China and to the relative demotion of the military that started during the late Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) dynasties. Wen masculinity and qualities such as cultural refinement, self-improvement, self-discipline, and strong mental capacities became the dominating (or hegemonic) concept of masculinity in the normative elite discourse, which redefined wu masculinity as low class, coarse, or even barbaric and foreign. However, Louie argued, both types were generally "desirable" and "sexy."90

Wu qualities, in the model outlined by Louie, comprised physical strength, military spirit, or martial arts skills. Real wu, however, is not about the application of brute and uncontrolled force. Under the impression of wen and the idealized balance between the two, wu men are supposed to restrain themselves, and only use their physical strength as a last resort and only in a deliberate and controlled fashion. Other qualities attributed to wu men were loyalty, honor, righteousness, and self-discipline when it came to resisting female attractiveness and (heterosexual) austereness. The relationship to other men, however, whether in the sense of a hierarchical patronage-protected connection, the fraternity or comradeship between equals, or even an erotic or emotional homosexuality was accepted and was part of the wu ideal. Wen men, on the other hand, were supposed to be competitive and their relationships to other men always appeared to be asymmetric and hierarchical, regardless of whether referring to friends, teacher and student, superior and subordinate, or homosexual lovers.91

Although there certainly were literati men serving as politically powerful scholar-officials who despised actual warfare and established the narrative of an essentially peaceful Chinese Confucian culture, the notion that wen became hegemonic and continuously dominated wu since the Song Dynasty is an oversimplification. During the Song period, despite the establishment of a professional standing army, a distinct and independent military upper-class or warrior caste was missing or, at least, strongly marginalized. Wealthy landowning families (the "gentry") replaced the old military-oriented aristocracy as the political and social elite, expressing manhood through cultural capital, literary and artistic achievements, and positions in the bureaucracy.92 Civil officials controlled the military and literati men, who collected and edited ancient military classics from the Spring and Autumn (771–476 BC) and Warring States (475–221 BC) periods, were absorbed in military affairs. This tendency already started in pre- and early imperial times because autocratic rulers sought to disempower the battle-tested military aristocracy, which adhered to heroic and valiant ideals, and to political independence. They were superseded by clever military strategists, who possessed only theoretical knowledge about warfare and directed infantry troops from afar, without engaging in battle themselves. Marc Lewis pointed out that, already during the early imperial period, warfare conducted by a trained infantry under a professional commander was associated with feminine qualities, whereas the chariot warfare of the nobility was considered heroic and masculine.93

Song civilian officials and literati turned military strategy into a theoretical subject of scholarship and styled themselves as martial "strategists" or "military experts" (bingjie). They rarely touched a weapon and their strategies or military technological inventions were almost never put into practice. Martial arts performances were common and popular, and civilian officials acknowledged skills in military arts such as archery, boxing, and horse riding. However, they increasingly looked down on military men. They considered individual heroism, as well as other wu qualities, as unfit for ruling and governing, and only necessary in times of conquest. Even equating wen and wu would bring instability. By the end of the Song, military people neglected martial practice and emulated the lifestyle and appearance of the civil elites. Nevertheless, there were also countereffects and some writers criticized the feminine tendencies of court and politics, referring to corrupt Confucians (juren), effete intellectualism, and the influence of women and eunuchs at court. They called for stalwart military masculinity, which emphasized courage, heroic vigor, loyalty, honor, youthfulness, and physical strength (as opposed to delicate wen men), to save the dynasty from feminine yin forces that brought instability and chaos.94

During the Ming Dynasty, military and civilian elites were closely connected, and they understood both spheres as complementary. Civilian elites from the well-off, literati families had much interaction with military families and cultivated an affinity to military objects. The Ming was a period of almost obsessive collecting activities. Swords and other weapons were very much
in vogue among the literati. The same was true for military literature, and literati men, as bingjia, produced a great number of eclectic military treatises, compilations, and re-editions of military writings and military technology manuals, whose content, however, was rarely implemented. At the same time, physical activities such as fencing and riding were common among men. While not entirely the same as 'yang men, who often adopted a fierce and martial guise with plenty of facial hair and a strong physique, the ideal male body was imagined as young and athletic, muscular and slender during the Ming Dynasty.

Popular martial romantic novels, such as the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the Water Margin (Shuihu Zhuan, also translated as All Men are Brothers or Outlaws of the Marshes) from the early Ming period, depicted romantic wu type men. The Water Margin described an archetypal lower class martial masculinity: the tough guy, or hao huan, was a tattooed, violent, and vengeful heavy drinker who was contemptuous of women and adhered to a brotherly code. A number of romantic or erotic stories, on the other hand, idealized the figure of the young and talented but fragile scholar (cai zhi), who was romantically in love with a woman. This sensitive man was yet to develop into a disciplined scholar (wen ren or even jun zhi) who was only interested in his official wives and concubines. Even before the Qing conquest of the Ming Empire, the self-perception of being effeminate and powerless proliferated among scholars because of the increasingly authoritarian Ming regime. The transition of dynasties, thus, left many of the literati with the impression of having forsaken dynasty and polity and thus having failed in their manhood. Their strategy was to revert completely to the wen type, empowering themselves again by refusing “feminine” chastity (i.e., being loyal to the Ming) and regarding wu masculinity as barbaric and inferior. From the mid-sixteenth century onward, the physical ideal of the elite literati class was a frail, sensitive, tender, and beardless “beautiful” man.

Louie has argued that the wen-wu concept applied only to Han Chinese men—and might thus actually define them—and not to men from other ethnic backgrounds in China or to foreigners. Women could possess wen or wu only by assuming the disguise of a male body, that is, by wearing men’s clothes and emulating male behavior and demeanor. Peter Zarrow criticized this approach as an over-generalization that relies only on the examination of literary or other cultural products and is sometimes inconsistent. Taken as a normative concept communicated in Confucian and other texts, it is useful as a framework, at least for understanding and examining the self-perception, identity, and practices of elite scholars as men. However, instead of limiting the wen-wu concept only to Han Chinese men and using it in strict concordance with a hegemonic-marginal model (Louie does not use these terms though), it should be viewed as a matrix in which various figurations of masculinity were located. Depending on the social, historical, geographical, ethical, or other context, a certain figuration would have been the predominant representation, or model, of a masculine identity: the assumption of a hegemonic concept of scholarly wen masculinity in a holistic China is rather inaccurate. Literati and officials looked down on wu qualities among their peers only during certain periods in history. The interest in theoretical military strategy or military of officialdom, for instance, counted less, compared to other activities that an educated man could undertake. And they looked down upon lower class perceptions of masculinity, but this does not deprive masculine figurations with wu qualities of their status, relative power, or even dominance in certain contexts. Throughout Chinese history, from the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC) up until today, masculinity was and is conceptualized and expressed in myriad ways, and it is necessary to speak of multiple masculinities instead of masculinity in the singular. Moreover, so-called ethnic minorities, such as Tibetans, Mongols, and Uighurs, played an important role for the construction of masculinities and gender arrangements in China.

Wen masculinity came in different forms and manifestations, including the cai zhi, the accomplished scholar, the official-bureaucrat and, perhaps, even the eunuch. However, instead of differentiating between wen figurations on the one hand and wu figurations on the other, it might be more to the point to analyze different historical masculine figurations with either wen or wu qualities or both. Late imperial figurations with strong wu attributes included the rebellious “hooligan” (liumang) and the underdog-like “tough guy” (hao huan) as well as the valiant and virtuous “hero” (jing xiong, literally “outstanding male”) and the chivalric “knight-errant” (you xia), which appeared mainly in popular literature and had existed in previous periods. They all shared an emphasis on physical strength or skill, such as in martial arts, and stressed (self-) righteousness (yi or yi qi), a “true heart,” and honor. And they often shared the ideal of self-discipline, particularly sexual discipline concerning women, as well as male bonding in general with wen figurations.

From the late eighteenth century onward, stories about chivalric martial heroes (called xiayi or you xia) became increasingly popular and anticipated the boom of kung fu stories in the twentieth century. Popular literature was usually written by members of the educated class, often low-ranking clerks or scribes. However, the masculinity figurations in these books were not only romanticizing fantasies about some simple, low-class life but played a major role in people’s perception of themselves and influenced their identity formation. Young men outside the patriarchal family-based order, for instance, aspired to being hao huan, which not only contributed strongly to individual identity formation but also offered alternative social structures within a brotherhood. In the form of secret societies or other criminal and illegal organizations, these brotherhoods developed tangible political and social influence.
Another important masculine figuration with strong 
wu attributes, which contests the hegemonic 
wen/marginal wu dichotomy even more strongly, 
is the Manchu warrior or Bannerman. If there was a sense of emasculation 
among the literati men of the Ming and reorientation toward wen, then this 
was only possible because they relinquished military or martial masculinity 
entirely to the Qing conquerors, who constructed their identity around an 
alleged Manchu or Inner-Asian warrior tradition. The Qing even controlled 
the scholarly works on strategy and military theory and the number of publications 
produced on military subjects was substantially lower as compared to 
the Ming period. Although the Qing quickly reestablished the system of 
military examinations, military officials played a minor role in commanding 
troops in action. They remained in the sphere of wen and wen masculinity, as 
officials or literati encompassing wu. But they were secondary to both civilian 
officials and true military figurations such as the Manchu Bannerman or the 
Mongolian warrior.

The Banner elites were educated in special schools in Beijing and in the 
Banner garrisons throughout the empire. These schools originally had the 
purpose of providing enough able men for the government apparatus, and 
they emphasized the learning of Mandarin and literary Chinese. The Qianlong 
Emperor, however, feared the total assimilation of the Banner people into Han 
Chinese customs and therefore admonished them to preserve the Manchu 
cultural heritage and martial spirit, including the Manchu language, a frugal 
life-style, and military skills such as riding and shooting. According to 
Pamela Kyle Crossley, the notion of a distinctive Banner identity and education 
even “created the foundation for the reprofessionalized military of the 
late nineteenth century and the emergence of technical, vocational and 
professionalized education in the languages, sciences, and military arts.”

And, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, the notion of a martial Manchu identity 
also influenced the revival of martial masculinity in the early twentieth 
century, at the level of the imperial family.

According to Winston Lo, central control of military affairs, standard-
ization of making war, and bureaucratization of the military class had all 
exist in China since the Song Dynasty. But the necessary conditions for a 
professional military, he argues, also have to include internal “occupational 
autonomy” (i.e., autonomy in military operational and tactical matters) and, 
related to this, professional pride. Although a popular notion of martial hero-
ism and appreciation of martial arts existed, this did not enter the realm of 
the military and army, Lo further claims. The figuration of warr (warrior) was 
little admired or considered an ideal worthy of emulation. However, as Jane 
Elliot notes, at least in the nineteenth century, commoners such as peasants, 
peons, or petty thieves were strongly influenced by widely circulating wood-
block prints that depicted historical-fictitious yingxiang and haohan figures.

It was these commoners, she emphasized, who made up the rank and file of 
the army, bringing with them a romantic notion of heroism, righteous martial 
deeds. Nevertheless, the martial masculine identity of these common fighting 
men still clashed with the increasingly negative picture of soldiers held 
by both commoners and members of the elite in the second half of the nine-
teenth century, which was caused by war and seemingly arbitrary war atroc-
ities. Haohan was associated more with cruel bandits, criminals, and villains 
bringing disorder and destruction. As Elliot points out, the romantic martial 
heroism found in popular literature and prints did not entail the production of 
an image of a proud and self-confident army leader. And this was also true 
for the legendary military heroes Zhuge Liang, Guan Yu, and Yue Fei, who 
represented martial qualities such as strategic genius, prowess, discipline, and 
loyalty that were promoted in the eighteenth century by the Qing emperors.

Common soldiers were not considered as members of the family-based, 
law-abiding good people (liangmin), who were the foundation of social order, 
stability, and morality. The opportunities for soldiers to marry and reproduce 
were limited, although they were not completely lacking. Green Standard 
Army soldiers were recruited according to registers listing military families 
(i.e., with a record of military service over generations) and the government 
was interested in both sustaining this system and stabilizing the men at arms 
socially, through familial bonds. Nevertheless, upward mobility through mar-
rriage was nearly impossible and common soldiers were located beyond 
the normal social order, although they were also supposed to be the protectors 
of this order and the liangmin. The proverb “good iron is not used for nails, 
good men do not serve as soldiers” (hao tie bu da ding, hao ren bu dan bing), 
which came into existence during the Song Dynasty, reflects the low 
standing of common soldiers in the (gendered) social order. Both ren (man, 
male) and ren (person, people) were used in the proverb and it makes sense 
to translate either term as “men.” Although it is not clear how common the 
proverb actually was, it seems to have been increasingly used in times of 
crisis and military breakdown, as a lamentation against marauding soldiers 
and rebels on the loose in the nineteenth century and during the civil war 
periods in the 1910s and 1920s. In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War 
1894–1895, the proverb was used as an expression of criticism against the 
social and cultural neglect of the military and against the preference for the 
cultural and literary sphere at the level of the elites.

NEW ARMIES

The condition and form of organization of the armed forces of the Qing 
Empire on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War was relatively complex because
it had undergone major changes since the seventeenth century. There were two distinct regular military organizations, the Banner troops and the Green Standard Army (*Liying*). The Banners were a form of social-military organization established in the early seventeenth century by the Manchu, who founded the Qing Dynasty in 1636, conquered the Ming Empire in 1644, and subsequently subdued extensive sections of Inner Asia. Originally, there were the Eight Banners (*Babu*) made up mostly of Manchus, but also of people with other ethnic origins, such as Mongols, Han (or, rather, people from Ming China), and Koreans. After the conquest, they mostly lived secluded from the rest of the population in the capital of Beijing and in garrisons or “Manchu cities” that were located in strategically important areas and large cities throughout China proper (virtually the old Ming territory) and Manchuria. Every adult male of the Eight Banners was theoretically supposed to join the military but, in total, only about five to ten percent were warriors. Even before 1644, the number of Banners was expanded to 24: eight Banners consisted solely of Mongols and another eight were made up of Han (called Han Martial or *Hanjun*). The Han Martial Banners were disbanded by the end of the eighteenth century and their members reclassified as civilians or Green Standard Soldiers.119

After the conquest was completed, the Qing reorganized the surrendering Ming units into the Green Standard Army, which became, in fact, an extremely fragmented provincial and local constabulary, organized in thousands of relatively small units throughout China proper. Although centrally administered by different government institutions in the capital, the command over regional and local detachments was deliberately distributed among military and civilian officials, to avoid a concentration of power. The main duty of Green Standard Army soldiers was maintaining order, defending borders, collecting revenues, escorting prisoners, protecting tombs, guarding waterways and granaries, and carrying out postal functions. In general, they were paid less and their equipment and arms were inferior, compared to those of the Banner forces.120

In the eighteenth century, the Qing conducted extensive military campaigns, which led to the expansion and stabilization of the empire’s borders. For these campaigns, troops from both the Green Standard Army and the Banners were deployed.121 However, starting at the end of the century, Qing military prowess declined and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the regular Qing armies were, by and large, incapable of coping with the many disruptions from foreign powers and the social-religiously motivated uprisings within the empire. Although cultural, social, and technological factors mattered in his view, Hans van de Ven argues that the de facto uselessness of the regular Qing armies in the nineteenth century mainly derived from fiscal problems and the changing (meaning more peaceful) security environment of the Qing Empire.122 Fiscal problems occurred due to the expensive campaigns in the eighteenth century, the embezzlement of military funds by military officials, and the large stipends allocated for the Banners. However, stipends and salaries for soldiers were not adjusted adequately over time, which contributed to the impoverishment of many soldiers, who were officially forbidden to pursue another occupation. Moreover, apart from military campaigns, the eighteenth century was a largely stable, peaceful, and prosperous era for most of the inhabitants of Qing China. For these and other reasons, such as cultural adaptation and demographic and social-economic change, at least parts of the Banners lost their interest in martial deeds and turned to careers in the prestigious civil bureaucracy or in business.123

Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, new military organizations developed due to the Taiping Rebellion—a large-scale syncretic anti-Qing movement that counted millions of followers and which controlled large areas in the Jiangxi region.124 Between 1851 and 1864, the Taiping movement established a Heavenly Kingdom with the capital Nanjing, which was eventually overthrown by mercenary armies raised by officials loyal to the Qing: Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtang. They were supported by troops led by French, American, and British officers, notably, the Ever Victorious Army (*Changshengjun*) under the command of Frederick Townsend Ward and Charles George Gordon.125 In 1853, Zeng Guofan established the Hunan Army (*Xiangjun*) and organized it along strict Confucian moral doctrines and personal relationships. The Anhui Army (*Huajun*), established in 1861 by Li Hongzhang, followed the same principle. The Hunan Army was disbanded in 1863 but the Anhui Army basically existed until the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and its offshoots provided the major fighting force of the war.126 The Hunan and the Anhui Army, together with other regionally and nationally operating mercenary armies, were called Brave Battalions (*yongying*) and had their origin in local militia units (*tuandian* or *tuandian*) that increasingly developed after 1800. Although these mercenary armies were based on personal relationships to individual commanders, the Brave Battalions depended financially and logistically on the government and remained loyal to the Qing.127

The deployment of the Brave Battalions was accompanied by the establishment of arsenals and shipyards by officials such as Li Hongzhang, who saw the need for military and economic reforms. These officials and their measures, subsequently called the Self-Strengthening Movement (*Zhiqiang yuandong*), were opposed by more conservative and anti-foreign elements within the Qing government centered around the increasingly powerful Empress Dowager Cixi, mother of the ruling Tongzhi Emperor (1861–1875).128 As a result, the Self-Strengthening projects lacked central coordination and were chronically underfunded. They were, however, not inevitably doomed to failure. Scholars often employ the iconic slogan “Chinese learning as substance,
Western learning for practical application” (zhongxue wei ti, xixue weiyong) to describe the narrowness of thought and limitation of the movement, which concentrated only on military technology and ignored the necessity of social and institutional reforms. However, in terms of industrial, scientific, and technological innovations, it was quite remarkable and significant for further developments. Most arsenals and dockyards employed foreign engineers and navy officers to acquire technical knowledge and included translation departments and schools to train technicians and sailors. Among the most important facilities was the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai, established in 1865 by Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan, as well as the Fuzhou Arsenal and Navy Yard, founded by Zeng Guofan in 1866. Later, in 1891, the governor-general of Huguang, Zhang Zhidong, founded the Han Yüng Arsenal, which became one of around forty arsenals and shipyards that existed in the Qing Empire at that time.

After the Sino-Japanese War, the focus of military reorganizing efforts shifted from the manufacturing of weapons and battleships to the training of new land armies, collectively called the New Armies. Already in 1894, Constantin von Hanneken, a German entrepreneur and military advisor in the service of Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhui, designed an army based on German organizational principles. It was initially named the Pacification Army (Dingwujuan) and led by Hu Yufen. Command soon moved over to Yuan Shikai, a military official and former Imperial Resident of the Qing in Korea, and it was renamed as the Newly Created Army (Xinjun lüjun). In 1895, the Newly Created Army consisted of over 7000 common soldiers and officers, stationed and trained in Xiaozhan, near the treaty port city of Tianjin. It was organized into several battalions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, as well as auxiliary troops, including engineer units responsible for construction, surveying, mines, or maintenance work. German officers were hired as drillmasters, instructors, or teachers for officers. The Newly Created Army was funded centrally by the central government through the Board of Finance, but administered itself, mainly through the bureaucratic apparatus at Yuan's disposal.

For Yuan Shikai, this was the beginning of a stellar career as one of the most important and powerful political figures in late imperial and early Republican China. In 1899, he was appointed governor of Shandong province and, two years later, he became governor-general of Zhejiang province. In 1902, he became Superintendent of the North (Bei yang dachen). Owing his rise to his political skills, military influence, and closeness to the Empress Dowager Cixi, he prestigiously joined the eminent but insignificant Grand Council in 1907 and was appointed Foreign Minister. He was dismissed after Cixi's death in 1909, but returned to the political stage in 1911 and became President of the Republic in 1912. De facto a dictator, he briefly declared himself Emperor of China in 1915. Opposed even by some of his closest lieutenants, he was forced to abandon this title after only a couple of months, shortly before he died in June 1916.

Also in 1894 and 1895, Zhang Zhidong, started organizing the Self-Strengthening Army (Ziquanjun) and established a military academy in Nanjing to train officers. Zhang was a career scholar-bureaucrat, who served as governor of Shanxi province, as governor-general of Huguang, Liangiang, and Liangjiang, and, in the same year as Yuan Shikai, eventually became a member of the Grand Council. The Self-Strengthening Army was stationed in Wuchang and Wusong near Shanghai and eventually consisted of 13 battalions with 2500 men, which was actually only a quarter of the originally envisioned number. More than 30 German commissioned and noncommissioned officers served as teachers and instructors, who, unlike the Newly Created Army, were also included in the command structure and hold leading positions. After being transferred to Wuchang where he resided as governor-general of Huguang, Zhang took parts of the troop and its German advisors with him to establish a new force. And he continued to be involved in the training of the Self-Strengthening Army, which was now officially supervised by the new governor-general of Liangjiang, Liu Kunyi.

Apart from the Newly Created Army, the Qing government supported the establishment of other new military organizations in the vial Shandong and Zhejiang areas around the capital Beijing, which, from late 1898 on, were jointly called Guards Army (Wuweijun). Among them, only the Tenacious Army (Wuji jun) commanded by Nie Shicheng, originally a civil official who pursued a military career since the Taiping Rebellion, employed German instructors and copied German tactics and organization. Like the Newly Created Army, the Tenacious Army was stationed near Tianjin, but it never reached the same quality and significance. In 1900–1901, the uprising of the anti-foreign Righteous Harmony Society (Tieshuijiao) or Boxer Movement, led to the intervention of an allied force from eight countries. The foreign powers made the Qing government responsible for the uprising and, apart from territorial concessions, it had to pay reparations and lost certain sovereign rights. The foreign invasion not only sparked a lasting discourse about “national humiliation” (guochi), it also resulted in the annihilation of most of the Guards Army and sparked new discussion on the Empire’s military strength. On January 29, 1901, the Guangxu Emperor issued a decree that called for suggestions concerning political and military reforms. Subsequently, the government abolished the military examination system for military officials and started to establish a national military school system. Moreover, it began disbanding the Green Standard Army and the Brave Battalions and created a new standing national army.

In early 1902, Yuan Shikai, who had managed to keep the Newly Created Army out of the Boxer War, started expanding the forces under his command.
into a Standing Army (Changbeijun), which was also called the Zhili or Beiyang Army (Beiyangjun). Yuan also gained control over the Self-Strengthening Army and incorporated it into the Beiyang Army, which had almost 20,000 soldiers by the end of 1902. New recruits, as well as Bannermen from the capital, were trained to further enlarge the army: in June 1904, there were three full divisions and by autumn 1905, the deployment of six divisions, each possessing over 10,000 soldiers, was officially completed. A seventh division located in Jiangsu was completed in 1907. Although some divisions or brigades operated in the Manchurian provinces (later called Fengtian) or in Henan, the Beiyang Army’s basis was in Baoding near Tianjin, where Yuan acted as the governor-general of Zhejiang. Funds for the Beiyang Army came mainly from the government in Beijing and from Shandong and Zhejiang provinces. In 1902, Zhang Zhidong also started organizing troops into the Hubei New Army (Hubei xiejun), which was commanded by Zhang Biao. Initially, it consisted of Zhang Zhidong’s personal bodyguard of 1000 soldiers, trained according to German principles, but by 1904, it consisted of over 11,000 men, including around 1000 Bannermen. Both the Hubei New Army and the Beiyang Army increasingly relied on Japanese instructors, who were cheaper and better available than Germans.

Spurred by the imminent Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria, in December 1903, the Qing government created the Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingcha, also translated as Commission for Army Reorganization), which announced a scheme for establishing a new national army in the following year. The plan stipulated deploying an army of 36 divisions with a total of 450,000 men, called Lujun. Similar to the previously established forces, it was often still referred to as Xinjun—New Army or, in the plural, the New Armies (to indicate the provincial quasi-autonomy of the divisions, despite national standards). The metropolitan area around Beijing was to train four divisions, Sichuan province was supposed to raise three divisions, and Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu were supposed to deploy two divisions each. All other provinces in China proper, as well as the three Manchurian provinces, each had to raise one division. Both the Beiyang Army and the Hubei New Army became part of the Lujun, whose organization was derived from the German- and Japanese-modeled Beiyang Army: two divisions formed a corps or army (jun). The division (zheng, or, from 1912 on, shi) was hierarchically divided into brigades (xie/lü, around 3000 men), regiments (biao/tuan, around 1,500 men), battalions (ying, 500 men), and further into smaller units such as companies (dui/tian), platoons (pao), squads (peng/ban), and fireteams (wu). A division had 12,512 officers, noncommissioned officers, common soldiers, and auxiliary personnel. It consisted of two infantry brigades, one artillery and one cavalry regiment, one engineer and one transport corps battalion as well as other auxiliary units, including a band of around 45 people. Although the Lujun was supposed to be completed in 1912 (1916, according to the original plan), no more than twenty divisions plus several so-called mixed brigades (huxie) were fully ready by the end of the Qing Dynasty.

Furthermore, the government put much emphasis on the education of a new generation of officers. Military schools, which employed German and other European instructors and which emulated the German military school model, had existed in the Qing Empire since the 1880s and they had a formative influence on New Armies officers. In 1885, Li Hongzhang established the first Military Preparatory School in Tianjin (Tianjin/Beiyang wubei xuetang), which initially attracted over 100 students. They were instructed in “military science” as well as in physics, astronomy, math, engineering, surveying, geography, strategy, and the use of weapons. In 1887, Zhang Zhidong founded the second new-style military school for naval and army officers in Guangdong (Guangdong shuilushi xuetang). It hired Germans and other Europeans and offered language courses in English and German as well as the option of specializing in artillery, cavalry, or engineering. Zhang subsequently established a number of civil and military schools, including a school for noncommissioned officers (Jiangbian xuetang), as well as arsenals and iron works in Nanjing and Wuchang. Graduates from these schools increasingly assumed office in the New Armies. A few of them, such as Duan Qirui, Feng Guozhang (President of the Republic 1917–1918), or Cao Kun (President of the Republic 1923–1924), who had graduated from the Tianjin Military Preparatory School, played an important role in the subsequent military reform process.

Starting in 1901, Yuan Shikai began to set up several schools in Zhili province under the umbrella term Beiyang Army Military Preparatory College (Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang). They were designed to produce officers for the Beiyang Army, trained in “international military science” (guo xue fengxue) according to standards in “East and West.” Yuan and his staff developed a hierarchical system in which young cadets started at a military primary school that focused on general intellectual and physical education rather than on military training. Students received a more specialized military education only after entering the middle and high schools of the college. Additionally, a “quick-learning” school (soucheng xuetang) was supposed to respond to the urgent need for officers. By 1903, six schools for educating staff officers, as well as commissioned and noncommissioned officers, had been established, including one school specialized in re-training old-style military officials. The schools provided a general military education as well as training in languages, trigonometry, ballistics, topography, and other relevant disciplines. The curriculum was constantly extended and improved, and new specialist schools focusing on ordnance, logistics, military administration, medicine,
and veterinary medicine were subsequently added. Until 1907, over 4000 students were enrolled in the Beiyang military college.140

The Qing government ordered all provincial governors and governor-generals to establish military schools based on the model of the Beiyang college and instructed Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai to share their experiences with the German–Japanese-style military school system.150 In September 1904, the Bureau for Military Training promulgated a plan for a multilevel military school system: on the elementary level, every province and every Banner garrison should create (and fund) at least one army primary school (lujun xiaoxuetang) that provided general education for students from the age of 15 to 18. Military training and physical education were only one part of the curriculum and graduates should be able to choose between a military or civilian career.151 Students were taught the (Confucian) classics, history, literature, foreign languages (usually Japanese, German, and English; also French in Yunnan province; and Russian in the Northeast), as well as hygiene, math, geography, and natural sciences or physics (gezhi). However, the inculcation of loyalty, courage, and obedience were nevertheless central and, in comparison to the original Beiyang primary school, more emphasis was placed on military drill, discipline, protocol, and correct behavior.152 By 1905, most provincial governments had launched army primary schools, with many more on the way, which led to a rapid increase in the number of students. The schools employed a few German teachers but most instructors were either Japanese officers or Chinese graduates from a military school in Japan or China. The Bureau ordered that all military preparatory schools established before 1904 had to be transformed into army primary schools and adjusted to the new national standards. However, the requirements were not easily met and regulations, as well as the quality and content of the courses, varied markedly between the schools.153

The army middle or secondary school, the second level of the military career ladder, offered advanced courses and practical training with troops. The proposal of the Bureau stipulated the establishment of one middle school each in Zhejiang (Baoding), Hubei (Wuchang), Jiangsu (Nanjing), and Shaanxi (Xi'an). A fifth school in Guangzhou (Guangdong) was added to the plan one year later. The school in Baoding was later abandoned in favor of a school in Qinghe, a city close to Beijing. The schools were all opened in fall 1909 except for the one in Xi'an. During the revolution in October 1911, many military schools were forced to suspend their activities, with the result that the schools in Nanjing and Xi'an remained closed and were never again reopened. Although general school subjects were still important, the curriculum of the middle schools concentrated much more on actual military education, compared to the military primary schools. Subjects included fortification, topography, military organization, administration, weaponry, strategy, cavalry, artillery, and (natural) sciences. Other disciplines were hygiene and cartography, which were sometimes taught in attached specialist schools.154

Finally, according to the Bureau’s plan, after graduating from the middle school, officer candidates could formally apply for admission to the Army Officer School (Lujun hengguan xuetang), which was to be established in Beijing. After eighteen months in school, the cadets would serve as officers on probation or as trainee officer (xueguan, huanxi guanbian) for six months. After passing the examination, they were qualified to be appointed to a post with the Lujun and become fully commissioned officers. After two years of service, these officers were able to enter the Army Staff Academy (Lujun canmou daxue), which represented the final level of higher military education. The concept and design of the officer school and the staff academy were based on the Japanese Imperial Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakkō), established in 1874, and the Japanese Army Staff College (Rikugun Daigakkō), established in 1882. Whereas the Japanese Imperial Army Academy was based on the French model, the Japanese Army Staff College was designed along the lines of the Prussian War Academy (Kriegsakademie).155

Although the government actively supported the original plan to establish a central officer school and a staff academy in 1909, neither of them came into existence as planned, due to the 1911 Revolution. Instead, a number of officer schools were established in several provincial capitals, including one each in Tianjin, Wuchang, and Nanjing. In 1906, the Beiyang divisions opened an officer college in Baoding (Beiyang lujun xingying junduan xuetang) that was headed by Duan Qirui and offered a fast-track education for staff officers. It was a staff college in all but the name. After the college had been renamed several times and had witnessed multiple changes of leadership, Yuan Shikai moved it to Beijing in July 1912, where it became the Army Staff Academy (Lujun daxue).156 In Baoding, a new Army Officer School (Lujun junduan xueziao) that was designed to train junior-rank (pre-staff) officers opened in October 1912. It incorporated cadets from Nanjing, where the officer school was closed for political reasons. The school became one of the most influential military academies in the history of Republican China. It had an enormous impact on military education in China and served as the model for the Nationalist’s Whampoa Military Academy, founded in 1924. The Baoding Army Officer School terminated in 1923 because of the civil war, after more than 6000 officers had graduated from it.157

Despite many efforts, the content, structure, and quality of the school-based education of officers varied enormously and depended on the cooperation and interest of provincial officials. Due to the urgent need for officers in the New Armies, Yuan and other military reformers implemented short-term programs or crash courses to train military instructors. Following the example
of quick-learning schools in Hubei and Zhili, a number of military lecture halls (jiangwu xue) in selected provincial cities provided fast-track training for officers. Some regiments and divisions even had their own schools, which had the purpose of commissioning officers as fast as possible.\(^{158}\)

Between 1895 and 1904, approximately 20 Military Preparatory Schools were created throughout the Qing Empire, with more than 2600 enrolled students.\(^ {159}\) By 1911, a total of approximately 70 new military schools existed, including 27 primary schools and various specialist training facilities such as schools for engineering, telegraphy, surveying and topography, ordnance, veterinary and human medicine, logistics and administration.\(^ {160}\) An estimated number of 7000 cadets were enrolled in the new military schools, whose mere existence was generally praised as an improvement, despite many shortcomings, by foreign observers.\(^ {161}\) Moreover, in an agreement with the Japanese government, the Bureau for Military Training fixed a quota of 100 cadets to be sent to Japan every year. In 1908, approximately 1000 out of more than 8000 Chinese students in Japan were military students enrolled at a Japanese Army military preparatory school, officer school, and staff college or specialist school.\(^ {162}\)

Although the popularity of the new military schools and the number of students increased steadily, it took many years and very extensive resources to create a new officer corps. There was still a lack of qualified men within the New Armies, particularly at the staff level. In 1910, an article in the Beiyang Military Journal, entitled The General Staff Urgently Calls for Talented Men, noted that the old habit of “emphasize culture, de-emphasize the military” was still not “rooted out.”\(^ {163}\) After the abdication of the Qing Emperor in 1912, some military schools did not reopen due to the lack of funds, which resulted from the change of political and bureaucratic power.\(^ {164}\) Subsequently, in order to produce more highly qualified officers, Yuan Shikai and his regime continued their efforts to standardize national military education and reemphasized the previously formulated goals. However, the increasing political tension and the lack of influence of Yuan’s government in the southern part of China made this a nearly impossible undertaking.\(^ {165}\)

Finally, the establishment of New Armies, military education, and the cultivation of a professional officer corps that met foreign standards was linked to the reformation of the administrative and command structure of the army. In the wake of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898, the scholar Kang Youwei demanded the rationalization of the bureaucracy by both eliminating unnecessary branches and superfluous posts and reorganizing the education of officials.\(^ {166}\) With the establishment of the Lujun, the Bureau of Military Training introduced a nationally standardized organizational structure. However, military reformers considered reforming the administration and command of the army itself as crucial for increasing professionalism, standardization, and occupational autonomy. In the context of the New Policy governmental and administrative reforms, the government created new institutions that were characterized by the attempt to centralize and compartmentalize at the same time.\(^ {167}\)

After the turn of the century, Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang Army created the Department for Military Administration (Junzhengsi), which was divided into three bureaus: military supplies (Bingbeluchu) led by Duan Qirui, planning (Carmouchu) led by Feng Guozhang, and training (Jiaolubuchu), led by Liu Yongqing.\(^ {168}\) The Department for Military Administration later served as a blueprint for the Bureau for Military Training, founded in late 1903. Many staff members of the former institution also worked for the Bureau for Military Training, which consisted of a Department of Administration (Junzhengsi) led by Liu Yongqing, a Department of Command (Junlingsi) headed by Duan Qirui, and a Department of Education (Junxuesi) under Wang Shizhen.\(^ {169}\) Each of the three departments encompassed four to six subsections that were, in turn, exclusively responsible for one aspect of establishing a uniform national army, such as personnel, quarters, supplies, legal and medical matters, strategy, cartography and reconnaissance, communication, education, and drill. Furthermore, the Bureau for Military Training sought to gain exclusive, centralized control over the manufacture, procurement, distribution, and maintenance of weapons and military technology.\(^ {170}\) Yikuang and his two deputies, Yuan Shikai and Tieheng, a Manchu Bannerman, headed the Bureau.\(^ {171}\)

In 1906, the government created the Army Ministry (Lujunbu), which absorbed the old Board of War (Bingbu), the Imperial Stud (Taijusui), and the Bureau for Military Training. Although it did not include or replace all the various administrative bodies (such as the Banner Office) that had hitherto shared responsibility for different kinds of troops stationed in the metropolitan area or the provinces, the Army Ministry had exclusive and supreme authority over the New Armies.\(^ {172}\) Tieheng became its first director. Two other Manchu, Shouxun and Yinchang, became vice-directors, and Yikuang acted as comptroller. It included a Council (Chengzhengting), a Secretariat (Canjing), and ten departments (si), which were further subdivided into sections (ke) with specialized responsibilities.\(^ {173}\) Because it was in charge of education and training of the army, the Army Ministry was responsible for all military schools, including the more general military preparation schools that already existed throughout the country.\(^ {174}\)

During the Qing Dynasty, military command was decentralized and separated from military administration. This was partly deliberate, to avoid the concentration of military strength, but also a result of the failure to establish a permanent central and exclusive military commanding institution. In 1733, the Yongzheng Emperor created the central Office for Military Secrets or Grand
Council (Junjiicha), but it quickly evolved into a privy council consisting of accomplished senior civilian officials. The new Army Ministry, on the other hand, included a Naval Council (Haijunjicha) as well as a General Staff (Junjiicha/Junjijia), which were supposed to function as the high command for the navy and the army, respectively. Already in 1901, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kuiyi suggested establishing a General Staff based on the German and Japanese models. Initially, in 1906, it was only introduced as a minor bureau headed by Feng Guozhang, but in July 1909, the General Staff was removed from the jurisdiction of the Army Ministry and placed directly at the disposal of the emperor. It gained a considerable range of responsibilities such as military planning and strategic decision, education of staff officers, command over all staff and field officers, and the appointment of generals and other officers. However, the General Staff never had the same prominent status as its German or Japanese counterparts, due to the power struggles between Yuan Shikai and various other factions and individuals. According to James Hevia, the failure of the late Qing to establish a German-style General Staff was a significant reason why the Chinese military reforms were much less successful than the Japanese. Hevia and most other researchers deem the late Qing and early Republican military reforms as inadequate and I will return to the question of whether the reforms were a success or failure in the conclusion.

NOTES

1. McCloy 1923, 2–3. At the time he authored these lines, Charles Harold McCloy was a secretary of the Department of Education of the National Council of YMCA’s in China. He later became a professor for physical education at the University of Iowa. See Todd 1991.

2. On the First Sino-Japanese War or Jiawu War (Jiawu zhanzheng) 1894–1895, generally see Lone 1994 and Paine 2003. In Japan, the war is today referred to as the Japan-Qing War. In China, the term Second Sino-Japanese War is used for the conflict in 1937–1945 between the Nationalist and the Communist party on the one side and the Japanese Empire on the other.


4. See Elman 2004, 318–22. Scholars have long attributed the Qing defeat to scientific, technological, and institutional backwardness, including the lack of systematic military education, ineffective central command, insufficient internal communication, and particularism as, for instance, only troops and ships based in the northern coastal area participated in the war. See Rawlinson 1967, 198–204; Smith 1976; Smith 1978, 25–9. Chinese authors still share this perception. A recent book talks the war “the original defeat” and declares that it was the waking call for true modernization, which is still unfinished today. Shi and Zhang 2011. See also Han 2008. According to Allen

Feng, the guns and ships of the Qing and the Meiji Japanese forces were at least on the same level and the crucial factors for the Japanese victory were logistics and training, because the Qing soldiers were badly drilled, unskilled with their weapons, and lacked discipline and morale. See Feng 1996. An early Republican account sharing most of these arguments, emphasizing the lack of knowledge and organization in the field of naval warfare, is LX 1912, 2: Jiawu zhong ri zhanbi shibian, 13–17.

5. Louie 2003, 9–11. Liang Qichao was the first to adopt the term “sick men” to describe Chinese men and their lack of physical qualities in 1903. See Xianxin congbo 1903, 29 (chapter 17). In the same year, the revolutionary Chen Tianhua similarly used the expression “sick men of East Asia” in his book An Alarm to Awaken the Age (Jinghuizhong). In 1905, the author Zeng Pu chose the pseudonym “sick man of East Asia” when publishing his novel The Flower in the Vicissitudes Sea (Nihaihuang), which became very popular and contributed to the dissemination of the self-derogatory expression in China. See also Wagner 2011b, 57.


7. For surveys on this topic see Hinsch 2013, 6–7, chapter seven; Mann 2011, 99–117; King 2014, 12. See also Brook, Bourgeon, and Blue 2008, 1–34; Ko 2005; Heinrich 2008; and Moskowiz 2013, chapter three. Many perceptions about “Chinese men” (and “Chinese culture”) seem to linger on in twenty-first century China, see Song and Hird 2014, 1–2. See also Vukovich 2013, chapter 1.

8. See Karl and Zarrow 2002.

9. I define military reformers broadly to include government officials, dynasty members, scholars, literati, writers, officers, and, to some extent, foreign advisors, who were interested in and dealt with the reorganization of the military and the governance of the New Armies. This group was in no way unanimous and involved people of various backgrounds and very different political intentions and associations. However, they all had a vested interest in rebuilding the military power of the state and in insuring society with military values, at least to a certain degree.

10. On late Qing domestic political struggles see Bays 1978 and Ma 1989. See also Xie 2009; Li and Zhong 1999; and Feng 1985.

11. The idiom derived from the fifth century Book of the Later Han (Houhanshu), which hinted at literati joining the army. A less literal, more common translation is “forsake the brush and enlist in the army.” See also McCool 1996, 798–99.

12. In this regard, military culture involves questions such as how are new members educated and trained, how are the specific norms and beliefs imprinted on soldiers and officers, and what is the social base and gender composition of the military? In this context, the term also represents the internal structure and hierarchies of the military as well as its relationship to other institutions, organizations, and social-economic structures.


15. See particularly Fairbank 1974. Generally see also Porter 2009, who warns against resorting to “military orientalism” and discusses works such as Victor Hanson’s Carnage and Culture, which promote the idea of a “Western Way of Warfare.” See Hanson 2001.
Introduction

23. The pre- and early imperial classics were canonized as the Seven Military Classics (Wujing zhihu) in the eleventh century. See Sawyer 2002.
25. Alastair Iain Johnston argues that the Ming leaders employed both a "parabellum approach" (the proactive preparation for war) and a "Mencian approach" (avoiding war through good government, after the doctrines of the Confucian philosopher Mengzi). Johnston 1998. For the strategic culture of the Qing period see Perdue 2009.
28. Smith 1975, 113. First attempts to theorize "intercultural learning" in the military sphere are Kunderus and Walter 2012; Füssel 2012; and, for Europe, Aust and Schönplug 2007a.
30. In the case of Chinese history, few works explicitly theorize cross-culturality, biculturality, or transculturality, but see Huang 2000; Cohen 2009, 228–40; and Leutner 2006.
31. This formulation is used, for instance, in the Organization Plan for the New Army (Luyin zhibu) from 1904, see Lianbingchu 1904, 1. Other examples are XBB 1905, 8; Geggö bingshui; JJ 1908, 1: Geggö lujiankuo.
32. See for instance, NBZ 1908, 27; Han Yingua shuang lujiankuo, 15.
33. Von 1996, 474–480 (fn 26 and 27); Kirby 1984, 9. Wang Tao's book manuscript was already widely known before it was printed in 1873. See Jing 2002, 66. Ever since, the Franco-Prussian War was referred to in military journals, memorials, and other writings as proof of German military strength and quality, even after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. See for instance NBZ 1908, 23; Geggö zhisib, 22–3. LX 1912, 2 and 1913, 2: Jin Dao, Pafa zhanshi jieyao.
36. To be sure, it is an oversimplification, often used by Chinese military reformers, to speak of a German way of warfare or a German military style. After 1871, the German army consisted of the armies of the larger German states Prussia, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Saxony as well as the Imperial Guards Corps. Efforts were made to align them along Prussian guidelines, yet "German military culture" was never static or uniform. On military culture in nineteenth-century Europe and the commonalities and difference between Germany and other countries see Hull 2005, 98–103. See also the contributions in Aust and Schönplug 2007b.
37. Kaske 2002b, 83; Pi 1990, 38. On German military instructors and the German impact see also Kaske 2002a and Eberspächer 2008. There is still a lack of detailed research on individual German instructors and their experiences in China, particularly for the period from 1895 to 1911. In many cases, even the full names of these men are unknown. On the German engagement see also Zhang 1991; Wang 2004; Yu and Sun 2007. Case studies, biographies, or writings of the three Germans Gustav Dethring, Constantin von Hanneken, and Georg Bau, who were close to Li Hongzhang or Yuan Shikai, are Schmid 1984; Hanneken and Falkenberg 1998; and Bau and Kaske 2005. On the diplomatic and cultural relations between Prussia, the German Empire, and Qing China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century see Leutner and Mühlhahn 2001; Leutner 2006; Schrecker 1971; Ratenhof 1987; Lee 1966; Yu 1981; Eberstein 2007.
40. According to Shi, the manuals written by late Qing military reformers and officers, which were based on German and Japanese military doctrines, demonstrate the fusion of Chinese and "Western" military culture. Shi 1996, 47–48.
41. Reynolds 1993, 160. On War was subsequently retranslated many times and the first Chinese-German translation appeared in 1913, see Bauer and Huang 1982, 439–40. Bauer provides an extensive list of translated (as well as Chinese authored, Germany-related) monographs and articles up to the 1980s. Ibid., 438–76. Generally, on the transfer of "Western" knowledge at the turn of the century, see Lackner, Amelung, and Kurtz 2001. See also Ch’en 1979a and Huters 2005.
44. NBZ 1906, 5; Lianbingchu zhi gesheng dufuwen, 2–4. Generally, see Huang 1994.
45. In late 1898, Zhang already sends a group to inspect the Japanese army and attend its grand military exercise in Osaka. Li 2004b, 48, 51–2.
46. Many Chinese military students in Japan were influenced by the revolutionary ideas of Sun Yat-sen and his allies, which they secretly promoted among the New Armies and thus contributed to the downfall of the Qing in 1911. See Fung 1980. Kat. In general, see Harrell 1992; Reynolds 1993, esp. 151–60; Fogel 1995; Fogel and Chung 2004. On the Japanese military during the Meiji era and its effects on Japanese society, see Hackett 1964; Fukushima 1965; Hackett 1971; Harries and Harries 1991; Stojić 2003.
47. The German public, too, viewed the Japanese army as Prussian-style army and sympathized strongly with the Japanese side during the war. See Wippich 2005.
48. Eventually, the reasons for switching to the German model were mostly political. The pro-German factions with the prominent and powerful statesman Hō
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Hofstede period the upper hand and this resulted in a short but extensive cooperation between German and Japanese scholars in various fields such as law and political science. Legal advisors, for example, were crucial in reworking the Japanese constitution and legal system, as Wim Rector notes. However, the broader context of this cooperation is not fully understood.


51. Although the majority of German instructors left the Qing Empire by the end of the 19th century, a few remained, such as the German linguist and Sinologist Franz Bopp, who taught in Beijing from 1871 to 1874.


53. See Frankel 1915.

54. See Friede 1998.

55. "Kung Fu" in the context of martial arts refers to a series of movements and techniques that are used for self-defense.

56. Two concise discussions on the different approaches are found in the secondary literature: see Forrester 2009; and Frankel 2012.

57. To be sure, the body and physical experiences do not only exist as symbolic representations, but they are also an integral part of the cultural context.

58. A more detailed discussion on the history of the Chinese body is found in the works of Hofstede 1995; Rector 2004; and Frankel 2012.

59. See Bittner 1993; and Beard and Bittner 2002.

60. See Bremer 1992; and Bittner 1993.

61. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

62. A more detailed discussion on the history of the Chinese body is found in the works of Hofstede 1995; Rector 2004; and Frankel 2012.

63. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

64. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

65. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

66. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

67. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

68. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

69. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

70. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

71. See Bittner 1992; and Bremer 1993.

cosmos of the imperial period. The equivalent of the extreme "cloistered lady" (quixia) was the figure of the "bare stick" (guangguan): a man unable to get married, establish a household, and maintain or extend his kin. Marriage and reproduction were essential for a man to fulfill his obligations toward his parents and to demonstrate his filial piety.

The study of historically constructed concepts of masculinities in China is still a markedly neglected topic and little effort has been made to understand the social practices and representations of men as men. An increasing number of English-language studies seek to close this gap: generally, see Wasserstrom and Browne 2002, 1–41; Mann 2011; Hirsch 2012; Song and Bird 2014, 1–27. For this paragraph, see also Barlow 1994; Furth 1999; Hirsch 2003.  

89. Louie 2003, 5. See also Wang 1975.  
90. Louie 2003, 6.  
91. Louie 2002, chapters 4 and 5; Kutcher 2000. Because sexuality was socially connoted with reproduction, homosexuality among men was less morally charged, compared to Europe and, generally speaking, tolerated as long as it remained a private matter. See, for instance, Hirsch 1990; Sommer 2002; Wu 2004. Samurai considered male love as "purer" and "more refined" than heterosexual love and sex, which was viewed as impaired by the need to reproduce. See Buruma 1984, 128.  
94. Davis 1996, chapter 5; Lo 1997; Lorge 2005a; Wyatt 2009.  
95. Ryer 2009. See also Brook 2010, 186–212.  
96. See Needham and Gwilkowski 2002, 1–100.  
100. Wu 2003.  
101. See also Mann 2011, 112–13. For cross-dressing and unstable gender boundaries, in general, see Connell 2009, 6.  
103. Bret Hirsch introduces chosen concepts of masculinity in China from the Zhou period to the present. See Hirsch 2013.  
104. For present-day China, see Hillman and Henfry 2006; Daucher 2009.  
111. Lo 1997, 1–2. Lo refers to Gerke Teitler to define professionalism among military officers, see Teitler 1977. The most important theoretical literature on the topic includes Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1969; Finer and Stanley 2002. Honesty and the lack of corruption likewise were important indicators for professionalism. One strategy of military reformers to argue in favor of establishing New Armies was to denounce the established troops as corrupt.

117. Investigating concepts of masculinity is complicated by the fact that they are "often elided in the equation of man with human and mankind, which conceals masculinity behind discourses of general interests and universality." Dudink, Hagemann, and Tush 2004, xii (emphasis in the original text). The same is true for Chinese history in which the signifier for people, a person or human beings is often reserved for men, whereas women are the "other." See Hong 2004.  
118. Lo 1997, 4; Lary 1985, 19, 83. See also Lary 2010, 54–5.  
120. Unlike the Banners, little research has been done on the Green Standard Army, which might be the result of its fragmented structure. It is difficult to obtain accurate numbers of soldiers for either the Banners or the Green Standard Army but estimates are between 130,000 and 250,000 and around 600,000 men, respectively. The Green Standard Army, in any case, was nominally about three times larger than the Banner forces. See Luo 1984, Smith 1974; and still Wade 1851.  
123. A huge problem appeared to be the fact that the actual number of Green Standard Soldiers was far below the fixed quotas and numbers that officers and military officials transmitted to the government. See Michael 1964, 39. See also Smith and Liu 1980 and Powell 1955, 3–19.  
124. The Taiping were, at least initially, quite resourceful concerning military organization and superior to the Qing armies they encountered. See Xu 2002, which also includes a comprehensive analysis of the structure of the Han army discussed below.  
126. The Hunan and Anhui Armies derived their name from the native province of most of their original officers. Their successors supplied a considerable part of the military force of the Qing Empire during several campaigns in the second part of the nineteenth century, including the Nian Rebellion (1851–1858) and the Sino-French War (1884–1885). See Luo 1939; Spector 1964; Smith 1974, 145–57; Wang 1987; Luo 1997a. Note that the different overall designations for regular and newly formed troops were not always consistent and clear. See Powell 1955, 38 (fn 51).  
127. Kuhn 1970; Wang 1972; Liu 1974; McCard 1988. Since the 1860s, not only were Brave Battalions created, but both Banner and Green Standard troops were also reorganized. Selected Banner troops were transformed into the Divine Mechanism Battalion (Shenjiaying), responsible for defending the capital. Based on the model of
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the Hunan and Anhui Armies, Green Standard Army troops were retrained and called Disciplined Forces (Lianjun). These forces, however, proved to be less reliable and effective than the Brave Battalions. See Rhoads 2000, 27; Powell 1955, 37–38.

128. The Self-Strengthening Movement is also labeled as the Westernization Movement (Yangwu yuandong) and the period is referred to as the Tongzhi Restoration. See Wright 1962.


130. While the Jiangnan Arsenal was strongly influenced by British instructors, the Fuzhou docks were dominated by French naval specialists. On the development of arsenals, military technology production, and a navy in nineteenth century China see Rawlinson 1967; Kennedy 1968; Kennedy 1969; Kennedy 1973; Hacker 1977; Pi 1993; Chu and Liu 1994; Luo 1997b, volume 2; Luo 1999, volume 5. For the significance of the arsenals as transmitters of knowledge see for instance Wright 1995; for their role in military education see Ayers 1971. The adoption of European military technology and interest in hiring European gunners in China already started in the fifteenth century. Even the Qianlong Emperor, famous for his allegedly ignorant rejection of the British ambassador Lord McCartney and his gifts, had a strong liking for astronomy, math, and military science introduced to him by Jesuits. See Waley-Cohen 1993 and Elliott 2002, 141–42. See also Lorge 2008.

131 Fung 1980, 1. See Herowitz 2002 for an analysis of the differences between the periods before and after 1895. See also Liu 2000 and Shi 2003. The first comprehensive examination of the New Armies in English was Ralph L. Powell’s The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895–1911. Powell served as a United States military analyst in China in the 1940s and his detailed study also counts as a seminal study on the late Qing military among Chinese-language researchers. Powell’s Chinese name is Luerfu Baowei and the title of the book in Chinese is Zhongguo junshi liiliang de xingqi. See Powell 1955; and Zhang and Han 2006, 177. Other seminal studies include Fung 1980; Liu 1980; Luo 1997a; Luo 1997b; Luo 1999; Lai 2000; and Shi 2003. See also Haino 1968; Wang 1995; Ven 1999. Early studies are Jiang 1932 and Wen 1932. One of the most important collections of official documents is Qingmo xinjun bianlian yangj. After 1895, the development of the navy was limited to the purchase of four sea-going ships from Germany and Britain. Only in 1909 did the Qing government start to revive the fleet. See Zhang 1982; and Rhoads 2000, 149–50.

132. On the Newly Created Army see Liu 1967a; Li 1992; and Zongli Yamen [1895–1900] 2005. Powell points out that the major innovations, compared to previous military organizations, were the centralized administration and supervision of vital issues such as the payment of salaries, supply of equipment, and more elaborate specialization of troops and staff officers as well as the training under combat conditions. See Powell 1955, 75–9. Yuan controlled a second army, the Vanguard Troops (Xianfengdai), stationed in Jinan, Shandong province, which consisted of 10,000 soldiers, less well-trained and less well-equipped than the Newly Created Army. See MacKinnon 1980, 28.

133. Biographies on Yuan include Ch’en 1972; Young 1977; and MacKinnon 1980. See also Young 1983. There are numerous collections of Yuan’s memorials and writings, for instance, an extensive 41-volume edition published by Shen Yanlong.

See Shen 1966. In both Chinese academia and the public, Yuan is usually depicted as a villain with political cunning, which largely neglects his role as a modernizing reformer. See for instance the novel Sandalwood Death by Mo Yan originally published in 2004, see Mo 2013. For an academic Chinese-language biography of Yuan Shikai see Hou 1994.


137. Powell 1955, 129–37; Fung 1980, 13–14. In 1907, some of these troops were transformed into the Patrol and Defense Force (Xianfengdai), see Fung 1980, 30–32.

138. On the organization and development of the Beiyang Army see Lai 2000; Wu 1987; MacKinnon 1973. For the original organizational plan see Yuan 2005. On financing the army, see Wu 1983 and Ven 1999. The splitting of the Beiyang Army was the result of power struggles and the attempt of Yuan’s political enemies within the Qing government to deprive him of influence. On Yuan and his political struggles with other factions at court and in the government see MacKinnon 1980, here chapter 5; Bays 1978, and Rhoads 2000.


140. On the perception of the Russo-Japanese War in China see also Miller 2008.

141. The (more or less) completed Beiyang divisions were assigned the numbers one to six. The Hubei New Army became the eighth division (the seventh division was to be the unfinished one in Jiangsu). Fung 1980, 20–21; Wang 1995, 81.

142. A division was supposed to have approximately 12,500 men, because this was the ideal size of an army, as bequeathed by the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC). According to Edward L. Dreyer, not only this number but also the denomination of military units derived from the Zhou ideal. Dreyer 2002, 20. The names of Lujun units were also similar to the Green Standard Army. See also Zhang and Duanfang 1990, 2005, 217–18.

143. There is some debate about how many divisions existed by the end of the dynasty and whether these divisions reached their fully designated strength, especially since desertion became a substantial problem for the New Armies toward the end of the Qing period. See Ch’en 1960, 436; Worthing 2007, 70; Ven 1999, 45–48; Luo 1997b, 213–16. On the Lujun see also Cameron 1974, 88–99; Collier and Lai 1969. See also Lai 1980, whose book is a comprehensive account of the organization of the institutions involved in the late Qing military reform process. See also Kapp 1973 and Sutton 1980. Two general contemporary accounts are the short article titled The New Armies published in a military journal (selected from an unspecified newspaper) and a longer one titled The Army of My Country published in a general journal. NBZ 1907, 6: Lu xinjun, 18–22; and Guangzhong 1910 (1), 21: Zhu Wu, Wu guo de lujun, 47–47.

144. Other scholars have outlined the establishment of military academies and the military educational reforms during the late Qing in some detail and I will thus only summarize them briefly here. See Powell 1955, 188–84; Smith 1978; O’Brien 1979; Fung 1980, 62–76; Xue and Zhang 1991, 186–98; Su 1994; Wang 1997, 93–100. On Zhang Zhidong’s role see also Li 2001.
145. Sun and Fan 2007. For the Naval Schools established during this time see Biggerstaff 1961, 200–51; Elman 2004.
146. Xue and Zhang 1991, 188–89. See also Hua and He 2009.
148. The entire educational process, from primary to high school, could be completed in 12 years. The quick-learning course took two years. Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang [c. 1902] 2005, 1–5.
151. See Powell 1955, 236; Fung 1980, 64.
153. The requirements for entering a military primary or preparatory school resembled the regulations for the New Armies with respect to physical standards and background. The cadets should also have engaged in a certain amount of previous education, should be literate and genuinely inclined toward military affairs. There were no tuition fees and students were supposed to receive a small allowance but, due to the lack of funds, they usually only enjoyed a free room and board, clothing, and school materials. See, for instance, Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang [c. 1902] 2005, 23.
154. NBZ 1908, 23: Lujunhui zouding lujun zongxuetang zhangchengzhai. The term used for natural sciences here was houyi.
155. Jacob Meckel, the Prussian officer who helped to rebuild the Japanese Army in the 1850s, had served as a professor at the Japanese Army Staff College. Like his books, which were all translated into Japanese, his numerous lectures had a profound and lasting impact on the Japanese officer corps. See Saaler 2005, 24; Pressseifen 1965, 45–7, 96–7; Helfia 2012b.
156. Xue and Zhang 1991, 216–19. It continued to exist throughout the Warlord Period (1916–1928) and was taken over by the Nationalists in 1928. After the staff academy moved to Nanjing in 1932, German military officers served again as instructors there. See Sutton 1982, 390; Liu 1956, 84–89. Jiang Jieshi went to the Baoding school in 1906, before continuing his military education in Japan.
158. Fung 1980, 66–68, 179; Luo 1999, 103–10; NBZ 1909, 34: Nanyang lujun jiangwutang zhangcheng. Most notable is the school in Yunnan, which existed from 1907 to 1927. Zhu De, later commander of the Communist People’s Liberation Army, was among its graduates.
160. See Jiang 1987, 20 and Xu 1997, 83. For a collection of the most important decrees and regulations concerning military education and schools see the jiaoyu section in GX, chapter 8 (jiaoyu).
163. BZB 1910, 1: Junzhicha jiaqiu rencai.
164. After 1911, as was the case with other institutions, the nomenclature of military units, ministerial departments, and military schools changed. O’Brien 1979, 164; Fung 1980, 250.
165. For instance, BZB 1915, 21: Lujun jiaoyuqing zhi chengxu.
169. The Department of Military Organization was then renamed as Bureau for the Supervision of Training (Xinjun Beiyang Dulanxu or simply Dulanxu) and served as the role model for similar bureaus in other provinces, which were called Dalian gongsuo. See Fung 1980, 38–40. The Bureau for the Supervision of Training overshadowed and engrossed the new Bureau for Military Training, because the same people, mostly Yuan’s lieutenants and confidants, were responsible for similar functions in both departments. The former chief of staff of the Newly Created Army, Xu Shichang, acted as a senior supervisor, making Yuan Shikai’s influence on the new bureau and military reforms all the more obvious. See MacKinnon 1973, 408; Rhoads 2000, 82–3. Note that some Brave Battalions already had their own bureaus, often congruent with the staff of the officials who led them. See Porter and Tseng 1972.
171. Tieliang was one of the first military students sent to Japan in 1909, and he was originally a protégé and close ally of Yuan. Their children were married to each other and, together, Yuan and Tieliang were in charge of turning selected Banner soldiers into a Lujun division. However, the power struggles between the two later turned their friendship into enmity. In 1904–1905, Tieliang and his German advisor, Heckmann, a former employee of the Krupp Company, made a tour to inspect the status of the Lujun. At the time, the demands for a stronger military as well as a more efficient government taking care of national security were at their height, especially due to the Russo-Japanese War that took place at the same time. Therefore, the Chinese media covered the tour, as well as Tieliang’s criticism of the slow progress of implementation, extensively. See Fung 1980, 56; Rhoads 2000, 102.
172. An account introducing, among other aspects about Germany, the system of military schools in Prussia, is Yang 1907. The creation of the Army Ministry was linked to the power struggles between Yuan Shikai and his rivals around Tieliang, who unsuccessfully sought to deprive him of his influence. See Ichikyo 1980.
173. On the new military bureaucracy and command organization see Brunnett and Hagelstrom 1910, 138–47; Liew 1980, 224–28; Luo 1997b, 243–47. For the institutional organization of the army prior to the reforms see also Mayers 1897.
174. NBZ 1907, 6: Wubei xuetang bu li xuebu, 11.
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176. Because, after 1895, there was hardly a navy to speak of, the Naval Council played a very minor role.
177. Hevia 2012b. Other contemporary accounts on the creation of staff officers according to German and Japanese role models include NBZ 1907, 14: Cannon fuwu and JJ 1908, 1: Canno qian zhidu de yi ji.

Chapter 1

Forging the Male Body

Drill in the New Armies

[For] governing soldiers, discipline comes first.¹

Detailed and Illustrated Manual for Instruction and Drill, 1899

The regulations governing the army in the early Qing and previous dynasties as well as most classical military treatises and manuals emphasized that observing strict discipline (jilli or junli) was the foundation of leading an army successfully. After the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, the notion of discipline and the technologies available to discipline men changed dramatically. Military reformers such as Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong increasingly focused on conditioning and improving the physical bodies of soldiers and viewed physical drill as essential for military discipline and the source of a powerful and effective army. They viewed a strong, well-disciplined and well-regulated body as essential for developing a new kind of military man and new Western-style armies. Following German role models, they systematically introduced German drill methods (caofa) to train and align soldiers, including military gymnastics, the meticulous regulation of individual posture and gait, group exercises, and collective movement. Military gymnastics or ticao, which included apparatus gymnastics, “free exercises,” and group calisthenics, became particularly significant in the emerging New Armies for training soldiers to be both fit and obedient. Exercise was thought to strengthen group cohesion and increase the courage, self-confidence, morale, and martial spirit of the troops. It prepared the soldiers for marching in step and assuming closed tactical formations, which military reformers considered vital for modern warfare. Besides German and other foreign instructors, Chinese military reformers drew on a large number of newly produced drill manuals to introduce new drills and exercises to govern both the physical
constitution and mental attitude of rank and file soldiers. Along with photographs of exercising soldiers, these manuals, and other military texts, such as drill codes and military journal articles, created an image of fit and disciplined men as opposed to the "sick men of East Asia."

**GERMAN MILITARY GYMNASTICS IN CHINA**

In his comprehensive, strongly German-influenced *New Book on Military Science (Bingxue xinshu)*, published in 1899, Xu Jianxin demanded that the military reject men who were "not familiar with discipline" and whose "mind and physique are not stable" (xin li wei qi). Concerning those who had been weighed, measured, and found wanting, he wrote:

Recruits joining the army [must] first train the strength of their hands and feet, to make the feet quick, the body light, and prevent the arms from trembling when holding a gun. Firstly, without a weapon, [recruits should] move their arms and legs frequently up and down, flex the body, and use dumbbells to work out.

Xu was an official concerned with establishing an army modeled on foreign forces and improving basic military training. In 1878, he became an attaché at the embassy in Berlin and, during his time in Germany, he traveled to Britain, France and other European countries to learn how their military forces were organized and about the military industry in general. In 1898, he became head of the military administration of Hubel province under Zhang Zhidong and he began to write down his experiences and knowledge of European military affairs. His book broadly dealt with all aspects of soldiering, including recruitment and military gymnastics.

Apart from introducing exercises at the horizontal bar (*mucha*), Xu offered few precise descriptions of how exactly soldiers were supposed to train to improve their strength or "jump over walls and ditches, nimble and light like a monkey," as he described the goal of such exercises. However, the physical exercises he referred to were part of a range of exercises originating mostly from German gymnastics, with and without apparatuses, as well as less rigorous Swedish calisthenics. Generally referred to as *ticao*, these forms of physical exercises were introduced rather haphazardly to the Qing Empire by Christian missionary schools and military organizations from the 1870s onward. The term *ticao* (literally *physical drill*) was adopted from the Japanese term *taijō*, which was coined in the early Meiji period (1870s) to encompass the English expressions "gymnastics" and "physical exercise." Effectively, *ticao* was associated with military drills and military discipline almost from the beginning and it is reasonable to translate it here as "military gymnastics." The first Chinese soldiers to have contact with these European-style exercises were soldiers from some of the Brave Battalions as well as the men serving in the newly-raised mercenary armies under foreign command in the 1860s and 1870s, such as the Ever Victorious Army. Although the Qing scholar Wang Tao had promoted the introduction of "Western" military training as early as the 1840s, the mercenaries were the first to be exposed to different forms of foreign military drills, which included physical exercises and were conducted by British, French, American, Japanese, and German instructors. Physical exercises were introduced more systematically at the first military academies such as in Tianjin, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Shanghai, which were founded in the 1880s and early 1890s. Military gymnastics at these academies were an important part of the curriculum and taught mostly by Germans and Japanese, but also by other European drillmasters. After the Sino-Japanese War, when German military organization became standard in the New Armies, German military gymnastics was used as the foundation of military training. It became the dominant form of *ticao* exercises and thus facilitated the adaptation of the concept of disciplining both body and mind through physical exercise.

In the German army, gymnastics were considered to be a "purposeful" and "indispensable instrument for the military education of both the individual and the physique and spirit of the masses." Military instructors, doctors, and theoreticians viewed the drilling of close-order formations as fundamental to infantry training. Formation drills depended on individual physical education, which was based on exercises without a weapon as well as the sufficient development and preparation of the physical constitution or "muscles and bones." Martin Kirchner, for instance, argued that the whole body of a recruit had to be strong enough to endure a military drill before he was capable of standing active service. He referred particularly to the expression "muscles and bones," which was also used by many German-influenced Chinese military manuals produced after 1895 (Chinese: *jingsa*, similarly meaning "physique"), to emphasize the organic wholeness of the body and the link between build, strength, and perseverance.

Already in 1869, Carl Kirchner, chief staff surgeon in the Prussian army, noted that gymnastics not only improved the strength and dexterity of a soldier and thus enabled him to observe his duties but also equipped him with confidence in his own abilities. He called this the "moral element" of exercise. The German *Gymnastics Regulation for the Infantry (Turnvorschrift für die Infanterie)* from 1895 stated that gymnastics would both "improve strength, agility and perseverance" and "arouse and increase courage, determination and self-confidence." According to Colonel Gustav von Dresky, head of the Prussian Military Institute for Gymnastics (*Militär-Turnanstalt*) in Berlin, gymnastics gradually gave the soldiers self-assurance and an energetic will.
Some years earlier, another Prussian military doctor, Max Rudolff, noted in the same vein that any muscle activity was governed by volition, which increased with the physical constitution and agility of a man. He claimed that military gymnastic exercises enhanced the ambition and drive of soldiers but also taught them to pace themselves and become used to obeying orders.\textsuperscript{14}

German military doctors viewed the physical constitution of a soldier, including strength and stamina, to be directly linked to individual health and hygiene. For this reason, military gymnastics and drills were an important topic in both drill books and military hygiene manuals. The latter dealt with any aspect concerning the body, from the medical examination and natural physical disposition of a recruit to the all-embracing hygiene and medical regulations of the army, which were concerned with the environment, barracks, nutrition, uniforms, bacteriology, mycology (the science of fungi), and any imaginable kind of infectious disease.\textsuperscript{15} Military doctors considered physical exercises as essential for the development and maintenance of military preparedness because they strengthened the body and kept it healthy. According to Carl Kirchner, gymnastics could help overcome or at least lessen the physical shortcomings of new recruits and easily redress their lack of "muscularity."\textsuperscript{16} He argued that the best and quickest way to increase individual physical capabilities was systematic, constant and scientifically guided exercise that acknowledged the organic nature of the body and took into account the blood circulation, respiration, and metabolism.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, he claimed that the invention of gunpowder and the ascendancy of the rifle had caused bodily fitness to be neglected. Stamina and a strong constitution could only be achieved with physical exercises, which were "now essential for military training in every army." Thus, in the Prussian army, Kirchner pointed out, gymnastics with and without weapons had been practiced since 1842 and originated from the physical exercises developed and practiced by the popular gymnastics movements in Sweden and Germany, which were in vogue from the early nineteenth century on.\textsuperscript{18}

Following the ideas of German gymnastics educators, military doctors and army instructors, late Qing military reformers adopted German physical exercises to improve both the physical constitution and vigor of soldiers.\textsuperscript{19} They particularly considered group calisthenics ("free and order" exercises, free exercises, or Freilüben) as an effective instrument to discipline men physically and mentally, and make them receptive for internalizing tactical formations and doctrines. In their view, German military gymnastics was "modern," globally in vogue, and superior to any other known form of physical exercise and military basic training. Fighting techniques or martial arts, which were known in China as "boxing" (quan) since the twelfth century, were considered as a basic skill of soldiers during the Qing era to train hand and foot coordination, agility, and the use of weapons. However, for establishing New Armies, foreign training and exercise methods seemed much more effective, complete, and integrated. Military gymnastics indeed had an enormous potential to discipline, align, and prepare men for tactical drills. It combined individual self-discipline and self-improvement with the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the military unit in an unprecedented way. "Chinese martial arts," on the other hand, only started to become a factor in the 1910s, as Chapter 6 will show in more detail.\textsuperscript{20}

Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong were the first to systematically apply German military gymnastics for basic military training. In both the Newly Created Army and the Self-Strengthening Army, the first New Armies established after the Sino-Japanese War, group calisthenics and apparatus gymnastics were first taught by German drillmasters. Instructions for and explanations of the various exercises were collected in drill codes and manuals so that they could be studied and led by Chinese instructors and officers. Military reformers supported or initiated the publication of numerous such manuals and drill codes, which were based on German military knowledge or were partial translations of German military books and which offered practical guidance and precise instructions on physical exercises. The purpose of these manuals was standardizing and disseminating new German-style military gymnastics and drills among the New Armies and promote the idea of linking the physical and mental constitution, exercise, and military discipline.\textsuperscript{21}

For Zhang Zhidong, who was masterminding the establishment of the Self-Strengthening Army, improving the physical aptitude of the soldiers was one of the fundamental goals of military drill.\textsuperscript{22} German instructors should train the men in the "different kinds of ticao from Europe, which [would] invigorate the muscles and bones and increase the mental vigor."\textsuperscript{23} The collection Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army (Ziqiangjiu xifa leibian), a comprehensive military manual strongly influenced by German drill methods and military theory and first published in 1898, introduced "various gymnastics exercises" (ticao ge fa), such as free exercises for flexing and stretching of the head, arms, legs, and upper body.\textsuperscript{24} One chapter, entitled the Six Rules of German Military Training (Denguo lianbing zhangcheng liu tiao), emphasized that only after physical exercises and a few other basic lessons had been internalized, should soldiers start with gun drill and the training of close unit formations.\textsuperscript{25}

The Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army was compiled by Shen Dunhe, a native of Zhejiang province, who graduated in political science and law at the University of Cambridge and later served in the administrative section of the Self-Strengthening Army. After returning from England, Shen became an instructor at the language college and the naval school in Nanjing and subsequently joined the armament department of the Self-Strengthening
Army in Wusong. Between 1895 and 1898, he published numerous military books that were based on or directly introduced the German role model. The topics of these books included military organization, regulations, tactics, and training methods as well as the latest developments in Germany concerning weapons technology, military engineering, intelligence, geology, and other related sciences.

Notable among Shen’s various publications was the Description of the German Military System (Deguo junzi shuyao), which was originally written by the head of the German advisory group to the Self-Strengthening Army, Albin von Reitzenstein, a lieutenant-colonel of the artillery in the Prussian army. Reitzenstein was employed by Zhang Zhidong to head of the largest contingent of German military advisors in the Qing Empire, which consisted of 35 commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The Description of the German Military System introduced the organization, command structure, financial administration, academy education, general logistics, weapons, military intelligence, engineering, recruitment practices, food and clothing, living conditions, and sanitary regulations of the German military. Shen co-translated the book with the Chinese-speaking German Heinrich Hildebrandt, an engineer temporarily in the service of Zhang Zhidong, who was involved in various railway construction projects throughout China for both the German and the Qing government. Although the Description of the German Military System did not include a detailed account of training methods, the book emphasized the substantial importance attributed to military gymnastics in German military academies for providing the bodies of cadets with “completely healthy and strong muscles and bones.”

Similar to the Self-Strengthening Army, the Newly Created Army under the command of Yuan Shikai employed German advisors and drillmasters to instruct the troops in German army drill and military gymnastics. “For training troops,” Yuan wrote in the memorial presenting the Record of Military Planning to throne, “[It is necessary] to systematically copy German regulations.” The Record of Military Planning combined the German-modeled Newly Created Army’s statutes, organization scheme, and drill manual and included instructions on physical exercises that should “invigorate the muscles and bones” (huodong jingru) and strengthen all individual parts of the body.

The most detailed instruction on military gymnastics for the New Armies were included in the extensive Detailed and Illustrated Manual for Instruction and Drill (Xunlian caofa xiangxi tushuo, henceforth: Detailed and Illustrated Manual), which emphasized that, although new recruits had to already possess a strong physical constitution, their bodies were still expected to be “stiff.” For this reason, they should “use all kinds of methods of stretching and extending to invigorate the limbs (zhui). […] When the limbs are agile

[only then] can other methods [of drill] be learnt,” as the manual stated at the beginning of the section on gymnastics. As in the case of Xu Jianyin’s New Book on Military Science, the gymnastics (or calisthenics) exercises in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual were strongly influenced by Prussian/German military gymnastics and it was the single most important drill manual produced for the New Armies during the late Qing and early Republican military reforms. It was originally edited by Yuan Shikai in 1899 for the Newly Created Army and co-authored by some of his most trusted lieutenants, including Feng Guozhang, Wang Shizhen, and the German-educated Duan Qirui. Showing the influence of both German military advisors and other German-influenced military writings, it was the first comprehensive manual designed for practical use, comprising twenty-two volumes dealing with infantry, cavalry and artillery drills, gun drills, tactics, cantonment, engineering, construction, intelligence, cartography, and military gymnastics in detail.

The Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized that improving both the vigor and stamina of soldiers was an essential and fundamental component of military training. An individual soldier represented the smallest unit of the military and his body was viewed as the constitutive substance of the army and of the overall military strength. The body itself was described as a weapon that should not be neglected in favor of mere gun practice and the use of technology. The manual stated:

The soldier is like a sword. The value of the soldier’s body lies in its strength, the value of the sword lies in its hardness. Soldiers train to become strong; swords are forged (duanzhan) to become hard.

The sword-like forging of the body should be from “head to toe.” Physical exercise should increase the strength of the soldier, relax his muscles (jiu shu), and make his movements brisk and nimble. Similarly, the senses should be trained to improve the soldier’s vision and hearing—not only to increase his effectiveness on the battlefield but also to make him quicker in responding to commands. Drill should enable the men to withstand wind and weather, endure hardships, and bear hunger and thirst. According to the manual, “everyone’s body (renren shenti) has to be prepared well for hard fighting.”

Not only the body but also the will should be “steeled” by physical exercises. Apart from enhancing the physique of soldiers, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized that “ordering heart and will” (qi qi xin zhi) was crucial and as important as physical strength for individual discipline. Enduring hardships, for instance, could not only be mastered by a robust body alone, but by an inseparable linking of mental and physical prowess. Gymnastics should increase both the strength and self-confidence of the men
and combine individual achievement and self-control with military discipline and national military power. In the eyes of Yuan and other military reformers, drilling the physical body always went hand in hand with the inculcation of loyalty, obedience, and a martial spirit: “Transforming the body and mind of common soldiers (shizu shenxin) opens up endless advantages. The benefits are without limits.”

Calisthenics or free exercises were performed in relatively smaller groups and the soldiers moved and changed postures according to the commands of the drill instructor. This way, the exercises were synchronized and the discipline and cohesion of the group would be guaranteed. The Detailed and Illustrated Manual described a full choreography of various exercises, including illustrations to visualize the individual postures and motions (see Figure 1.1): independent of the size of the group, everyone had to stand one step apart from the next person. In the basic, upright standing position, both hands were placed on the hips. The feet had to be positioned at a ninety-degree angle to each other, forming the inversion of the Chinese character for the number “eight” (ba 八), similar to the letter “v.” Following the command of the instructor or group leader, the soldiers had to slowly stand up on their toes, while keeping their eyes straight and their legs steady. Subsequently, the legs had to be bent downward and the knees moved away from each other to reach a squatting position. After the knee bends, the manual explained in detail the exercises that followed. These included, successively, the lifting and bending of the upper left and right legs, the full stretching of each leg in the air as well as various other exercises for the legs, thighs, the complete upper body, neck and head. Special exercises for the arms and hands were also part of the group calisthenics: first, the arms had to be fully extended forward, the elbows then bent so that the forearms pointed upward, the hands turned with the palms facing each other, and then the arms had to be moved back to the original constellation in reverse order. This was followed by similar exercises in which the arms were drawn out to the side or completely stretched upward. Finally, the soldiers had to perform jumps from a squatting position. All these exercises followed a leader-directed call and response routine.

Once new recruits were well versed in free group calisthenics, corresponding exercises with the gun followed, the wuqiang (rifle brandish), which also included several exercises for two people. These exercises did not involve shooting and aiming practice, which followed later, but were supposed to strengthen hands, arms, legs, feet, and the backs of the soldiers to prepare them for carrying and using a gun in general. Instructors admonished the recruits to view the gun as both an extension of the body and the ultimate instrument to protect it. The soldiers should thus make themselves well acquainted with their rifles.
According to the *Detailed and Illustrated Manual*, every new recruit was supposed to complete three month of basic preparatory drill before joining the regiment. The first ten days were exclusively scheduled for physical exercises in order to improve the physical shape of the new recruits. Afterward, the soldiers learned basic steps, movements, and commands for the close unit drill. All soldiers had to exercise with the horizontal bar every three days, and, in their spare time, they were to also work out “regularly to improve the strength of their arms and legs.” Xu Jianxin similarly suggested that new recruits should constantly practice with the dumbbells for the first fifteen days after they enlisted and subsequently train with them every three days. For a period of three years, which was later taken as the basic time of active service for any soldier, they should exercise and especially train the one arm they used mostly for handling and using their gun. In the beginning, the *Detailed and Illustrated Manual* noted, the bodily drill of new soldiers should not be too severe and demanding, and instructors should be lenient toward recruits, albeit without allowing them to act at will or violate the army regulations. Leniency at this stage of physical exercise was important “to prevent [the training] from being too excessive and harming the limbs.”

Apart from group calisthenics or free exercises, rifle exercises, and apparatus gymnastics, other forms of exercises that were part of the German military gymnastics were added to the basic training curricula of the New Armies. In the German army, physical education included exercises which made use of various machines and apparatuses (*Rüstübungen* or *Gerätübungen*) as well as the so-called applied gymnastics (*angewandte Turnen*), which consisted of running, jumping, climbing, and various techniques for overcoming obstacles such as walls, fences, or ditches. Applied gymnastics was performed either without or with weapons or equipment.

In 1900, Theodor H. Schnell (Ruina’er) and Xiao Songfen published the highly illustrated *Methods of German Military Gymnastics* (*Deguo wuweiti ciaofa*), which comprised instructions on weapons drill, techniques to overcome any kind of obstacle, exercises at the horizontal bar, as well as explanations and illustrations of various other training devices. This manual was a translated compilation, with Schnell being responsible for the verbal interpretation (kouyi), while Xiao put the content down in proper written Chinese (*bishi*). It was, at least partly, based on one or more unspecified German sources, which probably included the German Gymnastics Regulations for the Infantry. The manual included a second, attached volume titled *Common Japanese Gymnastics* (*Riben putong ticaoxue*) that introduced exercises with the dumbbells and other equipment, as taught in Japanese middle schools. It was the translation of a Japanese manual for schoolteachers and instructors. Apart from a stand-alone version, which appears to have been published by the Tianjin Military Academy in 1900, both volumes were incorporated into a collection of translated books on German military knowledge released by the Hubei Military School in the same year. Both the Hubei New Army and the Beiyang Army used Schnell’s manual for instructing German military gymnastics.

Schnell was a Prussian artillery sergeant who arrived in the Qing Empire in the early 1870s as an advisor for the Krupp Company, the world’s leading heavy artillery gun manufacturer. He was subsequently employed as an instructor at the Tianjin Military Academy, where he became a teacher of Duan Qirui. Schnell took Duan to Germany in 1889, together with a group of Chinese military cadets. Both Schnell and Duan were artillery officers and together they wrote an *Illustrated Description of the Krupp Canon* (*Kelujobajiu tushe*), which was published in 1890. Apart from other books on guns and artillery, Schnell authored, in Chinese, a book on German military organization, titled *Planning the Formation of China’s Military Preparedness* (*Niqing Zhongguo yangzheng wukezhi*), which was published in 1897.

Physical drill, Schnell emphasized at the beginning of the *Methods of German Military Gymnastics*’ first part, “make the bodies (shen) of the weary and weak tough, and the four limbs and one hundred bones of the tough strong[er].” He went on:

> [All] vigor derives from it, and a nimble body can endure hard work [...]. Moreover, *ticao* bolsters the courage and steadies the heart [...]. If the soldiers get into difficulties, they will be more self-confident, and won’t have any doubts and fears.

In other words, bodily exercises not only served to increase the physical but also the mental strength of the soldiers, by stabilizing and increasing their will power, spiritedness, and self-confidence. Schnell’s notion of exercising mirrored the approach of German military doctors and instructors who acknowledged gymnastics’ extremely positive psychological effects. He demanded constant and regular training that soldiers should not neglect at any point. Only when they exercised frequently could they (and the army) fully benefit from *ticao*. New recruits should be introduced to military gymnastics carefully, by gradually increasing the exercises’ intensity and level of difficulty. Similar to the *Detailed and Illustrated Manual*, he warned against overly excessive drill. After completing a fixed period consisting of the basic, daily drill exercises—which, Schnell stated, was twelve weeks for new recruits in Germany—he recommended that both the physical and mental strength (*shenli* and *xindan*) of every soldier be tested and to arrange the recruits into three qualitative levels accordingly.

For the exercises themselves, Schnell recommended wearing tight-fitting clothes, to make the body more flexible and faster. Basic, “empty-handed
calisthenics” (kongshou ticao) included stretching and flexing exercises for the head, upper body, arms and legs. Furthermore, the manual offered instructions on how to jump and run. First, the new recruits should practice individually before they participated in guided group calisthenics. Schnell stipulated that only one part of the body should be trained at a time, stressing the systemized, controlled, and non-erratic sequence of the training. Apart from basic military training, ticao should be the “foundation” for all those who studied at a military preparatory school. “How can one not [want to] invigorate his muscles and bones,” he rhetorically concluded, “[as it] means to clear one’s vital energy and blood?”

The second part of the Methods of German Military Gymnastics covered basic lessons on gun drill. The exercises described were supposed to increase the strength of the shoulders and back, and were designed for using either one or both arms. The third part introduced the horizontal or high bar, which was made popular in Germany by the spearhead of the popular gymnastics movement, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, and which was favored by German military educators and instructors who considered it as a relatively safe apparatus. Schnell described and illustrated chin-ups, upswings, various balance-improving exercises and many other gymnastics techniques, which could all be performed at the horizontal bar in order to “daily increase […] the strength of arms and legs.” The exercises, he wrote, were especially important “to influence the flexibility and health of the soldiers, [and increase] their self-assurance, courage, and determination.” The third part, moreover, introduced climbing and other exercises that made use of a rope. This led to the next part of the manual, dealing with overcoming any kind of obstacle such as walls and slopes, which could be crossed by jumping, using ropes, or with the assistance of one or more other soldiers. Finally, Schnell provided illustrations and explanations of various gymnastic apparatuses, from the springboard to huge wooden constructions with bars and cables. These constructions could be either used to perform gymnastics or simply serve as obstacles or climbing devices.

Sometime after the publication of the Methods of German Military Gymnastics, the Education Bureau of the Beiyang Army Department for Training and Instruction (Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu xuewu) launched a small handbook on military gymnastics with the simple title Gymnastics Methods (Ticao). It represented a catechism of 398 articles that summarized the Chinese military reformers’ knowledge of military gymnastics, including instructions on both light calisthenics (rouran ticao) and apparatus gymnastics (qixie ticao). Every exercise, including those using gymnastics apparatuses and equipment, was illustrated by drawings similar to those in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual. “Ticao,” the authors of the book initially stated, “is an excellent method to boost drill and is the way to protect the soldier’s life.” In other words, the well-being and further education of the men depended on military gymnastics, which was viewed as the key to both achieving a strong physique and keeping healthy. According to the handbook, light calisthenics not only “strengthens the body, develops the four limbs and invigorates the organism, [but] its purpose is [also] to free the vital energy and blood (shuchang qixue) and create a valiant and heroic demeanor (sashuang yingzi).” New recruits would suffer from “strained hands and legs” and “sluggish muscles and bones” but, with instruction and training, any physical ailments (tishu) could be rectified at any point. The light calisthenics section introduced exercises such as knee bends, the bending of the upper body or stretching of the limbs, as well as guidelines and time/distance tables for running exercises. Furthermore, it specified the commands for leader-directed group exercises and recommended performing these with a maximum group size of five soldiers.

Apparatus gymnastics, which was detailed in the second part of the handbook, aimed at “increasing the soldiers’ muscular strength, making their bodies nimble, nurturing their vivacity (yangcheng qi huopo) and endowing them with a courageous spirit (yonggan zhi qi).” Furthermore, gymnastics would open the blood vessels (mailuo changsha). Soldiers should always exercise with their full heart and, ideally, group calisthenics and apparatus gymnastics should be combined in the training schedule. Similar to German manuals, the Beiyang Army’s Ticao included a tabular schedule for a period of three years, which specified the time when new recruits had to start with a certain apparatus gymnastics exercise. Included were climbing, jumping, and balance exercises on apparatuses such as the horizontal bar and double bars, the balance beam, the vaulting horse, or the still rings. A section on “special exercises” (tiaoli yanxi) additionally explained acrobatic postures such as handstands on different apparatuses.

These special exercises were not necessarily part of the regular training of the soldiers but were performed at special occasions to demonstrate the skill and achievements of the New Armies. For instance, the annual national war games of the Lujun, which were first organized in 1905, did not only consist of a joint army training but also of gymnastics and drill performances, turning them into large “sport tournaments,” according to the historian Li Ning. This practice, however, was contested by an article in the Nanyang Military Journal in 1906, which criticized that apparatus gymnastics had become a merely “decorative training exercise” (zhuangshi de jiaoliian). The author admitted that gymnastics exercises surely strengthened the body of the soldiers, rectified their posture, caused their movements to become agile and made them persevering and courageous. But too much emphasis on individual apparatus gymnastics at the expense of tactical combat drill resulted in the neglect of the idea of a cohesive unit, which military leaders generally viewed essential for contemporary warfare.
Figure 1.2 "Light Calisthenics" (rouran ticao). Calisthenics was considered to be the best way of making the bodies of soldiers more flexible and counted as an excellent tool for creating group cohesion and discipline. The picture shows a relatively small group, which seems to be divided further, under the watchful eyes of instructors and officers. Source: Zhu 1911.

Figure 1.3 "Infantry Light Calisthenics" (budui rouran ticao). Source: Zhu 1911.

Figure 1.4 "Apparatus Gymnastics" (qixie tiao). Soldiers performing handstands on the vaulting horse. Acrobatic exercises were not recommended by German military doctors and were usually only used in the New Armies to demonstrate the excellent physical shape and body control of the men. Source: Zhu 1910.

Figure 1.5 "Infantry Apparatus Gymnastics" (budui qixie tiao). Zhu 1910. Soldiers in drill uniforms exercising on some kind of high bar apparatus. Aesthetic performances were part of the special exercises practiced for tournaments, reviews, or the camera. In a way, gymnastic performances replaced the "burlesque" (Emory Upton) drill parades of the Banners forces (see Chapter 3). To the far right: soldiers receiving instructions for the uneven bars. Source: Zhu 1910.
Chapter 1

RECRUITMENT

In the view of late Qing military reformers, physical exercises and the meticulous drilling of soldiers should be preceded by the careful selection of new recruits. They propagated strict standards for the recruitment of rank and file soldiers for the New Armies and emphasized the importance of an excellent physical constitution. Acceptance into the established regular forces of the Qing Empire, the Banner troops and the Green Standard Army, in contrast, was based more on ethical or hereditary criteria than on actual skill or disposition. In theory, members of the Eight Banners automatically became soldiers or officers in the Banner’s military organizations when they reached adulthood. Recruits to the Green Standard Army were selected according to district registers, which listed families with a military background. The ranks were often filled by incorporating members of armed rebels, or criminal gangs, who would otherwise pose a threat to security. The late Qing military reformers denounced the Green Standard Army soldiers, in particular, as being unskilled, decadent and physically weak, and leveled responsibility for the low social standing of military men in China at them.  

For all intents and purposes, the bodily constitution and strength of new recruits enlisting for an army had been taken into consideration by military theorists in the past, such as the Ming general Qi Jiguang, whose military manuals were still respected to some degree during the Qing period. The scholar-official Zeng Guofan, who commanded the Hunan Army and was involved in the Self-Strengthening Movement, similarly emphasized physical fitness. However, affiliation with the Hunan Army or other, similar late-nineteenth century mercenary troops (Brave Battalions) mostly depended on the place of origin and personal contacts. Officers, who were originally civil officials, selected their own sub-commanders, who likewise chose their own lieutenants. The removal of one level in this pyramidal hierarchy, through the death or defection of an officer, could result in the loss of an entire regiment. The extent to which these criteria of selection were applied appears to have decreased over time, with the result that men were drafted indiscriminately into the Brave Battalions when needed. Certainly, whether in the regular Qing armies or the Brave Battalions, all soldiers had to prove they were capable of handling a weapon and lifting a prescribed minimum load at the time they enlisted. But there was neither a comprehensive system of physical and psychological requirements nor any thorough medical examination before enlisting and no monitoring afterward. Soldiering was usually a lifelong occupation, regardless of whether or not a soldier was actually too old or for some other reason unable to fulfill the tasks required of him.  

The leaders of the New Armies, at least in theory, set limits on the length of service for common soldiers and sought to recruit only socially and mentally stable healthy young men. The idea of narrowing admission to the army and restricting the length of military service derived from European, particularly German models, which emphasized the enormous strain and stresses that soldiers faced. A German handbook on training and military medicine, authored by the Russian military doctor Martin Kirchner, even stated that overly long service could lead to drinking, insubordination, desertion, and suicide. In 1894, Constantin von Hanneken and Sheng Xuanhuai, who were initially in charge of organizing what later became the Newly Created Army (Xinjian Lüjian), presented an organizational model based on the German conscription system to the government. According to their plan, selected men would serve for three years in the army and then retire consecutively to the first and second reserve, where they would serve for three years in each. After that, they would spend five years as members of a militia.  

In 1902, Yuan Shikai reintroduced this multistage model for the Beiyang Army. According to him, it had proved its worth not only in Germany but also in other European countries and in Japan. Instead of four levels and altogether 14 years of service, including service in the militia, Beiyang soldiers were supposed to serve for three years in the standing army (changbeijun), followed by three years in the first (subeijun) and second (houbeijun) reserves. About two years later, in 1904, the Organization Plan for the New Army, drafted by the Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu), demanded that the “regulations of various Occidental countries concerning the conscription of soldiers” be copied and adopted the German-style service model of the Beiyang Army for all divisions of the Lüjian. The only minor change to Yuan’s original design was to increase the length of service in the second reserve to four years, up to a total of ten years. A system consisting of active and reserve forces was supposed to provide flexibility by limiting the number of soldiers the state had to equip and provide for. On the other hand, this system still allowed the army to draw on a larger contingent of well-trained men if necessary. In the case of war, the Lüjian was supposed to be able to double its strength to over one million armed men by combining the first reserve and standing army.  

Following Yuan’s measures in Zhili province, where the Beiyang Army was based, the Bureau for Military Training stipulated that local magistrates or village headmen should provide lists of the most qualified candidates in the areas under their jurisdiction. New recruits to the Lüjian had to prove that they came from that particular area when they enlisted and that their family had lived there for at least three generations. Moreover, a respectable person had to vouch for the recruit. This idea of thorough registration was inspired by German military registers, which were the basis for the system of universal conscription that already existed in the German Empire at the time. As I will examine in more detail in Chapter 5, the introduction of universal
conscription was widely debated among military reformers and its advocates not only referred to foreign examples but also to comparable institutions in China's history, such as the militia systems used during the Han and Tang dynasties. The implementation of strict requirements for recruiting common soldiers proved to be difficult. Since no reliable census statistics existed, the New Armies had to use the military registers of the Green Standard Army. Initially, military leaders were unable to find sufficient qualified men who conformed to the high demands of the New Armies and they often had to draw on veterans from the Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, the establishment of reserve forces was never fully put into practice and only some divisions actually possessed reserve units: because the number of new, qualified recruits was limited, men were allowed to reenlist or join police forces after completing their service in the standing army.

After the Sino-Japanese War, the most urgent issues were not long-term, systematic considerations but the "quality" and disposition of men actually available for the New Armies. The collected regulations of Yuan Shikai's first German-trained forces, the Record of Military Planning of the Newly Created Army (Xinjian Lujian bingliu lunm, henceforth Record of Military Planning), stipulated that "men whose five senses are not intact, and who have weak hands and feet, poor physiques, and bad eyesight cannot be accepted." Recruits should be strong, reliable, and committed: "the old, weak, and infirm (lao ruo pi long) should be excluded. Only "excellent" (you), well-educated, and "obedient" (xun) men should be accepted into service. Yuan Shikai and his lieutenants strongly criticized the malpractice of making up numbers with ineligible men (lanyu chongshu), which was common among the established troops and demanded that only "able-bodied men" (jingzhuang), capable of mastering the hardships of contemporary drill and combat, be selected. Similarly, the regulations for Zhang Zhidong's Self-Strengthening Army ordered the use of Western medicine to examine whether the bodies of recruits are robust (jianzhuang), and free from any "hidden diseases" (yinji), and to check whether the men are far-sighted.

The Lujian adopted the requirements for new recruits as stipulated by the Newly Created Army and the Beiyang Army. A healthy body free from any medical conditions was seen as essential and, apart from emphasizing good eyesight, the 1904 Organization Plan for the New Army demanded that those with "unmentionable diseases" (anji), a phrasing which indicated either an internal or a sexual ailment, be rejected as recruits. New recruits were expected to have an unscathed and fully developed body and fulfill a set of above-average prerequisites. The enlistment age was set between twenty and twenty-five years because this was supposed to be the age at which men reached their full physical capability. At the time of enlistment, recruits should be able to lift 100 jin or pounds (50 kilograms) and run 20 li (10 kilometers or 6.2 miles) in one hour. They were required to possess a sturdy nature and a good physical appearance as well as a minimum of four chi and eight cun, or approximately 157 centimeters (5ft 1 inch) tall. "Southerners" were allowed to be two cun (6 centimeters or 2.36 inches) shorter. According to contemporary German sources, the minimum height for recruits to the German army in 1887 was also 157 centimeters although the actual average height was 167 centimeters (5ft 5 inches). The latter figure was about the same in most other European countries. Japanese recruits were approximately 156 centimeters tall on average.

Besides purely physical requirements, the New Armies considered the behavior and manners of recruits to be important, emphasizing in particular that only men who had never smoked opium were eligible for service. The consumption of opium was known to dull the mind, influence the spirit, and have a lasting negative effect on the body. The ban on opium-smokers linked physical with mental requirements for soldiers, as opium smoking was viewed as being harmful to people's "character and conduct" in particular. The ideal soldier was not only supposed to be strong and healthy but also well-behaved and respectful toward officers and the civilian population, the "good people" (liangmin). Recruits had to have a clean criminal record, and to come from a decent and respectable family. They should not only be "well-nourished, tall and slender" but also "well-mannered and vigorous. Accordingly, after being admitted to the army, the basic military training of soldiers not only dealt with their general physical fitness and technical skills but also with their behavior, motivation, and psychology.

**POSTURE**

The inculcation of bodily postures and gaits were part of the basic military training of soldiers. In fact, the degree of individual discipline was attributed to and measured by a man's ability to assume, hold, or conduct postures and movements such as standing at attention and marching. Chinese military reformers, army leaders, and drill instructors adopted the German notion of absolute control over the body and they sought to impose uniformity and strict discipline upon both the outer and inner bearing of every soldier. Drill manuals determined every movement of the body and the position of every body part. Through the scrupulous training of postures, the recruits were "dressed" and drilled to react and obey to commands. Officers and instructors sought to achieve the automated submission of the soldiers and the highest possible degree of order and discipline.

The basic position for all soldiers was standing at attention (lizheng). According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, which precisely defined
how to assume the posture, it symbolized strength and perseverance: on command, the soldiers had to put both feet together and distribute the weight from one leg to both legs. The feet were supposed to be at a ninety-degree angle (v-shape), the legs and knees fully extended. The chest should be pushed out and the stomach drawn in, resembling the German slogan *Brust heraus, Bauch hinein*, which was cited by German military instructors and military doctors to define this posture (German: *Stillstand*). Moreover, a soldier’s shoulders had to be steady and at the same height. The arms should hang down close to the upper body and the elbows should be slightly flexed in a way they would fit naturally to the body. The hands should rest flat on the hips, but not be too tight. The neck had to be fully straightened and the head held in an upright position. The chin should be pulled back, the eyes looking straight ahead. The slightest shaking or moving of the body, as well as speaking, was strictly forbidden. The soldiers should stand upright and firm like a “clay sculpture” (*nisu*, see Figure 1.6, left).

The *Record of Military Planning* contained an explanation of this posture directed at Chinese officers and instructors and written by one of the Newly Created Army’s German instructors, who went under the Chinese name Boluo’en. It is an insightful account of how German military culture and notions of physical discipline were adopted in late Qing China. “Standing to attention,” the instruction started, “is the fundament of all drill. If it is not appropriate, it is very difficult [...] to get rid of any kind of defect.” It goes on:

Standing at attention is the most fundamental skill [literally first level of gongfu]. Don’t be afraid of being overly pedantic, take time to check whether the posture is correct or not. The body has to be trained in order to achieve [standing and moving with] facility. Do not overstretch, twist too much or make any errors. Otherwise, energy is wasted. The body must be forced to avoid the disease of slanted shoulders and a slanted waist. The position of the feet is most crucial [...], it must be proper without any exception. When the legs move, [the position of the feet] influences whether legs and body are crooked or straight. If the position of the feet is not correct, the whole [posture] of the body is wrong. For instance, if one has a splayfoot on the right side, then the right arm is hanging back and the movements are not straightforward. The arm cannot swing forward and [the soldier does not] move in line [with the others], [and he moves] in a very unnatural way. If the lines are not closed evenly, it is because the position of the feet must be wrong.

The report continued to emphasize the importance of getting rid of even the slightest error at the earliest possible stage, as it would be increasingly difficult later and any “unevenness” (*cenci*) would become worse. The head and arms should be absolutely straight, the nape should be stiff, the chin should not be stretched out, and the gaze should be straight ahead. The report went on:

After standing at attention, the whole body is calm, the four limbs do not move the slightest, even the facial features and the fingertips do not shake. The arms are in a natural position [...], the hands rest on the legs, the fingers are stretched and stiff, the thumb is placed between the middle finger and the forefinger, the small finger and the wrist touch the trousers.

During breaks, the body and legs were allowed to rest, but standing at attention should never be stopped without leave. Soldiers were not supposed to talk, fool around, or laugh. Finally, the account deals with the physical constitution of soldiers who suffered from inadequate drill methods. The
author criticizes that, in the case of some recruits, the bodily posture was very bad, and their way of moving was tiring and they were wasting a lot of energy. While exercising to “invigorate muscles and bones” (huodong jingji), the soldiers should conscientiously pay attention to moving their legs and feet correctly. They should be carefully instructed and inculcated to assume postures.86

The Detailed and Illustrated Manual went further and explained how to stand at ease (shaoxing), which, it claimed, was important to rest the exhausted spirit after the hard drill. Putting both hands at the hip was supposed to enable the soldier to straighten his body and carry out other moves and postures. Moreover, it depicted various ways of moving (juanfa) and footwork (bugu), including the basic goose or parade step (zhengbu), slow walking, trotting and running. Every step was exactly regulated. For the everyday walking style (bianlu), for instance, a soldier should lift a foot only one to two cun (three to six cm) above the ground and walk at a speed of around 120 steps a minute, without using too much energy or becoming exhausted.87

The New Armies attributed special importance to the goose step, which was the iconic symbol of Prussian-German soldiering, discipline, and militarism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.88 The goose step, or literally “piercing step” (Stechschritt) was tactically obsolete since the mid-nineteenth century but was practiced for drill and ceremonial reasons. And still is in some parts of the world, including China. As the standard march during regular drill, it was supposed to strengthen the feet and legs but the psychological effects were even more important. The New Armies’ recruits should start making ninety-six steps and then 114 steps a minute, which was exactly the same as the prescribed speed of ordinary marching in the German army.89 Every step should have a length of 80 centimeters (ca 2ft 7 inches), and the arms should be swinging appropriately back and forth in a natural way without using energy. The swings should not be too high or overextended (see Figure 1.6).90

The number of steps per minute was also defined for other gaits such as trotting (kuibu, 140 steps) and running (paoju, 160 to 170 steps), which was used when engaging the enemy in battle. Furthermore, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual determined the position of the elbows, feet, and the head when moving, as well as the direction of the eyes when the company stopped after marching. Finally, it described how to correct position of one’s feet if becoming confused and making mistakes during the drill.91 Another chapter introduced instructions for postures and moves with the gun, teaching soldiers exactly how to present the gun, carry it while marching or running, or how to hold it while aiming at a target in a standing, squatting, or lying position.92 In comparison, the German army used even more detailed guidelines for marching and posturing, including not only regulations concerning the number of steps per minute but also the length of a step, depending on the type of movement. Instructor particularly considered marching as essential for every soldier and described it as “standing at attention put into motion.”93 They gave precise instructions on the position of the head, upper body, and other body parts, as well as the position of the feet and techniques of moving.94

German military drill doctrines emphasized that exercising individual postures and ways of walking, along with gymnastics, prepared the soldier for drill in a closed tactical formation. Only after soldiers automatically assumed the right postures and moved and marched correctly, could they start with gun drill and shooting exercises.95 A man first had to “master his own body, develop and train his muscularity, and systematically increase his natural abilities and stamina,” before he could learn to work in a team, become part of the regiment, and fully start to prepare for battle.96 Late Qing military reformers absorbed these ideas. They were intended to develop the soldiers’ physique and martial spirit, and improve their skills at arms and combat behavior. But more than that, the New Armies aimed at total control over body and mind, to govern the conduct of an individual soldier, and completely assimilate him into the collective of the army corps. Recruitment, military gymnastics, postures and movements were only the first, albeit fundamental, disciplinary technologies that were applied to govern the New Armies. Following German tactical doctrines, the ultimate aim was forging the bodies of individual soldiers into a cohesive unit or formation: literally, into “one single body.”

MARCHING IN STEP AND THE “CULT OF THE OFFENSIVE”

In the war against France in 1870–1871, the Prussian army demonstrated its superior speed and effectiveness, particularly of its infantry. The underlying tactical doctrine emphasized aggressive offensive warfare conducted, at its very core, by a disciplined, well-drilled and machine-like infantry that simply overwhelmed or shocked the enemy by its speed, deep concentration, and intensive gun-salvos. This, however, was the tactical doctrine of Frederick II and the eighteenth-century Prussian army. It became obsolete because technological innovations such as smokeless powder, the percussion cap, the breechloader, the recoil mechanism, and rifled guns, which allowed for rapid fire over greater distances, turned closed-unit infantry attacks into suicide missions. In the late nineteenth century, the leadership of the Prussian and then German army became aware of this problem and developed new tactics that emphasized flexibility, undulation, the breaking of ranks and spreading out (also called line warfare), as well as the use of ground and terrain as cover. Supporters of the closed-unit tactics within the German military leadership warned that the new tactics would result in a defensive deadlock.
They sought to reinforce established tactics by enforcing strict discipline, which should ensure cohesion and prevent fear and panic during the attack. To be sure, neither group considered abandoning the doctrine of aggressive attack or "cult of the offensive," which eventually proved to be disastrous in the First World War.86

In Japan, military leaders and officers were strongly influenced by Jacob Meckel's ideas on tactics, as evidenced, for instance, in the infantry drill regulation of the Japanese army from 1886. The Prussian officer Meckel played a major role in reorganizing the Japanese military in the Meiji period, and he was a proponent of the doctrine of massive and concentrated infantry assault, for which he was strongly criticized in Germany. Meckel favored close-order drills, which were necessary to prepare the soldiers for battle formations able to produce a concentrated shock and, in the Japanese army, he promoted the idea that a unit should fight like "one man," which was later adopted by Chinese military reformers. Several of Meckel's books were translated in 1890 by different German-Chinese teams from the Hupeh Military Schools in Wuchang, including the Principles of Tactics (Zhanfa jiyao) and other books and book chapters on the tactics of battery, cavalry, infantry, and squad operations.87 Although the Japanese army later translated and followed the revised German drill regulations (from 1889 and 1902, which were improved versions of the code from 1888) that were a compromise between competing tactical doctrines, they generally applied Meckel's approach in the Sino-Japanese War and in the Russo-Japanese War. Only after suffering heavy casualties during the latter, particularly within the officer corps, did the Japanese military leadership modify this doctrine.88

In Germany and Japan, the success of the Japanese troops was generally taken as a confirmation of the German offensive doctrine and the role of the infantry as a major branch of the military. The German army leadership considered basic ideas fixed in the drill code from 1888, such as flexible decision-making by officers during battle, to be still valid and only in need of enhancement. A new drill code was released in 1906 that highlighted the interaction between artillery and infantry as well as the fact that attacking foot soldiers, like defensive units, had to entrench themselves, if necessary. Notwithstanding, precision marching or marching in line remained the basis of military training because it was viewed to be the most useful technique of group bonding and inculcating soldiers with the essential qualities for battle: strict discipline and a high morale.89

In Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the infantry was viewed as the foundation and most important part of any "modern" army and gradually replaced the cavalry as the decisive element in battle in the nineteenth century.90 In China, even in pre-imperial times, infantry units increasingly constituted the mass of soldiers and represented the backbone of any army. Chariots and, later, cavalry could only be deployed under certain circumstances and most of the time played a minor role in battle.91 Although the Qing's military success in the seventeenth century had depended on mounted archers, cavalry units quickly became less important in the mountainous and hilly lands of central and southern China. However, even in the nineteenth century, mounted archery still enjoyed the highest prestige. After 1895, Chinese military reformers acknowledged the crucial role of a disciplined infantry for what they perceived as high-tech warfare in the late nineteenth century. The New Armies emulated the German and German-based Japanese drill codes and tactical doctrines, which emphasized the significance of the infantry, closed formations and decisive strikes to "shock" and overwhelm enemy troops. Chinese military reformers and military leaders closely observed contemporary debates among military circles in Japan, Germany, and other European countries, particularly the discussions on infantry attacks and offensive warfare following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905. They incorporated notions about flexible infantry deployment or the use of covers and trenches. However, similar to their German and Japanese role models, they persisted with the idea that the infantry was most efficient if it eventually formed a concentrated closed unit in front of the enemy.

To be sure, the intention of improving individual fighting skills and the effectiveness of an army through drill was neither new to the armies of the Qing period nor to any military organizations of previous dynasties. In his two manuals New Book Recording Effective Techniques (Jixiao xinshu, first version written in 1560/1561)92 and Record of Military Training (Lianbing shiji, first published in 1571), the Ming general Qi Jiguang emphasized the necessity of physical fitness and rigorous training, with and without arms.93 For Qi, small and strictly disciplined units of carefully recruited men constituted the backbone of the army on the battlefield. Physical exercise and the inculcation of courage were equally important for achieving unanimous discipline and preparing both body and mind for battle. Qi's books were widely read and used during the late Ming and the Qing periods and even studied in Korea and Japan.94 However, although these military writings were acknowledged classics of strategy, military organization, and drill, they were hardly used in reality by the Qing regular armies. In fact, there were no established standards for the Green Standard Army involving drill exercises and only occasionally did detachments practice the visually pleasing but virtually obsolete battle formations from the Ming period.95 Only Zeng Guofan rediscovered and implemented Qi's designs when raising the Xiang Army in the 1850s, particularly the idea of an army structured by personal loyalties, but also those for drill and discipline. While the Xiang and Huai Armies exercised daily, most Banner troops only drilled a couple of times during one month and usually focused on archery, which remained the most prestigious
military skill, even in the nineteenth century. The Qianlong Emperor's famous dictum, that a "soldier cannot spend a day without training" seems to have been largely neglected by them. Only after the Sino-Japanese War did military reformers emphasize the idea of concerted deployment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units and introduce the European doctrine of closed-unit infantry formations, which demanded incessant drill and alignment.

From 1897 on, numerous manuals and translations introduced European, particularly German, principles of closed-unit drills, infantry formations, and marching in step. Subsequently, Chinese drill codes strongly emphasized that the aim of all military drill exercise had to be the creation of a cohesive and mechanical unit, which required well-disciplined individuals with optimized and homogenized physical bodies. Drill codes described the individual (danren) as the very foundation of success in both drills and battle. Only when the body of an individual soldier was fit enough and he behaved according to the rules, could he form a unit with others. Small units, after sufficient training, were combined to larger units until the army constituted a cohesive entity.

The original source for the infantry drill codes and manuals of the New Armies was the annotated translation of an unspecified German drill code authored by Li Fengbao, which strongly influenced the Detailed and Illustrated Manual from 1899. Li Fengbao was a protégé of Li Hongzhang and head of the translator's section of the Jiangnan Arsenal and Wusong Armory, where he co-translated manuals for Krupp canons and books on various other topics. Between 1878 and 1885, he subsequently served as Qing minister to Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and France. In Germany, he was the superior of Xu Jianyin, the author of the New Book on Military Science. Li's book New Ways of Military Drill (Lucao xinyi), which had the parallel title New Book on German Military Training (Deguo lianjing xinshu), was produced in Berlin and first published in 1884. It comprised explanations, diagrams, and tables concerning German infantry drill. The most important thing in modern battle, according to the book, was fighting in formation and the firing of guns in salvos. Because the infantry represented the most important part of the army, its drill had to be perfect and the training of simultaneous shooting was essential. "The German infantry has the most refined troops," Li stated. They were the absolute role model and Chinese soldiers should be trained accordingly. To underscore the German emphasis on the homogenous and corporate infantry unit, Li quoted the famous military strategist Zhuge Liang: "If the army does not drill, one hundred [men] cannot become one. With drill and experience, one becomes as strong as one hundred. The value of a soldier lies in his training."

In the Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army, Shen Dunhe explicitly praised the skills of the German infantry in a manner similar to Li Fengbao. In particular, he viewed the ability of breaking up a formation, spreading out, and forming up again as highly valuable for contemporary warfare, which increasingly involved rapid gun and canon fire and demanded extreme tactical flexibility. The German army, Shen stated, was praised for having a perfectly organized and well-disciplined infantry that maintained closed formations during both drill and battle. Other manuals and codes of other New Armies, which considered infantry drill as the basis for military training of both common soldiers and officer cadets, shared the same perception. They also described the infantry as the backbone of the army, and the ultimate tactical task was the well-balanced combination of infantry, artillery, and cavalry in battle. According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, the first step was to bring the physical bodies of new recruits into shape. Afterward, the men could start to practice shooting and learn the techniques of forming a unit, and attacking and retreating as a formation. Every soldier had to understand and internalize the movements for fighting in a formation, the authors of Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized.

Already in the Record of Military Planning, Yuan and his lieutenants explicitly demanded putting more weight on daily drill on a high level, because all previous Chinese armies had effectively neglected practical drill. During the instruction and drill of the common soldiers, the rigidity of formation (suzheng or zhengwu) had to be observed. All drill exercises were to be carried out with united strength (tongli hexue) and even the slightest unevenness in a formation (cencil) had to be eliminated. If ten people could be instructed and accomplish the highest level of sophistication, then a hundred, a thousand or even ten thousand men could also, the authors of the Record of Military Planning announced. The soldiers had to drill regularly to become nimble and well versed in moving their bodies, hands, feet, and guns, and gain skills in using their eyes and ears. Perfectly trained and disciplined bodies were essential for keeping a closed formation and facing the enemy with the necessary speed. Similar to gymnastics, formation drill aimed at mental indoctrination and influencing the soldier's mind to make him react physically to commands, obey, and "lay down his life on the battlefield" (jiangchang xiaoming).

The Detailed and Illustrated Manual additionally emphasized that soldiers were no longer only men who fought bravely in battle. Now, soldiering was much more sophisticated as every step (bu), drill (yan), and line-up (pai), was strictly regulated and synchronized. All these (new) elements of soldiering had to be trained to a degree of excellence. Unlike in the past, according to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, many should act and fight "like one man" (he qianwan ren ru yi ren) to overcome all enemies and achieve certain victory. Shen Dunhe similarly stated that, by using foreign drill, "many men become one [man]" (quanbai ren jie neng zhengqi ru yi). The authors of the
Detailed and Illustrated Manual described and illustrated various modes of formation drill, with and without weapons. The basic units for the drill were the platoon (pai or dapai) or the squad (xiaopai), consisting of 8 to 14 men. A soldier had to internalize the exercises for both squad and platoon with all of its various movements and regulations, because they were viewed as the skeleton of the basic army unit: the company (dui). Formation drill in small squads or platoons was considered essential for tactical flexibility during battle because it trained soldiers how to form lines, disperse, seek shelter, hide, retreat, advance, and regroup again. According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, formations should be like waves (literally “undulate,” fuyi), implying that individual soldiers should coalesce like drops of water to form a powerful homogeneous mass but, if necessary, break apart to elude enemy fire and eventually conjoin again and form a unit.

Like group calisthenics, formation exercises of small units were strictly regulated in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual. At the beginning of the basic platoon drills, soldiers were to stand one step apart from each other and put one hand on the shoulder of a neighbor. After an instructor issued the respective command, the head and eyes had to turn to the announced direction and the chest had to be stretched. The eyes should always be focused and look straight ahead. The soldiers were then instructed in different methods of forming a company, dispersing into squads, regrouping, and rearranging to compose new formations. They were instructed to move, turn, and line-up as a squad. Every movement, posture, and position of every part of a soldier’s body was meticulously determined. Moreover, the soldiers were indoctrinated to know their precise position while being part of a unit, no matter what size the unit assumed. Even the exact position of the officers involved was fixed according to their individual rank, determining where they had to stand when a squad, company, or battalion stood at attention, exercised, paraded, or engaged in battle (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8).

The Detailed and Illustrated Manual was a thick manual with over a thousand pages and composed in the classic written language. Its intended readership was government officials and those among the educated elite who considered a military career as well as officers in the New Armies and cadets attending a military academy. For the purpose of inculcating common soldiers and less educated, lower-ranking officers, and drill instructors with the German infantry drills, all units of the Newly Created Army received a copy of the Introductory Manual of German Army Drill (Deguo lujun caodian runen), which contained basic explanations on formation and close-order drill. It was reproduced for the Self-Strengthening Army and, together with copies of the Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army (including the Six Rules of German Military Training), distributed to every battalion.
Forging the Male Body

Chapter 1

For the same reason, the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, published in 1905, included in every issue a section on frequently asked question regarding infantry drill. Using simple language, basic ideas and questions concerning postures and drill were explained in chronological order. Questions concerned individual or danren drills as well as shooting postures, specific commands, or the movements of units.

The first question was:

From which point should a new recruit start to learn the drill code?

Answer: Start with learning the training methods (jiaolianfa). These methods are the foundation of military drill. Without learning these methods by heart, lining-up (chengpai chengdui) is later impossible. It is like someone who does not understand characters. How can he read a book?²⁰⁶

In 1906, the Bureau for Military Training decided to issue a drill code effective for all Luijun divisions. The reason was not only to further standardize military practices throughout the country but also the revision of infantry drill codes in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905.²¹² Military publications such as the Nanyang Military Journal included reports on these revisions and analyzed the latest tactical innovations.²¹⁶ One article, co-written by the Japanese Sakata Toranosuke and entitled Evaluation of the German Correction on the Infantry Drill Code (Du Deguo gaizheng bubing caodian yougan), quite accurately assessed the new German drill and combat regulations from 1906. Prior to the war of 1904–1905, which had made the development of firearms and the need for tactical innovations obvious, the German army had wasted a lot of time and energy on the drill grounds. Instead of exercising combat relevant issues, too much attention had been given to closed horizontal lines. Now the Germans emphasized practical training for the battlefield, particularly concerning the coordination of artillery and infantry, and raising the spirit and morale of soldiers. “The German infantry is among the best in the world,” the authors of the article underlined, and “with the recent drill code changes, its quality will be doubtlessly without comparison in the world.” However, one flaw remained, according to the article. The drill code still emphasized precision lockstep marching (fanlieshi), which was world famous in its German version and viewed to be the most effective way to inculcate discipline. But it was old-fashioned and in two years, recruits should better receive combat relevant training instead of learning to look good.²¹⁷

The strongly German-influenced Military Studies Magazine included comprehensive accounts and translations of the latest (infantry) tactics and drill regulations. One translation, for instance, of unspecified origin by Fan Chongwang, included illustrations from a German source, supposedly from a version of the drill regulation from 1906 (see Figure 1.9). In particular, the article dealt with defense tactics, trenches, and the entrenching of attacking infantry soldiers, which was a tactical innovation emphasized after the Russo-Japanese War. The journal also included articles on infantry warfare by Wang E, who was a cadet in Germany, as was the editor of the journal, Chen Zongda.²¹⁸

In 1907, the Chinese military finally released an infantry drill code whose publication had been decided on in the previous year. In charge was still the Bureau for Military Training (more precisely, its Department for Military Education), which had officially merged with the Board of War into the Army Ministry (Luijunbu) in November 1906. The 1907 Temporary Infantry Drill Methods (Bubing xanzing caofa) was a small and handy booklet, which reiterated the organic principle of the previous Chinese drill regulations published after 1895. It emphasized the importance of the individual soldiers (danren) and the careful step-by-step training which was supposed to form them into increasingly larger tactical units. In particular, the individual’s physical body was viewed as the foundation of all further military drills. According to the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods, “the basis of infantry training is the individual; [and] military gymnastics completes this training.”²¹⁹ Only when the soldiers were disciplined, sufficiently physically fit, and knew how to handle a weapon, could the implementation of simultaneous movements be successful.

Although the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods did not state explicitly that it was a translation from the Japanese, it strongly resembled previous translations and Chinese manuals that followed the same principles.²²⁰ Both the Beiyang Army and Nanyang Army published infantry drill codes in 1903 and 1904, respectively, that were structured in a similar way.²²¹ Around the same time, a Chinese student in Japan, called Meng Sen, who later was a co-founder of the popular journal Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) and became a professor of history at Peking University, translated the Japanese drill code from 1898. In the foreword of the translation, he pointed out that the Japanese original was based on German principles. The translation was called Infantry Drill Code (Bubing caodian) and structured along 344 articles (plus 14 in the appendage) and, as always, starting with regulations for instructing individual soldiers and continuing with instructions for increasingly larger units. Similarly, the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods consisted of altogether 351 consecutive articles. The articles in the two books were by and large the same, though not identical.²²²

In 1909, Tieliang, the director of the Army Ministry, ordered all division commanders to Beijing to discuss and draft official drill codes for all branches of the army, including cavalry, artillery, and infantry.²²³ In the following year, the Army Ministry issued a booklet titled Revised Infantry Drill Methods
(Xinding bubing caofa), which was similar to and based on the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods from 1907. In fact, the Revised Infantry Drill Methods was a translation of the latest Japanese infantry drill code. According to its preface, it was produced to replace all other previous drill codes, end the confusion of simultaneously existing codes and, finally, to achieve national standardization. It was circulated widely and was still used after the downfall of the dynasty. One edition, for instance, was published in Wuhan for the troops in Hubei in November 1911.124

Like its predecessor, the Revised Infantry Drill Methods was a small and handy, easily accessible booklet that was structured into about 350 articles. Both the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods and the Revised Infantry Drill Methods followed the simple idea that first the individual had to be instructed, undergo strict physical training, and learn basic postures and movements. After completing his individual education, the soldier could participate in close-order drill and successively join larger formations and exercises. Fundamental for preparing the soldiers for drill and war, both drill codes highlighted, was the observance of “strict military discipline and correct sequences.”125 Rigid instruction was considered the key to enhancing soldiers physically and mentally and achieving absolute discipline, which made them “skilled and sophisticated” and allowed them to “fight unanimously with other branches of the army.” The Revised Infantry Drill Methods emphasized that “discipline is the lifeblood [or pulse, mingmai] of the army.”126

Similar to the German army, the Japanese army revised its drill regulations after the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese New Armies adopted the tactical adjustments their role models made, including the emphasis on better coordinating the different branches of the army and flexible formations and extended lines. However, following their role models, the emphasis on strict discipline, determination, and concentrating strength for decisive offensive strikes even increased among Chinese military reformers.127 During the war in 1904–1905, the Japanese army had, for the first time, made use of sandbags and entrenching as tactics for attacking infantry soldiers, but most observers attributed the Japanese victory to the martial spirit, audacity, and cohesiveness of their troops. Correspondingly, the infantry drill codes released by the Lijun leadership did not deal with entrenching but underscored the crucial role of combining spirit and morale (jingshen shiqi) with physical fitness and military skills (titi, nengli, wayi) for creating a forceful and effective unit. Discipline would ensure the homogeneity of this unit, which should ultimately be held together by patriotism and loyalty to the emperor (aiguo zhongjun).128 Chinese military reformers and the leaders of the New Armies were, by and large, up to date with current transnational debates concerning infantry tactics. Similar to the prevailing German and Japanese tactical doctrines built around concentrated infantry attacks, they adopted flexible tactics.
and loose formations but they also emphasized closed order drills and strict discipline as the basis for military training. Starting in Europe during the First World War, the crucial impact of the machine gun and technological innovations such as tanks finally made these established infantry tactics obsolete.\(^{19}\)

**CONCLUSION: PERFORMING MUSCULAR BONDING**

Gymnastic exercises as well as posture and movement drills were the basic disciplinary technologies to govern the bodies of all military men in the New Armies and prepare them for tactical drills. According to German drill doctrines, only once soldiers automatically assumed the right postures, and marched in the correct way, could they start with gun drills and shooting exercises.\(^{140}\) Exercises and drills were not only supposed to optimize the physical bodies of soldiers. Military leaders also considered them as excellent disciplinary technology to mold the minds of soldiers, raise their morale and martial spirit, and govern their behavior and obedience.

Body and mind were perceived to be reciprocal because manuals, drill codes, and other military texts emphasized that will, morale, virtue, and the right spirit were indispensable for physical perseverance and military drill. This idea was not entirely new and drew on established notions about the body in late imperial China; there was a tendency in philosophical, religious, medical, and literary accounts to associate visible physical deficiencies with flaws in one’s personality. Those with a weak and disreputable character were often expected to bear outward signs of corruption or disease. In classical European and Judeo-Christian thinking, the Cartesian paradigm was predominant, which assumes a dualism of essentially distinct mind and body. The mind, representing culture or civilization, was linked to the intellect and the immortal soul. It was favored over the body, which represents nature, ephemeral matter, and carnal drives.\(^{141}\) In classical Chinese thought, however, the relationship between body and mind was not viewed in terms of dualism but was interpreted as two poles that constituted a complementary psychosomatic unity.\(^{142}\) Marc Elvin examines the connection between heart-mind (xin) and body-person (shen) in a variety of stories from the Imperial, Republican, and Communist periods and concluded that, in these stories, the body is driven by the heart-mind. At the same time, the body represents and reveals the nature of the heart-mind. Outer changes were interpreted as changes of the inner life of an individual and outward defects were viewed as corresponding to character deficiencies. Elvin defines the heart-mind as “a concept than can be interpreted as the psychological field of force that is attempting to control the body, and which reveals itself in physical structure and posture of [...] beauty in the sense of prettiness [emphasis in the original text].” The role of the body was to be the mere “carrier of corporal and/or sartorial attributes,” which were an outward expression of the heart-mind.\(^{143}\)

Arguably, this concept of body and mind facilitated the adoption of the prevalent psychosomatic oriented philosophy that accompanied German gymnastics and military training. In the eyes of German military instructors, the physical constitution, mental self-control, behavior, and attitude of an individual were strongly entangled. They considered the physical health and psychological capacity of new recruits as essential criteria for joining the army and enduring its disciplinary regime. Through the physical body of an individual, the army leaders would be able to gain access and control over the “heart-mind.” This, in fact, is a reversal of the idea that the heart-mind controls the body-person, whereas a person’s character was still thought to be visible through external physical appearance.\(^{144}\)

While shen refers to the individual person, personality, or the self, and stands for the connection between body and the spirit, the psychosomatic entity or someone’s physical identity, there is also another central term for body in Chinese: ti is usually used for the physical body, the limbs, the flesh, and the bones and can also mean “embodiment.” It represents the organism, the body as an organic whole system or unit, and its individual parts.\(^{145}\) As a term and as a concept, ti became increasingly important in the beginning of the twentieth century for military reformers, educators, and intellectuals and began appearing in phrases such as tiyu (physical education), ticao (physical exercise), and tizhi (physical). Yet, shen and ti were increasingly thought of as a unit, forming the present-day Chinese term for “body” and the phrase duanlian shenti ("exercising" or "doing sports") refers to the training of both the “flesh-body” and the “body-person."\(^{146}\)

In his seminal book _Keeping Together in Tune—Drill and Dance in Human History_, William Hardy McNeill argues that shared rhythmic movements create a sense of community and cohesion. Coordinated movements, such as marching in step, evoke visceral and emotional sensations and a euphoric feeling of “muscular bonding,” which enables human groups to cooperate and even contributes to evolutionary survival.\(^{147}\) In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese military reformers and army leaders paid increasing attention to the idea of uniting particularly infantry soldiers into a fast, effective, and perfectly aligned tactical formation. For the first time in history, Chinese common soldiers began to march in lock step and conduct choreographed physical exercises in unison.\(^{148}\) The New Armies absorbed German drill doctrines, which, with Foucault, might be traced back to notions about institutionalized (military) discipline developing in Europe since the seventeenth century. Drill exercises aimed at inculcating total discipline upon the soldiers and homogenizing their bodies and minds to form them into a cohesive unit. Following German-Japanese tactical doctrines, the ultimate
aim was to combine the bodies of individuals into a cohesive unit or formation: literally, "one single body." Soldiers were subjected to meticulous and constant conditioning and dressing, which aimed at assimilating them into the collective army corps and producing a more powerful army than ever before.

Numerous images produced and circulated by the New Armies should underpin the progress of military reforms and the success of adopting German military training and doctrines. Illustrations and photographs of soldiers performing gymnastics and drills promoted exercise and discipline among troops. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, they also demonstrated the newly acquired skills of soldiers and the "modernity" of the New Armies to the national and international public. Illustrations contained in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual and other manuals, first of all, helped instructors and soldiers to visualize various body techniques, postures, and moves and showed what an exercising body was supposed to look like. Illustrations of gymnastics exercises, showing one or more soldiers in simple drill uniform (see Figures 1.1, 1.6, and 1.7), were excellent tools to help the often illiterate or near-illiterate men to memorize postures, movements, and formations after they had been instructed by drillmasters and officers. Cadets, as well as drill and gymnastics instructors, were the main target groups for reading and using manuals but common soldiers, too, were admonished to study the manuals along with army codes and military journals. The text-embedded illustrations used in the manuals of the New Armies strongly resembled similar images of much older military manuals, which showed formation diagrams as well as individuals in a specific fighting posture or manipulating a specific weapon, including short descriptions. To borrow Jane Elliot's formulation, there was an "unbroken visual tradition" linking images in the military context from around 1900 with prior depictions of military training and war. The content, however, differed. Text and image in the New Armies' manuals now described German drill exercises and formations, and depicted men wearing "Western-style" uniforms.

The new appearance of soldiers and officers, including uniforms and posture, was even more obvious in photographs. Whereas illustrations contained in drill manuals had a practical purpose, the army used photographs of soldiers performing German or "Western" gymnastics for display. Presenting the capabilities and accomplishments of the Lijun, for instance, were the purpose of two photographic volumes, published by the Army Ministry in 1910 and 1911, which were both edited by Zhu Kequn (see Figures 1.2 to 1.5, and 1.8). The books included pictures of men performing apparatus gymnastics, calisthenics, and other military drill exercises as described and illustrated in the manuals examined above. They also contained photographs of a variety of army-related situations such as field maneuvers, formation drill, canon drill, paramedics and doctors in action, soldiers presenting equipment and weapons, reviews, and officers posing for the camera. Photographs, particularly those depicting exercising soldiers, showed fit and healthy male bodies that literally embodied the European and American notion of absolute discipline. Like texts, photographs (and other images) facilitated governing both body and behavior of military personnel. By way of example, for instance, by depicting various postures, images contributed to the production of disciplined objects and a new concept of military masculinity performed through the body.

NOTES


4. See the Introduction to Zhongguo jingdian jiceng biaowei, 1992, volume 49, 3. See also Wright 1995, 75–90. Xu had started his career as an official and interpreter at the arsenals in Jiangnan, Tianjin, and Shandong. Together with the educator and missionary John Fryer, he translated numerous scientific works on chemistry, physics and other subjects into Chinese. He was well versed in foreign languages, interested in science, and highly knowledgeable about arms production. After returning to the Qing Empire from Europe, he held leading positions at the Jiangnan Arsenal, the Huabei Railway Department, and the Fuzhou Dockyards. He translated two books about Germany from unknown or not clearly identifiable sources: Deyi jinzhong zhejiang (The Constitution of the German Parliament, 1882) and Deyi henmen jishu bexu (A Full Account of the German Federation 1897). See Wright 1995, 78. On Fryer and the translation of "Western" scientific terms to China see Lippert 2001 and Spence 1969, 129–60.

8. On the beginning of ticao and German military gymnastics in China, see Morris 2004, 6–9; Li 1984; Gimel 2006, 325. Other forms of physical exercise did not go completely unnoticed among military circles after the turn of the century. A military journal article from 1907, for instance, reported that the British army had started using Swedish-style gymnastics for military training. See BNZ 1907, 11: Gaiyong Radinsashi tiao, 13. Another article reported the story of the German emperor Wilhelm II, who was so impressed by the judo performance of Japanese sailors during a goodwill visit of Japanese ships to Kiel that he ordered that German navy cadets be instructed in this martial art. See BNZ 1908, 21: Gaiyong Riben zhili roudao. The visit already took place in 1906.
Chapter I

10. Kirchner 1896, 1106.
11. Kirchner 1890, 375.
12. Citited in Kirchner 1896, 1136.


15. The manuals and readers on military training and hygiene addressed officers and noncommissioned officers, instructors, and drillmasters. The authors were military doctors, who referred to or included official regulations for the Prussian and the German army (before and after 1871, respectively). Apart from the examples used in this chapter to illustrate the specialist discourses on the body in the German military profession, various other manuals on Militärgymnastik or Militärmedizin were written by doctors, many of which are mentioned in the preface of Martin Kirchner’s book from 1896. See Kirchner 1896, VI.
17. Ibid., 369.
18. Ibid., 375–76. Carl Kirchner additionally mentioned several apparatuses such as the parallel bars and horizontal bar, and described balancing, head, and chest exercises. He warned against excessive training and acrobatic performances. Martin Kirchner dates the introduction of gymnastics to the Prussian army to 1851, and to the public as early as 1844. See Kirchner 1896, 1136. According to Daniel Kirn, gymnastics were highly appreciated by the Prussian military since the beginnings of the nationalistic romantic Turner Movement in the early nineteenth century, which will address in more detail in Chapter 5. See Kirn 2009, 59.

19. Cycling and swimming, which were increasingly popular for training purposes in the German army, were not part of the drill of the Chinese New Armies. Mao Zedong later strongly promoted swimming as embodying physical fitness, will power, and perseverance. Accompanied by extensive media coverage, propaganda output, and thousands of spectators, he publicly swam in the Yangzi River many times. See Kirn 2009, 59; Spence 1998.

20. Particularly the sixteenth century Ming general Qi Jiguang emphasized the necessity of exercising without weapons in order to strengthen the body and inculcate the men with discipline and courage. As it had been the case for centuries, certain forms of martial arts similar to those described by Qi were still practiced in the Qing military. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, novels and other popular accounts began to attribute martial arts styles to Shaolin mysticism and heretic secret societies such as the anti-foreign Boxer Movement in 1899–1901. This attribution continues in present-day academia, which misperceives the origins of martial arts as purely secret, quasi-religious, and unsystematic popular cultural body techniques. The New Armies did not so much dismiss existing forms of martial arts techniques because of an alleged link to obscure and dissonant movements but because military reformers and officers viewed foreign drill as much more effective. On Qi Jiguang see Huang 1981, 156–88 and Millinger 1968. On martial arts see Henning 1999 and Lorge 2012.

21. Apart from the manuals and drill books examined in more detail below, other military manuals based on the German role model include the German Infantry Drill

Forging the Male Body

Code (Deguo huding coddian), the Essence of the German Conscription Law (Deguo zhengbingfa dayao), and the New Book on Military Training in the West (Xiangliang liubing fashi). Most military writings produced between 1895 and 1899 had a strong German imprint, even if they mentioned the German role model only indirectly and referred to “international” (guguo) standards and practices. See Bauer and Hwang 1982, 438–76; Shi 1996, 47–8. Sun 2007, 65.
24. Ibid., 550–53.
25. Ibid., 660.
26. From 1902 to 1906, Shen Dunhe was director of the newly founded Shank University. Together with Sheng Xuanhuai, he established the China section of the Red Cross Society in 1904 and opened public hospitals and medical schools in Shanghai and Tianjin. For a contemporary biography in English, see also Shen 1903.
28. Shen 1897a, 7–8. Together with another book produced by Shen, the Foreign Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army (Ziqiangjun yangcao kecheng), the Description of the German Military System was published in a collection, edited by Liang Qichao, of translations of European and American reference works on all kinds of topics, such as politics, law, or constitutionalism, which also included independent works drawing on foreign knowledge. See Liang 1897. Shen's translation already appeared in a bibliography on translated books by Liang Qichao from 1896 and was reprinted separately at least once in 1901, as the holdings of the library of the Peking University suggest. See Liang 1896.
30. Ibid., 182–85.
32. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992. The manual, or at least parts of it, was republished in 1908 by the Beiyang Army’s administration under the title Succinct and Practical Instructions for Soldiers (Xunbing yuyan). See MacKinnon 1980, 98. The Detailed and Illustrated Manual drew on previous translations of German drill codes such as Li Fenghao’s Luya xingji, discussed below, or the German Infantry Drill Code, but it was the first manual based on German principles for practical application. Chinese authors usually consider the manual as a blend between Chinese and “Western” training principles. Accordingly, “traditional” Chinese military culture aspects included the inculcation of respect for superiors and regiment regulations as well as the encouragement of loyalty, diligence, and bravery in battle. “Western” military culture aspects would be rather “technical” matters such as tactics, strategy, and drill. See Lai 2000, 136–37; Shi 1996, 49; Zeng 1999, 59.
33. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 108. Today, the term duanlian is used exclusively for exercising and doing sports (duanlian shenti). However, the original meaning of duan is “to forge,” and lian means “to smelt.” Like tiao, the contracted form duanlian was coined in Japan. The literal translation of duanlian shenti is “forging the body,” which is, arguably, how late Qing reformers understood the term.
35. The expressions of “stealing the will” and “raising the courage” in the context of gymnastics are used, for instance, in Martin Kirchner’s book. See Kirchner 1896, 1136.
38. Ibid., 297–307.
42. See, for instance, Kirchner 1896, 1136–137; Dresky 1896; Leitenstoffer 1897, 58–66.
43. Schnell and Xiao 1900a.
44. Schnell and Xiao 1900a, volume two.
45. Schnell and Xiao 1900b. Inside the manual, the authors alternatively used the slightly different titles Deguo wubei ticaoxue and Deguo wubei ticaoxue. The collection of the Hubei Military School was compiled with the help of German advisors and contained works on a variety of topics such as geography and engineering. Schnell’s manual was here simply called Methods of Gymnastics (Ticaoxue) and described as “original German military training,” comprising volume one of eight, or chapters one to five of the collection. The Japanese textbook bore the title Common Gymnastics (Putong ticao) and was part of volume two (chapter 6). The fact that the manual was published only three years after Schnell died might indicate that he already used a manuscript of the book as teaching material at the Tianjin Military Academy, where he taught until 1894 or 1895.
47. Schnell and Xiao 1900a, 1.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 1–4.
50. Ibid., 2.
52. The second part was in fact co-interpreted by another German-Chinese team, which I could not identify more closely.
53. For instance Kirchner 1899, 376.
54. Schnell and Xiao 1900a, juan 3.
55. Ibid., juan 4.
56. Ibid., juan 5.
57. Beiyang lijun jiaoalianchu xuemao 1901–1911. The book was edited by the Education Bureau but published by the Beiyang Military Research Institute (Beiyang wubei yanjiushu). An exact publication date was not given.
58. Beiyang lijun jiaoalianchu xuemao 1901–1911, 1.
59. Ibid., 1–3 (here and previous citation).
60. Ibid., 3–26.
61. Ibid., 1–3.
62. Ibid., 27–87.
63. Li 1984, 8.
64. NRZ 1906, 2: Lun qixue ticao zhi jiaoyu, 15–16. The article was a translation by Qi Guohuang, probably from the Japanese. Military journals rarely included discussions or detailed description of gymnastics.
66. The recruitment practices of the established forces did not necessarily mean that all soldiers were incompetent. Parts of the Banners or Brave Battalions certainly consisted of quite capable, courageous, and fit men, but in the long run, they were de facto not able to master the military challenges that the Qing Empire faced in the nineteenth century. See Luo 1984, 229–35; Lecocq 2002; Ven 2003. See also Pi 1991 and Michael 1949. For insightful contemporary observations in English, see also Cavendish 1898, 717; Lamprey 1868, 413.
67. Kirchner 1896, 1106. Kirchner was a student of the famous bacteriologist Robert Koch and, at the peak of his career, a professor for social medicine and head of the medical department of the Prussian ministry of the interior.
68. Ch’en 1972, 30.
69. According to the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, this system also followed ancient Chinese examples. See XBB 1905, 2: Changbeijun yanshuo. Another installment of the article explained the pioneering role of the foreign-modeled Beiyang Army for the Lijun. See XBB 1905, 3: Changbeijun yanshuo.
70. Lianbingchu 1904, 6–7. See also Fung 1980, 28–30 and Li 1912, 53–4. The Organization Plan for the New Army was reprinted in the Eastern Miscellany in 1905, making it known to a wider public almost immediately after its publication. See DFZZ 1905 (3), 53–76.
73. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 4. Concerning education, Zhang Zhidong in particular required that at least some of the common soldiers were literate. The Lijun leaders later envisioned that a fifth of the men should be literate and constitute the nucleus of noncommissioned officers. See Powell 1955, 63, 176. Soldiers were lectured on the importance of reading skills for the wealth of their country and informed about China’s backward literacy rate, compared to foreign countries. See XBB 1905, 5: Bing yi xiangyuanshuo.
75. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 265. Although there are references to medical examinations during the process of recruitment, I was unable to find any specific and detailed regulations or reports. The reason might be that the recruitment plans were never fully implemented and the New Armies lacked enough qualified men to rigorously carry out the original plans. Moreover, the education of military doctors and awareness of European military medicine only emerged after the turn of the century.
76. Lianbingchu 1904, 7.
77. In the Self-Strengthening Army the age of new recruits should range from 16 to 20 years. See Shen [1855–1896] 1992a, 265.

78. Lianbingchu 1904, 7. See also Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 45. A chi nowadays is an equivalent to the third of a meter or a foot. A cun is a tenth of a chi. During the Qing Dynasty, the exact value of a chi varied strongly, allowing it to be between 31 and 36 centimeters (12 to 14 inches). Assuming a chi was between 32 and 33 centimeters at the beginning of the twentieth century, we obtain a minimum height between 154 and 160 centimeters (5ft 11in to 5ft 2in). According to Diana Lary, the Ministry of War demanded, in 1916, a minimum height of 5ft 6in (171 cm) for “southerners” and the ability to lift 133 lb (60 kg). Lary 1985, 29–30. The adjustment made for “southerners” only appeared in the regulations of the Lujun. See Wilkinson 2012, chapter 38.

79. Kirchner 1896, 1111. The minimum height for recruits in the German empire in 1877 was only 157 centimeter, compared to the older Prussian standard of at least 165.9 centimeter (5ft 4inches), according to Franz Hermann Froelich, a military doctor in the service of the Saxon army. Overall, the physical requirements for conscripts in the German army were much stricter, demanding not only a minimum height but also defining size spectra for the chest, head, neck, belly, limbs as well as a minimum and a maximum body weight. Froelich 1887, 185–87, 212. A comprehensive assessment of the recruitment regulations and practices in the German empire, 1871–1914, can be found in Kirn 2009, 24–39. Note that the German requirements were for the draftees of a conscript army, whereas the late Qing military reformers rather sought to create a showcase new model army. Requirements concerning chest girth, weight, diastole, and urine (for protein and sugar data) were only introduced in 1935, according to Zhu, Gao, and Gong 1996, 119.


81. See Kirchner 1869, 377–78.


83. I was not able to identify the real name of this person. Another, rather bizarre account of German military discipline is given by Anton Leitenstorfer, a medical officer with the army of Württemberg, who included a series of so-called Kephalogramme or “spiked helmet drawings” in his book on the physiological and practical aspects of military training. To measure the discipline of a soldier, Leitenstorfer injected paint into the spike of his helmet. He then had to stand at attention under a screen, which touched the tip of the spike. The screen showed even the slightest movement, allegedly demonstrating the degree of discipline, strength, and perseverance of the respective soldier. See Leitenstorfer 1897. Such a test of discipline was not common in the German army and apparently not adopted by Chinese military reformers.


85. Ibid.

86. Ibid. Dresky also emphasized the correct position of the feet. See Dresky 1896, 14.


88. See Mauss 1979, 114.

89. Exerzir-Reglement für die deutsche Infanterie, cited in Kirchner 1896, 1129. All the following numbers likewise exactly match those in the German regulations. Ibid., 1132–136.


93. Kirchner 1869, 378.

94. Martin Kirchner’s study included details and statistics on distances and marching regulations concerning aspects such as breaks and provisions. Kirchner 1896, 1128–130.

95. Dresky 1896, 25.

96. Leitenstorfer 1897, 67.


99. See Bauer and Hwang 1982, 451. The basis for these translations was probably Meckel’s Elemente der Taktik (later re-edited as Grundriss der Taktik), written in 1877.

100. See Prasseisen 1965, here 89–149 and also Saaler 2005. Stefan Zimmerman notes that the German military did not lean much from the Russo-Japanese War (most European states had military observers on the ground) and, like most other national armies, failed to realize the full effect of the machine gun and entrenching on the offensive doctrine. Instead, the Japanese victory was viewed as confirming the success of attack warfare conducted by a mentally superior infantry. The result, however, was the trench warfare of the First World War, already foreshadowed during the Russo-Japanese War and in earlier conflicts such as the American Civil War (1861–1865). See Zimmermann 2010. The reception of the Russo-Japanese War by German military theoreticians was also noted in China: see LX 1913, 3: Deguo bingxueyi yu e zhanyi hou zhanshu zhi gushi, 119–22. On the role of the machine gun on warfare see also Ellis 1993. On the global impact of the Russo-Japanese War see Steinberg and Wolff 2005–2007; Sprotte, Seifert, and Löwe 2008; Krebs 2012.


104. An alternative translation is New Book on Effectual Discipline.


106. Parts of Qi’s book were incorporated into the Weibei (Treatise on Armament and Provision), a military encyclopedia compiled at the beginning of the seventeenth century and both books were later included in the Shih shu, the mammoth book collection carried out under the Qianlong Emperor between 1773 and 1782. See Sawyer 2002, 110–111; see also Siegmund 2014.

108. See Li 2002. Most metropolitan Banner soldiers were not obliged to train their weapon skills more than six times a month and during various annual war games, which included precision marching and mounted archery. These drills, however, were "highly formalized and dualistic," according to Richard Smith. See Smith 1974, 140, 150, 154. See also Di Cosmo 2004.

109. See Liao 1897; Shen 1897c; Chen 1897; Huang yun ge jian kecheng en 1897; Xu [1899] 1992.


111. During his time in Germany, Li Fenghao was also in charge of negotiating the purchase of battleships on behalf of Li Hongzhang, including the Dingyuan and the Zhenyuan, which entered service during the Sino-Japanese War. See Kaske 2002a, 11, 31; Chen 2001, 22, 177.

112. Li [1884], 2–6. Li’s translation was based on an original book authored by a German general with the Chinese name Kang Bei.

113. Ibid., Jula (appendix). Li also cites the Confucian philosopher’s emphasis on military training for fighting and defending.


120. Ibid., 106.

121. Ibid., 265–88.


123. Wang 1995, 70; Yu and Sun 2007, 222. I was not able to get hold of any copy of the Deguo lujun jiaodan yumen and the exact content of it is unknown to me.

124. XBB 1905, 1: Bubing caoqian wenda, 1. The section was called caoqian wenda in the following issues.

125. See NBZ 1907, 6; Lajunzi zi gai daoding caoqian, 5; Tongwenbao 1906 (184): Lianbingchu bianzuan caoqian, 6.

126. For Japan see NBZ 1906, 5: Dayu, Xin jiu bubing caoqian zhi kao’con, 1–4 and NBZ 1907, 10: Shuomin xin caoqian, 26–8. For a comparison between the new drill codes in Germany, Russia, Austria, and France see NBZ 1907, 15; Tao Shumao, De E Ao Fa caoqian zhenji fangyu zhanfa zhi hui, 5–7.

127. NBZ 1907, 12: Sakata Toransuke (zhuhezhan), Du Deguo gaizheng bubing caoqian yongzuan, 1–3 (another author is not given). BB 1908, 1 and JI 1908, 2; Fan Chengweng, Bingfa layao. The explanation of the image is included in another part of the article published in a later issue of the journal, which is no longer available. JI 1908, 1 and 1908, 2; Wang E, Bubing bingfa. See also Harisch 1999, 90.


129. The Beiyang Army’s Translation Bureau (Beiyang wubei bianyijia) participated in the publication of the code by printing the copies.

131. Beiyang lujun jiaodan chuan 1903, 1–4; Nanyang jiangbei xuetang 1904. The Nanyang Army was supposed to be the southern equivalent of the Beiyang Army, and supposed to include the New Armies of Jiangsu and the coastal provinces to its south. However, it never reached the same strength and importance as the Beiyang Army and the term Nanyang Army was much less common.

132. Nanyang gongzue yishuyuanxin [1898–1908]. The exact publication date of Meng’s translation is not known. The copy held by the Peking University Library is dated between 1898 and 1908. Meng Sen went to Japan in 1901 and in 1906, the same year that the Japanese army revised its drill code. The German infantry drill code (Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie) was structured very similarly. The code from 1906, for instance, was a small booklet containing more than 500 articles. It started with drill exercises for individual soldiers and then introduced tactical drills for smaller and, subsequently, larger units. It also included guidelines for military etiquette and, unlike the Chinese codes, songs. See Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie 1906.


134. Lianbingchu bianyijia 1910, Wuhan shebian 1911. According to Hans van de Ven, who bases his statement on the multi-volume Chinese Military History edited by the People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, this drill code was directly translated from a Japanese one. See Ven 1996, 748.

135. Lianbingchu juxuezai 1907, 1–3.

136. Wuhan shebian 1911, zonggang.

137. See also NBZ 1909, 34: Lun bingli zhi jiji 9–11 (translation from a not specified source).


139. The New Armies released new drill codes for all its branches in 1916. See ZBB 1916, 22: Gz bingke caoqian jiang jian shixing, 10–11; ZBB 1916, 22: Dayuanshuai mingzhi ge bingke caoqian, 5–6. The Zhejiang Military Journal, first published in 1915, frequently reported about the war and introduced the latest war machines, including tanks, planes and submarines.

140. Dresky 1896, 25.


145. Instead of the classic character ti, which is a compound of the characters gu (bones) and li (vessel), a simplified version was sometimes used to write ti, which consisted of the character ren (human being, person, man) and ben (root) and that is currently used as a simplified Chinese character in the People’s Republic. Apart from shen and ti, xing (literally "form") was used in classical Chinese writings, but referred more to the body as an outline or shape than to physical aspects. There are various other characters to describe the body or parts of it, such as shi (corpse) or qu (human body). These terms are often paired with the three root words xing, shen, and ti. See Ames 1984; Sivin 1995, 12–14; Unger 2000, 101–02 and 114; Cheng 2003.
Chapter 1

146. Both shen and ti stand for the whole person. According to Susan Brownell, they more or less refer to each other in a similar way as the German terms Leib and Körper do. Leib refers to the body as a subjective, experiential category and Körper to objective matter. She describes Leib as the “body that one is” and Körper as “the body that one has.” However, she points out that the German and the Chinese concepts are different in so far as shen and ti do not constitute a subject-object dualism and both terms can be connected to personal experience. Neither has the connotation of a lifeless container per se. In the European context, only at the turn of the nineteenth century did Körper replace Leib as object of cultivation, when discourses on health and fitness started. Only with the introduction of European and American concepts of science and physical education in the late nineteenth century, Brownell assumes, did ti become more dissociated from its subjective implications and gained a more objective, rather physical, meaning. See Brownell 1995, 15–17. On the body in Chinese history see also Link 2001; Martin and Heinrich 2006; Heß 2006.

147. McNeill 1995. I particularly thank David A. Graff for pointing out this reference to me.

148. See Wilkinson 2012, 326. Wilkinson is wrong, though, in his assessment that calishenics only became a standard element of army training “after the Nationalists came to power.”

149. For instance Qi [1550/1561] 1994a, 323. Military journals also contained images resembling nineteenth century woodblock prints that depicted battle scenes between Qing and foreign armies. These images were produced and arranged in very similar ways.

150. Elliott 2002, 121. Elliott refers to the link between martial arts depicted during the Boxer War in 1900–1901 and today’s kung fu movies.

151. Zhu 1910; Zhu 1911. The pictures of exercising soldiers were apparently taken in the military camps of the Fifth Lufun Division, then stationed in Shandong.

Chapter 2

Body, Space, and Daily Life

In 1906, an article in the recently launched Nanyang Military Journal emphasized the importance of clear regulations and procedures for disciplining and “molding” (taozheng) new recruits. Men had different personalities as well as different occupational, educational, and social backgrounds, and the purpose of military training was to bring them in line with each other and with the standards of the army. In the perception of Chinese military reformers at the turn of the century, strict military discipline translated directly into effectiveness and military strength. However, discipline could not simply be established by the threat of severe punishment for those misbehaving, or the promise of rewards for those who complied, as had been the practice in previous centuries. Instead, physical exercise and tactical drills became the new technologies to govern the discipline of the men of the New Armies. But more than that, the soldiers were enmeshed in an environment specifically designed to control, regulate, and monitor their daily life (qiji) and daily routines at all times. Following the German archetype, Chinese military reformers introduced an all-embracing form of military-industrial discipline, which linked the male body to the meticulous organization of time and space, and provided the foundation of a new concept of military masculinity. The healthy and disciplined military man became the very antithesis of the “sick men of East Asia.”

What did this German model look like? In 1867, the Prussian military doctor Nütten explained in a lecture to an audience of officers that military drill strengthened the body and boosted morale. However, he emphasized that military service not only meant physical toughening-up but also introducing young men to a well-ordered and healthy way of living, in which every aspect of their lives, including nutrition, housing, and clothing, were taken care of by empathetic instructors. In many cases, Nütten argued, serving as a soldier was
a “physical and moral cure” for the young men, who would return to society as morally better persons. In reality, however, military service worked much more drastically on men joining the army. According to Sara Plattner, the civilian identity of new recruits was transformed into a military identity and they were turned into over-disciplined and docile soldiers: initially, a new recruit was isolated from his familiar environment, experienced psychological regression and lost his autonomy and maturity. Intimidation, degradation, and constant disposability demanded from the individual soldier aimed at breaking his will and absorbing him entirely into the military corps. Privacy and individuality dispersed gradually as joint unit drills, lockstep marching, and uniforms brought the men into line. Physical exercises, drill, and clearly defined postures “dressed” the body and led to the internalization and automation of commands and respective reactions. Outward behavior correlated directly with a mental attitude. The body became the prime object of governance through which instructors and officers gained access to the mind and were able to create a demeanor of habitual submission. The civilian ego was replaced by a military personality. The individual imagined itself as member of the military corps and part of a group that was outwardly represented by the uniform. Membership in the military organization endowed the individual with feelings of solidarity, comradeship, and security and with a symbolic share of the power of a higher force, such as the state or king. Soldiering fulfilled the desire for unanimous rules, simplicity, and pure physicality, providing an ideal of masculinity that transcended the military institution and became powerful throughout society.

IN THE ARMY NOW: LIFE AND TIMES IN THE BARRACKS

In Europe, only in the nineteenth century were most soldiers actually stationed in barracks and even then only for a limited period. Moreover, it is a matter of debate when standardized drill and time schedules were actually introduced to the Prussian and other early modern European armies. Over time, these armies increasingly turned into “total institutions,” where the management of time was part of effectively controlling and governing soldiers and their bodies, behavior, and identity. Time and timing played a tremendous role in military training and was a major technique to enforce regimentation, strict discipline, and uniformity. The modes of industrial production changed the perception of time and the organization of everyday life of the broad masses in industrializing countries in Europe and the United States. Train traffic, Fordian assembly-line work, and faster means of communication demanded strict adherence to time tables and schedules, and forced upon the body a temporal and spatial discipline connected to both work and scarce leisure time. Among the first industrial factories in the Qing Empire were military arsenals, iron and steel works, and shipyards, which were established from the 1860s onward to supply the Qing military forces with modern weapons. The workers in these arsenals were the first to be exposed to the time and space management of efficiency-seeking industrial production.

Whereas most Green Standard Soldiers either housed in small camps or with their families, Banner forces lived secluded from the rest of the population in Beijing or in garrisons throughout China proper. They too lived in “Manchu cities,” together with their families and other Manchu, not in gender secluded military barracks. Soldiers in the Green Standard Army and the Banners only drilled a few times during a month and were not subject to the strict time schedules and meticulous regulation of daily life in barracks, as the New Armies later were: after getting up in the morning, the usual day of the soldiers in the Beiyang Army started with personal hygiene, including face and hand washing, and with preparing personal items for the day. After dressing, the soldiers had to clean up inside and in front of their tents (or shacks) by sprinkling water and sweeping the floor, according to the regulations. Twenty minutes after getting up, the chief or platoon leader inspected the tent and its cooking space and checked whether the soldiers, their uniforms, boots and bags were neat and orderly. Then, the company officer on duty again inspected both sleeping places, and instructed the men, who were lined up in front of their beds, about the further activities of the day. Finally, he examined whether all soldiers were ready to report for service and whether anyone was missing, on leave, or sick. The morning roll call concluded with a small breakfast. The whole procedure of inspections and eating was to be completed within thirty minutes.

After breakfast, the soldiers had ten minutes to receive their weapons appropriate to the branch (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) they belonged to. They were obliged to check whether the weapons had any damage or defects. The morning drill session that followed consisted of two hours of “following commands and marching in lock-step” (zun haoing fu) on the drill grounds. Soldiers who violated the regulations or disobeyed their superiors could be sentenced to additional exercising. After the morning drill, before having lunch, the soldiers had ten minutes to examine their rifles and report any damage. After lunch, they were given two hours for private matters or self-studying the drill codes and regulations. The afternoon started with two hours of training in military etiquettes and protocols. This was followed by target practice, which included rifle maintenance, shooting exercises, and instructions concerning firing and aiming. The evening drill began almost seamlessly, after a thirty-minute break for refreshments, and consisted of two intense hours of rehearsing orders and verbal commands. Finally, twenty minutes prior to dinner, an officer inspected the rifles, collected them, and returned them to
the armory. After dinner, soldiers had one and a half hours at their disposal, which could be used for studying drill instructions. The men then gathered for one hour to recite and study military theories or to receive instructions or hear a lecture by their commander. They eventually returned to their tents or rooms to rest until the lights were turned off, usually around ten o’clock or earlier, depending on the time of year. Every tent had to provide one man for guarding the walls or gates of the camp during the night.

The daily routine regulations summarized above were designed for battalion camps of around 500 men during peacetime but could be customized to other occasions, for instance, when the battalion was on the move or on a campaign. Most military camps of the New Armies consisted of much more than only one battalion, because brigades (ideally half a division, around 6250 men) usually stayed together. Apart from this daily routine, the regulations of the New Armies stipulated two different seasonal routines, one for the summer and autumn and one for the winter and spring months. There were no days off, apart from one to two holidays every month. Each day had assigned to it a special task, such as joint battalion or army drills, the evaluation of shooting skills, field exercises, defense maneuvers, or night fighting simulations. On the first day of the month, soldiers received their salaries, which was viewed as a very sensitive matter. Embellishing salaries had been a common method of misappropriating military funds among the officers and military officials of the Green Standard Army. After the Sino-Japanese War, military reformers introduced a system of centralized money allocation that required the physical presence and facial check of every man. The soldier would receive his salary directly from an officer of the military administration, bypassing any intermediate agents who might pocket it.

The condition of military barracks, where soldiers spent most of their time, was a highly important matter to Chinese military reformers. The Bureau for Military Training, the predecessor of the Army Ministry, considered the condition of barracks and military camps essential for creating a new, European-style national army, and every province was supposed to reorganize and enlarge military garrisons according to “international standards” (guoguo guanfa). It defined them as nearly self-sustaining microcosms, consisting (at least ideally) of dorms for the rank and file and rooms for the officers, sanitary and medical facilities, mess halls, reading and recreational rooms, prisons and detention rooms, storage space for food and supplies, as well as arsenals and armories. Outdoor facilities included cooking and washing places, barns and stables, parade and drill grounds, shooting ranges and training grounds for practicing sword fighting and calisthenics, workplaces to repair weapons, and workshops for carpenters, ironworkers, tailors, shoemakers, and other artisans.

Soldiers were usually not allowed to move freely or behave at will while in the barracks. The regulations for the first infantry brigade of the Luijün division in Guangxi, for instance, offered a short, but explicit guide on how to behave in various places. When entering either the lecture room or the mess hall, the soldiers were supposed to line up and, in single file, enter one after the other, without shoving or loitering. In the classroom, men first had to stand at attention and salute the instructor before they were allowed to sit down. They had to sit upright and were forbidden to lean on the table, to rest the chin in their hands, to put up their legs, to turn their heads, or rest upon the elbow with one hand at the ear, or to stretch and yawn. Spitting, smoking, or drinking tea was not allowed. If questioned by the commander, a soldier had to stand up and assume an upright posture. In the mess hall, every man had a fixed seat, which could not be changed. Tables and chairs were always to be well arranged and orderly. Silence was required, and speaking, laughing, coughing, or spitting was forbidden. Spilled or unclean food had to be reported back to the officer in charge, but the soldiers should not be too fussy. No one was allowed to bring his own food or cutlery. Sick soldiers were not allowed to take part in the common meals in the mess hall and had to eat someplace else or, if necessary, got food delivered to their sleeping places. The mess hall had to be kept strictly clean and swept regularly. Finally, the soldiers were admonished to wash their hands before eating.

Yuan Shikai and his generals considered barracks not only as army accommodations and fortresses but also as places of “recreation,” where the men could regain their strength. The main purpose of the barracks, however, was providing the environment where ordinary civilians assumed a military masculine identity. Barracks became spaces of drill and indoctrination, where every procedure was exactly determined and scheduled. Here, the men were admonished to serve the country, obey their officers, and be loyal to their supreme commander. In the case of the Beiyang Army, this was Yuan Shikai, who paid much attention to directing the faith and loyalty of the soldiers toward both himself and the dynasty. Reportedly, a picture of him hung in every classroom and mess hall (at least in the barracks of the sixth division), projecting an image of him as a nourishing father. The soldiers of the Eighth Luijün Division (Hubei) sang songs dedicated to Zhang Zhidong, who was their supreme commander. An article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers reminded the soldiers, in a similar manner, that the emperor, like a strict father, knew when they were not training diligently.

In addition to the roll call, which summoned the soldiers to report for duty, the New Armies introduced German military music to increase the coherence of the collective, and lift the morale of the troops. Zhang Zhidong, for instance, established a German-style musical corps as part of the Self-Strengthening Army that played German military music with the corresponding instruments. Following the relocation of the troops to Wusong near Shanghai in 1896 and after acquiring brass instruments, drums, and
other musical instruments in Germany, the corps consisted of eleven soldiers and three civilians. At about the same time, two German officers were hired to instruct and conduct the music corps. Moreover, the Self-Strengthening Army started the translation of “Western military music books” (xigu junyue geshu). The Newly Created Army, similarly, had a brass band and, later, every division of the Lijun was supposed to have a small band of around 50 men. Music, songs, and sounds were used to drill the soldiers, coordinate and standardize their motions and conduct, and strengthen the bond between them. Military music supported a group of soldiers to keep together in time while moving.

Military regulations emphasized a correct and serious attitude on the drill grounds. All training methods had to be centrally authorized. In the case of the Beiyang Army, the Bureau for the Supervision of Drill (Duzaocuo), a section of Yuan’s military bureaucracy under the powerful Bureau for the Supervision of Training (Dulianguan) in Tianjin, was in charge of approving drills and exercises. Instruction and drill should be in accordance with the latest “occidental methods” (xiyao xinfu) and should be deeply internalized by all soldiers step by step. The foreign-style drill (yangceao) was divided into three sections. One hour before the actual exercise started, men had to get ready, clean their faces and hands, put on their training clothes and hat and, for gun drill or target practice, prepare their rifle. After thirty minutes, they had to line up next to their tents and were inspected by an officer. Finally, the company would move, in strict formation, over to the drill grounds, where their uniforms and weapons were inspected again. Any changes in the number of men or any other irregularities were recorded by an officer from the Bureau for the Supervision of Drill. German instructors acted as overall supervisors and looked for bad practices and deficits, and inspected the general appearance of the men, including the orderliness of uniforms and weapons. They checked whether the regiment’s roster was complete and fulfilled the standards. Soldiers were particularly admonished to take care of their own weapon because their lives depended on it. The weapon would “protect the body” (hushen) in battle. According to a textbook used for instructing staff officer cadets, the drill grounds itself should be sufficiently large and located within a suitable environment. There should not be any obstacles such as trees or bushes or any adjacent civilian settlement, which might be the source of unwanted spectators.

The Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized that soldiers should exercise whole-heartedly and observe the drill guidelines strictly. If anyone was not fully committed or unskilled, he could be punished with additional exercising. The performance and behavior of the men was recorded daily and they were only excused in the case of a severe injury. The drillmasters should not be lenient or hold back when reprimanding slow, slacking, or uneager recruits. Those who were too clumsy could be degraded and those who were either frequently ill, had bad eyesight or chronic hand and foot diseases, or suffered from an “unnomentionable disease” (anji) could be dismissed at any time. New recruits had to train at extra times to catch up with the level of the company. Twice a month, the strength and skills of every soldier were to be assessed. Moreover, battalion commanders instructed noncommissioned officers on the latest drill styles and weaponry technology. Foreign observers, such as British or American military attachés who examined the New Armies in person stated that the drill was extraordinarily tough, “to a degree that might have caused even a German recruit to revolt.”

When soldiers were not actively exercising while their comrades did, they had to stand at attention next to the drill ground. Before starting, the unit had to stand uncluttered in file. During breaks, the posture of the men was not be crooked or tilted and they should not loll or appear to be lazy. Sitting down or squatting was not allowed. Speaking, laughing, and joking were strictly forbidden. Instructions and inquiries by the officer in charge had to be received in an upright posture, but questions and suggestions were allowed. After the drill exercises, the soldiers had to tidy up the weapons and other equipment. However, according to the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods, the spirit and strength of soldiers would easily wear out if the drills were not diverse and adjusted to individual abilities. If new recruits were quickly tired and unable to work hard, the army’s discipline would be harmed. Cadets even learned that drillmasters and instructors should pay attention to individual traits, preferences, habits, and the development of any new recruit: in this way, they would gain control over both the individual’s physical body and his mind, and the soldier would assimilate into the army corps more easily.

In 1911, the Nanyang Military Journal published the translation of one of the most thorough (originally Japanese) accounts of various aspects of a soldier’s everyday life in the barracks. Apart from discussing how to “cultivate” military discipline and mental strength (yangcheng junji, yangcheng qili), it dealt with forming a physically healthy and fit individual, and with creating a cohesive unit of “comrades” (qinni tongxue), who shared a room and who died together. Furthermore, the article discussed basic military training (such as gymnastics) but also included less common topics such as general education, language, and diary-writing: military language was supposed to be simple and brief, mirroring the frugal and fast-paced life of soldiers. Regional dialects had to be eliminated in the army. The translator of the original Japanese text remarked that men born in the south of China had to pay particular attention to the way they spoke. Diaries not only had the purpose of teaching soldiers to write but also to keep their thoughts and mood under surveillance. Moreover, a step-by-step career path explained how a man proceeded from being a simple recruit to becoming an officer.
The account also contained a paragraph on cleanliness and addressed the issue of health care and hygiene regimens of soldiers, which became one of the most crucial disciplinary techniques of the military in the twentieth century. In Germany, military barracks were designed and maintained according to strict scientific guidelines. The condition of the barracks and camps, the hygienic standards of military buildings, and the general environment where military men lived and operated were a prime concern for German military doctors and hygiene specialists. The New Armies copied these common hygiene standards and adopted German and Japanese military medicine and hygiene practices for individuals, which were linked with the purpose of both keeping military men healthy and disciplining them.

**MILITARY HYGIENE AND MILITARY MEDICINE**

Medical care and the services of physicians were poor and played a minor role in the Qing armies prior to the twentieth century. Although a few doctors accompanied armies during campaigns, similar to European armies until the mid-nineteenth century, only officers enjoyed treatment when injured or sick. Doctors from the Imperial Academy of Medicine (Taiyiuyuan) in Beijing were dispatched to take care of high-ranking officers, who were sent back to the capital to be cured, if necessary. During the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the foreign-trained battalions started to employ European doctors, who set up a hospital near Shanghai. In 1856, the Qing government appointed Guan Tao, who had been trained at the American missionary Boji hospital in Guangzhou, as head of military medicine, but he did not manage to set up structures for the education of military doctors, military hospitals, or military medical departments. Foreign military observers who reviewed Chinese troops before the turn of the century, stated that “this service [i.e., the medical service] being non-existent, the Chinese soldier and sailor, when sick or wounded, has to shift for himself.” Another observer warned that “the science of surgery and medicine are at a low ebb,” with soldiers tending to each other or going to a civilian physician. From the 1860s onward, American and European doctors and missionaries were increasingly active in medical work in China. They opened hospitals and medical colleges to educate Chinese doctors in their science-based medical techniques, including anatomy. However, European and American doctors had to compete with established indigenous medical practices and ideas, and the overall acceptance of their medical concepts among the Qing Empire’s elite was relatively slow.

By the end of the century, however, military reformers began to realize the value of “Western” medicine and surgery. In his widely received treatise *Exhortation to Study*, published in 1899, Zhang Zhidong emphasized that the “Western medical arts (xī yì zhì yì) are especially useful for the military” and those who studied military matters should pay attention to them. The leaders of the New Armies recognized the tremendous possibilities of “Western,” science-based medicine for the army on the whole, particularly in the fields of sanitation and hygiene. They became increasingly aware of the link between the physical and mental health of soldiers and its effects on the overall strength and effectiveness of the army. Hygienics (weishengxue), the study of practices performed for the preservation of health, received particular attention among military reformers, and the New Armies were among the first institutions in China to implement strict regimes of daily hygiene, following the German and Japanese models. Hygiene was not only useful for preserving physical health but was also an efficient technique to control bodies and govern the conduct of military men. The well-being of the individual was secondary and, as a Prussian textbook on military hygiene clearly stated, the aim of preserving the health of soldiers was producing a disciplined army and sustaining military strength.

German doctors were leaders in the field of hygiene, which was a relatively recent scientific discipline that emerged in the context of discoveries about contagious and epidemic diseases. In the nineteenth century, armies in Europe, the United States, and Japan had vested interests in limiting contagious diseases, which were often the result of battle injuries and the close-ness of soldiers both stationed in barracks and in the field. The military thus played a pioneering role in the development of practical surgery and hygiene. Military medicine made significant progress during and after the Crimean War (1853–1856), which caused the British army, in particular, to implement an advanced organization of sanitation and medical care.

From the 1860s on, however, the armies of Prussia and the other German states stood at the forefront in the field of military medicine and military hygiene. German doctors gained substantial experience and new knowledge during the Unification Wars (1864–1871), leading to the steady improvement of military surgery and hygiene based on bacteriology and epidemiology. Hygiene was a very new scientific discipline—Max Joseph von Pettenkofer became the first professor for hygiene in the German states in 1865—and the Prussian army quickly adopted the new knowledge about health care and sanitation. In April 1869, it published the *Instruction Concerning Military Sanitation on the Battlefield* (Instruktion über das Sanitätswesen der Armeen im Felde), which was standardized and extended for the whole German Empire in 1878. In 1869, the Prussian military doctor Carl Kirchner, who was one of the pioneers of military medicine, published the first German textbook on military hygiene. In his opinion, sickness prevention was essential for military success because “diseases are much more dangerous to armies than the weapons of the enemies, and mere healing is not sufficient to fight them.”
Subsequently, research in bacteriology and pathology by internationally recognized experts such as Rudolf Virchow and Robert Koch lead to decisive scientific breakthroughs in the field of contagious diseases, epidemics, and military hygiene. Koch was himself a Prussian military doctor à la suite, enabling him to study medical conditions within the army and advising its leaders in questions of hygiene. Apart from the scientific foundations of the discipline, including bacteriology, germ theory, and research on contagious diseases, German military hygienists were concerned with various issues such as air quality, ventilation and breathing, the environmental condition of water, ground, and light, barracks and housing, waste management, clothing, food, beverages, and tobacco. At the same time, the field of surgery was improving fast and military surgeons gained increasing acknowledgment among medical specialists. In 1895, the Kaiser Wilhelm Academy for the Education of Military Doctors (Kaiser-Wilhelm-Akademie für militärärztliches Bildungswesen) was founded in Berlin. Koch, Virchow, and many other leading medical scientists of the time were members of the academy. Although the German armies had difficulties in finding enough qualified doctors willing to serve in the army, the status of military doctors increased and the systems of peace and wartime sanitation improved considerably. During battle, every doctor was advised by a military hygienist, and every German soldier was issued a small first aid field kit, which contained antiseptics. Generally, the main responsibilities of military sanitation and health care officers, during peacetime, was to supervise the general sanitary conditions as well as the health of the soldiers, including housing, nutrition, water, the examination and dismissal of new recruits, measures to prevent diseases and epidemics, and smallpox vaccination. German doctors were convinced that “the strong health of our young soldiers is recognized everywhere” and praised the “celebrated improvements in military hygiene” made possible by the discoveries in bacteriology by Koch and others. During the Boxer War in 1900–1901, not one soldier of the German expeditionary corps in China was infected with tetanus, which was a very common infectious disease in Northern China at the time. Doctors and military leaders viewed this as confirmation of their successes in the field of prophylaxis.

Knowledge about medicine and hygiene was transferred from Germany to the Qing Empire and the New Armies via Japan. As early as 1869, the Japanese government decided to officially adopt the world-leading German medicine, employing German military and civilian doctors to educate Japanese medical students. German-trained Japanese doctors subsequently contributed to innovative medical research and to the establishment of public hygiene administration as a fundamental part of national governance in Japan. In 1872, the physician Nagayo Sensai visited Berlin, where he was impressed by the political influence and involvement of leading physicians in public debates on hygiene and the link between medicine and a strong nation. Nagayo later coined the term *eisei* for hygiene in Japanese, which was later adopted in China (pronounced *weisheng*). One of the most influential Japanese doctors responsible for the adoption of German military medicine and hygiene by the Japanese and Chinese New Armies was Mori Ógai, a graduate of the Tokyo Medical School and officer in the Japanese army medical service. He studied military hygiene under Robert Koch at the University of Berlin’s Institute of Hygiene. Mori’s work on hygiene was later crucial for the education of Chinese military doctors, who were taught courses in contagious diseases, bacteriology, military hygiene administration and other fields modeled after those of the Japanese military.

Already in 1888, Li Hongzhang took over a medical school in Tianjin founded by British missionaries eight years earlier, and turned it into the Beiyang Navy Medical Academy. Foreign doctors were employed to educate Chinese students in “Western” medicine. Among one of the first groups of German military instructors and advisors, hired by Li Fengbo on behalf of Li Hongzhang, was at least one military physician with the surname Bahr, an assistant doctor in the German army reserve. As the number of graduates of the Tianjin medical academy was still low at the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, the Qing troops had to rely on a few foreign doctors. Medical care was highly limited and, according to one Japanese observer, the use of “Western” medicine was the reason for the victory of the Japanese troops.

In 1903, the Bureau for Military Training drafted an organizational scheme for the emergency treatment of soldiers wounded in battle that resembled similar plans of European armies. According to these schemes, wounded men were first treated in medical tents close to the front line and then, if necessary, transferred to a larger, better-equipped medical station or facility further away from the battlefield. If a soldier’s injuries were too severe, he could be transferred to an army hospital. The Bureau for Military Training emphasized that injured men had to be taken care of and allowed to rest and recuperate. If they could not resume their duties they would be repatriated or reassigned: “with many [new] ways to protect the injured or sick, all the brave [men] devoting their lives [to service] (yong yu xiao ming) need not be abandoned.”

Following the example of European, American, and the Japanese armies, the Bureau for Military Training established a Section for Medical Service (Yi wu she) to supervise medical care and hygiene. At least every second division was to have its own Department for Military Medicine (Bing yi ji) in charge of administering medical care and supervising the implementation of hygiene regulations. The Army Ministry, in 1906, included a Department of Military Medicine (Jun yi si) consisting of Sections for Medical Service, Hygiene, and Veterinary Medicine. Moreover, He Shouren, the head of the
The Lujun Department of Logistics, was sent to the United States in 1907 to participate in the sixteenth International Congress of Military Doctors. He subsequently traveled to Europe, visiting Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and other countries to examine the state of the art in medicine as a scientific discipline, particularly military medicine.31

The International Red Cross also played a role in the implementation of hygienic and medical standards in the Lujun according to European models, and the Bureau for Military Training recognized its importance early on.32 A few weeks after the start of the Russo-Japanese War in Northern China in February 1904,33 Shen Dunhe, who had previously been in the service of the Self-Strengthening Army, founded the Shanghai Branch of International Red Cross Society (Wanggu hongshizhui Shanghai zhihui) to help Chinese civilians in the war zone. Following the war, the Red Cross continued to provide relief for natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, or epidemics, and many more branches were established all over the country.34 In 1906, the Qing government signed the Geneva Convention and in 1907, the Shanghai Branch became the Qing Red Cross Society (Da Qing hongshizhui) under the supervision of the Army Ministry. It was first headed by Li Haihuan, who was followed by Sheng Xuanhai, one of the first commanders of the Newly Created Army and founder of the Beiyang University in Tianjin.35

After the Qing government issued provisional regulations for the Red Cross Society in February 1910, the General Staff of the army suggested expanding its responsibilities further and linking it more firmly to official and military structures. A central office should be established in Beijing and branch offices should be opened in all provincial capitals and in ports open to foreign trade. A copy of the Red Cross Statutes in Chinese should be provided for every military school, provincial governors, and general-governors. Following international models, the Red Cross and doctors of the Navy and Army should work together and consult mutually. But during war, the latter should be in charge of preventing the Red Cross from interfering with military affairs. Furthermore, the General Staff recommended jointly establishing a national military medicine school, a corps of physicians, the Brothers and Sisters of Mercy (kanharen), and pharmaceutical laboratories to produce “Western medicine” (xijiao) and medical equipment. The purpose was to make the country more independent of foreign imports, especially during war.36

Although Chinese military reformers acknowledged the medical work of foreign missionaries and foreign doctors,37 the New Armies needed a much larger number of doctors and their education became a crucial issue. In 1902, Yuan Shikai founded the Beiyang Army Medical Academy (Beiyan junyi xueyuan), which was renamed in 1906 as Lujun Medical Academy (Lujun junyi xueyuan). The school was initially headed by the Japanese military medical officer Higara Seijirō as senior physician and by Xu Huaiqing as director. Xu had studied medicine in Hong Kong, where he had also worked as an English and German instructor at the Queen’s College. Because of his outstanding course achievements and good command of German, he was later dispatched to Germany to study medicine. After his return to the Qing Empire in 1889, he gained the favor of the court for healing the Empress Dowager Cixi from an ailment.38

In the beginning, medical instruction at the Army Medical Academy was conducted by four Japanese military and civilian doctors, including one pharmacist. The academy initially had only 40 students but the number increased every year. In 1907, the first class of graduates had 35 doctors, who were all appointed to positions within the Beiyang divisions and became full medical doctors after a few years of service. The academy was fully equipped with labs and a translation bureau, and had a hospital, a pharmacy, and a diseases prevention center attached to it. The four-year curriculum consisted of courses in the natural sciences, math, languages (Chinese, Japanese, English), and every existing medical discipline, including physiology, surgery, bacteriology and epidemiology, general and military hygiene, psychiatry, ophthalmology, and dermatology. The school also had a gymastics or ticao instructor and students attended special seminars for analyzing physical exercises in the army.39

Subsequently, other medical academies were founded to provide the Lujun with surgeons and hygienists. By 1911, there were six such schools in the Qing Empire. Moreover, a number of schools for paramedics, including the Nanjing Military Paramedical School (Nanyang lujun weisheng xuedang), were established for educating assistant surgeons, paramedics, and “hygiene teams.” Other schools, so-called mayi xueyuan or shouyi xueyuan, specialized in training military veterinarians, usually focusing on horses.40 Despite the increasing number of doctors, finding enough qualified men was difficult and the medical sections of the Lujun divisions were permanently understaffed.41 However, as Ruth Rogaski points out, the impact of the medical doctors on the hygienic education of thousands of New Armies soldiers was immense.42

In the late nineteenth century, hygiene became a major concern of state governments and public administrations, particularly in Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. Hygiene regulations enabled state bureaucracies to exercise influence over the population and slogans such as Gesundheitslehre, santé publique, and public health, were propagated as comprehensive national programs. Hygienic standards became an indicator of wealth, civilization, enlightenment, and modernity. Both in Japan and China, government officials and educators adopted the European concept of hygiene and started public hygiene programs. The implementation of hygiene standards was a way to create a healthier population and fight epidemics, which had partially been introduced by foreigners, as in the case of cholera.
Moreover, hygiene standards were instruments that increased the authority, grasp, and control of the state and Chinese officials and intellectuals viewed them as necessary to regain the status of a civilized and advanced country, in the eyes of Europeans and Americans. Japan and Germany, which had the most sophisticated programs and institutional structures concerning hygiene regulations, served as direct examples for the Chinese.73

Sarah Stevens points out that, in the context of colonial discourse and contemporary evolutionary thought, the idea of hygiene facilitated the emergence of the dichotomy of “masculine-hygienic-colonizer” versus “feminine-dirty-colonized” and the self-rendering of Chinese intellectuals as “sick men of Asia.”74 In colonial Tianjin, hygiene became an indicator of modernity for urban, educated Chinese, who imagined the Chinese people as less clean, less healthy, and, therefore, less disciplined and organized than Europeans, Americans, and the Japanese. Hygienic standards were first introduced by the administrations of the foreign concessions in Tianjin, but under the pressure of the foreign powers, the city also served as experimental ground for testing public health and sanitation programs by the Qing government. Early twentieth century Tianjin, which was under the administration of Yuan Shikai, was the first place to have a health administration bureau modeled after similar institutions in Japan and Germany.75 Like the city of Tianjin, the army became a testing ground for hygiene standards, regulations, and regiments. It was a well-structured and closed organization, where new techniques and policies could be tried: not for the well-being of individuals but in order to discipline physical bodies for the greater good of nation and society, as Nagayo Sensai defined hygiene.76

After the Sino-Japanese War, military reformers such as Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong particularly sought to fight transmissible diseases and widespread vices such as opium addiction, which they viewed as a serious and common health issue among the old Qing forces and in the same league as infectious diseases. Reform-minded intellectuals, such as Liang Qichao and Yan Fu, who first introduced “Western” ideas such as liberalism and Social Darwinism to China, criticized opium smoking as one of the major obstacles for China and the Chinese people to becoming a strong nation. Along with the custom of foot binding, these intellectuals viewed the physically weak bodies of (usually male) opium addicts as a symbol for and an indicator of the weakness of the entire society. In accordance with scientific medical discourses, they considered consumption of opium as an addiction, and not, as before, a moral character flaw and indulgence of an individual. After 1900, the Qing government signed a series of bilateral agreements to restrict and finally ban the opium trade. It successfully fought against the consumption and cultivation of opium within the Qing Empire, including an anti-opium campaign by Yuan Shikai in Zhihi province. Smoking opium was declared illegal in 1906 but the problem of habitual smoking persisted.77 Opium addiction was no more prevalent in the army than elsewhere but it still posed a serious threat for the military strength of the state. New recruits were checked for addiction to opium during their initial physical examination. In the army, smoking opium was strictly forbidden and was severely punished because it made the soldiers dizzy, slow, and dull. Like excessive drinking and gambling, military reformers rejected opium because it was highly addictive and because of its weakening effects on body and spirit. In their eyes, it not only encumbered the fitness and skills of the men but also impinged on their mood, disturb their minds, and negatively affected their comportment. The weak and listless body of the male opium smoker represented the exact opposite of the disciplined, strong, and healthy body of the new military man.78

Military reformers, moreover, hoped to increase the acceptance of soldiers among society by inculcating the men with respect for the property of the common “good people” (liangmin) and the sexual integrity of their wives and daughters. The soldiers of the New Armies were admonished not to harass and steal from civilians and, in particular, to refrain from raping. Controlling the sexual desires of common soldiers was a disciplinary technique that aimed at protecting civilians and at turning common soldiers into a compliant, patriotic, and national army.79 The Self-Strengthening Army’s Department for Foreign Drill (liangce yingwu), for instance, warned against being “trivial” and “philandering (with) women” (biaoxu fumu). Romantic and physical contact to women was banned and the men were urged to be disciplined and focused on their drill exercises. On the other hand, sexual discipline was also viewed under the aspect of protecting the health of the soldiers. Military reformers, without possessing exact scientific knowledge of the matter, feared the weakening effects of sexually transmissible diseases on the strength of the armies. Sexual intercourse, the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Army warned, might led to a sick body, which, in turn, might be an indicator for the “crime of lusting for women.”80 Although there are no detailed reports or statistics available, some Luijun divisions had to deal with the spread of venereal diseases, according to Ralph Powell. The frequently used term “unnemonicable disease” (anji) also hints at the fact that transmissible venereal diseases were an issue in the New Armies.81

From the end of the nineteenth century, the awareness of contagious diseases (chuanranbing) grew steadily in China and military reformers paid increasing attention to hygiene and medical care.82 In 1896, Liu Kunyi reported that a large number of soldiers of the Self-Strengthening Army stationed in Wusong became ill with the summer flu or had ulcers and scabies, because of the damp and hot weather. There would be no other choice than hiring “Western-trained” doctors from Hong Kong and buying “Western” medicine, he stated in a request for the necessary funds. According to his
report, 300 out of 2700 men suffered from external diseases and wounds, which impeded their training. Consequently, the establishment of new hospitals for internal and external treatment according to “Western medicine” would be necessary.85

The responsibility of doctors in the New Armies included not only taking care of the wounded and sick, but also instructing paramedics and orderlies, observing general hygienic standards, and, together with drill instructors, monitoring the physical constitution of individual recruits. Doctors decided whether or not a sick soldier was able to attend to his duties and, most importantly, whether there was a threat of infection for the whole regiment. They should personally attend to every patient and see a sick soldier at least once a day. Furthermore, military doctors were in charge of supplying medicine and responsible for its quality. They oversaw the regimental hospitals or sick bays, and were responsible for bookkeeping, medical files, prescription lists and counterfoils, medical records, and guidelines concerning medical care. At the end of each month, doctors observed the physical check-up of the soldiers (shenti jiancha) and passed a statement to the officer in charge for reviewing. The doctors could recommend dismissing soldiers who had a “frail constitution,” were “overly sick,” or “unable to endure military service.”86

Military reformers and leaders particularly admonished doctors to be attentive to contagious diseases, and to prevent the spread of infection diseases and epidemics by any means necessary. Li Rensuan, a doctor at a military school in Guangdong, even linked the prevention of contagious diseases through hygiene to the survival of the entire “human race.” In the past, he emphasized, all kinds of disasters had been perceived as heavenly punishments. But now, with the findings in bacteriology, medicinal scientists and doctors were able to identify and describe in detail the cause of epidemics and pandemics. According to Li, hygiene was a task for the entire society and “Westerners” were much ahead. Without studying hygiene, he argued in a journal article, China, the “sick man of East Asia,” could not be cured and would die.87

Weisheng, referring to both hygiene and sanitation, became a major focus of Chinese military reformers after the turn of the century.88 The plans for the Lujun by the Bureau for Military Training from 1904 offered guidelines for medical care as well as hygiene regulations and highlighted the crucial significance of hygiene and medical work: “the prosperity of the country is connected to the army. The quality of the army is connected to soldiers. The strength of the soldiers is connected to weisheng. It is the imperative when truly maintaining an army.”89 The Bureau for Military Training warned against the four most common causes of pain and sickness in the army: shoes, saddles, cold, and heat, and pointed to the disastrous effects of lacking sufficient sanitation, because untreated injuries and diseases would disintegrate and undermine military strength during battle. International sanitary standards should be copied and inculcated upon the men. Hygiene should be observed everywhere and always, on the drill ground and in everyday life. Rooms should be spacious, clothes and food should be clean, and the soldiers should wash regularly. To prevent epidemics, special examination rooms should be built and every battalion was supposed to have medical facilities, and every division its own hospital.89

Military journals frequently addressed the issue of hygiene in the military. In accordance with its usual style of using very simple and basic language, the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers emphasized the importance of hygiene and explained that it consisted of eight elements, which were addressed in more detail in subsequent issues: breathing, everyday life, nutrition, drill, uniforms, barracks, healing, and emergency medical care.90 From its very first issue, the Nanyang Military Journal included a rubric titled the science of hygiene (weisheng zhi xueshu), where different authors dealt with various aspects of hygiene such as environmental hygiene, skin care, cleaning habits, and “horse hygiene.” The first contribution in the rubric proclaimed that a wealthy and strong country needed a complete army, which, in turn, depended on the cultivation of qualified soldiers. Attention should be paid to understanding the use of hygiene regimens and observing hygiene in the regiment. The article stated: “the countries in East and West that emphasize the physique of soldiers, seek valiant and mighty warriors (jiuhuan zhi shi), [...] [who] possess a martial spirit (shangwu zhi jingshen) and patriotic feelings.”91 The health of military men was the foundation of a strong army and, therefore, a strong country.

According to Li Dehua, a prolific writer for the Nanyang Military Journal, the field of hygiene was concerned with the quality of air, light, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and drinking water, food, as well as dental hygiene, clothing, and space, including ground, construction, and vegetation. Soldiers depended on their intellectual and physical capabilities, he argued. Whereas the first was linked to the study of tactics, the development of the later depended on hygienics. More soldiers died from malnutrition, excessive work, and diseases than from enemy fire on the battlefield. “Dying on the battlefield is glorious for men,” he stated, but all the other ways of dying could and should be prevented by observing hygiene.92

Apart from personal hygiene, which should help to prevent infections among soldiers, the correct diet and food safety, and particularly clean water, was central to hygiene measures. Li Dehua, for instance, explained in detail how to clean water and included illustrations showing how to arrange layers of different stones and minerals to filter dirty water.92 The Guangxi Lujun Division directed its cooks to make the kitchen a particular clean place. They should tidy up the shelves daily and wash the water tanks, food baskets, and the cutlery. Leftovers and waste should be disposed of at the designated
places instead of being emptied out randomly. The soldiers were not allowed to take bowls, mugs, chopsticks, or plates to places outside the kitchen and dining room. The number of people preparing food should be fixed and the number of staff working in the kitchen should never deviate from this number. Only those people actually working in the kitchen were allowed to enter it. Food, however, was a common good and no one, including cooks and kitchen staff, was allowed to take anything without permission.95

Despite the lack of qualified doctors, an increasing number of soldiers were trained as paramedics and able to serve as assistants in military hospitals and sanitary facilities, thus helping to improve the overall situation of medical treatment and hygiene in the army. In 1903, the Bieyang Army Department for Training and Instruction (Bieyang lujuan jiaolianchu) issued a multi-volume textbook covering five different topics, including one volume on Elementary Emergency Measures for Soldiers (Jundui jiujixian jianfa).96 It was not only designed for paramedics but for all rank and file soldiers, giving them detailed hygienic advice and explaining first aid procedures. “Everything one does in life,” the volume stated at the beginning, “depends on the spirit. If the body is not healthy and strong, how can work and duties be endured? [Thus], the soldiers must not neglect weisheng” (hygiene and sanitation). According to the textbook, soldiers suffered from the hardships and bitterness of fighting but also from the climate, imponderable terrain, and “unsuitable diseases and wounds” (shiying jinong shangyin).97 Therefore, it was necessary to possess the techniques to cure these maladies and be able to apply basic first aid help until a wounded soldier could receive treatment from a doctor.98

The first part of the book summarized fundamental hygienic rules for the army, referring to topics such as nutrition, clothing, personal hygiene, and housing. Camps, for instance, should ideally be erected on elevated, dry, and spacious grounds, not on valley-like and wet places, which were overgrown with wild plants and offered only foul and contaminated water. The air there was bad and harmful for people, and, in case many people were present, it became smelly and stifling. If dirty water was used in kitchens, washing places, stables, living quarters, public baths, toilets, and other locations, toxic vapors would easily concentrate. Moreover, soldiers should regularly sweep the floors to clean every facility and open the windows to ventilate the rooms. Dirty water should be poured away outside the living quarters. The textbook also paid great importance to food and drinking hygiene. Food should always be fresh; rotten food had to be thrown away. Grain, meat, and vegetables should be consumed together, to ease digestion. For the same reason, after conducting physical labor, the soldiers should rest before having something to eat. Water should be kept clean and cold, and thrown away if it had a strong odor. The textbook emphasized repeatedly that soldiers should only drink boiled water. “Drinking unboiled water can easily make a person sick, it must never be drunk, great caution is necessary.”

Regarding clothing, soldiers should wear uniforms that fitted perfectly and were not too tight because otherwise the blood circulation would be impeded. The coat, which the soldiers wore outside, should be adjusted to the weather conditions. Shirt, belt, and socks had to be neat and shoes of good quality, soft, and not too small. In summer, when the men were sweating at work, they should not try to cool down too quickly by pulling off their clothes. Instead they should rest and wait until the sweat dried. However, when the clothes got wet from rain, they should be changed immediately.

The textbook further posited that “not washing the body was the easiest way to get sick.” After marching or drilling, the soldiers were required to wash their face, gargle, and wipe clean their hands and feet. Every morning they should brush their teeth and clean their mouth. After a meal, the men should use toothpicks “to remove all the matter between the teeth.” Fingernails should have a suitable length and be cleaned regularly. Furthermore, the whole body had to be washed diligently, but the limit of fifteen minutes should not be exceeded. The temperature of the water could be adjusted individually but should be neither too hot nor too cold, the textbook warned. Having a bath after a meal was not recommended and was even regarded as potentially harmful to the body. In the morning, the soldiers should wash their whole body with a clean wet towel instead of bathing. The time of sleep was also fixed. Every night, the soldiers should sleep at least six, but no more than eight hours.99 All these rules and guidelines seem trivial and extremely patronizing but they underscore the fact that the bodies of military men were exposed to a scrupulous disciplinary regime. Personal hygiene was a serious matter and viewed as essential for maintaining the strength of both army and nation-state. At the same time, hygiene affected the understanding of soldiers and officers as disciplined, clean, healthy, and fit men.

The second, much longer part of the textbook dealt with emergency medical care, including first aid measures and the treatment of external injuries, critical afflictions, infections, and common diseases as well as techniques of sterilization, bandaging, and emergency medication. Illustrations at the end of the book showed the exact size and proportions of the emergency kit and also explained how to administer first aid. As in the case of individual gymnastics postures, these illustrations were easily accessible guides for both instructors and common soldiers and helped them to remember their first aid training (see Figure 2.1). Soldiers were taught the crucial importance of preventing any delay in helping their wounded comrades. An appendix specified the equipment and drugs of a standard first aid kit (jijiuxiang): chemical disinfectants, antiseptics, ointments, mustard (to improve blood circulation), alum powder (against infections), antipyretics, analgesics, menthol (against
itching), bandages, tissues, dressing rolls, adhesive tape, cotton wads, and menthol tissues. A smaller field kit, which contained most of the equipment of the larger one but in smaller amounts plus safety pins, tissues, and yarn instead of real bandages, was also depicted.98

These pharmaceuticals, equipment, and techniques were ascribed to “Western medicine” and had not been used by any Chinese army previously. An article in the Nanyang Military Journal from 1911 underlined that the Lijun had been established according to “Occidental scientific and technical criteria” and thus also had to copy the “Western” scientific discipline of wensheng. According to the article, “Western” medicine possessed the drugs to fight contagious diseases and epidemics and was thus superior to Chinese medicine.99 Only some years ago, opium, which had been brought to China by Europeans and Americans, was viewed as a threat to (Chinese) physical bodies and (Chinese) civilization. However, the article argued, other drugs from the “West,” based

on medical science, were now used to preserve the health of both individuals and the population, and counted as an indicator for discipline and civilization. In the fields of hygiene and medicine, the New Armies assumed a pioneering role and served as a laboratory to test governance practices of disciplining and regulating the population. The discourse on hygiene and transmissible diseases particularly contributed to the re-conceptualization of the physical body in China, which the social elite increasingly perceived as a biological organism subject to the laws of nature, instead to cosmological interpretations. The health and strength of the bodies of both military and civilian men became a major focus for government and army, which sought to secure the existence of the state by improving the “quality” of its (male) human components. This perspective on the male body altered the perceptions, representations, and practices that referred to men as men and masculinity.

**PUNISHMENT AND PRISON IN THE NEW ARMIES**

The rationale of preserving the health and physical body of soldiers fundamentally changed the way they were punished, compared to previous periods in Chinese history. Severe corporal punishment, which was aimed at retaliation and deterrence by inflicting torment on the body, was mostly replaced by the practice of imprisonment, which aimed at reforming and rectifying the mental attitude of the culprit. Imprisonment or incarceration became the standard practice of punishment in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and resulted in the “birth of the prison” (Michel Foucault) as a potentially more efficient model of disciplining people.100 In the late nineteenth century, this led European and American observers to condemn Chinese penal practices as brutal and inhumane, particularly the way in which the death sentence was performed. Although a few Chinese scholars had criticized the excessive punishment of the body prior to the foreign intrusions in the nineteenth century, it was not until the early twentieth century that the opportunity arose to abolish practices such as the “death by a thousand cuts”: the complete dismemberment of the convict.101 Following foreign pressure and criticism, the Qing government reformed the law, criminal jurisdiction, and practices of punishment from 1905 on. For late Qing military reformers, however, other factors than humanity played a more important role: much time and effort was invested in the training, disciplining, integrating, and aligning of new soldiers and their physical bodies, which became too precious to be more or less arbitrarily harmed or exterminated. Military reformers and leaders no longer viewed corporal punishment as the most effective form of disciplining military men. On the contrary, physical punishment and torment threatened the strength of the army as a whole.

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**Figure 2.1** First aid in case of injuries through falls or blows as well as drowning. Source: Běiyáng lìjūn jiǎolíanchu 1903, volume 5, p. 16.
Criminal justice in imperial China was dispensed by the civilian bureaucracy and, like other dynasties before them, the Qing promulgated a code at the very beginning of their rule, modeled after the code of the preceding Ming Dynasty. The Qing Code (Da Qing liüli) regulated the penologic relationship between the emperor and various branches of state and government, including the army. The catalog of offenses and the corresponding punishment procedure relevant for the military in the code were listed under the Board of War, which was in charge of administering the military. The code was gradually supplemented by various statues of military orders, which later became part of the Collected Statutes of the Qing (Da Qing huidian). The Qing military laws were more detailed, compared to the Ming military laws, but the character of punishment was the same and always stipulated corporal punishment. It was based on the Five Punishments (wu xing), outlined at the very beginning of the Qing Code, which had existed in this form since the Sui Dynasty (589–618). The Five Punishments included beating with a light bamboo stick, beating with a heavy bamboo stick, penal servitude, exile, and the death penalty. Other forms of punishments, such as the caning, or tattooing, were also stipulated in the code and used as supplements or substitutes. According to the Five Punishments, the death penalty was to be carried out by strangulation and decapitation. In the case of severe offenses, the culprit could also be sliced and dismembered, and in some cases the head would be hung up for public exposure (this was called xiaoshou). Fines or imprisonment were not considered as penalties, although in most cases money could be used to redeem oneself from punishment, and people accused of a crime could spend a long time in detention awaiting final judgment.

During most of the imperial period, draconian corporal punishment was generally used for the purpose of determent, exposure, and retribution. Inflicting damage on the body was not only agonizing; it also had effects on the afterlife. Death by strangulation was more tormenting, but decapitation destroyed the “somatic integrity” of a person only a whole body could receive offers by the progeny of the deceased or, in folk-Buddhist or Daoist thinking, could be reborn. Removing the head or, worse, complete dismemberment, was pure horror in the popular belief system and the cosmological universe.

In the regular Qing armies, corporal punishment for misconduct was the most important means of implementing discipline and meting out rewards served only as a supplement. Apart from the Five Punishments, military laws very often stipulated the piercing of one ear or the nose of the culprit with an arrow (called chajian) and marching him through the camp. In the Collected Statutes of the Qing, a difference between members of the Green Army and Bannermen was made: the latter were beaten with a whip instead of being caned with a stick. Bannermen generally received preferential treatment before the law and were more often able to commute sentences into a lighter form of punishment. As part of the common criminal law administered by the civilian bureaucracy, and because of the scattered organization of the army, several provincial and central institutions were involved in the process of criminal jurisdiction and punishment. The first level of jurisdiction was the provincial authorities, headed by the civilian general-governor or the Banners. In the capital, the Board of Punishment usually revised every case of a person sentenced to penal servitude, exile, or death. The last two cases could also be passsed on to the Censorate (Duchayuan), the Court of Revision (Daiji), or other higher institutions.

Between 1895 and 1904, before the foundation of the Lujun, the idea of military criminal justice did not change substantially, including the practice of and reasoning for punishment. The threat of severe corporal punishment remained one of the most important techniques to enforce discipline. The Self-Strengthening Army proclaimed a simple carrot and stick philosophy not unlike the statutes announced under the Qianlong Emperor in the eighteenth century. Its codes stated, that “the wicked and sly should be punished and the honest rewarded.” The Detailed and Illustrated Manual similarly instructed officers that “the way of governing soldiers lies between leniency (kuan) and severity (yan).” Imposing punishment should be severe but fair in the case of malpractices, crimes, and violation of the army code, whereas good performance, obedience, and loyalty should be rewarded. Officers and instructors should not be cruel, brutal, or excessive when punishing but lead with a firm hand, to discipline and encourage their subordinates. Military discipline had to be “precise without ambiguity,” otherwise reward and punishment would be “turned upside down and discipline become slack.”

The penal codes for the Newly Created Army and the Beiyang divisions stipulated beheading for a multitude of offenses such as cowardice, not following orders or acting without orders, reining illness, erratic and slow behavior during drill and battle, failure to protect a commanding officer in battle, losing or abandoning weapons and equipment, betraying secrets, harassing and stealing from the people or—in the case of officers—commanding or allowing soldiers to steal, abuse or rape women, “aligning with an organization which deludes the masses” (i.e., a secret or revolutionary society), causing an uproar and fighting with other soldiers, opposing officers, smoking opium, and leaving the regiment without permission. Lesser wrongdoings, such as excessive drinking, gambling, or “being undisciplined” could be punished by putting arrows through one or both ears or the nose but were usually subject to the officer’s discretion. Any violation of the regulations a man committed would be noted down. When the establishment of the Lujun was promulgated in 1904, the Bureau for Military Training announced that even light punishment for common soldiers should imply the idea of
new regulations, such as the Army Punishment Regulations (Lujun chengfa zhuanzhang), which introduced salary cuts and confinement as standard penalties. Moreover, the regulations denounced arbitrary corporal punishment and uncontrolled violence inflicted by officers and demanded that the victims concerned report its occurrence.\textsuperscript{114}

In September of the following year, the Army Ministry issued a compendium of comprehensive penal regulations. Among them was the Army Punishment Regulation for Misconduct (Lujun chengfa guoshi zhuanzhang), which listed over thirty possible offenses, including “unmotivated drill” and “dirtying one’s room and [thus] obstructing hygiene.” The standard penalty was confinement for up to 30 days, depending on the rank and position of a common soldier or officer. All confined soldiers experienced salary cuts during their time in prison and were only allowed to leave their cells for exercising. Cadets were allowed to attend lectures while serving a sentence.\textsuperscript{115}

A supplementation issued later specified prison procedures and the requirements for prison cells, emphasizing that the prisoners had to be treated and supplied well. This military prison regulation determined precisely the size, design, and furnishing of the small single-person cells, as well as the daily routine prisoners had to follow. The cells should be approximately four meters high, but only two meters in width and one and a half meters in length, containing nothing else but a pallet, a small window, and a door with a small hole to pass food through. It was forbidden to drink, smoke, sing, be noisy, or talk to prisoners in adjacent cells. In addition to food, hot water, and salt, convicts received medical treatment when they were sick, and, if necessary, they were relocated to a military hospital. Prisoners such as army artisans and cooks who could not exercise with their platoons, had to clean the cells and other facilities during their penalty time. Prisoners were allowed to receive other soldiers as visitors but could not get any gifts. The prison staff and director should be specially trained and have their tasks and responsibilities outlined in detail.\textsuperscript{116}

Another regulation from 1908 (Lujun jianyu zhangcheng) formulated a two-level system of military prisons for soldiers who committed capital crimes. Every division should have one prison for convicts who had to serve sentences from more than a month up to ten years under the direct supervision of the division command. On the second level, the prison of the Department for Military Law of the Army Ministry (Junfasi) housed convicts sentenced to more than ten years, as well as other felons. The staff of military prisons should be specially trained, with fixed responsibilities, conditions of employment, and equipment. It is not apparent whether the jailors and overseers had to be soldiers, but it seems that they were not part of the military police (Lujun jinchadu), which was the highest authority concerned with the observance of discipline and the investigation of violations against the regulations.\textsuperscript{117}
In case of wrongdoings, the prison personnel were subject to the army’s regulation on misconduct. They were strictly forbidden to mistreat the convicts and should be monitored by the prison director and by independent prison inspectors. The medical personnel of troops stationed nearby were in charge of the hygiene in the prisons. Every ten days, the military doctors should inspect whether the rooms were clean and examine and treat prisoners who had been transferred to the medical station of the prison, the army camp, or a military hospital, if necessary. At the beginning of their sentence, prisoners underwent a physical check-up. In prison, they had to shower every five days, their heads were shaved every ten days, and they had to wear a blue and red prison uniform, which visibly turned them into criminals and convicts. If a prisoner died, a doctor had to examine the body and friends of the dead could claim and repatriate the corpse, which would otherwise be buried at a military burying ground (junyong zangdi) close by. Apart from other general rules concerning standard procedures in cases such as visits or how to deal with prisoners sentenced to death, the regulations precisely outlined the (possible) design of the prison building itself. There should be cells for convicts with determined and undetermined prison time, death rows, different cells for officers (or cadets) and common soldiers, an indoctrination room, a tool room, a sick bay, a bathroom to wash and cut hair, a visitors’ room, storage rooms, and a dark cell for solitary confinement. The jailers had separate rooms to store equipment, to cook, work, and rest, as well as bathrooms. Prisoners had to strictly follow the prison regulations and the instructions of the jailors, and could be awarded a badge for good conduct. Finally, the prisoner’s daily nutrition was precisely regulated.

An article by Zhang Liangyuan in the Nanfang Military Journal, entitled Investigation Report on Army Prisons, discussed the general meaning of prisons, their implication for the military, and their role in the relationship between soldiers and citizens. Referring to the idea of a citizen’s state and citizen-soldiers, Zhang emphasized that the old practice of focusing on the flesh as an object of punishment was insufficient. Criminal punishment should instead concentrate on the spirit of the offender and the “handcuffing of his mind” (zhigu qi jingshen) by restricting his freedom and imprisonment. He argued that the introduction of prisons depended on the living standards and the degree of political and military participation of the citizenry, for whom freedom was the most important issue. “The Germans often say that the army is the representative of the people.” However, he claimed, China had not yet fully transformed itself into such a citizen’s state and the practice of imprisonment thus had its limits. Only temporarily conscripted citizen-soldiers, who cherished their freedom, should receive a prison sentence, particularly because the most common offense was desertion. For mercenaries, on the other hand, prison sentences were not required.

Changing perceptions of discipline and punishment accompanied the institutional reorganization of the military and the introduction of military jurisdiction modeled on the German and Japanese examples. In 1910, Zaitao, a young uncle of the Emperor Puyi, who was strongly involved in military affairs, demanded ceding military justice entirely to the army and the Army Ministry. He listed four points to justify his claim: first, if the army alone was to judge over offenses committed by soldiers, the unity within the military and its autonomy from the civil bureaucracy would be strengthened. Second, legal professionals could be involved in military trials but a member of the military should always preside over the proceedings. This way, the prestige of the whole army would increase. Third, the chairman of a military trial (junfa hulixu) should have a higher rank than the defendant, in order to maintain the military hierarchy. Fourth, he argued that a person without military training could never understand the particular context of a soldier committing an offense. Any crime perpetrated by a member of the army should be judged according to military law and not according to the general criminal law. Zaitao, citing “international practices of military organization,” viewed military jurisdiction as essential for establishing a truly autonomous military that was independent of the civilian bureaucracy. In a supplement to his demands, he underlined that the Supreme Court of Justice (Daliyuan), which replaced the old imperial Court of Revision in 1906, did not have the competence to handle cases involving military law. For the sake of the cohesiveness and unity of the army, military law should be independent, following international standards of punishing soldiers.

In October 1910, the Army Ministry promulgated the Pilot Scheme Regulation for Military Trials (Lujun shenpan shiban zhengcheng). It emphasized: “In every military organization in East and West, crimes committed by soldiers occupy a special place. Thus, they are not tried by regular courts but by special councils for military justice.” According to the scheme, only these military courts, staffed by professionals trained in military justice, were able to take into account the particular martial spirit of soldiers. The principal jurisdiction over soldiers was now placed in the hands of the military itself; civilian legal authorities were only allowed to assist. Overall responsibility for military law proceedings and supervision of military prisons lay with the Department for Military Law of the Army Ministry. The military penal code was supplemented or revised several times between 1910 and 1915 and new, more detailed prison regulations were implemented under Yuan Shikai’s government. In 1913, for instance, it promulgated a preliminary Order Concerning Punishment in the Army (Lujun chengfailing), and in 1915 a systematic Army Penal Regulation (Lujun xingshi tiaolie) as well as a Military Trials Regulation (Lujun shenpan tiaolie).
The preface of the original *Pilot Scheme Regulation for Military Trials* from 1910 stated that both old customs and international (guguo) practices had been carefully deliberated for devising this preliminary regulation. As stated above, Japanese and German laws again played a major role as examples. German military criminal law and military jurisdiction counted as among the most advanced in the world and influenced the military law and practice of punishment in the New Armies. In the military criminal codes of the German states, corporal punishment was increasingly replaced by imprisonment during the nineteenth century. Moreover, the scope of the military criminal law was limited to include only disciplinary violations and it was adjusted to the civil law. The purpose was to attract a larger social variety of people to the army and, on the other hand, preserve the army’s fighting strength. Chinese military reformers emulated foreign ideas and practices, but they were also able to draw on the quite detailed regulations concerning military-related offenses in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Qing statutes, which already differentiated between peacetime and wartime, or intentional and unintentional offenses. The introduction of an independent military jurisdiction to strengthen the autonomy of the military, on the other hand, was entirely new and contributed strongly to the professional pride of the New Armies.

**CONCLUSION: LI JISHEN AND THE MOLDING OF MEN**

In the army, the death penalty continued to be carried out by decapitation, although the new general law codes stipulated using strangulation or the firing squad as the standard form of execution, which was also the practice in the German and other European armies. But overall, the perception and use of corporal punishment in the context of discipline and governance changed strongly among military reformers and officers. A textbook for staff cadets, published during the early years of the Republic, stated: “corporal punishment is the most extreme form of punishment” and should therefore only be used as a last resort. Whereas the death penalty had always counted as an extreme punishment, which should not be administered thoughtlessly, this textbook denounced any form of corporal punishment. Soldiers had to be punished for their wrongdoings but arbitrary physical punishment created hard feelings and resentment, the textbook emphasized. Instructors and educators should take into account the motives, personality, disposition, and intellect of a man as well as the specific circumstances under which an offense or crime was committed. Officers should not lose their temper, remain calm and serious, and never punish in rage or for personal reasons.

The author of the textbook, Li Jishen, was a graduate of the Army Staff Academy, who later became an academy instructor and subsequently held various posts in the Military Education Department of the Army Ministry (Lijunju jiaoxuesi). He advocated a middle way between reward and punishment to “cultivate” (wangcheng) and “mold” (taoye) common soldiers. Instructing and educating men consisted of “active” or “positive” and “passive” or “negative” techniques of governance. The active techniques included guidance and encouragement as well as physical exercise. Coercion, restriction, the observance of strict personal hygiene, and punishment were passive techniques. Li emphasized that punishment and praise, as well as rewards, should only be meted out with hesitation. Awarding too many certificates of merit, medals, and souvenirs, as well as preferential treatment, was harmful because it caused vanity, suspicion, and a feeling of inequality among the men. As in the case of severe and immediate corporal punishment, resentment toward the instructors arose and the consequence could be a “depression of the collective spirit” of the regiment.

According to the textbook, control over body and spirit were central to the philosophy of military instruction, which aimed at completing the development of the individual and its transformation into a compact unit. Military education had to focus on “nourishing a firm military spirit (jiaoren jingshen) and strict military discipline.” Skills with weapons and physical strength, and the “comprehension of military discipline” (jinxiaoxue) were equally important for modern troops. Li’s notions about military drill summarized the state-of-the-art knowledge and understanding of military discipline and drills, including the relationship between individual physical exercise and closed-unit drill. Referring to various, but not specified military regulations from Japan, Germany, Austria, Russia, France and Italy, Li demanded paying strong attention to the assessment of the individual soldier, particularly his psychosomatic condition. When supervising and observing common soldiers, educators should take into account the individual differences of personality and disposition, including “pre-birth” qualities such as gender, physical constitution, and psyche, as well as “after-birth” qualities such as age, education, and other factors that might affect a person’s personality and spirit. Instructors should comprehend and govern the body of a soldier through physical exercise and moral and intellectual education (deyu zhiye). Without a healthy body, Li argued, there would be no morale and no knowledge, because both were “stored” within the body. Because the mandatory medical examination at the time of recruitment could not fully determine whether a body was sick, the new soldier should be observed permanently and closely: healthy men were patient, perseverant, and never behaved erratically or overstepped the regulations. Bodily development should be monitored closely. The physical status of the soldiers had to be scrutinized constantly by inspecting their physique, diagnosing their physical constitution, and observing and conditioning their movements during drill and work. Men should also be observed when
eating, drinking, and sleeping. In addition, the color of their hands and hair should be checked regularly. Educators and instructors should determine a soldier’s character by monitoring his friends and acquaintances, his preferences, the books he was interested in, his daily behavior, respect for his teachers and other people, and his general ability to judge specific situations. The military spirit of an individual soldier should be evaluated by examining his knowledge and interests.  

For Li, the concept of “reward and punishment” was unsatisfactory and he considered the close control and regulation of the physical body to be far more effective. He and other military reformers, leaders, and instructors started to turn away from administering harsh and draconian corporal punishment as a deterrent and enforcement of discipline. They increasingly perceived a military man and his body as a resource, which had to be managed and tended, to improve the quality of the army and military preparedness. The aim was not to break the physical body but to discipline the mind and govern the conduct of military men by drilling their bodies. Imprisonment as a new standard of punishment, for instance, aimed at repentance and mental submission. Military prisons as well as military courts and courts, however, interacted mutually with common societal developments and referred to spheres such as military autonomy and professionalism, civil-military relations, military service and citizenship, which will be addressed in the following chapters.

To be sure, strict discipline remained the nucleus of military training but the way it was perceived and enforced changed fundamentally. Physical exercise and drills were combined with the close regulation, control, and literal regimentation of every aspect of the soldiers’ lives, aligning them physically and psychologically and transforming them into a depersonalized, homogeneous group. The regulation of spaces such as barracks and prisons played a tremendous role in preserving the life of soldiers. But establishing strict order, daily routines, hygiene regimens, as well as limiting the death penalty and the threat of transmissible diseases were, more than anything else, disciplinary techniques. Following the German, Japanese, and other foreign role models, the Chinese army turned into a “total institution,” which carefully arranged, supervised, and governed daily life in the army and surrounded the exclusively male soldiers with a space of permanent conditioning and meticulous regulation of the body and its functions. Military reformers believed this to be the very way to create better soldiers and, physically and morally, better men.

NOTES

1. See NBZ 1906, 3: Taot Junbão, Lün lijun lishi, 18–21.
3. This is a summary of the article Wie man aus Menschen Soldaten macht (How to turn humans into soldiers) by the historian Ute Planert. The article is an ideal-typical analysis of the particular technologies of military discipline and considers the nineteenth century Prussian army, by far the predominant force in the German Empire 1871–1918, as the prime example for systemized methods of forming, conditioning, and dressing rank and file soldiers. Planert 1994. For an account of discipline in the British army in the nineteenth and twentieth century, see French 2005, esp. chapters 3 to 5. This chapter is strongly informed by Michel Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power and his notion of “docile bodies” in his book Discipline and Punish, see Foucault [1975] 1979, 135–69.
4. Planert 1994. Planert also argues that the army is central for perpetuating social hierarchies outside the military, particularly with respect to gender inequalities in a patriarchal society. See Planert 1994, 84.
5. Wilson 2008, 30. The term “total institution” was coined by Ervin Goffman to describe the almost absolute grasp of institutions such as the military on its members. See Goffman 1961.
9. Having breaks after meals before starting with physical exercise was viewed as important for health reasons. See also Kirchner 1869, 373.
10. The times to get up and go to sleep were given in the old wugeng-system, which divided the day in five day and five night watches of unequal duration, depending on the time of the year and the hours of daylight. See Wilkinson 2012, chapter 40.
12. An overview of the Lüjun divisions and brigades is provided by Ch’en 1960.
15. Lianbingzhu 1904, 17–18. Stephen R. MacKinnon argues that the loyalty and morale of the Beiyang soldiers were rather low because of the poor living conditions they experienced including, among other things, the severe enforcement of discipline and forced conscription. See MacKinnon 1973. Nevertheless, military reformers recognized that excellent accommodations and training facilities were important for introducing European-style army organization and discipline. For an early Republican account on barracks (translated from the Japanese) see also ZBZ 1916, 30: Wu Qintai, Jundai shenghuo, 41–9.
16. According to Ch’en, the Lüjun division in Guangxi province had no number assigned to it. According to Powell this was officially the twenty-fifth division. See Ch’en 1960.
18. Ibid., 415–16. A detailed account about supplying and feeding soldiers (probably a translation from the Japanese) is NBZ 1908, 26 and 27: Zhaozhan geyanglu. The article also discusses food rations and compares them to the nutrition of the German and Austrian armies.
20. Powell 1955, 229, 277. See also Zhao 2001, 75. XBB 1905, 1: Gong du zheng yue ershi ri.

21. Military music as such, to be sure, was no novelty and part of most armies and wars in former dynasties. See for instance Graff 2002, 148.


27. Li 1912, 61–3.


31. Lianbingchun junxuesi 1907, 1–3.

32. Li 1912, 47–54. German military educators emphasized a similar careful attitude toward the so-called "untrained material." See Leitenstorfer 1897, 67.

33. NZB 1911, 55 and 56: Lijun rawaisheng zai yang zhi xinyan. Lijun rawaisheng zai yang zhi xinyan, paragraphs 12 and 16.

34. See for instance Kirchner 1869, 247–68; Frecllich 1887, 284; Kirchner 1896, chapter 8; Bischoff 1910. See also Hladik 1914, chapter 12. Kirn argues that the barracks and drill ground were central spaces for the everyday life of German soldiers. See Kirn 2009, 115, 124. For a short account in Chinese on the housing and supply of the German army see Shen 1897a, 9–10. A military journal article from 1914 addressed the importance of maintaining hygienic standards in field camps to prevent infectious diseases, which "extraordinarily consumed" the physical health and morale of soldiers. LX 1914, 6: Ming ying zhi yunji, 13.


36. Ibid., 89. Sun Yat-sen later also studied at Boji.

37. Cavendish 1898, 717. This assessment by Alfred Cavendish, British military attaché to the Qing Empire, was published in 1898 but did not take into account the developments after 1895. Instead, he examined Banner forces, the Green Standard Army (including the retrained Disciplined Forces), and the Brave Battalions.

38. Lamprey 1868, 418. J. Lamprey, a British military surgeon who apparently was in the temporary service of Charles Gordon, had also much cause for complaint about the hygienic conditions in the military camps of the "Chinese army." It is not clear whether he was referring to Green Standard Army soldiers or to the Brave Battalions. Although the camps he visited were well organized, the tents were "dirty," "untidy," the "ground was not swept," and he reported "filthy water" and "bad sanitary conditions." The "latrine arrangement" was "very defective" and "in a horribly filthy state." He also described the helplessness of Chinese doctors during a cholera epidemic. See Lamprey 1868, 411, 418–19.


42. According to Ivan Crozier, healthiness became a “paradigmatic form of discipline.” See Crozier 2010, 4.

43. Kirchner 1896, III-IV.

44. Hedinger points out that the Japanese government consciously decided against England and the Netherlands, and in favor of Germany as the role model for medical reforms in the early 1870s. See Hedinger 2008. Concerning medicine and hygiene, Chinese (military) reformers were primarily influenced by Japan. Nevertheless, a few articles in military journals took into account the practices and regulations of the British army. See for instance NBZ 1907, 12: Yingguo lijun ma pao gong bu zhiqong weisheng ge dai zhi bianzhi and NBZ 1908, 18: Yingguo lijun weisheng zhidu.

45. This was then called Kriegssanitätsordnungen, which was revised in 1907. See Pilster 1981. On Britain see also Harrison 2010.

46. Kirchner 1896, III.

47. See also Virchow’s own lecture on the topic of military medicine and infectious diseases from 1874, Virchow 1874.


50. Kirchner 1896, III.

51. Ring 1962, 203.


53. Literally, weisheng means “protecting life” and originally, in Daoist medicine, stood for the idea and practice of prolonging one’s life to ultimately reach immortality. See Rogalski 2004, 12–19 and Schulte 2008a, 144–49.


55. Kaske 2002a, 39, 41.

56. Cavendish reported of foreign doctors attending to the many wounded in Yantai, Niuzhuang (Yinkou), and Tianjin in overly crowded hospitals during the Sino-Japanese War. He referred to the hospital under Li Hengzhang in Tianjin and other hospitals run by missionaries of various foreign confessions. Cavendish 1898, 717.


58. Ren 2003, 6–7. See also the image in BBZ 1910, 2: Fangshoushi ji weishengdui zhi tiahu. For the German example see Ring 1962, 203–13.

59. Lianbingchu 1904, 15–16.

60. Brunnet and Hagedorn 1910, 145; Lianbingchu 1904, 15–16; Luo 1997b, 243–44. Hygiene and medical care for horses was frequently addressed in military journals. See for instance NBZ 1910, 42 and 43: Lijun bingma kanhua and NBZ 1911, 56: Riwen lijun mopu chuanyu bangfang guize.

61. I believe the congress took place in Jamestown, New York. The outcome of He’s mission is not clear. Available reports only deal with his travel expenses
from China to San Francisco, Washington, Jamestown, New York City, and Europe. See NBZ 1907, 11; Paiyuan tu wanguo jinyihui: Ha 1999b.

62. Lianbingchu 1904, 15.

63. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in Northern China in February 1904 fueled the debate of medical care in the military around the globe. According to an article in the Nanjing Military Journal, the Russo-Japanese War offered an excellent opportunity to study the impact of new weapons and the damage they inflicted on human bodies. In 1907, an international conference of surgeons convened in Berlin to discuss precisely this issue, the article reported. See NBZ 1908, 18: ‘Re E chanyi zhong zhi waike yishu. On the New Armies’ later engagement in Manchuria concerning health care see Ha 1999a. Japanese colonizers viewed Manchuria as particularly disease ridden and in 1910 the bubonic plague killed more than 60,000 people. See Rogaski 2010 and Summers 2012.

64. Reeves 2011. On earlier attempts to establish a Red Cross Society in order to introduce international notions of civilization, and its connection to the Hague Conventions of 1899, see also Reeves 2005.

65. After 1911, Li served a second term as director. The society was then renamed into Chinese Red Cross Society. See also NBZ 1907, 13: ‘Wangguo chaohizhi zonghui.

66. XT, chapter 19, 26–7. See also Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 146–47.

67. For instance, in 1913, Yuan gave a speech full of praise during the national conference of missionary doctors in China. See Eckart 1989, 186.

68. For a short review of the development of the school see Ha 1999a and, for the time after 1911, see Zhang and Sun 1987, 353–55.

69. Hou 1986, 316–17. Hou’s text is a translation from a Japanese newspaper article of 1909. See Rogaski 2004, 343. Psychology was also taken into account by military doctors and reformers. One rather odd, although scientifically based suggestion from 1916 by a certain Yue Zhang was to use hypnosis to improve the performance of soldiers. ZBB 1916, 31: Yue Zhang, Caimianshu ju jinchang zhang zhi yingying. Observing gymnastic exercises was also part of the responsibilities of German military doctors. Max Rudolff states in his book that “every military doctor can be expected to know the details of military gymnastics and to be able to offer advice, if necessary.” Rudolff 1873, 30.

70. Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 320–21. There are numerous short reports on newly established military hospitals, schools for military doctors and medics, military pharmacies, and regional departments administering medical care throughout the country in the Nanjing Military Journal. A more comprehensive account of a school offering a short, intensive program to educate “hygiene teams” is NBZ 1907, 9: Ben gongsuo xiang qing kaibian sucheng weishengdai zhuangwen, 12–31.

71. Both Ralph Powell and Edmund Fung, who base their studies on contemporary foreign observers, criticize the health care as the “most backward” (Fung) part of the Lujun, in particular for treating wounded soldiers and for surgery. The lack of up to date equipment and foreign-educated doctors was only partly compensated by foreign missionary doctors. They agree, however, that the quality of sanitation generally increased significantly. Powell 1955, 293; Fung 1980, 231. Edward Dreyer comes to the same conclusion, stating that medical services were insufficient “despite elaborate proposals.” Dreyer 1995, 34.


76. Ibid., 153.


81. Powell 1955, 235. Further research might be able to shed more light on the issue of sexuality in the Chinese military. Venereal diseases were also an issue in the German army. See Kim 2009, 280–81.

82. On the ideas of “contagion” and epidemics in China see Leung 2010 and Hansen 2011.


84. Guoxi changbeijun budui [1907] 2005, 439–41. See also Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1085. Military doctors were probably also in charge of controlling the use of harmful and addictive substances such as alcohol and opium, but drug abuse was usually a topic for the punishment section of manuels and regulations.

85. NBZ 1908, 24: Li Renxuan, Chuanrenbing zhi weisheng yu renzheng cuwangu zhi guanyi.

86. Note that in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, the issue of medical care was not very prominent and the term weisheng did not appear, although hygiene regulations were included.

87. Lianbingchu 1904, 15.

88. Ibid.

89. XBB 1905, 8: Jundui weishengxue qianhuo.

90. NBZ 1906, 1: Zuo Qiqing, Weisheng zhi xuexu, 1. See also NBZ issues 1906, 2; 1907, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, and 15 for other contributions for the rubric. From its creation in 1914 on, the Zhejiang Military Journal frequently reported about hygiene in the field, including examinations of the experiences of the German and other armies during the First World War. In 1916, it started a series called Bingshi zhi weisheng. See for instance ZBB 1914, 2: Li Jiufu, Zhanzen yu weisheng zhi guanxi. NBZ 1907, 13 and 14: Li Dehua, Jun renweisheng zhi yanji.

91. Ibid. (13), 5–8.


93. Baiyang lujuan jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5. The volume was co-produced by the Medical Care Section (Yuyyi) of the Military Logistics Section of the Baiyang Army (Bingbeichu). The other volumes dealt with infantry drill, weapon instruction, defensive fortification, and reconnaissance.
95. This can either be understood as “improper,” “inappropriate” illness, which possibly referred to sexual diseases, or rather as “weakening,” “impeding” nuisance, which reduced the fitness of the soldiers.

96. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, 1.

97. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, 1–3 (including all previous citations). A journal article explained that every battalion of 500 men (jing) had one bathroom (yuhan). Shower time was after the afternoon drill exercises. See ZBZ 1916, 30: Wu Qintai, Juadui shenghuo, 44.

98. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, 25–26. See also XT, chapter 15, 43. For a short explanation (for soldiers) of the field dressings men carried during the war games in 1905, see XBB 1905, 9: Xingjun daxiao xia zhi, 3.

99. NBZ 1911, 57: Jundui weisheng jiujiu xin huan.


101. On the “death by a thousand cuts,” see Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008.

102. Although the Qing law represented more than just a penal code, it was exclusively concerned with matters of the state, the emperor, and the bureaucracy, and contained no civil law that regulated the matters between individuals, such as contracts, or only when they concerned the state, for instance, marriage. Personal rights and individual protection were only indirectly regulated. For a complete translation and introduction of the code, see Jones 1994.


104. The term was coined by Macaulay 1998, 216. See also Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 11.

105. Theoretically, there was one more level, the complete dissolution of the body, including the pulverizing of the bones. See Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 13.


111. Ibid., 1033.

112. Ibid., 1041. Similar regulations for the Self-Strengthening Army can be found in Shen 1897, 4–6.


114. Ibid.


119. GX, chapter 8, 113–15.

120. XT, chapter 21, 513–14. The regulations were reprinted in NBZ 1909, 30.

121. The responsibilities, size, equipment, and wages of the military police were first detailed in the Pilot Scheme Regulation for the Army Police (Lujun jingchao shihua zhangcheng) from May 1908. The introductory memorial of the regulation emphasized the importance of the military police in European barracks to uphold discipline and to assist the local police. The scheme contained a military police office in the capital, as well as provincial offices in charge of the respective division. See GX, chapter 8, 81–3. See also NBZ 1907, 7: Zhu Guangkui, Ouzhou xianbing zhi yanye. 122. This is one of the few hints that such a thing existed at all.

123. The appendix to the Army Prison Regulations included a possible panoptic design for an army prison. See NBZ 1909, 30: Lujun jianyu zhangcheng.

124. GX, chapter 8, 115–19.

125. NBZ 1907, 7: Zhang Liangyan, Kuohe lujun jianyu baogaoshu, 7.

126. Ibid., 1–15. Zhang outlined prison regulations and included a prison floor plan in his report. Concerning the shape of prisons, see also Chen 2012, 30.

127. BBZ 1910, 3 Junfa ying gui dali qing jiang lujun fanzui ren yuan yili jiao lujunbu banzhe, 3–4.


129. BBZ 1910, 3 Junfa ying gui dali qing jiang lujun fanzui ren yuan yili jiao lujunbu banzhe, 4–5.


131. Yinchan [1910] 2005, 324. Emil Dangelmaier, an Austrian Major-Auditor who wrote numerous books on military law in Europe in the nineteenth century, similarly stated that “military law […] has to be based on a military spirit.” See Dangelmaier 1893, VII.


133. Kong 2006, 24–7, 42. See for instance LX 1913, 3 Lujun jianyu fishe kanguansuo sanxing guize.

134. Ji 1997, 334–43. Military jurisdiction was effective throughout the Republican period and is still in China today.

135. Contemporary legal professionals considered the German military law as very advanced, compared to other European countries. See Dangelmaier 1893. Since 1872, the military jurisdiction in Germany was based on the Militärstrafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Military Criminal Code for the German Empire), which was officially effective until 1945. The Reichsmilitärgericht, installed in 1900 in Berlin-Charlottenburg, was the highest court and headed by an admiral or general, who presided over violations against the military disciplinary code and the military legal code. See Königlich Preußisches Kriegsministerium 1900 (includes the military court regulations from 1898 and the Criminal Code from 1872).


137. See also Fung 1980, 48.

138. GX, chapter 8, 110; Mühlhahn 2009, 61.

139. Li 1912, 40.

140. Li 1912, 38–40. See also an article by Huang Chongyun that examined the causes for soldiers becoming “bad.” ZBZ 1915, 16: Yu hutang bing zhi yanjiu, 20–30.
Chapter 3

Dressed to Kill

Uniforms, Masculinity, and Military Culture

A NEW LOOK

Although the Qing and Meiji Japanese armies were not at a fundamentally different technological level during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, as both possessed state-of-the-art ironclad battleships and guns, they gave quite a different visual impression. On the Qing side, common soldiers wore bright blue, ornamented, and red-brimmed dresses with conical hats or turbans. They mainly wore similar dresses, with variations from squad to squad. Like every man in the Qing Empire, each soldier had a shaved forehead and braided hair. In contrast, the Japanese soldiers were clothed in black, European-style uniforms with brimmed hats and short hair. Japanese propaganda woodblock prints strongly emphasized and exaggerated the great difference between the two armies. Compared to the neat and fierce-looking Japanese, the Qing soldiers appeared outmoded and oriental, though not necessarily weak, which would have undermined the Japanese victory. The difference was even more obvious when it came to the depiction of officers. Woodblock prints show Qing commanders in their long official garbs surrendering to tall, upright, broad-shouldered, bearded and Caucasian-looking Japanese generals. The images clearly contained the message that the Japanese victory was a natural consequence of a modern-Western and masculine Japanese nation-state triumphing over a backward, effeminate Qing Empire.¹

In the nineteenth century, foreign military observers encountered Qing soldiers, who did not meet their expectations and standards regarding the appearance of troops. To them, the Qing soldiers contradicted the notion of manliness. Convinced of their own military and cultural superiority, the foreign observers ridiculed and emasculated the Qing soldiers particularly for their (un)military livery and bearing. The rank and file of the Green Standard