141. After studying at the Liangguang Military Middle School in Guangzhou, Li transferred to Beijing in 1907 to receive higher military education. In 1921, he joined the Army of the Nationalist Party in Guangdong and, in 1924, became deputy dean of the Whampoa Military Academy that replaced the recently closed Military Academy in Beijing. During the subsequent Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), he held important military commands and political offices and worked toward the reconciliation between Communists and Nationalists. In the newly founded People’s Republic, he served for some time as vice-chairmen for the new government and later for the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, besides other political posts. Li was also involved in hiring a new group of German military advisors for the Nationalist army in the 1920s. See Martin 1981, 311; Kirby 1984, 38; Jiang and Jiang 2001.

142. Li 1912, 38-40.

143. Ibid., 1-5.

144. The Prussian-German military doctor Leitenstorfer similarly demanded from the instructors to “know” the individual soldiers. See Leitenstorfer 1897, 67. See also Dreyer 1896, 12.

145. Li 1912, 47-54.

146. Corporal punishment slowly vanished, at least as an official penalty, but rewards for good performances remained an important incentive to encourage soldiers to improve their skills and risk their lives in battle. For instance, target practice contests were organized regularly. See Kong 2006, 15.

Chapter 3

Dressed to Kill
Unforms, Masculinity, and Military Culture

A NEW LOOK

Although the Qing and Meiji Japanese armies were not at a fundamentally different technological level during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, as both possessed state-of-the-art ironclad battleships and guns, they gave quite a different visual impression. On the Qing side, common soldiers wore bright blue, ornamented, and red-brimmed dresses with conical hats or turbans. They mainly wore similar dresses, with variations from squad to squad. Like every man in the Qing Empire, each soldier had a shaved forehead and braided hair. In contrast, the Japanese soldiers were clothed in black, European-style uniforms with brimmed hats and short hair. Japanese propaganda woodblock prints strongly emphasized and exaggerated the great difference between the two armies. Compared to the neat and fierce-looking Japanese, the Qing soldiers appeared outmoded and oriental, though not necessarily weak, which would have undermined the Japanese victory. The difference was even more obvious when it came to the depiction of officers. Woodblock prints show Qing commanders in their long official gowns surrendering to tall, upright, broad-shouldered, bearded and Caucasian-looking Japanese generals. The images clearly contained the message that the Japanese victory was a natural consequence of a modern-Western and masculine Japanese nation-state triumphing over a backward, effeminate Qing Empire.¹

In the nineteenth century, foreign military observers encountered Qing soldiers, who did not meet their expectations and standards regarding the appearance of troops. To them, the Qing soldiers contradicted the notion of manliness. Convinced of their own military and cultural superiority, the foreign observers ridiculed and emasculated the Qing soldiers particularly for their (un)military livery and bearing. The rank and file of the Green Standard
Army usually wore a long shirt, loose linen trousers, sandals or cloth shoes, a jacket and sometimes a waistcoat, in colors such as blue, green, red, and black, with different trimming and borders. This varied between units and regions. For the head, they used a headscarf or turban. Banner soldiers wore a single-colored garb on top of trousers combined with a round black felt hat with a turned-up brim and a red tassel. In summer, soldiers from both armies commonly wore a conical straw or bamboo hat. Officers of the Green Standard Army wore the same embroidered robe as civilian officials, although various details, such as a different set of animal symbols stitched on the front, marked them as military officials. They possessed a combat or drill outfit consisting of a shortened garb, as well as an armor made of leather plates and a helmet. As military officials seldom engaged in actual drill or fighting, this outfit was rarely seen in the second part of the nineteenth century. Banner commanders and elite troops had their own, distinctive Manchu-style armor in the colors of their respective Banners.

Foreigners describing Qing soldiers rarely made any distinction between the actual type of military organization they encountered and many reports and depictions, such as the Japanese woodblock prints of the war in 1894–1895, referred only to the Brave Batalions. Major Alfred Cavendish, serving as a British military attaché to the Qing Empire at the end of the century, described in an article the “peculiar” and “picturesque” sight of Chinese soldiers marching through the capital with the bayonets fixed on their rifles:

[..] a small teapot slung to the muzzle and a birdcage to the trigger-guard, and fending off the rays of the sun with a foreign lady’s parasol; but after a time these picturesque variations seem quite natural. The dress of officers is much the same, except that their servants carry the teapot. The plastrons are squares of embroidery, and Banner officers wear yellow jackets. They hardly ever carry any weapons.

The British military surgeon J. Lamprey cynically reported on “a loose jacket of a peculiar form and colour,” which new recruits had already worn before becoming soldiers and made them look like coolie laborers. “Curious” to him was that the soldiers adapted their clothes to every circumstance without order, went bare-foot, and used umbrellas and fans whenever it suited them. Most striking to the Euro-American observers was the white, round patch of about 20 to 30 centimeters (8 to 12 inches) in diameter, sewed to the front and the back, showing Chinese characters that either stated the bearer’s name, his unit affiliation, or both. The army livery was therefore called haoyi or “marked dress.” In the eyes of foreigners, this “bull’s-eye” symbolized that Qing soldiers were no better than dummies for target practice. In his report from 1878, the American officer Emory Upton noted the following, based on his observations on soldiers in Zhejiang province: “the uniform, too, is a great obstacle to military pride. It consists of a cotton jacket, usually blue, with trousers so loose and flowing as to completely conceal the figure. [...] In no two provinces are troops armed and equipped alike [...].” Adding to this image were the huge and colorful flags carried by the Qing troops, which gave them a “very gay and even gaudy appearance,” according to Lamprey.

Obviously, the perception of an appropriate military and masculine appearance differed from place to place. Foreign observers mocked the non-martial, effete manner of Chinese military officials, who were dressed in a sedan. And they wondered about the clothes of these men: the long gown (changyi), which was the standard dress of eminent officials and men of status and which concealed everything of the physical body but the head. On the other hand, for both commoners and elite members of the Qing Empire, soldiers from Britain, France, Germany, or the United States offered a similarly strange and absurd picture. Chinese elites considered the clothes of foreigners as unseemly and inappropriate, revealing too much of the physical shape of the body. Chinese woodblock prints, which were highly popular among commoners, depicted foreign soldiers in tight uniforms, comically long-legged, and sometimes almost grotesque.

In late imperial China, dress was strongly influenced by Confucian notions of ritual and propriety. The physical body had to be concealed—not simply out of sheer prudishness but because attire was regarded as a marker for civilization and social hierarchy. As an expression of social relations, clothing shaped gender arrangements and concepts of masculinity and femininity. Fashion changed greatly over time and, in relation to that, gender concepts were also fluid and had transgressive boundaries. Dress and adornment transformed the more potent of the natural body into an organized system of cultural signs. Attire alone gave the human form a meaning, a status, and a gender, and thus inappropriate clothing was viewed as barbaric and savage. Shen, the body-person, was the bearer of sartorial aspects, which therefore indicated an individual’s character, morality, and social standing. The naked body or exposed parts of the body, such as bound feet without shoes, were considered meaningless, and also a neglected topic in the visual arts. A popular example of how clothing had a gendering effect on the bearer is the story of Hua Mulan, a young girl pretending to be a man to save her old father from being conscripted to the army. Only by putting on a military dress consisting of armor, boots, and trousers was she able to be recognized as a man and could fight and bond with other men.

During the Qing period, dress styles for both men and women were strongly influenced by the Inner-Asian origins of the dynasty. Like all preceding dynasties, the Qing issued an official dress code, which strictly regulated attire and adornment according to gender, social sphere, office, rank,
Chinese men should adopt the “Western” fashion, as the Japanese had already done. Kang also called for removing the queue or pigtail, which foreigners considered as the very sign of backwardness, inferiority, and femininity of the Chinese civilization. An increasing number of intellectuals and politicians followed Kang’s plea after the turn of the century and fiercely attacked the customary and allegedly backward appearance of Chinese men and women. A change of dress styles would fuel reforms, trigger the end of outmoded customs and rituals, and propel a martial spirit and the determination to modernize in China, they argued. The Qing court initially ignored such demands but foreign-style dresses became increasingly popular among the urban population in the final years of the dynasty and the early years of the republic. This was a long-lasting struggle in which fashion ostensibly served as a proxy for conservative, reformist, or even more radical social and political agendas. Foreign dress and short queueless hair became a symbol for anti-Qing revolutionaries, who emphasized ethnic identities and the alleged suppression of the Han by the Manchu. However, the link between politics and appearance was much more complex as not only radical republican revolutionaries but also reformers, government officials, and even some members of the dynasty advocated new dress styles and short hair. The reasons for either advocating or opposing changes in dress and appearance were manifold and included social and cultural paradigms as well as political and economic objectives.

The new fashion was strongly inspired by military uniforms (junfu, junzhuang, rongfu, or zifu) and military-style clothing, with narrow cuts and body-hugging shapes, which gave the bearer a more dynamic appearance. The customary Qing period dresses began to change under the influence of the new style and the clothes of both urban men and women increasingly included elements like the high collar adapted from the uniforms of the New Armies. Wearing a military dress was forbidden for civilians but the body-hugging military uniform became the desired and imitated prime symbol for a “Western” or “modern” attire. It represented masculine vigor and energy and, at the same time, demanded and emphasized a well-trained, strong, and healthy body. Early Communists such as Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, for instance, viewed both the body and attire of Chinese men as representing weakness, slowness, and femininity. The new fashion they wanted to prescribe for everyone was linked to the changing perception of the body and the increasing popularity of physical culture. It emphasized a disciplined male body and emerged from the military reforms and the introduction of Prussian-style military uniforms at the turn of the century.

Military uniforms convey a variety of meanings. They can represent distinct symbols of the state or any other political authority, a social order, or ideological allegiance. They are a means to discipline individuals by bodily alignment and homogenization. Military uniforms embody and produce a
specific military identity as well as a concept of military masculinity. Military styles and dresses are adopted outside the army to allude to this masculinity, and the values and ideals attached to it. For instance, as Evelyn Rawski emphasizes, the Manchu dress was originally “made synonymous with martial vigor” as clothes and queue were designed to be convenient for fighting and horse riding. Civilian fashion, on the other hand, can influence dress styles in the military, which happened during the Ming and Song periods, and changing societal notions of gender and masculinity can affect the military and the dress of military people.

Although military clothing is connected to the changing needs of the battlefield, serving as protection or the identification of friend or foe, what counts as a soldierly appearance and represents the military (symbols, attire, and accessories) depends on different historical-cultural contexts and respective fashions. Every place and period in history had a distinct military “dress code.” In Europe, the introduction of standardized, properly defined, and regulated uniforms started in the seventeenth century out of tactical needs and a socio-political desire for order, which led to the development of regimental and even national uniforms. However, the argument for pragmatism is also determined by ephemeral contemporary perception and fashion. Since the first appearance of uniforms in Europe, styles changed constantly and this often depended on the personal taste of monarchs and lords. In the eighteenth century, the uniforms of some European armies were so tight that soldiers could not move certain parts of their body at all. Long hair was viewed as disruptive and even dangerous since firearms were introduced. However, as they could be bound, coiled, or trimmed, close-cropped hair expressed the need for discipline and order rather than a real military and tactical need. By the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans viewed queues as a sign of Oriental backwardness and effeminateness, even though armies such as the Prussian had only cut off their own braids barely a century earlier. Prussian uniform regulations from the eighteenth century not only focused on the design, color, and material of clothes but also on hairstyle, height, and other physical aspects, thus standardizing the bodies of soldiers.

Appearance, clothing, and hairstyle were strictly regulated in imperial and early Republican China. The introduction of new military uniforms at the beginning of the twentieth century not only had sartorial and politically symbolic effects but was also linked to the perception of the male body, to governance technologies, and to the reconceptualization of masculinity. The original military Manchu dress, which included pants and influenced the civilian garment of men during the Qing Dynasty, did not reveal much of the body. Physical strength and endurance were not unimportant for military people but there was no need, generally, to emphasize the physical body. Late Qing military reformers, however, viewed uniforms in relation to physical exercises, drills, and fighting; as a means to work upon and discipline the body of military men. Uniforms influenced the demeanor, posture, and gestures of an individual and they were essential to impose martial values and military-professional ideals. Chinese military reformers realized that military men had to change their appearance to count as both real men and real soldiers. Uniforms were essential for governing the performance of soldiers and officers as military men. They influenced their masculine identity, and produced and stabilized a military masculine figuration.

The introduction of German-style military uniforms to the New Armies affected and interacted with the appearance, self-presentation, and gender performance of “military men” or junren. The soldiers and officers of the New Armies not only dressed in a new way but also behaved and presented themselves differently, drawing on various body techniques, military rituals, and parades based on German and other foreign examples. Moreover, officers increasingly posed in front of the camera, thus facilitating the circulation of the image of military men in “Western-style” uniforms and the renewed concept of military masculinity. Eventually, members of the imperial family adopted the new military style, with the aim to rekindle a unifying national military culture. Subsequently, the leaders of the new Republic continued this agenda, contributing to the dissemination of the junren icon.

**DRESSING THE NEW ARMIES**

German instructors at Tianjin Military Academy (founded in 1885) were the first to introduce “Western-style” (xishi) uniforms to the Qing Empire. The academy’s cadets had to wear light khaki clothes with straw hats during the summer, and black cotton dresses and hats during the winter. Although the Brave Battalions already looked somewhat different from the regular Qing armies and some of them had adapted foreign uniform styles, they looked slovenly and untidy compared to the neat and uniform looking Japanese soldiers, who were wearing German-style uniforms. After the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese military reformers repeatedly and vehemently addressed the inconsistent and heterogeneous look and the lack of functionality of the customary military dress. For the New Armies to be accepted as a “modern” equal to the armies of the imperialist powers of the early twentieth century, “everyone [had] to be uniform” (dazhong yilai) and comply with the standards of military fashion and appearance of foreign powers.

The Self-Strengthening Army, the Newly Created Army, and the Tenacious Army (commanded by Nie Shicheng) gradually adopted the German uniform style, because of the strong influence of German instructors, military organization, and drills before 1900. The new uniforms should, above all,
be close-fitting and convenient. The soldiers of the Newly Created Army initially still looked very much like their predecessors, wearing a version of the haoyi with huge characters indicating their unit affiliations. Eventually, the first comprehensive manuals of 1898 and 1899 required that all soldiers wore black boots and simple black uniforms in winter, and khaki-brownish (literally “earth-colored”) uniforms in summer. They were prompted to take good care of their clothes, and keep them clean and orderly. The uniform should never be unheeded and always ready. Most important was a tidy and plain appearance, especially in public outside the barracks. Both in the Newly Created Army and the Self-Strengthening Army, German drillmasters inspected the condition of the soldiers’ uniforms, shoes, and hats, and their general appearance, which had to be soldierly and disciplined. Officers were not allowed to wear the long gown anymore. Only the highest military commanders, such as Yuan Shikai, were still allowed to choose between the new-style uniform and the customary official’s dress, which they were still required to wear when dealing with the court or the civilian bureaucracy.36

The image of the disciplined German military men became the desired ideal. Every German soldier, Shen Dunhe reported in his Description of the German Military System, had four sets of uniforms provided by his regiment and he was thus properly equipped for every circumstance.37 More than one uniform set seemed to be the best way to end the established practice of arbitrarily putting on and off different layers of clothes, which created the impression of uneven and sloppy troops. The soldiers of the New Armies eventually possessed at least two different sets of uniforms, one for summer and one for winter, which also had hygienic reasons.38 They were no longer responsible for acquiring their own clothes, as it was the case in the established regular Qing armies: a standardized outfit was provided by the centrally organized procurement and made possible by the beginning industrial manufacture of fabrics and clothes. Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi as well as Shen Dunhe and all other officials in the service of the Self-Strengthening Army were particularly concerned with the financing of new drill uniforms and the acquisition of new-style outfits, paying great attention to details, such as embellishments and badges, the color of the uniforms, and the material of trousers (“dark blue foreign twill”) and hats. The Self-Strengthening Army most directly copied the style of German armies and even sought to emulate the Prussian-blue uniforms. The German instructors in its service even requested to acquire German military bags, satchels (mantoubao), and leaden drinking bottles.39

The uniforms of the Beiyang Army, which evolved from the other early New Armies after the Boxer War, consisted of a grayish-brown cotton jacket, sateen-brimmed brownish felt hat, and simple cloth boots or puttees, which common soldiers usually had to acquire themselves. Officers possessed a drill uniform as well as a full dress uniform. They emulated the appearance of German officers and wore leather boots and a knee-length “German-style coat.”40 Moreover, the uniforms indicated individual ranks by colored stripes on the sleeves. The Beiyang Army introduced a color scheme modeled after the German army, which assigned a color to every branch of the army. The color red stood for the infantry, white for the cavalry, and yellow for the artillery. The worker’s corps (gong) was assigned to the color blue and the supply and equipment units (zichong) had the color purple, indicated on the shoulder epaulets.

The uniform style of the Beiyang Army served as a model for the Lijun, which basically kept the color classification system and added new colors for other units, such as green for the medical corps.41 In 1904, the Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu) highlighted the functional aspect of military clothing and demanded perfectly tight-fitting uniforms. It emphasized “particularly avoiding resplendent and flamboyant colors which easily attract the eye of the enemy.”42 According to the Bureau, “modern drill” (jinti caofa) required speed, flexibility, taking cover, and concealing oneself in battle. The uniform of the men thus had to correspond to these needs and had to be “tight-fitting to the body, flexible, and suiting.” In addition, the men should wear forage caps, which protected them from wind and sun, and thus made it easier to aim at targets.43

In early 1905, the Bureau for Military Training issued the Distinct and Illustrated Manual for Uniforms of the Army (Lijun yi chi xiangzi tuhaoo). It was compiled by senior military reformers, such as Yikuang, Tieliang, Yuan Shikai, and Xu Shichang, and introduced the design for the uniforms of the Lijun, including images and descriptions of jackets, trousers, hats, rank badges, shoulder emblems, insignia, ornamentation, and belts.44 The manual explained that “in East and West, military uniforms are more or less the same.” China, however, had avoided contact to the rest of the world. When students were sent abroad to study foreign armies or when foreign military advisors and observers came to China, they became aware of the “mixed and uneven” look of Qing soldiers and their sloppy, negligent, undisciplined, and unorganized appearance (fu yanzheng zhi xiang). “Having our own practices makes us a laughing stock (xiaobing),” the authors of the manual noted.45 Therefore, the soldiers should adopt the international style and put on tight clothes (duanfu) instead. Only when the “old look [was] washed away,” would foreign soldiers and officers respect the Chinese military men and consider them as equals. This would be the only way, the manual concluded, to make foreigners respect the Chinese “national essence” (guoti zhi dao). No item of the old-style military dresses should be kept, apart from certain objects, such as the marten hat for ceremonial functions. Officers were supposed to wear their uniforms all the time, even when off duty, and never mix it with another attire or embellishment. Adopting foreign military dress codes
was a way of "self-strengthening," the manual declared, and would help stir the martial spirit of the men and strengthen military power.  

The new uniforms consisted of a tight and well-fitting (heti) dress of "Western-style cut," which allowed full mobility during drill and combat. Waist and hip measurements as well as the length and width of sleeves were all taken into account. The design and material as well as the size of the various parts of the uniform, such as sleeves, shoulder emblems, and hat, were prescribed exactly. Trousers should be tight and well-fitted, not loose or wrinkled. The primary function of the new, German-style uniforms was to "protect [the] body-hull" (hu er shenwu) and thus had to be cleaned regularly and be bright and shiny.

While officers were wearing leather boots, common soldiers usually used slippers and puttees. The colors of the combat and drill uniforms of both officers and common soldiers were dark blue in winter and "earth-colored" (tuselhuangtuse) or khaki in summer. By the end of the nineteenth century, khaki uniforms, probably the first camouflage uniforms ever used on a standard basis, became fashionable among European armies, particularly among colonial troops. Originally, British troops copied the color from local warriors in India in the 1840s and khaki uniforms subsequently became the commonly used dress of British soldiers in the Second Boer War (1899-1902). The term khaki (kakase) derived from the Persian language and described both a fabric and its color. According to the Shanghai-based journal The Continental (Dala), it derived from the name of a river in Southern Africa. The journal reported how the Japanese Army had found the dying method for khaki and successfully introduced the new uniforms during the war against Russia, underlining their indispensability to soldiers and to warfare. The Russian army, on the other hand, only changed the color of their uniforms to "yellowish grey" after the war, as the Nanyang Military Journal reported.

Khaki uniforms, however, were not the only sartorial novelty and trend that the late Qing military reformers closely followed. After the turn of the century, many European armies started to introduce gray-colored uniforms. In 1907, the German army began to replace their customary blue with gray-colored uniforms. It started to experiment with different shades of gray until a compromise was officially found in 1910. Fan Xueqing argues that although the late Qing New Armies increasingly turned to the Japanese military as role model for military education and organization, the German military remained the benchmark for style and dress. In 1907, the New Armies also switched to gray cloth for both their summer and winter uniforms. Eventually the Army Ministry decided to follow the Japanese style when it came to the uniforms, which was originally modeled after the standard German military dress, and the German style when it came to the headdress. In reality, the Laju adopted elements from both the Japanese and German armies and combined them with Chinese elements in terms of embellishment. Generally speaking, while the rank and file soldiers, wearing puttees and a simple hat instead of a helmet, more resembled Japanese common soldiers, the officers emulated the look of their German counterparts.

Both officers and common soldiers possessed not only a common drill or combat uniform (changfu) but also a full dress uniform (lifu). The dress uniform of officers consisted of an azure-colored uniform jacket and, from 1907 on, black pants with red stripes, looking quite similar to the German full dress uniform. It included adorned sleeves, a sash, and a high collar decorated with a golden or, for officers of auxiliary units, silver dragon (feimang), which was introduced as the official emblem of the Qing Empire during the Taiping Rebellion. High-ranking officers additionally possessed a ceremonial uniform (da lifu) for imperial audiences, which consisted of the embroidered robe of officials, a peacock feather, and the customary round sable hat.

In 1906, Xu Shaozhen, commander of the Ninth Division in Jiangsu, criticized that many officers still neglected wearing the correct new uniforms and used their old hats. He was concerned about the negative effects of a flawed and inaccurate demeanor on the attitude and morale of the troops. The high-ranking official Duanfang, at the time governor-general of Liaoning, issued a similar communiqué emphasizing the significance of a uniform appearance and its direct effect on discipline. Spirit, he wrote, was a characteristic trait of qualified soldiers, which was expressed by an appropriate and correct appearance (yiyong). Other countries (geguo) had regulations on military etiquette, which insisted on a serious appearance, including both hair and dress, he emphasized. Li Jishen later summarized the meaning of correct uniforms in his manual for the army academy. If the clothing was not correct, it was difficult to assume the right posture and carry out orderly movements, and, furthermore, the "spirit could not flourish." The uniform should also be adapted to the current kind and level of training. According to Li, uniforms aroused the martial spirit of soldiers and inured them to the discipline in the army. They conveyed not only the "beauty of the regiment" but also a "reputation based on (martial) spirit." He argued that orderly clothes, like personal hygiene, were the responsibility of every individual man and part of their self-conduct. Uniforms were thus a technology to "cultivate the soldier's self-governance abilities" and to organize his own body (shen) or the body of their comrades in arms (zhanyou).

Chinese military reformers untiringly highlighted the utilitarian and functional aspects of the "Western" or German uniforms and pointed out that military dress had to adapt to new tactical and bodily requirements. The body had to be both protected and be able to move without any impediment. Most importantly, military reformers viewed uniforms as a tool to discipline men and stir their martial spirit. Correct and orderly uniforms were necessary...
for the correct movement, posture, and behavior of individual soldiers and important for the appearance of the army (junrong). The neat and tight-fitting uniforms of the Lujun emphasized physicality and thus influenced the social perception of the body and increased the popularity of exercising in the late Qing and early Republican China. Nevertheless military uniforms retained the gendering and socializing function generally attributed to clothing and fashion. Clothes conveyed status and prestige and, in this respect, European-style military uniforms were not different from the vesture of Qing bureaucrats. Since the new military men sought appreciation not only from foreign powers but also from the late Qing court, members of the elite, as well as common people, uniforms had to express reputation and social distinction, particularly in the case of the new officer caste. A translation of a German text in the Nanyang Military Journal, titled On the Duty of Military Men, thus emphasized: “for German men, the uniform means honor.”

The Bureau for Military Training stipulated that the new uniforms clearly showed the rank of any soldiers and made officers easily recognizable as such. Rank and dress were closely connected and together with new uniforms, the Lujun introduced a new rank and command structure. This newly established hierarchy combined both the traditional nine ranks systems for civilian and military officials and the trisection of military ranks into commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, and common soldiers, which was the standard in Europe, the United States, and Japan. Based on the rank system of the Beiyang Army, the Qing government separated the Lujun officers into three different grades: senior, ordinary or middle, and lower or junior. Every grade was further divided into three levels, constituting altogether nine different ranks (the system was called sandeng jiujie). Although the new rank system was modeled after foreign patterns, the actual naming followed the titles of the Banner troops. Senior officers were called dutong, middle grade officers were called canling, and the lower ranks were referred to as jiaoxiao. Consequently, the highest-ranking officer in the Lujun was called zhengdutong, which was originally the title of the head of a single Banner (often translated as “Tartar General”) and, in both cases, officially corresponded to the rank of governor-general. Similarly, canling was originally the designation for the commander of a Banner unit of approximately 1500 men. In addition to the three officer grades, there were three different grades each of noncommissioned officers and common soldiers. Like lower grade officers, they had the color of their respective military branch stitched on their uniform. Auxiliary and specialist units, such as medical, veterinarian, logistics, survey, and musical corps as well as armorers, juridical personnel, inspectors, secretaries, civilian officials, and clerks, were given supernumerary ranks, which were later fitted into the regular rank structure. In November 1909, the government decreed the ranks of Lujun officers to be equal to the corresponding
civil ranks, thus strongly upvaluing the newly emerging military elite within the ritual universe of Qing society and polity. Military men increasingly became desirable men, symbolizing power, and representing and performing a concept of masculinity that idealized martial spirit, professionalism, and discipline through their appearance.

MILITARY ETIQUETTE

The New Armies not only adopted foreign-style military clothing but also ways of individual bearing, comportment, and movement and established new rules of military etiquette and conduct based on foreign models. Generally speaking, social and ceremonial etiquette largely determine how someone behaves and moves under certain circumstances. Like uniforms, etiquette or rules of behavior were important for performing military masculinity. The author Jianfei emphasized in the Nanyang Military Journal that “etiquette (liyi) indicate the status of a person.” He continued:

Military men act as representatives of the citizens and are the essence of the nation. [...] Foreign military observers often pay attention to whether the [Chinese] troops comply with [military] etiquette and judge the strength of the army and the prosperity of the nation accordingly. If the [rules of] etiquette are not observed, then the quality of the people is not correct. If one does not [behave] correctly, he affects his whole regiment.

Apart from general good behavior, New Armies soldiers and officers were expected to fulfill the “international” standards of military courtesy and conduct to be accepted as real military men. Uniforms were a decisive element (re-)producing a concept of military masculinity in early twentieth century China. But besides uniforms, the New Armies adopted verbal commands and other military usage, rituals, gestures, and etiquettes from German and Japanese military culture. Military reformers propagated the use of verbal drill commands (kouling), postures, salutes, and other elements of military courtesy as an essential part of the new foreign-style drill and military culture, and absolutely necessary for establishing a functioning military organization and hierarchy. Tao Shumao punned that orders (mingling) were the lifeblood (mingmao) of commanders during war. Enlisted men were obliged to greet or stand at attention when meeting a superior officer. The uniform, indicating the position in the military hierarchy, engendered clearly defined behavior and gestures, such as salutes or bows. For instance, an early manual for Howitzer canons, the Key to the German Army Officers Drill (Deguo Iushi caofa rumen yaojue) written by Bian Changsheng for Yuan Shikai and the
Newly Created Army, paid much attention to the verbal commands used to instruct the members of a gun team. Although the New Armies did not use German as everyday language, commands and orders were fashioned after the succinct and sharp speech of the German military, as was the case in Japan.

In 1905, the Bureau for Military Training issued a Code of Conduct in Army Quarters (Lujun xingying lijie), which regulated manners and etiquette between military men. The code detailed the so-called four categories (sigang), the etiquettes that applied (1) when a common soldier beheld an officer, (2) when a soldier and an officer actually met, (3) when a military unit encountered another unit, (4) when military men drilled. The code, moreover, dealt with the right order of courtesy, called list of five points (wumao): (1) fixing the eyes on another person, (2) standing at attention, (3) saluting, and (4+5) presenting the gun or sword. Only officers paying respect to a superior or a foreigner, which involved a kowtow or shaking hands, were exempted from this sequence. Concerning uniforms, the code stated that, apart from specific circumstances, officers always had to wear the appropriate military dress. The four categories of interaction or sigang regulated every imaginable circumstance of encounters. For instance, a common soldier had to stop five to six foot in front of an officer when entering a room. Moreover, it was strictly regulated when he had to salute, depending on the place he met an officer. For officers, the code included regulations concerning the drawing and sheathing of the sword, as well as the right posture and look when meeting a superior. When facing an officer, all men should have a "vigorou spirit" (zhengchen jingshen) in their eyes. When standing at attention, both officer and common soldiers had to put their weight on the left foot. Only generals should put their weight on the right foot. While saluting, the index and middle finger touched the hat, the palm pointing outside. Similarly, the code meticulously regulated how officers had to draw their sword and how soldiers had to present their gun, including the exact position of all body parts.

Similar but more concise rules of military courtesy were listed in the small drill booklets distributed among soldiers in the final years of the Qing Dynasty. The Revised Infantry Drill Methods emphasized that "the way of saluting and facing [other] soldiers must be trained frequently and cannot be taken lightly." For officers, the booklet detailed the use of the sword (in fact a saber), including explanations on when to draw it, how to hold and wield it, and how to position various parts of the body and one's posture while operating it. Saluting with the sword could be done by holding it in front of the body or by stretching one's sword arm with the blade pointing down. No differences were made in this case between the different ranks of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Another drill book, the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods commanded that all officers had to wear a sword, apart from those working in administration. Furthermore, it described the correct presentation of a unit's flag. The army flag or military banner (jungi) was very important for the morale of troops but its significance had been ignored by "East Asian soldiers," Tang Zhongyong explained in an article. According to him, martial spirit was the "line of honor and reputation (and the martial spirit) not only of the army or a regiment but also of the entire nation, its citizens, and the emperor. It was the emperor, who conferred the regimental flag to the soldiers and to whom they had to return it. This was the case, for instance, in Japan as well as in France during the Franco-German War 1870–1871. Losing the flag therefore, Tang concluded, was the biggest shame for any soldier.

Military reformers were anxious to appropriate aspects of foreign military culture such as codes of courtesy and etiquette to fit into the standards of foreign armies and diplomats. For instance, the failure to behave properly toward foreign navy or army commanders was punishable for Chinese officers. More importantly, military reformers recognized that, in order to successfully introduce new forms of military organization and improve the social standing of the army, the behavior and conduct of Chinese military men had to be in accordance with "Western" military etiquette and appearance. Apart from uniforms, gestures and objects had to be acculturated and used in the right way. Horse riding and sword fighting, for instance, alluded to ideal of man-to-man combat and signified rank as well as an honor, military masculinity, and noble manliness. Already in 1896, Liu Kunyi requested the introduction of the European-style saber (waiyang madao, literally an "overseas horse blade") produced by the German company Carlowitz and Co. An article in the Nanyang Military Journal later explained that "today, the education of both common soldiers and the officer corps include lessons in swordsman ship (jianshu)." According to the author, Qi Guohuang, the (intangible) advantage of sword training was, that, once the students mastered sword fighting, they would have the "will and mettle to take on [every] enemy. Their spirit will be calm and their demeanor (jushi) composed." The other, more tangible advantage was the positive effect on the physical education of those practicing with the sword. For this reason, swordsmanship was not only suitable for military men but also for (ordinary) citizens. "Our East Asian race," Qi wrote, "has an inferior physique compared to Western Europeans." Lifestyle and habits prevented the body from developing, he argued, but swordsmanship, riding, (military) gymnastics, and other physical exercises would help tone for this lack and militarize the citizenry (jun guomin). High boots, as part of the military uniform, were a particularly iconic symbol embodying military masculinity. Shen Dunhe and the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Army viewed the persistent and water-resistant "Western-style leather-boots" (xi shi quanpixue) as indispensable for implementing the foreign-style drill.
with simple, sometimes half-leather, walking boots, the officers of the New Armies adopted the knee-length black leather riding boots worn by Japanese and German officers. These high boots were originally designed for the cavalry but as an allusion to mounted nobility, they symbolized an exalted or even aristocratic status and were popular among high-ranking officers in Europe, the United States, and Japan. As Chinese officers emulated the style of foreign military elites, knee-length leather boots became a distinctive marker for officers and leaders. They represented a clear counter piece to the scholar-official’s robe and stood for military preparedness and martial spirit.

Compared to the dresses of military officials, the New Armies officers looked plain and simple. In 1902, Zhang Zhidong explicitly banned the old robe entirely from the Hubei New Army (the later Eighth Division). Officers should represent and visibly embody the break with the figure of the customary military official, who rode in a sedan chair, was accompanied by grooms, and not even bearing weapons. Instead, the ideal new military man was a disciplined officer, who exercised and took care of his sword and horse himself, and whose appearance demonstrated his willingness and eagerness to fight in an honorable and noble way. Horsemanship was viewed as one of the most sophisticated martial skill during the Qing and earlier dynasties, and horses often symbolized the military, masculinity, and imperial authority. In Europe, since the First World War, horses no longer played a significant role in actual battle but the mastery of horse riding was still a significant matter for military elites. The use of the cavalry was criticized as outdated and militarily worthless but horses and riding were a way for Chinese officers to link themselves to both European military elites and a past martial tradition. Horses symbolized martial heroism and were regularly depicted in military journals (see, for instance, Figure 3.1).

**CUTTING OLD QUEUES**

The introduction of the new military look, including uniforms and hairstyles encountered much resistance. Apart from economic difficulties to supply and provide standardized uniforms in times of early industrial production and financial shortage, various factions strongly opposed the introduction of “Western-style” uniforms. Already in 1900, as a sign of allegiance with the Righteous Harmonious Society (Boxer Movement) and to avoid confusion with foreign armies, Empress Dowager Cixi and the court commanded the New Armies to return to the “old” drill and clothing style. While most officials and military leaders, such as Nie Shicheng and Zhang Zhidong complied to the order, Yuan Shikai as well as many high officials in the south

of the Qing Empire simply ignored it. They sought to continue the military reform process and also wished to preserve their good relations with foreign diplomats and representatives. After the end of the Boxer War, the return to the old military livery was officially cancelled but many conservative officials continued to disapprove of the foreign military dress style. They viewed the uniforms as empty and poor, and a few demanded to go back to the allegedly more magnificent dress of the past. Cixi rebuked the introduction of new uniforms and a change of dress regulations for officials and military officers, at least during official ceremonies and occasions. In 1905, the monthly newspaper Wanguo Gongbao quoted her saying: “changing to Western clothes is absolutely not possible now. When I am gone, you can do what you want and change what you want.” New uniforms for both common soldiers and officers were introduced nevertheless and the style eventually became part of the understanding of the new military circles.

Military uniforms also became a popular attire and symbol desired by the civilian elite since foreign clothing styles became increasingly fashionable
in urban Chinese cities after the turn of the century, including “Western” suits and military-style clothing. Still, “people outside of military circles,” were prohibited from wearing military uniforms. Although the government, military reformers, and the New Armies promoted military values and sought to increase the social standing of military men, they strictly controlled and restricted the use of army insignia and clothes. The main concern was that men who misbehaved while wearing military uniforms and pretending to be soldiers could harm the reputation of the army, as was reported in a case in Hunan in 1908.79 The army leadership sought to preserve the positive image of the 
junren, who, by 1911, widely counted as highly qualified men who valued a “strong will and heroic heart, appearance, strength, sternness” and were “filled with the spirit to conquer rivers and mountains” (qitian heyue).80 Furthermore, restricting the use of military uniforms had deep political implications: anti-Qing revolutionaries increasingly wore uniforms as a symbol against the seemingly outmoded and old-fashioned dynasty. For many progressive military reformers and (Qing loyal) officers this posed a dilemma as they also viewed particularly the queue as a sign of effeminacy, similar to revolutionaries.

After the foundation of the 

The promulgation of an official military dress code, an increasing number of officers and cadets became uncomfortable with the customary hairstyle and perceived it as unhygienic, unmanly, and unfitting to the appearance of the new military men. Along with policemen, they were gradually allowed to shorten their queues but not to entirely remove it.81 Cadets and officers in the cities of Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and Anqing as well as in Yunnan province reportedly cut off their queues without being severely punished. Others made efforts to conceal their queue by coiling it and cramming it under a cap. Many Chinese students, who were enrolled in military academies in Japan, sought to copy their Japanese instructors and fellow students, and removed their queues completely. In 1907, however, the Ministry of Education and Army Ministry jointly announced to punish students returning without a queue or, in the case of civilians, wearing “Western-style” clothes, such as suits or military-style student jackets.82 The army leadership, while showing understanding for cadets in Japan and other foreign countries cutting their hair, still ordered all officers to refrain from removing their queues. Military leaders were afraid of mutual mockery and discord between those who had cut off their queues and those who had not. In order to upkeep uniformity and discipline, all 

The majority of officers followed the regulations and kept their customary hairstyle, which many viewed as a symbol of loyalty to the Qing and token of their identity as Chinese men, despite the affinity to the new military fashion.
welcome Yinchang at the train station in Beijing wearing military uniforms. In the same year, the Army Ministry issued a decree, which commanded officers to constantly wear their army uniform in public, as Huang demanded earlier. The decree particularly aimed at officers who held a rank in the old regular Qing forces prior to joining the New Armies. The only exception was an audience with the emperor where they had to wear the customary official’s dress and decorations, such as the richly ornamented, red-and-black cone hat (dingdai). Otherwise, they had to wear their Lujun uniforms, which indicated their actual rank within the new military hierarchy. The Liangjiang Office for Supervision and Training, in charge of the Nanyang or southern divisions, reiterated this regulation after observing that many officers of the middle ranks did not wear their uniforms on the drill grounds. For the sake of “establishing the discipline and appearance of the army” (li junrong), officers of all levels and areas of specialization had to wear their uniforms to both secure their authority and provide a role model for common soldiers. The General Staff, in charge of appointing division commanders and provincial staff officers, was particularly anxious about the appearance of higher-ranking and staff officers. Already in 1909, the military regulations stated: “the style and insignia of uniforms of staff officers must express a difference [to other officers]. Everywhere in the world, [staff officers’] uniforms look imposing (huangguan) and respectable.” While (staff) cadets, that is their bodies, should already appear to be of “strong physique and healthy nature, free from injuries and diseases,” the uniform of staff officers in particular should emulate the “international style.”

**VISUALIZING MILITARY MASCULINITY**

The image of the junren was circulated widely, as both a mental representation and an actual photographic picture. Numerous photographs of officers produced after the turn of the century contributed to the staging of both the New Armies and the figure of the military man. Photographs depicted officers wearing German-Japanese uniforms, winter coats, hats, and leather boots, often holding European-style sabers, which were demonstratively placed in front of the body. At first sight, such photographic portrayals of Chinese officers, including posture and body language, were rather unusual, as their appearance resembled foreign officers. Eventually, however, these images reproduced the emerging concept of military masculinity and disseminated it to a wider audience.

The large majority of photographs showed Chinese New Armies officers posing in front of the camera for a group photograph, or during overseeing drills as well as counsel and instruction sessions. In the latter case, they were arranged in a half-circle around a map, table, or a commanding officer, so the
camera could get an unobstructed view (see for instance Figure 3.2). Most officers were photographed in smaller groups, which was supposed to express a certain esprit de corps. Other reasons for group pictures were the high costs of individual photographs and the generally low standing of portraiture pictures (for instance, as paintings or drawings), which became popular in China only with the introduction of photography in the nineteenth century. Individual portraiture photographs became also more popular with officers and symbolized military heroism and exemplary leadership. Despite the New Armies’ emphasis on unity and coherence, officers aspired after the European ideal of the valiant and outstanding officer rather than the mass of soldiers and presented themselves accordingly in photographs.

This self-presentation is most tangible in photographs that included both new-style officers and men wearing old-style garments (often, though, with an already altered, narrower cut). In one photograph (Figure 3.3), two men, possibly scribes or secretaries, are wearing civilian “Chinese-style” dresses and displaying an entirely different posture than the military men. In an exemplary manner, such photographs recorded and juxtaposed not only two competing clothing styles, with all their political implications, but also two correlating concepts of masculinity. The New Armies used photographs to convey an image as well as a particular idea of soldiering and manliness in accordance with the “international” style, which should testify to the resurrection of military strength. The potential audience of these photographs included foreigners as well as Chinese civilians and military men, who should be inspired and mobilized by soldiers performing calisthenics or apparatus gymnastics and by officers proudly presenting their disciplined and self-confident demeanor. Although the number and volume of print media started to rocket in the final days of the Qing Dynasty, there is no exact data on the actual access to photographs of the New Armies men. However, for the large urban areas and the officer corps and army divisions themselves, the degree of circulation was, assumedly, still significant. More importantly, while photographs had the purpose to influence a wider audience, they were also an active form of self-staging and self-performing, particularly in the case of individual and group portraiture pictures of military men. Imitation and mimicry of the German-Japanese military style influenced the identity and self-presentation of New Armies soldiers and officers. The performance of the body and the self in front of the lens contributed to the formation and expression of the identity of these men (and those who wanted to be like them) and their conception of masculinity.

Leading military reformers, whether military officers or civilians, such as Yuan Shikai, Tieliang, Yinchang, Dunfang, and Shen Dunhe had their portraiture photograph taken dressed in a military uniform. During the large war games in 1905 and 1906 (see Chapter 4), foreign observers explicitly noticed that Yuan and Tieliang appeared exclusively in military uniforms instead of the robes of officials, which would have been appropriate according to established customs. Early on, Yuan was conscious of the significance of images and photographs and he reportedly had his portrait (probably in military clothing) hanging in every barrack. The Germanophile reformer Yinchang almost entirely appeared in military uniform (see also Figure 3.5). He had received a German language education at the Translator’s College in Beijing, which he continued in Berlin from 1877 on. He also attended a military academy in Germany, where he was trained in military drill and technology. After returning to China, he became part of the faculty of the Beiyang Military Preparatory School in Tianjin, first as head of the language program, later as the head director. During the Boxer War, he supported Yuan Shikai and Li Hongzhang in dealing with the Germans in Shandong. In 1901, he accompanied the young Zaifeng, brother of the Guangxu Emperor and father of the future Xuantong Emperor, on an atonement tour to Germany, where he became a Chinese ambassador in the same year. In 1906, he was appointed vice-president of the Army Ministry and, subsequently, also commander of the Seventh Lujuan division. He served again as minister to the German Empire from 1908 to 1910, before he became head of the Army Ministry and first bearer of the title minister (dachen) of the same institution. During the Wuchang Uprising, Yinchang was appointed commander of the forces, which
unsuccessfully tried to quell the revolution. After 1911, he served as a staff officer in the military administration of Yuan Shikai.

Although he was criticized for only having very theoretical knowledge of military affairs, Yinchang was very engaged in the reorganization of the military administration and reformed the New Armies’ military legal structures during his tenure as Army Minister. However, his efforts to give the government and military bureaucracy a more martial character received greater attention. Yinchang was very sympathetic to Germany, in particular its military culture, and he was very eager to promote a German-style patriotic and militaristic society, in which soldiers and officers were given great respect and kudos. He preferred wearing German-style military uniforms and even grew a mustache in the same trademark-style of the German emperor Wilhelm II, whose personal favor he reportedly enjoyed. Yinchang was fluent in German and married to a German woman, who he brought with him to China. Upon becoming Minister of the Army, he announced he would assume office in uniform and ordered that everyone working for the ministry, including all civilians, had to wear one. Old ways of greeting and gestures were replaced by the military salute. Yinchang furthermore supported basic military education in schools for all levels and campaigned to increase the military character of both the government and the imperial clan.102

THE PRINCES’ NEW CLOTHES

Eventually, the highest dynastic circles among Prince Regent Zaifeng supported the aim of military reformers such as Yinchang, who aimed at militarizing society and endowing the government with a more martial—and by implication more “Western” masculine—appearance. After the death of both the Guangxu Emperor and his aunt, the Empress Dowager Cixi, in November 1908, a group of young princes installed an “Imperial Kinsmen’s Cabinet” or “Manchu Cabal,” led by Zaifeng, who inherited the title of Prince Chun and who was also the father of the new child emperor Puyi.103 As the old guard vanished—Zhang Zhidong died in 1909 and Yuan Shikai was forced to retire—the Manchu Cabal distributed most high government offices, including the administration and command of the army, to members of the imperial family (Aisin Gioro) and loyal Bannermen. Only Yikuang remained in office and became the first prime minister of the newly created government cabinet in 1911.

Reforming the Qing state and its bureaucracy continued, but there was an even stronger tendency to promote military values and militarize culture. Zaifeng and his advisors returned to emphasize the German army as the ultimate military role model, for instance, by using the General Staff to secure central control over the army and make the command structure more efficient. They sought to elevate the status of military culture at court by adopting the image of military masculinity embodied by the German emperor Wilhelm II and by referring to the martial tradition of the Qing Dynasty and the Eight Banners.104 Zaifeng himself was deeply impressed by German military culture since he visited the German Empire in 1901 on an official mission to apologize for the alleged atrocities of the Boxers committed against the Germans.105 He was the first member of the imperial family ever to leave the Qing Empire and he recorded both his schedule and impressions in a travelogue. Already on the ship to Germany, Zaifeng adored the discipline and diligence of the German soldiers aboard, who exercised twice a day and cleaned their gun every afternoon, as he noted. Impressed by the neat and “flawless” weapons and uniforms, which were closely inspected and paraded once a week, he concluded: “one can really see why the spirit of the German army is the most acknowledged in Europe.”106

Zaifeng’s schedule in Germany included visiting galleries, the zoo in Berlin, the Krupp iron works in Essen, various shipyards, the Rhine valley, and ore mines. During his journey, he was exposed to the meticulously performed military splendor of both the German military and the imperial German court. Only 18 years old, he and his escorts Zhang Ji and Yinchang attended small drill exercises, large war games, military music performances, and parades, and visited military academies and arsenals. After observing an exercise of 1200 men near Potsdam, Zaifeng remarked: “When I arrived, I was shown respect with drawn swords. Although this was not a big exercise, one could see the condition of the German army from their shiny uniforms and their orderly march.”107 Near Danzig, the group attended a large-scale, joint war game over several days, involving infantry and cavalry troops as well as music, hunting, provisioning, and naval units. Zaifeng also met Prince Heinrich, Wilhelm’s brother, who was responsible for showing the Qing prince around. Although Heinrich was actually a navy commander, he was in charge of the cavalry during the exercise.108

During his time in Germany, Zaifeng was deeply impressed by Wilhelm II, who, in the martial tradition of the Prussian imperial house, was pursuing a military career and usually wearing a military dress uniform that he designed himself. Wilhelm II was obsessed with parades and war games, which he often attended with his sons or other members of his extended family.109 Full of awe, the Qing prince described the German emperor as a great huntsman, who owned a personal stud with about 200 “stout and spirited horses.” Later, after having dinner with Wilhelm II and his generals, Zaifeng was granted the Order of the Red Eagle, which was usually bestowed upon members of foreign troops.110 In Germany, Zaifeng not only personally experienced what many in the Qing Empire viewed as a powerful nation-state, with a highly
cherished military culture, but he also encountered an imperial family, which emphasized and displayed that military service was the most important tradition of their dynasty. Its members assumed important roles in the command of both the army and navy, and emperor Wilhelm II himself was a popular and notorious symbol of military masculinity and the glorification of military culture in Germany.

On his return trip to the Qing Empire, Zaifeng met the Siamese king Chulalongkorn’s son, along with his entourage, who received a military education in Germany and were “able to drill in German.” The group was on its way back home for vacation, after which they would return to Germany to continue their training and studies. Zaifeng commented: “this, one can call determination!” After assuming power in late 1908, he, his brothers, and advisors sought to emulate the military splendor of the Prussian-German court and German notion of military masculinity to demonstrate strength toward inner and outer enemies and to show their readiness to lead the New Armies. They established a new imperial guard, took over the leading positions of military command and administration, underscored the role of the emperor as commander-in-chief over all armed forces, and promoted martial values and “Western-style” military uniforms, which many members of the “Manchu Cabal” were wearing themselves. Probably inspired by Wilhelm II and Prince Heinrich, who were both obsessed with warships and naval warfare, Zaifeng even planned to reestablish a fleet, which military reformers had completely ignored since the defeat of the Betyang fleet in 1895. In July 1909, the government installed a Commission to Reorganize the Navy (Chouban haijun shiwuchu), which was transformed into a full Navy Ministry (Haijunbu) at the end of the following year. Zaifeng’s half-brother Zaixun and Su Zhenbing, who undertook several tours together to Japan, Europe, and the United States to study the organization of naval forces, were in charge of the new ministry.112

Central to (re-)establishing the martial image of the Qing government and propelling military culture (and linking it, at the same time, to the Qing Dynasty) was the physical body of the emperor. In 1898, Kang Youwei suggested that the emperor should set an example by cutting his hair and changing his dress, so that both officials and commoners would follow his example. Short hair and clothes, he argued, would inspire the country’s martial vigor and create a new spirit. In the United States and in Europe, people had cut off their queues a long time ago, which had the effect that everyone (theoretically) became a soldier and the countries were able to cope with the rapid development of technology and military science of the last decades. Similar to the Japanese, the Chinese had to adapt this fashion to prevent them from being mocked at and invaded. “To change the senses of the people, [one has to] lead them to martial vigor, similar to [the martial vigor of] Europeans and Americans,” he stated.113

Kang did not directly call on the emperor to wear a military uniform but the insinuation was obvious. The image of foreign rulers in military uniforms, which underpinned the martial tradition of foreign imperial houses and their claim to rule, was known throughout the Qing Empire. For instance, against the background of the Russo-Japanese War, one of the most influential and wildly circulated Chinese periodicals of the first half of the twentieth century, the Dongfang zazhi (Eastern Miscellany), opened its first issue in 1904 with photographs of the Japanese Tsuru Mutsuhito and the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, both wearing full dress military uniforms. The sixth issue contained a similar picture of Wilhelm II (Figure 3.4).114 Picturing these three emperors not only served the purpose to inform the readers but also presented them an alternative male role model that symbolized military culture and political power. Each emperor was, officially, the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the respective state. Wilhelm II was formally the Oberster Dienstherr (supreme commander) of all German armed forces and had indeed enjoyed a military education from early childhood. Photographs of him were omnipresent in Germany and conveyed an ideal and iconic military “hyper-masculinity.” Wilhelm II and his court carefully controlled all photographs and in most pictures—predominately portraits in the style of military paintings—he was dressed in uniform or military gear, assuming a stalwart and firm pose and displaying a self-possessed and patriarchic charisma. During the First World War, photographs of Wilhelm II were distributed widely to soldiers to increase their fighting spirit. However, while many Germans idolized him and his image, this almost religious worship115 and Wilhelm’s vanity and pretentiousness became the object of mockery and satire in both Germany and other European countries.116

In Japan, a similar image of Mutsuhito was depicted in photographs and woodblock prints, showing his transformation from a delicate and frail person into a hypermasculine “Western-style” military man. The previously noble and androgynous image of the emperor changed in the 1880s, as he was portrayed in the pose and attire of European monarchs, wearing a ceremonial military uniform, saber, mustache, and beard.117 The military image of Mutsuhito served the aim of promoting military values, spiritual unity, and “Western-style” military culture and established a link between the army, the ruling dynasty, and the nation-state. Moreover, through schools and the army, the emperor in uniform impressed upon men and boys a Euro-American concept of military masculinity. Like the German emperor, he was viewed as a patriarchic role model and the soldiers were conceived as his “sons.”118 With the establishment of conscription armies in both Japan and Germany, this metaphorical father-son relationship between emperor and soldiers was extended to all male citizens. The Meiji oligarchy around Hidetsugu Hirohumi planned to give the Japanese emperor a military education so he would be able to actually
assume the supreme command of the military. However, unlike the German Kaiser, the Japanese Tenno remained to be a symbolic figure and had no real political or military power.\footnote{110}

From 1906, a movement to introduce a constitutional monarchy in China demanded that the Qing emperor assumed a similar military masculine role. Duanfang, one of five senior officials who traveled to Japan, the United States, and Europe in 1905–1906 to inspect different political and administrative systems, recommended in a memorial that the Qing should copy the martial appearance and spirit of the German imperial family.\footnote{110} He spent most of his time in Germany during his journey and recommended adopting the German military organization as a model for the Qing Empire, including the administration of army and navy as well as the system of training soldiers. Duanfang was a Chinese Bannerman, who, typically for a high Qing official,

successively held several high posts throughout his career, including the office of governor-general of Liangjiang. Moreover, he was particularly engaged in foreign policy and education, establishing schools and libraries and encouraging students to study abroad. Military strength, he argued, was not only the result of technical skills but also of “promoting morale” (chang shiqi). “Even if one possesses good technology and refined machines—how can these develop craft and science […] and discipline the army and utilize morale?” To boost troop morale, the emperor and his family should wear military dress (rongfu). In East and West, Duanfang wrote, whether monarchy or democracy, all the heads of state wore a military dress. They were the supreme commanders of army and navy and supervised and lead everyone serving in the military. “Real [control] over the military administration is the right of the monarch. No official can interfere. For instance, [this is the case in Germany, where] the imperial family leads the army and Oversees the conduct of war games.” The Russian Emperor, he continued, was similarly putting himself in danger, reviewed new soldiers, and encouraged his officers. As a sign of esteem, other countries and their leaders also honored their soldiers with banquets. “The monarch is bound to wear a uniform and take care of things!” If the monarch of a country complied with this, then the martial esteem of the people would rise and glory would be attributed to those joining the army. The strength and prosperity of the country would increase, he concluded.\footnote{112}

Duanfang’s memorial, reprinted in the Nanyang Military Journal, went on evoking the (lost) martial tradition of the imperial clan, including the affection for horse riding, archery, and hunting. His journey to the United States and Europe left him with the strong impression that the Chinese had to militarize and become manlier in the eyes of foreigners. He remembered how bystanders in military uniforms had chuckled during an audience with a foreign monarch, because he and his companions were wearing the customary long gown of Qing officials as well as queues. Only with the help of the emperor and the imperial family, he argued, could this shame and ridiculous be stopped and the urgently needed militarization of all aspects of culture and society be truly implemented. The challenges from within and from outside made it necessary to revive the martial spirit and military preparedness of the imperial clan, which had to be exhibited to inspire the people and intimidate foreign enemies. The Qing emperor had to assume an active role within the military by becoming the supreme commander of the army and navy. This should also be fixed in a future constitution. Moreover, the emperor should always wear a military uniform and, together with his kinsmen, regularly review the army. He would then receive the revere of officials, commoners, and foreign diplomats, and add respect to the military profession.\footnote{112}

Duanfang emphasized that the implementation of a martial culture was not the emperor’s responsibility alone, but lay also with the sons of the (Banner)
nobility and the imperial family. For a thousand years, the Chinese had possessed culture but no martial spirit, he argued. Cadets studying abroad experienced the respect military men received from the people in their countries. However, they were not able to truly grasp the glamour, pride, and heroism of the foreign military men. The Banner noblemen, with their aristocratic and martial Manchu background, should be the first to go to Germany, Japan, or another powerful country to learn everything about the different military units, study a specialist subject within military science, and even join a regiment there. Upon their return, they could hand down their knowledge to young cadets. The imperial family, Duanfang wrote, particularly had the obligation to be engaged in military affairs and embrace martial culture. In Germany, he emphasized, all princes as well as the sons of the noble families joined the military. The emperor’s brother Heinrich was a fleet admiral and two of the emperor’s sons were generals in the Prussian army. The members of the imperial Qing clan, on the other hand, had lost their martial skills of the past and their morale was corrupted for almost a hundred years. They should go abroad and join a foreign army, so that they would gain power as well as the respect of foreigners.\(^{123}\)

Other reformers echoed Duanfang’s plea for reviving the Qing or Manchu martial tradition under foreign parameters. In an article on military education, Tao Shumo similarly emphasized the role model function of the emperor. “Every country’s monarch,” he wrote, “must in person be the commander-in-chief. [He should] furthermore graduate from a military academy and attend the autumn war games.”\(^{124}\) Other articles demanded that the Qing imperial clan needed to emulate the members of the Japanese imperial family, who were attending war games and reviewed troops.\(^{125}\)

Zaifeng, after becoming Prince Regent in late 1908, adopted the idea to turn the emperor and his kin into martial role models. Strongly influenced by his visit to Germany and attendance at military parades and exercises, he decided to emulate the German Empire and imperial family as early as 1905. In the same year, Prince Friedrich Leopold, a relative of the German emperor, who was assigned to counsel the Russian side during the Russo-Japanese War, officially visited the Qing Empire and brought gifts for Cixi, including a photograph of Wilhelm II. But more importantly, Friedrich Leopold and Zaifeng discussed the “issue of arming the imperial clan,” referring to the establishment of a new imperial or palace guard, the martial image of the Qing Dynasty, and central imperial control over the military.\(^{126}\)

In July 1909, Zaifeng declared the emperor commander-in-chief to all troops (daoyanshui), as it was outlined in the draft for the future constitution promulgated by Cixi shortly before her death. Zaifeng himself would assume the function as commander-in-chief until his son, the child emperor Puyi, would come off age.\(^{127}\) Moreover, the court created the new rank of general (daijiangjun or jianguan), which was equal to the rank of a grand secretary. From now on, the court directly appointed all officers from the rank of fucangling (Lieutenant-Colonel, the fifth overall rank) or higher. The next step was the reorganization of the military bureaucracy and the further centralization of military command at the government. Zaifeng removed the General Staff Council (Jianzichu), previously a mere counseling agency, from the jurisdiction of the Army Ministry and made it an independent institution directly at the service of the emperor, which was renamed into General Staff Office (Jianziju) in 1911. Copying the German and Japanese model, the General Staff was no longer only in charge of developing long-term strategic planning but also responsible for appointing, overseeing, and educating staff officers. The idea was to develop it into a full-fledged supreme army command after the model of the German General Staff. Yulang, a young imperial prince, and Zaitao were appointed to head the General Staff Office. Two more seasoned (and actual) generals, Feng Guozhang and Ha Hanzhang, who had received his military education in Japan, assisted the two princes.\(^{128}\) Moreover, the government hired three new German military advisors, including Major Richard Dinkelmann, to instruct Chinese military academy instructors and thus improve the education of staff officers.\(^{129}\)

By making the emperor the explicit supreme commander of all forces and by creating and controlling an ultimate command institution, the General Staff, Zaifeng and the “Manchu Cabal” sought to reclaim imperial sovereignty and central authority.\(^{130}\) In theory, the emperor was already the supreme commander of all military forces, but reconfirming this role was an attempt to represent and constitute political power. By turning the emperor into the prime example of a military masculine man, Zaifeng and his entourage sought to bind the loyalty of military men to the dynasty, impressing both foreigners and the Chinese, and re-unifying the disintegrating multi-ethnic empire. Restoring the image of the emperor and the imperial clan as a military masculine figures would turn them into role models, awaken the martial spirit of the people, increase the social appeal and prestige of the army, and earn the respect of foreigners. In September 1909, repeating the earlier proposals by Kang Youwei and Duanfang, Zaitao and Yulang submitted a memorial concerning the emperor wearing a new-style military uniform:

> Except for donning special clothes at a sacrificial ceremony, all the leaders of the countries with a constitution usually wear a military uniform. When receiving other sovereigns, [the Qing emperor should] wear a full dress uniform, when meeting officials [he should] wear an ordinary military uniform, [thus] emphasizing military uniforms on every official occasion. [Then] the respect for the martial spirit and the expression of militarism (junguo zhi zhuo) will go deep and far.\(^{131}\)
Returning to the martial origins of the dynasty, as the Guangxu Emperor already demanded in the early phase of the Kinxeng or New Policy reforms, would redefine the emperor as the ultimate power center and legitimate his claim to rule the vast and culturally diverse empire. The concept of imperial rule during the Qing Dynasty differed markedly from the previous Ming as it contained multiple facets surrounding the person and body of the emperor, who was particularly depicted as a martial ruler. The Qing emperors performed the role of a wise Confucian sage-ruler observing the idea of the impartial heavenly mandate and its most important elements wen, li (ritual or propriety), and xiao (filial piety). However, in addition, they assumed the modes of a Buddhist Bodhisattva, a Mongolian Khan (or Buddhist warrior-khan), and a Manchu bele or prince. Each role addressed a specific audience such as the “Han” literati, Tibetan Buddhists, or Mongolian and Manchu warriors.  

From the early days of the dynasty, fighting skills and martial spirit were declared an innate aspect of Manchu identity by the Qing rulers, who, starting with the second Qing emperor Hong Taiji, feared the loss of this “Manchu way,” which included shooting, horse riding, a frugal life, and the Manchu language. All emperors were taught riding as well as fighting with weapons and some were known to be skilled archers, even the late Qing emperors such as the Daoguang Emperor. They were educated in military history and theory, and officially had the supreme command over the army during campaigns, though the Kangxi Emperor was the last to lead troops into the battle. During the eighteenth century, the Qing expanded the empire by successfully mobilizing resources and funds for military purposes. The Qianlong Emperor styled himself “Old Man of the Ten Completed Great Campaigns” (shì quán laoren) referring to the great wars between 1747 and 1789. He pursued an imperial project and used, as Joanna Waley-Cohen has shown, military culture to link the different peoples together under his rule. At least for some time, not Confucianism but military ritual in a broad sense was the strongest bond holding the Qing Empire together. Military rituals included troop reviews, victory celebrations, and ceremonies as well as other demonstrations of martial prowess such as inspections tours and hunting parties. Multilingual steel, elaborate paintings, and copper prints partly produced in Paris during the Qianlong period should bear witness to the martial power and splendor of the dynasty and its rule over a vast empire. According to Waley-Cohen, the Qianlong Emperor intended to militarize culture: “beyond the actual conduct of war, he initiated a wide-ranging campaign to propel military success, and the military values that underpinned it, on the center stage of cultural life.” He sought to elevate wu over wen, or at least restore the idealized equilibrium of the two as guiding principles. Civilian institutions were infused with martial values, as experience in war and a record of military service were favored when appointing civil officials. Art, architecture, literature, and other forms of aesthetic production depicted war and insinuated martial values. Even actual defeats such as the failed campaigns in Burma (1765–1769) were presented as success.  

Within the wen-wu matrix, the emperor embodied an ideal and a role model for others, owing to the fact that he was not divine but only a (privileged) mortal man. “He was a man among other men (and the perfection of yang masculinity), he provided the model of how to model for others who would emulate him.” Contemporary portraiture paintings by Giuseppe Castiglione show the Qianlong Emperor in full military armor or as a hunter shooting animals with his bow. He staged himself as a “real man,” embodying the Manchu or Inner-Asian habit of qishe, riding and shooting. One of the characters in his reign name Qianlong contained the meaning “(heavenly) male principle” (qian). Unlike his grandfather, the Kangxi Emperor, who sought to provide a model of perfectly harmonizing wen and wu that Bannermen could emulate, the Qianlong Emperor exhorted the Manchu to emphasize their martial heritage and identity, and to leave cultural and literate endeavors to the Han scholars.  

The Imperial Kinsmen Cabinet’s project to restore the martial image of the emperor and the dynasty was opposed by different political factions. Zhang Zhidong had already feared a power accumulation at the court and the loss of provincial autonomy. Meng Sen, an editor of the Eastern Miscellany, compared Zaifeng to the Ming Emperor Wuzong, who was notorious for his childlike affinity for battles and warfare. Lu Chuanlin, a member of the Grand Council and Puyi’s warden, was a proponent of moderately adapting “Western” structures and institutions in fields such as education, but he was against the idea of the commander-in-chief wearing a military uniform. Support, however, came from the newly established National Assembly. While it merely had consultative functions and no real power to make any decisions, it was a first success for those struggling to achieve the introduction of a constitution and the separation of powers in China based on European and American models. The National Assembly first convened on October 3, 1910 and in December, it passed a resolution requesting that officials, students, soldiers, and policemen cut their queues. Furthermore, they demanded changing the dress code for official events and ceremonies. Both regent and emperor should henceforth follow the example of the Meiji Emperor and wear a military dress uniform.  

However, Puyi, the Xuantong Emperor, was only three years old. Zaifeng was unable to style himself as a military leader and military masculine role model, probably due to the pressure at court to maintain the established role and dress. He officially assumed the supreme command of the military and sought to emulate the military style of Wilhelm II but there is no evidence that
he ever publicly wore a military uniform.\textsuperscript{143} Thus, the members of the imperial family had to step up and adopt the military conduct of the Prussian royal house. Zaitao, Zaifen’s younger half-brother, particularly styled himself like Prince Heinrich and publicly wore a military uniform. His sole experience in the military, however, was two years of attending classes at the Nobles Military School (\textit{Lujuan guizhou xuetang}), which was opened in 1906 based on recommendations from eminent officials such as Duanfang and Liang Cheng, a diplomat who had accompanied Zaifen on his trip to Germany. According to Ralph Powell, the Nobles Military School added prestige to the new military schools in general. It was headed by Feng Guozhang and had 120 students in 1908, of which 70 belonged to the imperial family. Zaifen and Zaitao regularly attended classes at the school, but did not complete the full three-years program. It largely resembled the new colleges for educating officers at the middle (\textit{zhong}) level, including theoretical classes and practical drill. Like other military schools, the Nobles Military School’s program was purely based on foreign models but no foreign instructors were engaged.\textsuperscript{144}

Zaitao compensated his lack of actual military experience with enthusiasm for German military culture. Together with Yulan, he supported a dress reform for the whole population. Not only did he frequently appear in military uniform himself, he was also reported to have his queue cut off. During a military inspection tour in spring and summer 1910, which led him to Japan, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, Zaitao’s fervor for “Western” military culture and technology deepened further. On this trip, Lianbi, another member of the wider imperial family and a graduate from the Japanese Army Officers School, accompanied him as an advisor. They observed military drills and, in Paris, inspected airships. Zaitao even took a ride in a balloon, during which he was so relaxed that the French were reportedly impressed by his courage. In London, Zaitao attended the funeral of the British king, Edward VII, where he rode together with the new king, George V, and Wilhelm II. Both the “English and German emperors” were very impressed since they did not expect the Qing prince to be able to ride a horse and therefore had reserved a car for him. The next day, the French and English press also praised Zaitao’s riding skills. After his return to China, various journals and newspapers discussed whether or not Zaitao had removed his queue, triggering what probably became the Qing Empire’s first royal celebrity media affair.\textsuperscript{145} The \textit{Beiyang Military Journal}, for instance, reported of various events during Zaitao’s journey, including an encounter with well-trained, shorthaired foreign officers that urged him to cut off his queue. According to the report, this was only prevented in the last moment.\textsuperscript{146}

Despite the support from prominent figures such as Zaitao and Yinchang to introduce a new hairstyle within the army and navy, Zaifen and the Qing government did not issue any clear order or decree concerning the matter. More than his brother, Zaifen was facing the dilemma of being trapped between his own enthusiasm for “Western-style” military culture and the wish to preserve the Qing rule and its symbols. In September 1910, the Army Ministry, together with the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, advised the removal of the queue and many officers, cadets, and common soldiers followed the example of Army Minister Yinchang. Zaifen, however, did not openly militate against the queue, which, more than ever, became the very symbol of Qing power in the public discourse. In December, he ordered that all public servants except soldiers and policemen had to keep the customary clothing fashion, but without explicitly mentioning the queue.\textsuperscript{147}

Zaitao was not the only member of the Imperial Cabinet who was publicly wearing a German-style military uniform and performing military masculinity.\textsuperscript{148} Other princes and high-ranking noble Bannermen not only took over most of the leading government and ministry positions, but also occupied commanding positions within both the army and the navy. Correspondingly, they displayed new-style military uniforms and staged themselves in portraits photographs, emulating typical foreign military masculine postures. Journals and newspapers printed photographs of members of the imperial family and their entourage in full dress uniforms. One photograph in the \textit{Eastern Miscellany} from 1911, for instance, was titled \textit{Important People from the Navy and Army} (Figure 3.5) and showed, from left to right, the Minister of the Army, Yinchang; Palace Guard Commissioner Zaihao; the Minister of the Navy, Zaixin; the director of the Nobles Military School, Zairun; Zaitao; Lingguang; a Mongolian called Paleta; and the Vice-Minister of the Navy, Tan Xueheng. Another photograph in the same journal, titled \textit{Group Photograph of Recent Princes and Ministers}, showed the same people mixed with civilian officials in their respective dress (Figure 3.6).

A major part of the Imperial Kinsmen Cabinet’s project to resurrect the military glory and martial image of both the Qing Dynasty and the Qing Empire was to establish a new elite regiment, responsible for guarding the emperor and his family. The creation of such a guard had been discussed during Cixi’s final years but only Zaifen eventually established a new Palace Guard (\textit{Jinweijun}) in December 1908.\textsuperscript{149} It should not only consist of crack troops but also underline the new, German-style martial splendor of the dynasty.\textsuperscript{150} The Palace Guard was organized similarly to a \textit{Lujuan} division and reached its full strength of two brigades in September 1911, shortly before the Wuchang Uprising caused the Qing Dynasty’s downfall. The Palace Guard was designed “after the latest fashion of international modes of organization,” referring to the German and Japanese imperial guards.\textsuperscript{151} It was directly controlled by Zaifen, instead of the Army Ministry, and was overseen by a special commission headed by Zaitao, Yulan, and Tieliang. The latter was
then the president of the Army Ministry and the only one with substantial experience in military affairs. Zaibo, the son of Yikuang, later replaced him as the commissioner of the Palace Guard. Originally, Zaifeng and his advisors wanted the new Palace Guard to consist only of Manchu. Following protests, Han Chinese and Mongols were also admitted, but the soldiers were still predominantly Manchu, recruited from the First and Sixth Lujun divisions and from regular Banner troops. The leadership was almost entirely in the hands of members of the imperial clan or Banner noblemen, who, in many cases, had attended either the Nobles Military School or a military academy abroad. Liangbi and Wang Tingzhen, a Han and a graduate from a Japanese military school, each commanded one of the two brigades.

The men of the new Palace Guard should be the best soldiers available and had to fulfill the same minimum requirements expected of Lujun recruits, such as literacy, a strong physique, and shooting skills. Moreover, Zaifao emphasized that the Palace Guard had to stand out visually as it accompanied the emperor and guarded the imperial palace: “because of this huge responsibility and [the necessity of] a solemn appearance, their coat, shoes, and uniforms have to be scrupulously straight and accurate.” They should be “easy to distinguish, and make a strong and manly impression (zhuangfu guanzhan).” The uniform of the Palace Guard followed the basic design of the Lujun and each soldier possessed a khaki drill uniform for summer and a gray uniform for winter. However, there were small differences, which made it possible to distinguish the elite Palace Guard men from ordinary Lujun soldiers. The uniform regulations of the guard stated that “every country in East and West has its own dress code for [their respective] palace guard. More decoration is used to show their greater quality.” Nevertheless, the uniform style followed the “Western-style” military fashion, which was plain, compared to the traditional robe of a civilian or military official, and avoided an overly extravagant appearance. Every detail was precisely regulated, including the footwear, belts, the sword hilt and sheath, the spurs, and a German-style coat with six buttons. The regulations concluded: “if the appearance is orderly, [the uniforms will always] look like new, and this aggrandizes military strength.”

Besides the imperial dragon, the Palace Guard used an eagle symbol on uniforms and badges, which was probably another allusion to Prussia and the German Empire, where the eagle served as heraldic animal. An eagle medal was introduced to award the best shooters among the Palace Guard soldiers. The most striking artifact of the influence of German military culture, however, was the iconic spiked helmet (Pickelhaube). Designed for the Prussian infantry in 1842, the spiked helmet came to symbolize German militarism, subservience, and warmongering, in particular due to British propaganda during the First World War, although it was replaced by a more sophisticated
the gentry, peasants, workers, businessmen, and others for outstanding work or performance for the country and for society.\textsuperscript{162}

Awe-inspiring military culture and military rituals had been an effective way in the eighteenth century to hold the Qing Empire together and secure the loyalty of various peoples. Zaifeng, Zaitao, and other Manchu nobles sought to revive the lost martial identity and heritage of the Qing Dynasty, the Aisin Gioro house, and the Banners. Therefore, the Imperial Family Cabinet attempted to directly control the New Armies and sought to legitimize this claim by mimicking the military masculine style of the German and Japanese imperial houses. In the end, the Manchu princes did not manage to become military masculine icons as others, such as anti-Qing revolutionaries or Yuan Shikai, had already co-opted "Western-style" military culture for political purposes. Moreover, the Manchu princes and their supporters encountered too much resistance from conservative, yet influential elites, who refused the ritual and sartorial transition to a German- and Japanese-style military monarchy.

**REPUBLICAN MEN ON PARADE**

The struggles over appearances, clothing, and hairstyle, gained a new quality with the revolution in late 1911. After the abdication of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic on January 1, 1912, the new government under Sun Yat-sen promulgated a new dress code and issued booklets illustrating the new mandatory formal dress for both men and women. The "Western" suit and hat replaced the customary garb and headgear. Short hair and an unshaven forehead became the commonly accepted hairstyle and queue cutting became a national project strictly enforced among both civilians and military men throughout the country.\textsuperscript{163} As already planned by Sun and his fellows before the revolution, an *Order Concerning the Uniforms of Military Men (Junshi zhidunju)* from February visually turned the Qing New Armies into a Republican army.\textsuperscript{164} Both the uniforms and the rank system of the army were reformed. The use of Eight Banner titles for officers was abandoned and all insignia of the perished dynasty were removed. The Qing dragon, for one, was replaced by the five-colored star, which symbolized the new Republic. The color of the common drill uniform was changed to tarnished green (*chapanse*), though equipping the whole army with the new dress was rather problematic financially and logistically.\textsuperscript{165}

Besides the suit and the military uniform, the student suit or the Sun Yat-sen suit (*Zhongshanhuang*, also known as Mao suit) was the third vestiary novelty emerging in the final years of the Qing Dynasty, which came to symbolize modernization and an anti-Qing stance. A few historians argue that...
the new student suit that emerged during the final years of the Qing period originally stemmed from Japanese student uniforms, which were influenced by European, probably Prussian, student uniforms. This is not wrong but the German- and Japanese-style military uniforms also directly influenced the development and growing popularity of the new civilian male clothing, including a trimmer fit and the high collar. Moreover, the student uniforms both in Germany and in Japan were also based on military uniforms. Sun Yat-sen publicly appeared in all three different dress styles, thus strongly impressing them with a revolutionary image. Although he was closely linked to the student suit, which was later named after him, Sun wore a “Western” suit most of the time. Yet, during many occasions, he sought to embody military strength and stern leadership and put on an officer’s military uniform.

The old style, however, did not disappear and was mixed with European fashion, leading to various hybrid clothing styles in China. Not only the design but also the material (i.e., the type and origin of the fabric) was crucial for clothing and fashion. As Karl Gerth demonstrates, the powerful silk industry successfully lobbied for preserving a (adjusted) Chinese-style dress for strengthening the national economy. As some officials and intellectuals had suggested during the final years of the Qing, the silk industry lobby managed to decouple and dissociate the customary fashion style from the Qing Dynasty and the Manchu and render it as essentially Chinese, representing nationalist and patriotic sentiments. After assuming power and becoming the president of the Republic of China in 1912, Yuan Shikai revised the official dress code accordingly. However, although Yuan only removed his queue a few days after the formal abdication of the Qing Dynasty in February 1912, after becoming president, he initiated campaigns against the queue to demonstrate his progressive and republican stance. Moreover, he continued to militarize society, political culture, and the male appearance by generating an image of himself as a supreme military leader, by securing loyalty through military honors, and by enhancing the status of his regime through ritualistic military spectacles such as reviews and parades.

While Yuan reorganized the Army Ministry, a newly created military secretariat attached to his presidential office (Zongtongfu junshicha) was, in fact, in charge of administering and commanding the army. Yuan modeled himself and his political role after the German and Japanese emperors and presented himself as a stern and strong military leader. He assumed the title of dayuanshuai (Commander-in-Chief or Generalissimo), which had originally been created by Zaifeng during the final years of the Qing. The Office of the Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, established in 1914, centrally controlled military affairs and decision-making. The German Richard Dinkelmann served Yuan as his military advisor. Yuan also sought to restructure the bureaucracy within the military, and after dissolving the parliament and evicting his one-time partner Sun Yat-sen, the provincial administration was turned over to military governors (dudu) in order to increase the centralization of power. Like the German emperor, Yuan usually wore a military uniform in public and surrounded himself with men in uniform. Newly published encyclopedias and readers for citizens as well as newspapers and journals thus presented to the people a president in military uniform.

Furthermore, Yuan again revised and subsequently refined the system of military ranks promotion. The early Nanjing government under Sun was the first to issue a distinct regulation for decorating outstanding service and achievements exclusive to military personnel, which the late Qing government and the Manchu princes had failed to accomplish. The early Republican government approved of a Decoration Regulation (Xunzhang zhangcheng) replacing the Qing dragon orders with three different new orders, the Order of the Nine Tripod Cauldron, the Order of the Tiger and Bear, and the Order of the Awakening Lion. Only members of the army and navy were eligible for the first two medals and only the Order of the Awakening Lion could also be awarded to civilians for outstanding services to the country. Yuan’s government subsequently refined the system of medals, and issued several instructions concerning military decoration. The new Beiyang government under Yuan introduced three new military orders of merit, the Order of the White Eagle Order, the Order of Wen Hu (Wen Hu was a general of the kingdom Cao Wei during the Three Kingdoms period), and the Order of the Golden Lion. For Yuan and his regime, awarding military decoration was an important means to secure the loyalty of officers and the army. Yuan generously conferred orders of merit, honorary military ranks, and titles—particularly, after he had secured his rule against Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalist Party in 1913.

Every year, Yuan’s regime conducted a military parade and a troop review to commemorate the beginning of the Wuhan Uprising in 1911. The tenth of October became the National Day and the people were ordered to celebrate, fly flags, hang up lanterns, and bear the colors of the Republic, while the government evoked Republican ideals in proclamations and speeches. The National Day was a holiday and the festivities should include sacrifices, rewards for the successful, alms for the poor, and amnesties for prisoners. In the capital, a large military parade (dayue) was conducted (see also Figure 3.7). In other cities and towns military reviews were held as well or, in other cases, sports meetings for school children took place, which similarly emphasized military strength and individual physical fitness. During the parade, Yuan usually moved through several gates of the Imperial City. Troop reviews took place in front of the newly erected New China Gate (Xinhuamen), which formed the entrance to his new headquarters, the Zhongnanhai compound adjacent to the Forbidden City. In 1913, he presided
over a ceremony in the Hall of Supreme Harmony (Taihedian), which was preceded by a short ceremonial procession from the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen). There, Yuan mounted a ceremonial sedan carried by four men, which was accompanied by a hundred or so other people leading the way and a “squad of warriors in exceptionally shiny uniforms carrying silver spears with both hands.” Important foreign guests and high state officials followed. The procession, which was “flanked by soldiers forming a guard of honor in neat formation,” then went through Duannan, Niumen, Taihemen, and other gates. After several breaks, it finally reached the Hall of Supreme Harmony, where the main ceremony took place.179

In 1915, Yuan, clad in the military uniform of the commander-in-chief of navy and army, mounted a “chrysanthemum-colored horse” and rode from the New China Gate to the Gate of Heavenly Peace to review troops, together with his “pretty wife.”180 The troops marched orderly in file. First came four brigades of infantry, then a regiment of each artillery and cavalry, followed by engineers, logistics, and music battalions. Altogether, two full divisions (more than 24,000 men) were present, according to one report. In overall charge was division commander Lu Yongxiang, the divisions were led by Zhang Jingyao, and Liu Jinhao, respectively. The military parade was followed by a procession of 1200 primary school students, who were grouped in 24 groups.181 After the procession, Yuan talked to the primary school students, stressing their education as loyal Republican citizens. He told them about the history of the founding of the Republic and exhorted them to be patriotic and faithful to it. In particular, they should pay attention to morality and the martial spirit, since the strength of the country depended on the physical and mental power of the citizens.182

Yuan died in June 1916 and therefore could not participate in the National Day celebrations in the same year, but commemoration festivities and military parades on October 10 continued to take place every year. In 1916, Yuan’s direct successor as president Li Yuanhong, who had been a high-ranking officer in the Lujun and appointed the military leader of the revolutionaries in 1911, participated in a military review taking place at the Nanyuan drill grounds in the south of Beijing.183 In the presence of government officials, parliament members, foreign dignitaries, and journalists from inside and outside China, Li attended a ceremony, which strictly followed protocol. His entry into the parade grounds was accompanied by music, followed by the salute of officers as well as cavalry and infantry men, who drew their swords or presented their guns. Various troop units then marched by Li and his generals, and after an officer announced the regiment number, the respective soldiers saluted on command their president, who came closer to review the soldiers.184 For the first time, planes also took part in a military review.185 More troop reviews took place in the following days, on October 12 and 15, which day Li inspected infantry and other units by horse. Afterward, the presidential headquarters ordered to distribute documentary photography prints of these reviews to all government institutions in great numbers.186

In the early Republic, politicians and military men continued the late Qing Imperial Kinmen Cabinet’s project to re-militarize and, under Yuan, to re-urbanize the government and society of China. Military parades were a way to perform, legitimize, and constitute authority and they tied in with the large-scale war games in the final years of the Qing Dynasty, as well as the efforts of Zaifeng and his allies to stage the imperial family as military masculine icons. This staging of military culture was supposed to impress inner and outer enemies with the military strength of the new government, and most importantly, to promote a martial spirit and a sense of unity among the new Republican citizens. Particularly during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor in the eighteenth century, military rituals were part of the imperial project to absorb new territories and tighten the cohesiveness of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural realm. The Qing employed military rituals centering on

![Image](image_url)

Figure 3.7 “Commemoration Day of the Revolution in the North.” See also DFZZ 1914 (4), which includes illustrations from the 1914 review. Source: Zhenshang huaobao 1912 (10), 4.
the emperor as a technology of governance to perform martial grandeur and utilize rituals and text (civilian wen culture) to promote military culture. Military rituals (junzi) included peacetime troop review (grand inspections), dispatching generals and welcoming victorious armies as well as the presentation of captives. After the turn to the twentieth century, politicians again viewed military culture, including military rituals, military appearance, and military conduct as a way to bridge ethical divides and resolve ethical tensions. Already in 1907, for instance, the Nan'yang Military Journal had issued a note titled Inside Military Circles the Boundary between Han and Manchu Does Not Exist, and Yuan Shikai later explicitly explained his soldiers that all the five major peoples were citizens of the Republic.

Eventually, in 1915, Yuan had proclaimed himself emperor (his era name was Hongxian or ‘constitutional abundance’), declared his own imperial dynasty, and renamed the state into Empire of China. Even many of Yuan’s closest confidants opposed this step, which met opposition throughout the country and was reversed only after a couple of months. It seemed like a megalomaniac conservative backlash when Yuan ordered to return to emphasizing Confucian writings and moral teachings in school and reintroducing some of the obsolete imperial rituals and etiquettes. On the other hand, Yuan’s monarchical project was in line with the scheme to establish a constitutional monarchy that emphasized military culture based on the German and Japanese models. Yang Du, who accompanied the official mission to the United States, Japan, and Europe in 1906, was Yuan’s advisor and responsible for preparing his investiture. For this purpose, he wrote an essay titled Constitutional Monarchy to Save the Nation (Jin xuan jinguo), in which he argued that the strength of Germany and Japan stemmed from the fact that they were constitutional monarchies. Neither country could exist today without the emperor and his chancellor, Wilhelm I and Bismarck as well as the Meiji Emperor and Itō Hirobumi and Katsura Tarō. Yuan would be a strong monarch and the first of his line, which would be continued by his son Yuan Keding, himself a major supporter of his father becoming emperor. Yuan Keding had studied in Germany, personally met with Wilhelm II, and was frequently wearing the uniform of a German prince. Similar to his father, he had his own freelance German military advisor, Major Max König.

The legitimacy of Yuan’s regime was strongly built on the promotion of military culture and the display of military pomp. Though Yuan continuously spoke of a nation-state, which belonged only to its citizens (and which they had to defend), he sought to create continuity and legitimacy by emulating imperial rituals and staging himself in the space of the imperial city as the reinvented military masculine ideal and the leader reminiscent of foreign emperors, such as the German Kaiser and the Japanese Tenno as well as the perished Qing Emperor. Although Yuan’s desire to emulate Wilhelm II or the Japanese Emperors was never made explicit, there were many references exemplified by the style of military reviews, which were obviously modeled after parades in Japan, Germany, or other European countries. While he performed imperial harvest rituals, for instance, soldiers in dress uniforms that resembled a German honor guard, flanked Yuan, who was himself clad in the customary imperial gown. Moreover, reports and photographs of military reviews and parades in Germany and elsewhere appeared regularly in the Chinese media, whether in specialized military journals or the general press.

**CONCLUSION**

Chinese military reformers, at the transition to the twentieth century, sought to cultivate a new class of military men and, therefore, the issue of governing the behavior, motivation, self-understanding, and identity—the conduct of conduct, to use Foucault’s concept—of military men became the most pressing issue regarding military reforms. Governing the self-discipline indirectly through uniforms, rituals, and codes of conduct, added to the more direct and coercive governance and disciplinary technologies described in the previous chapters. With the promotion of “Western-style” military culture by the Imperial Family Cabinet and the early Republican government, the New Armies’ concept of military masculinity arrived at the center stage of politics in China. The public performance of soldiers, officers, and politicians in formfitting German–Japanese style uniforms, along with a new set of corresponding ways of conduct, in photographs and during military exercises, reviews, and parades contributed to the circulation and increasing popularity of Westernized military masculinity. The appearance and behavior of military men—embodying and somatically constructing military masculinity—generally affected the appearance of men and the conceptualization of masculinity in China throughout the twentieth century by affecting fashion, political culture, and social hierarchies. However, gender concepts are unstable and subject to change: Yuan Shikai, and the numerous officers who became warlords and military rulers over limited territories after his demise, were not only criticized for being cruel and dictatorial but were also mocked for displaying too much military pomp and circumstance. The icon of the professional, disciplined, frugal, and devoted military man was not discredited though and, more than ever, intellectuals and the media called for a military leader to appear as national savior and re-unify the country. After 1916, political and military leaders such as Sun Yat-sen, Jiang Jieshi, and Mao Zedong did no longer wear the overblown military ceremonial attire with medals, epaulets, and braids to express their claim to rule. As Louise Edwards argues, within the increased militarization of clothing in China, the political elite appeared
in simplified military attire to demonstrate their down-to-earth approachability and connection to the common people.  

Nevertheless, during the late Qing and early Republican period, the ostentatious display of disciplined, uniformed male bodies demonstrated both the professionalism and martial spirit of the New Armies and, above all, they contributed to the performance of military masculinity. Uniforms conveyed a distinctive idea of soldiering, soldierly conduct and appearance, and facilitated the staging of a foreign-inspired concept of military masculinity. Military men could not simply become professional experts by applying the “modern Western” way of warfare, they also had to emulate the military habitus and style of European, American, and Japanese officers. In other words, the technologies introduced to educate and cultivate military men according to foreign models created the masculine figuration of juren. Reformers addressed masculinity less consciously and less explicitly than the physical body but the transformation of the identity of military officers was pivotal for the military reforms. Professionalism and other martial traits and ideals attributed to military men coalesced, as the following chapter will show in more detail, into a concept of masculinity through the repeated performance of military men and their bodies.

NOTES


3. The Brave Battalions wore clothes similar to the regular troops but avoided the colors green and red, which were associated with the Green Standard Army and the Banner forces. The Xiang and Huai Armies mostly wore blue with red facings to distinguish themselves from the Green Standard Army. Blue as color for military uniforms was quite common and accepted in Europe and the United States and worn by British sailors and marines as well as by German, French (partly), and American soldiers. Some troops in China before 1895, taking the Ever Victorious Army as a model, wore a sort of blue British/American uniforms, looking very much like European soldiers at the time. See Wang 1972, 26; Smith 1974, 155; Fan 2007a, 1.


5. Lamprey 1868, 417–18.

6. Cavendish 1898, 714.


8. Lamprey 1868, 423. The image of a ragged and clownish Qing soldier was quite persistent and also perpetuated in the academic literature. Ralph Powell considered the late nineteenth century Braves as “caricatures of soldiers.” Powell 1955, 31. A strongly biased but nevertheless valuable contribution to unmask the orientalism of both nineteenth century observers and latter researches is Jane Elliot’s book on the Boxer War. See Elliot 2002, 180–93, 381–85.


18. Generally, see Godley 1994; Cheng 1998; Gerth 2003, chapter two. See also NBZ 1909, 29: Shuangmei xiangyu shu.


24. See, for instance, on Britain, Miller 2007.


27. Fan 2007a, fn5.


31. Shen 1897a, 9–10.

32. Liu 1867a, 127.


34. Shenbao 1903, October 4: Buoyang chisu.


37. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 204.
40. Ibid., 205–06
41. Lujun mubing yiniao tushuo (1910) in GX, chapter 8, 103–04.
42. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1145. Shenwu can be translated as “body-material,” “individual matter,” or “hull-substance.”
44. Dalu 1904, 2 juan, 6: Kakeki zhi jinfu, 15.
45. NBZ 1907, 15: E guo lujun fuzhe gai cheng, 25. After the Russo-Japanese War, the German military leadership noted with great interest that the Japanese troops changed their dark-blue uniforms against more nature-colored uniforms already after the first battle. See Zimmermann 2010, 218.
46. Fan 2007a, 105.
47. NBZ 1907, 9: Junyiliao zu zhidu yizun.
48. Yikuang [1905] 2005a. Uniforms of cadets were defined in separate regulations such as the Regulations and Illustrated Explanations on Style and Color of Army School Uniforms (Lujun jundai xueyong fuzhe zhangji tushuo). See Ma 2004, 163.
49. NBZ 1906, 3: Lujun di jiu shen Xu tongzhi tongxia ge buaoying zengqi fushuangwen, 10–12.
50. NBZ 1907, 6: Jiangsu Duan tonglian ge buaoying jiangxiao mubing ji ji xueyong zengqi fushuangwen 1.
52. NBZ 1906, 5: Huang Cong, Lun junren zhi yiyou, 13. The author of the original was rendered as Beilaifa, but I was not able to identify the man.
54. From March 1905, the Army Regulation for Uniforms of Officers (Lujun guanbians fuzhang) and other subsequent regulations codified the rank structure for officers and the corresponding uniforms and badges proposed earlier in the Distinct and Illustrated Manual for Uniforms of the Army. See Ma 2004, 163.
55. For the titles and positions in the Eight Banners see Elliott 2001, 413.
56. For the development of the military rank system in the twelfth century see Zhuang 1994 and Ma 2004, who also deals with the translation process and different translation strategies concerning military ranks. See also Vissiere 1914.
57. NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, Lun junren zhi jinsheng, 4–6. See also NBZ 1906, 3: Tao Junbao, Lun lujun lishi.
59. NBZ 1907, 13: Tao Shumao, Zhandou zhihui zhi gaishun.
61. Bian 1895. Bian was the student leader of the first group of cadets who went to Germany in 1876. See Meng 2005, 50.
62. Low 2003, 83. Even after most German instructors left China in the early twentieth century, German was still spoken by some graduates of the Tianjin military academy. See Kaske 2002b, 91.
64. Ibid., 379.
91. According to the Nanyang Military Journal, the Japanese army regulated in 1907 that both common soldiers and officers had to wear their drill or full dress uniform almost anytime. See NBZ 1907, 6: (Riben) Lijun fazhuang guize gaizheng.

92. WX 1910, 14: ‘Wu you wang yu lüanju chu ye, ni, 118.

93. XT, chapter 17, 4. The decree is dated from March 27, 1910, before Huang’s own journal article appeared. Nevertheless, Huang was likely instrumental in drawing up the decree or at least one strong voice advocating the new-style guidelines.

94. NBZ 1910, 51: Guangdu, 1.

95. Junzhe zuo zhou ni lüan jiong chengzhe zhe et Junzhe zuo zhuang xueyuan xu zuan hongfugian, see XT, chapter 7, 37-9.

96. According to Bourdieu, photographs simultaneously represent popular mass culture and contain an element of snobishness. See Bourdieu 1990. On the history of photography and visual culture in general see also Mitchell 1984; Jäger 2009; Rico 2010. Generally, for the history of photography in China, see Cody and Terpak 2011; Henriot and Yeh 2013. For photography as ritual staging in twentieth century China, see also Borthwick 1980. 135. Photographs of military men from the New Armies can be found in Lea 1907; WX 1908, 1 and 2; WX 1910, 12; Zhu 1910; Zhu 1911; Qingmo lüan xiaoyou tu. n.y.; Liu and Xu 1994, 224–31; Lai 2000; Lao zhidun bianliu tu 2001, 19; Lu and Stafford 2009.


99. Their dress is itself already held in a new-style fashion, substantially different from the old scholar-official’s long gown, which, apart from the headgear and the long sleeves, remained common and accepted as formal wear throughout the Republican period. See Finnane 2008, 75–7.

100. Powell 1955, 206, 227.

101. Lu and Stafford 2009, 72 contains a photograph with Yinchang and the former president Li Yuanhong overseeing troop movements. According to Lu (i.e., the Stafford collection) it was taken during the 1911 Revolution. However, I believe it dates back earlier and was taken during a military exercise in 1908, where both men were actually on the same side, unlike 1911 when they lead the imperial and revolutionary forces, respectively. One of the men in the picture wearing the official’s robe might be Duanfang. For a portrait of Yinchang, see also DFZZ 1911 (3), 1.


103. The best description of the political struggles of this “Manchu Ascendancy” between 1908 and 1911 is Rhoods 2000, 121–72. See also Chin in 1972, 60.

104. The (lost) martial heritage of the Manchu or the Banners was an occasional topic before 1908. See, for instance, an article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, which called for combining the martial spirit of dynasty and Banners with the patriotism of the New Armies men. XBB 1905, 5: Guochao longxing wugong ji jian yi, 1.


107. Ibid., 154.

108. Ibid., 158.


110. Zaifeng [n.y.] 1989, 154, 156, 159. Before traveling to Germany, Zaifeng was appointed army inspector, which made the bestowal formally possible.

111. Ibid., 163. Upon his return to Shanghai, Zaifeng visited the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Nanyang Public School before returning to Beijing. For a general comparison between Qing and Siamese “Western-modeled” reforms see Peterson 2000.


114. DFZZ 1904 (1) and (6). Later issues of the Eastern Miscellany contained portrait pictures of other important head of states. Not all of them complied with the image of a martial emperor but they were similarly presented as men strongly concerned with military affairs. This included particularly the presidents of the United States (at the time, Theodore Roosevelt) and reports on them as commander-in-chief of all armed forces were frequent. See for instance BBZ 1910, 1: Zongtongqi zhi gexin, 114.


116. See Rogasch 1991, 95–6. Although Wilhelm II desperately attempted to present the image of youthful, dynamic, and martial manhood, he was increasingly criticized for lacking many qualities such as mental firmness, assertiveness, and the cold rationality of a true leader. The famous Daily Telegraph Affair, involving a case of homosexuality among his closest advisors, damaged his masculine image lasting. On the image of Wilhelm II and the crisis of masculinity in the German Empire, see Dahleke 2006, 1–15; Rebentisch 2000; Winzen 2010; Clark 2009, chapter 6; Petzold 2012, 126–31.


118. Low 2003, 81–3; Kitaoaka 1995, 70. See also Khan 1998. For Germany, see Frevert 1997a.


120. On Kang Youwei’s indirect influence on Duanfang concerning military and other aspects of reform through Liang Qichao, see Horowitz 2003, 782–83.

121. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzhe zonghiao qing ze yao qifa genggou zhidu, 5–6.

122. Ibid., 6–7. Xu Shichang, who was originally a part of the mission abroad but who did not join in the end, was a military officer. Wearing his military uniform, as he was explicitly supposed to do, he might have left the foreign hosts with a different impression about Chinese men. See Dulu 1905, 3, 17; Chuang dachen yu bei junfa. 2.

123. NBZ 1907, 8: Zou junzhe zonghiao qing ze yao qifa genggou zhidu, 2–3. Duanfang, however, was no militant and he viewed the power of the German nobility as a mixed blessing. Their great reputation and professionalism served the whole country but their warmongering tendencies endangered peace, he argued.


125. See for instance NBZ 1908, 5: Ri huangxin yue lüanju dacao. In 1911, an article proudly reported that Qing princes and nobles attended military drills and demonstrated their martial spirit. NBZ 1911, 57: Guizu shangwu jingshen.
126. Zaitao [n.y.] 1989, 237. According to Zaitao, it was Prince Heinrich who visited China in 1905, but he apparently confused him with Friedrich Leopold. See Rhoads 2000, 318-19. See also Schütz 1994. Heinrich was in China from 1897 to early 1900 as commander of a German squadron and, eventually, the German East Asia Fleet. He was, as first European prince of a ruling dynasty ever, received at the Qing court by the Guangxu Emperor and Cixi. See Eschenburg 1989, 65.

127. DFZZ 1909 (7), 331.
128. For the whole part see Fung 1980, 45–7, 88; Rhoads 2000, 144; Powell 1955, 265; Dreyer 1995, 27–8.
129. Because of security concerns, the three Germans, together with one other German and seven Japanese officers, were the only foreign instructors in China by the time the revolution took place. See Fung 1980, 85.
137. Ibid., 280–82. See also Li 2002 and Dai 2005a.
140. DFZZ 1909 (7), 332–33; Rhoads 2000, 144.
143. Ibid., 287.
146. BEZ 1910, 2: Fa jing laitan, 91–3.
147. Rhoads 2000, 163–66; Fung 1980, 79. Some soldiers of the Palace Guard were against queue cutting, while others at the Noble School favored it.
148. See also Dreyer 1995, 33.
149. NBZ 1908, 21: Lujunba yi fu yush Zhao Binglin zhou qing ding Jinweijun zhidatze.
151. XT, chapter 1: Jinweijun yingyi xiangzhang, 13; XT, chapter 6: Jinweijun dachen zou ni qing biaotong ben jun xianzhang xiangzhangzhe.
152. See also NBZ 1908, 29: Xuan lian Jinweijun zhou baofu, 5.
153. Although designed as a loyal and "private" army of the imperial clan, the Palace Guard could not do much to prevent its dynasty's demise. After 1911, it was commanded by Fei Guozhang and thus controlled by Yuan Shikai.
Chapter 3

183. *Li Yuanhong nanyuan yuebing* 2011 includes photographs from the review.
185. *Li Yuanhong nanyuan yuebing* 2011, 23. In the German Empire, aircrafts were first used in such a context during the autumn maneuvers of 1911.
189. At the beginning of the twentieth century, junshi was used to refer to protocols of correct behavior and interaction between common soldiers, officers, and civilians—in other words, to military etiquette or military courtesy.
193. Lu and Stafford 2009, 129.

Chapter 4

Making Real Men

Military Professionalism and Martial Spirit

War is a discipline for experts.¹

Bureau for Military Training, 1904

The German army’s regulation concerning field duties and military exercises from 1908 stated at the very beginning that not only “Manneszucht” (severe military discipline, obedience) but also strong-mindedness, and an inspiring and exemplary demeanor were essential for officers when leading soldiers into battle.² Chinese military reformers, adopting ideas and practices from the German and other European armies, considered the cultivation (yangxu or yangceng) of a new generation of military leaders adapted to “modern” warfare and “Western” military culture as the most important issue for reforming the Qing Empire’s army and regaining its military strength. In order to attract the most qualified and capable people, and direct them to immerse themselves in a yet foreign assemblage of rules, thinking, and behavior, military reformers had to find other “sources of motivation” and apply instruments other than the disciplinary technologies described in the previous chapters. They sought to form officers according to the German and Japanese models, including not only practices of conduct, demeanor, self-expression, and appearance but also notions of professionalism, heroism, and patriotism.³

The emphasis of late Qing military reforms lay on professionalization and specialization (which, in China, were not, per se, distinct) and on the establishment of a military elite independent of both the civil bureaucratic stratum and of the Banners, with their restrictive ethnic-hereditary setup. In the eyes of military reformers, the emulation of German-style military professionalism was essential, which included expert knowledge, the rational planning and conduct of war, and the internal autonomy and pride of the
military as a professional group. Moreover, military professionalism became a fundamental part of a "new form of military masculinity based on technological expertise and rational material practices." Chinese military reformers emphasized technical and practical skills, and promoted military academies, systematic education, professional conduct, and "military science," which led to the construction of a new masculine icon: the professional military man. Instead of evaluating the actual degree of professionalism of the Chinese New Armies, this chapter focuses on how military men performed and were staged as professional soldiers, and how this was linked to the idea of a martial spirit.

Joining the New Armies as an officer became increasingly popular among young members of the elite after the turn of the century, particularly during and after the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905. The war, which took place in Northern China, and the final abolition of the civil service examinations in 1905, resulted in a growing popularity of military academies in the Qing Empire among young men with an elite background, who enrolled into military schools because of a mixture of pragmatism and patriotism. Despite the strong emphasis on professionalism that was supposed to differentiate the Chinese New Armies from the established Qing military, ideas of heroic deeds, valor, and a patriotic willingness to sacrifice played an important role in the military reform discourse and the conceptualization of military masculinity. Military reformers and New Armies leaders propagated the idea of martial spirit (shanggan zhuyi or shanggan jingshen), often simply referring to "spirit" (jingshen), to inspire and stage various alleged martial qualities attributed to men, such as will, perseverance, and honor. In the end, the attractiveness of the New Armies rested on the recreation and re-elevation of a concept of masculinity, which drew on pre-existing military or martial masculine models in China, but focused predominantly on contemporary European elements, concepts, and icons of masculinity. Notions about military professionalism were adopted from Germany and other European countries, the United States, and Japan. But both foreign examples and legendary Chinese figures and ancient tales of bravery, sacrifice, and loyalty inspired ideas of a heroic martial spirit and patriotism.

PROFESSIONALIZING MILITARY MEN

In July 1901, the governor-generals Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi petitioned for the introduction of both civilian and military schools based on the "Western" and Japanese model, with the goal of fundamentally overhauling the education and the selection system of all those in the direct service of the Qing Empire. China, they argued, was neither poor nor was there a lack of soldiers. What was missing were "talent" (rencai) and "aspiration" (zhig), which were essential for avoiding certain doom and disintegration. They demanded the reform of the structures of military and civilian education in order to improve the efficiency of both army and administration and, at the same time, to bring balance to the continuum of civil culture (wen) and military (wu). Zhang and Liu criticized that the cultural sphere, which was based on written texts and ritual, had been strongly favored over the military sphere. Even more, wen had absorbed wu and turned it into a theoretical, scholarly field. Both wen and wu, as well as other "paths" such as agriculture, commerce, or manufacturing, should become independent, specialized disciplines (zhuanmen zhi xue). Furthermore, Zhang and Liu demanded that the old military examination system should be abolished and replaced by foreign models of military academies, which trained real military experts. They envisioned a new type of military men, different from the established military officials who were, in fact, similar to scholarly civilian officials. Rather, military men should be professionals who focused on practical matters and specialized skills instead of generic knowledge and Confucian doctrines. Academy-based training would equip them with these skills but also enhance their prestige, which was necessary to contest the supremacy of wen within society and to equalize wen and wu men. The eminent role model for military and other specialized schools was Germany, which, according to Zhang and Liu, possessed the best educational system in the world.

The old system, which Zhang and Liu sought to abolish, dated back to the year 702, when the Tang government introduced examinations to select officers for military posts. These military examinations were systematized, transformed, and refined during the following dynasties and although they were discontinued during certain periods, they were eventually reinstated. However, military examinations neither gained the same social appreciation and relevance as the civil service examinations nor did they reliably produce able and, among troops, accepted commanders. In 1644, the Qing followed the model of the preceding Ming Dynasty and reinstated military examinations parallel to the civil examination system. They consisted of several stages, starting at the district level, and ending with the metropolitan and palace examinations, which were usually held every three years. Successful candidates were awarded titles and ranks equivalent to their civilian counterparts, became military officials, and were eligible for posts in the Green Standard Army. Other common ways of attaining a higher military position were advancement and promotion within ranks, inheritance, or through a special appointment by a superior official or the emperor. Except for schools for high-ranking members of the Eight Banners, military academies or any kind of systematic education for officers did not exist. Banner members were, at certain times, allowed and sometimes even encouraged to participate in the military examinations and were subject to favorable quotas. Officers for the
Banner companies or the special military organizations within the Banners were appointed according to provenance and separate examinations exclusive to them. Commanders-in-chief and leaders during military campaigns were appointed ad hoc and, ideally, impermanently; in order to avoid the concentration of power outside of the imperial court. The examinations itself consisted of the demonstration of martial skills such as marksmanship, riding, and weight lifting, as well as the testing of the candidate’s knowledge in the corpus of canonized military writings, including the Sunzi bingfa. Being aware of the overly theoretical and outdated character of these classics, examiners allegedly never placed much emphasis on the literary skills and abilities of candidates to memorize the texts. For the metropolitan and palace examinations, the Kangxi Emperor ordered the addition of a discussion of the military thoughts expressed in the fundamental Confucian works Mengzi and Lunyu. Additionally, candidates participating in the civil administration examinations were confronted with questions on how to deal with military affairs. And all candidates who passed the provincial examinations of either the civil or the military systems were subsequently allowed to continue with the other examination system. The Yongzheng Emperor reversed these reforms, which aimed at both improving military education and raising the standing of military culture in general. Similar to the civil service examinations, anyone was theoretically allowed to participate in the military examinations on the lowest level. However, candidates were usually members of the wealthy gentry class, who were not only able to afford the preparations and education but also derived an inherent claim to titles and posts from their elite social background. Although the military exams emphasized martial skills, they often served as a safety net for unsuccessful civil examination candidates. In the late nineteenth century, an increasing number of military officials reportedly used their titles and military assignments as a stepping-stone for a civilian appointment.

Late Qing military reformers did not necessarily intend to bypass the established elites. Before a new military education system was established, Zhang Zhidong sought to recruit examination degree holders as troop commanders and academy instructors. Bannermen enlisted in the New Armies and were at least one entire division strong. Literacy and a certain degree of education were necessary to enroll in one of the newly established military preparation schools, implying that most new cadets were supposed to be members of the established wealthy elite. Moreover, the curricula for prospective New Armies officers included elements of the classical education, which aimed at strengthening the acceptance and prestige of a military career. Social background and personal connections remained to be important for a career in the New Armies, but military reformers were anxious to eliminate these factors.

Most late Qing military reformers, such as Zhang Zhidong, sought to balance wen and wu and were rethinking the category of rencai (or simply cai, meaning talent, ability, capability, and qualification) within the wen-wu matrix, instead of pursuing the reactivation of Manchu or Banner martial values. Throughout their petition, cited above, Zhang and Liu used the term shi, which originally signified military people but which increasingly referred to both warriors and scholars, and eventually more closely represented the latter. They demanded that cai or talent should be redirected toward the military (and other sectors). Ultimately, with the challenges and the new ideas from abroad, cai was redefined to include expert and technical knowledge. It became an important device to call for professionalism, both in the civilian and the military sector.

In late 1901, the Qing government issued a series of decrees ordering the immediate end of the established military examinations as well as the introduction of a national system of military education. Military preparatory schools (wubei xuetang) were to be established in every province as a basis for higher military education in academies and specialist schools for artillery, surveillance, or logistics. A general education, however, was not to be replaced but, instead, complemented by practical, hands-on experience, acquired tactical knowledge, and leadership skills. The new-type officer was expected to possess both “technical” skills (shuke) as well as “scientific” skills (xueke). The former included abilities such as riding, shooting, sword fighting, and apparatus gymnastics, while the latter comprised tactics, strategy, logistics, and fortification, as well as “cultural” proficiencies such as knowledge of foreign languages, history, the classics, and natural sciences. Military reformers agreed that officers and military education had to adapt to the scientific form of warfare. Therefore, it was not only important to possess the latest military technology but also able to master the use of weapons and acquire related skills and techniques of warfare. Europe—in particular Germany, France, and Britain—and Japan repeatedly served as references for the significance of a systematic, professional military education and the successful establishment of military academies.

A military journal editorial from 1907—probably produced by the New Armies administration office in Liangjiang province—highlighted the significance of military education for implementing standards in the army. “Through their military, Western European [states] are recognized as many countries (xiang zhi guo). To select their officers, they draw on military schools. The level of education is viewed as decisive for appointments. [Moreover,] the curricula for the primary level must be uniform for the whole country. In order to unify the new soldiers of the country, everyone must receive the same education.” The basic purpose of military education, the article argued, was standardization and the streamlining of command structures. The
Japanese army had successfully implemented uniform military education and therefore achieved victory during the Russo-Japanese War.

Chapter 4

Making Real Men

The German General Staff was a highly efficient, extremely specialized military organization, which served as a model for the Japanese General Staff. In 1904-05, two officers from the Japanese General Staff were sent to Germany to study the military education system. Although the commission, charged with examining the most important aspects of military divisional training and organization, established the conclusion that the German General Staff was a model for Japan, it was not making any use of it. The need for military officers with high qualifications was recognized, and the government decided to establish a special institute for the education and training of officers. The German army, with its professional army, was recognized as a model for Japan. However, the German General Staff was not a perfect example to follow. The success of the German army was achieved through a combination of professional training, strict discipline, and efficient organization. Japan, on the other hand, had to develop its own system of military education and training, taking into account its own cultural and social context.

Although Japan did not adopt the German system of military education and training, it did adopt several key elements. The creation of the Imperial General Staff College was one of the most important. The college was established in 1914 and was modeled after the German General Staff College. It was designed to train officers to be capable of serving in the highest positions of the military hierarchy. The college was divided into four sections: staff, tactics, engineering, and炮兵 (artillery). Each section had its own curriculum and teaching methods. The college also had a system of examinations and promotions, which were based on the performance of the students. The education at the college was not only theoretical but also practical. The students were required to participate in exercises and drills, which were designed to simulate real combat situations. The training at the college was considered to be some of the best in the world and was highly regarded by the military leaders of Japan.

In conclusion, while Japan did not adopt the entire German military model, it did adopt several key elements that were important for the success of the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War. The establishment of a professional military education system and the creation of the Imperial General Staff College were two of the most important. These developments helped to create a highly trained and disciplined military force that was capable of achieving victory in war.
and aristocratic prestige was amended in the nineteenth century by rational and systematic military education in specialized academies, which adapted war-making and military organization to scientific, social, and economic developments. These academies for educating military elites became popular in Germany, Britain, France, and the United States only in the middle of the nineteenth century. Specialist schools to train gunners and engineers had existed since the late sixteenth century in the Netherlands and the German territories, but the training of officers was rarely formalized and usually a matter of private upbringing within certain noble families. Practical experience, social background, and conduct were favored, among military elites, over a school-based education. However, during the nineteenth century, the ideal of the charismatic, heroic, honor-driven, and self-sacrificing aristocratic “fighting man” was increasingly challenged by the figure of the intellectual, technocratic, and rational military manager. Although the originally aristocratic, monarchist officer corps sought to limit the access of “lower” bourgeois and proletarian classes to the army, the emerging concept of the knowledgeable and scientifically educated officer or “military manager” contested the established perspective. Military masculinity increasingly rested not only on honor and an uninhibited martial spirit but also on professional expertise. In Europe, the conflict between old and new military elites was also a conflict between these different but interacting concepts of military masculinity, and involved generational and class issues. It lasted at least until the First World War, after which the nobility eventually lost most of its former political and military significance. Similarly, in Japan, officers were influenced by the German notion of rational technocracy and professional specialization, including academy and staff officer education. At the same time, the military became the only source of true manliness, where Japanese men were able to comply with the notion of sacrifice for nation and emperor.

Chinese military reformers often referred to “international standards” or the situation in “all countries in East and West” for military education but, in fact, they had the German-Japanese system in mind. Military academies and “scientific training” became increasingly popular throughout Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century and the education of staff officers was channeled through a single, national academy in Britain (Sandhurst), France (École militaire), and the USA (West Point). In Germany, however, despite the existence of the Prussian War Academy, military education was more decentralized. Young cadets started much earlier than elsewhere and passed through various consecutive levels. A broad general education, furthermore, was part of the military school education, though this was sometimes viewed as counterproductive for strengthening the status of (bourgeois) military academies, compared to an upbringing within aristocratic warrior clans.

The German military education system had been adapted in Japan and seemed suitable for the large Qing Empire. Chinese military reformers viewed a general primary education for officers as the foundation, which was followed by scientific and technical instructions for military specialists. And they considered the inculcation of martial values and a martial spirit to be linked to military professionalism and “talent.” Military academies, as well as military institutions, with absolute authority and discretion regarding administration (including education and recruitment) and command were the foundation of occupational autonomy and a truly professional army. Duanfang reinforced the enthusiasm for German military organization and education prevalent before 1900, but he also emphasized the importance of martial values. Chinese military reformers believed that both professionalism and a martial spirit were necessary to become an excellent military officer. If one aspect was neglected, the military reforms would end in failure and would be like “drawing a tiger and ending up with a dog.”

WAR GAMES

Military science and scientific warfare, as well as professional military education and the professional organization of administration and command, were discussed widely in journal articles and other publications, and practically implemented through military academies and new institutions. However, professionalism was also performed and it was precisely this performance that solidified ideas about the mindset and behavior of military men into a concept of military masculinity. One way the men of the New Armies performed military professionalism and demonstrated that they adhered to what they perceived as standards of universal, modern, and scientific military culture involved War Games, referring to both large-scale military exercises and, more literally, to an actual tactical board game.

The Kriegsspiel (wargame) was the iconic device of the professional military manager for the rational, technocratic yet flexible conduct of war. It was a tactical battle simulation, on a tabletop, which made use of maps and dice to reproduce a three-dimensional territory and the element of chance. Originally developed by the Prussian war councillor, Georg Leopold von Reiswitz, and his son, Georg Heinrich Rudolf Johann, in the early nineteenth century, the Kriegsspiel was introduced by Carl von Münchting (Chief of the General Staff from 1821 to 1829) and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (Chief of the General Staff from 1857 to 1888) for the education of staff officers in Prussia. The game, including many variations on the initial design, was not only highly popular among German officers—even the military theorist Clausewitz was a passionate player—but was also adopted by many other armies, including
the ones of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, France, and the United States.\textsuperscript{34} The Kriegsspiel contributed to the fame of Prussian-German officers as effective master strategists and military managers. Jacob Meckel, the expert on military tactics who substantially contributed to the reorganization of the Japanese Army in the 1880s and 1890s, wrote several books on the Kriegsspiel, and the Japanese Army reportedly used it during the Russo-Japanese War.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, it was more than just a tool for training tactical skills or a mere symbol for planning and organization on the battlefield. Rather, it represented the desire for dissociating warfare from aristocratic traits and heroic valor, and turning it into a controllable, predictable, and projectable undertaking that could be learned and taught. According to Corelli Barnett, “it is Kriegsspiel was a great gift to modern professional [military] education.”\textsuperscript{36}

Zhang Zhidong was among the first in China to mention the Kriegsspiel (Bingqi). In his piece Exhortation to Study (1898), he included a chapter on “Western” (and Japanese) military science (bingxue) and the importance of combining academy learning, drill, and experiences in the field. Together with war maps (zhantu), which were used to study historical battles, Zhang realized that the Kriegsspiel was the most valuable tool to teach officers strategy and tactics.\textsuperscript{37} Subsequently, the Qing government considered Bingqi as a part of the “international standard” of military education and ordered that it be included in the curriculum of the higher officer schools and the staff college.\textsuperscript{38} Zhang Renjun, governor-general of Liangjiang from 1909 to 1911, emphasized that Bingqi was a distinct and important subject at military schools “in the countries in East and West.” At the time, he was in charge of the Ninth Division (Jiangsu) and suggested that 5000 maps should be printed for the division’s officers to practice the game.\textsuperscript{39}

Li Jishen, army instructor and military theorist, compiled a textbook on the Kriegsspiel for the staff academy, entitled Guideline for the Wargame (Bingqi zhizhen), in which he summarized the origin, development, and use of the game in the German Empire. Li introduced several modes of the game, such as tactical, strategic, or defense simulations, and how to prepare the various elements of the game, including maps, dice, and tokens.\textsuperscript{40} According to Li, the benefits of the Kriegsspiel were immense, enabling officers to practice at any time, to learn to make decisions, and to rehearse the transmission of commands. They would learn to be flexible and adapt to changing conditions. Junior officers could use it to familiarize themselves with the duties and tasks of their superior officers. Furthermore, he noted that “the Bingqi is the only method to develop a diligent heart.” Moreover, the wargame would make it possible to study military tactics, gain an overall picture, and allow for comparability.\textsuperscript{41}

The game was also an occasional topic in the military journals. The Nanyang Military Journal, in particular, published a few articles specifically on the Kriegsspiel or Bingqi. One article, from 1906, presumably written by He Gongxia, a military primary school student in Hubei who later joined the anti-Qing revolutionaries, praised the game as the very best way to instruct officers in tactics and key to military victories. By using simple rhetoric and deductions, the author argued that tactical maps were vital to understand the battle situation and changes occurring in the army of the enemy. Comprehension and knowledge were important for making decisions and commanding. He also noted that the Kriegsspiel was based on the ancient Chinese board game Weiqi (better known under its Japanese name Go).\textsuperscript{42} According to He, Weiqi had traveled via Tibet and India to Europe, where the French had used its principles to create the Kriegsspiel. However, only the Germans had perfected the game and turned it into a new field of learning (xin xuewen). Under von Motke, they had started to use it for the training of officers, and Germany eventually became the leader among Europe’s “grand manly powers” (changxiong). Therefore, He concluded, the Japanese officer corps sent people to Germany to specifically learn the Kriegsspiel.\textsuperscript{43} Another article on the game appeared in the same journal two years later. It not only gave a more accurate and detailed account on the origin of the Kriegsspiel than the article by He, but also provided rudimentary graphic illustrations of game tokens, similar to Li’s textbook. According to the article, the Kriegsspiel became immensely popular with the German military and was particularly beneficial for the education of young officers, because they became more confident in making decisions and gained a feeling for real troop maneuvers.\textsuperscript{44}

To further understand the significance of Bingqi for the construction of military masculinity, it is worth looking at Marc L. Moscovitz’s anthropological study on Weiqi in contemporary China. He finds that both women and men, both old and young, view Weiqi as a game for men as it, at the same time, requires and trains allegedly masculine qualities and virtues such as rational and logical thinking, discipline, commitment, aggressiveness, and competitiveness. Although Weiqi has its origins in and is still associated with military strategy, the large majority of these manly qualities are ascribed to scholarly wen rather than to martial wu masculinity, including, in particular, cognitive abilities and a competitive spirit. Guan Yu, the heroic “god of war,” was sometimes depicted playing Weiqi while a doctor treated his battle wounds.\textsuperscript{45} A strategic (or rather tactical) game such as the Kriegsspiel or Bingqi, then, was both a tool and symbol for adding wen qualities to the education and cultivation of new officers. These wen qualities were perceived as much more relevant for the military than studying classics of strategy. But the Bingqi was also exclusive for the military, not only revaluing but also helping juaren (“military man”) to become a distinct military masculine figuration that was attractive for the elite.

Whereas the Kriegsspiel was used to teach tactical skills to staff officers, large-scale military exercises aimed at enabling military leaders to study the
actual military preparedness of their armies, from the individual infantryman to the overall logistics, planning, and strategy.\textsuperscript{46} Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, moreover, were eager to showcase the success of the Beiyang and Hupei New Army and sought to inspire other provincial officials to follow their model. The Beiyang Army conducted an initial, relatively small military exercise in 1904.\textsuperscript{47} After launching the Lujian in 1904, the Bureau for Military Training under Yikuang, Yuan Shikai, and Tieliang, planned to organize annual autumn war games, similar to those in Germany and Japan. These were to be carefully orchestrated, to impress both foreign observers and Qing subjects, and dishearten enemies of the dynasty. Duanfang considered war games as essential for rousing the martial spirit of the people. Recalling how foreigners mocked him for not wearing a military uniform, he emphasized that (grand) military exercises were important to convince the world of the redeveloped military capabilities and strength of China.\textsuperscript{48} On the other hand, Feng Yuxiang, who started off as a self-made low-ranking soldier and later became one of the most powerful warlords in the 1920s, described the intention behind the early twentieth century war games as “intimidating” revolutionary forces and impressing the increasing opposition against the Qing Dynasty.\textsuperscript{49}

In 1905, 1906, and 1908, three large war games, which included several divisions from the North and South, were held. Attempts to conduct war games in 1907, 1909, and 1910 failed, either due to lack of funds or the problematic political situation and internal power struggles during those years, particularly between Yuan Shikai and the Manchu nobility.\textsuperscript{50} Some divisions or provinces, however, conducted smaller military exercises in and after 1907.\textsuperscript{51} In early 1911, the Army Ministry and the General Staff scheduled a military exercise with multiple divisions that was to take place near Luanzhou, along the Beijing-Shenyang railway line in October. However, it was cancelled because of the outbreak of the uprising in Wuchang, which eventually led to the revolution and the end of the Qing Dynasty. The troops, which already assembled for the military exercise, were sent to Wuchang to quell the revolt.\textsuperscript{52}

Large military exercises or war games were conducted by European armies and served to provide soldiers with true-to-life combat experience, and to test and demonstrate military strength. Like Kriegsspiel, the nineteenth and twentieth century conduct of military exercises can be traced back to the Prussian-German army. The German war games were emulated in Japan, and both inspired the war games held by the Chinese New Armies. Manöver (war games) were held in autumn every year in Germany. If the emperor attended, the scale of such a war game was usually larger, and they were then called Kaisermanöver (emperor’s war game). Particularly Zaifeng, Puyi’s father and regent, was deeply impressed by the huge Kaisermanöver in Danzig, which he attended while visiting the German Empire in 1901. Between 1893 and 1913, the Kaisermanöver were supposed to enable German military leaders to study the strength, the drill tactics, and the movements of the army. These war games, however, turned into mere display of pomp and pageantry—to a large degree because of the active involvement of the German emperor, Wilhelm II, who insisted on personally leading a cavalry attack as the highlight of every war game. French and American observers, as well as German critics, agreed that the Kaisermanöver reflected the backwardness and fixation on outdated tactics of the German army, including the use of cavalry. By contrast, Chinese military reformers and the late Qing government were impressed by the Kaisermanöver.\textsuperscript{53}

Chinese military observers attended Japanese military exercises as early as 1898 and Tieliang himself led a delegation in 1903.\textsuperscript{54} In spring 1905, Yuan Shikai also sent a delegation of Beiyang cadets, led by Zhang Yongzheng, to the autumn military exercise of the German Second Army. A general chosen by Zhang Zhidong, whose name is unknown, as well as “a few Manchu military officers,” who represented the Huguang New Army and the Bureau for Military Training, respectively, accompanied the delegation. This episode, reported in the English-language newspaper North China Herald, revealed that there was still organizational disunity within the New Armies. But it also demonstrated that Chinese military reformers still ascribed great importance to the German army and that every faction was strongly interested in studying military exercises in Germany and Japan.\textsuperscript{58} In 1906, the Bureau for Military Training issued guidelines for Chinese military observers who were sent abroad to study foreign military science, including war games in particular. They were told to immediately telegraph any information to the Bureau, which would exclusively decide how to process and centrally administer the intelligence. The guidelines also instructed the observers to report deficits of the relevant foreign army and to send copies of their travel diary to the Bureau upon their return.\textsuperscript{56}

In the autumn of 1905, the “first but large-scale” (Duanfang) military exercise of the New Armies, which lasted five days, took place in Hejian, Zhi province.\textsuperscript{57} It only involved Beiyang divisions and battalions, and the Chinese commanders relied strongly on the advice and planning of Japanese instructors, though this fact was treated discreetly.\textsuperscript{58} Japanese advisors were also involved in organizing the military exercise in the following year, which were held at Zhangde (today called Anyang), Henan province. The Zhangde war games in 1906 included the Eighth Division (Hubei New Army), under the command of Zhang Biao, as well as Beiyang troops under the command of Duan Qirui, who had already commanded one of the armies during the exercises in the previous year.\textsuperscript{59} In both cases, tens of thousands of troops participated: 45,000 men mainly from the Second and Fourth Divisions in
In his biography, he shared some of the observations of the foreigners present concerning the good discipline of the troops and the overall progress of Chinese military reforms. However, he also reported on poor planning and coordination, lack of communication and information, and chaos caused by rain and bad weather. According to Feng, Duan Qirui was extremely frustrated with his subordinate officers, who refused to exercise out of fear their uniforms could get wet. Feng quoted him as saying: "You are afraid that your uniforms will get soaked? So, when it is raining, then you do not go to war?" Moreover, Feng wrote, many soldiers looked sloppy, their boots and clothes were in a bad condition and, more often than not, their uniforms were either too big or too small.

In order to impress the rest of the world and demonstrate military strength, the Qing government and army command were anxious to present the image of engaged and spirited professional military men on all levels of rank. An article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers reminded the soldiers in a Have-to-know for the War Games survey that "various countries are sending envoys to observe the autumn exercises." Although the New Armies had existed for some time by then, foreigners did not possess detailed knowledge about the soldiers' qualities, the article argued, and "if this war game goes well, then the foreigners will respect us. Our China will be strong. But if the war game does not go well, our China will be despised by the foreigners even more." Therefore, mistakes were not allowed. Furthermore, the article urged the men to approach the war game with the "mind of real battle" (zhengzhuan de xin) because, otherwise, there was no courage and spirit, and everything would end up being "child's play." Moreover, the soldiers received information on how to take care of their medical kits and other equipment, and were exhorted to take good care of their uniforms and observe discipline. To increase the morale and appearance of the men, provisions were increased in quality and quantity during the war games. The soldiers were instructed to behave well toward civilians and reminded to buy food instead of simply requisitioning it.

In 1906, the Bureau for Military Training issued a small booklet with guidelines for staff officers involved in the planning of the war game, including personnel from the Bureau’s own departments as well as officers from the participating provinces and Lüjun divisions. Because foreign observers had praised the elaborate organization of the previous war game, the booklet noted, the responsibility was even greater now. If the military exercises, and the subsequent troop review, were not well prepared, the troops would not move perfectly. Accordingly, the full effort of everyone involved would be necessary to complete the sophisticated preparations. Tieliang and Yuan Shikai were officially appointed to evaluate both the war games and the troop review (yuebing dachen). Together with the other main organizers, they
took great pains to perform well before, during, and after the actual exercises. Already in 1905, Yuan established a special Bureau for Troop Review (Yuebingcha), which included departments for the reception of Chinese and foreign guests. For the war game in the following year, he ordered that the city of Zhangde should be polished up: shops on the main street were repainted and they were decorated with lanterns and flags. Yuan reportedly brought in hundreds of men from Tianjin to patrol and clean up the streets, and get rid of dirt and unwelcome people. Both the war games in 1905 and 1906 were concluded with a full-day final ceremony, for which the soldiers lined up neatly in units, "martially gallant and ready for battle on the review ground," according to Yuan's own report. Valiant riders (mashi xiongjiu) and all officers appeared in ceremonial dress. Under the pompous sound of military music and with their swords drawn, they waited to be reviewed by Chinese and foreign observers. Large "bustling" banquets with "more than 1000 people" concluded the war games.

Foreign military attachés were, overall, positive about the war games, and they were less critical concerning the Zhangde war games in 1906, compared to the one in Hejian in 1905. Yuan and the other military leaders also succeeded in impressing the foreign and Chinese press, which enthusiastically celebrated the rising military strength of the Qing Empire. Chinese journals and newspapers, moreover, were satisfied by the positive coverage of the foreign-language press. The Shenbao, for instance, reported that the Hejian war games were praised by various foreign observers and viewed as "xiong-zhuan,” meaning majestic, full of grandeur, manly and strong, heroic. Citing the North China Herald, the Shenbao report continued that, according to the German and Russian official observers, the Chinese New Armies were now comparable to the Japanese Army. Military journals were also content with the acknowledgment by foreigners. The Nanyang Military Journal published the translation of an overwhelmingly positive report from a Japanese correspondent, which included quotes from The Times, as well as positive remarks on the uniforms and appearance of the soldiers.

The war games, to be sure, were not just a mere spectacle to stage military pomp and circumstance but useful events to perform and, therefore, to promote and create military professionalism and learning in the military sector. According to Yuan Shikai, the war games were supposed to "inspire the martial spirit of everyone and combine the skill of everyone [...] to turn weakness into strength, [and were] not just for a decorative appearance." But Yuan was highly anxious about being ridiculed by foreigners for any mistake that might occur during the war games. He knew that observing a certain military style and habits was intertwined with what other Chinese military reformers and foreigners regarded as a professional "modern" army. Successful military reforms were not merely a question of actual firepower or, for that matter, training and discipline, but a question of adhering to predominant epistemological categories and notions of military culture. Chinese military men had to perform individually and collectively according to the standards of Euro-American military professionalism, including ideas and practices about professional military men. Military exercises should no longer appear as a "mere burlesque" as the American military observer, Emory Upton, remarked about an allegedly foreign-style drill he attended in Beijing in 1878. According to him, during the drill, superior officers were "comfortably seated under tents arranged along the line of battle" and the soldiers were warily "[wandering] back to the city" after the exercise had concluded.

Being "revered by foreigners" and giving a "strong appearance" (zhuang guanzha) also remained the prime purpose of military exercises in the early Republic. One military journal article, for instance, viewed the impossibility of providing such an appearance as reason for postponing a planned exercise in 1916. In the end, political and military struggles during Yuan's presidency impeded the conduct of any larger war games. Yuan's regime, however, resorted to another way of staging military culture: parades and troop reviews, which, unlike military exercise, were more a spectacle or military show, as described in Chapter 3.

PROFESSIONAL MEN AND "MILITARY SCIENCE"

The notion of "military science" and the scientific academic education of military officers were also propagated by a number of emerging military journals that were established from 1905 onward, either by the NewArmies and their respective administrative arms or by scholars and students more indirectly linked to the army. Irrespective of the contents of the numerous articles and reports published in these journals, the unprecedented creation of military journals itself speaks for the increasing self-awareness, internal autonomy, occupational independence, and self-governance of the army in late Qing and early Republican China. The journals contributed significantly to the construction of the figure of the professional military man and influenced the formation of a military masculine identity particularly of officers and cadets. The very first military journal was the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers (Xunbingbao), which was edited by the Beiyang Bureau for the Supervision of Training and under the aegis of the Bureau for Military Training. First published in 1905, the journal was supposed to be issued three times per month. Unlike other journals, which followed shortly after, it used simple, vernacular language and addressed common soldiers in particular. The Nanyang Military Journal (Nanyang bingshi zazhi) was published on a monthly basis between 1906 and 1911 and mainly reported on the developments of
the Lujun divisions in the southeastern (Nanyang) part of the Qing Empire. It explicitly addressed all ranks of the military but it was actually directed toward a much more educated readership, that is, officers, in particular those of the Ninth Division stationed in Jiangsu Province. In 1910, the Beiyang divisions started publishing the Beiyang Military Journal (Beiyang bingshi zazhi), which emulated the Nanyang Military Journal. In both cases, the Education and Training Departments (Jiaolianchu) of the respective army supervision bureaus (Nanyang/Jiangnan and Beiyang/Zhilin) were in charge of the journals. The successor of the Nanyang Military Journal was, presumably, the Hangzhou-based Zhejiang Military Journal (Zhejiang bingshi zazhi, often simply referred to as Bingshi zazhi), which appeared from 1914 to 1926.

Another journal was the Military Studies Magazine (Junxue jikan), which was established in 1908 by the Shanghai-based Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan), the largest Chinese publishing house at the time. Its chief editor was Chen Zongda, a graduate of the Jiangnan Army School and former military cadet in Germany. A journal called Martial Studies (Waxue) appeared monthly and was published by the Society for the Translation of Works on Martial Studies (Waxue bianyishi) in Tokyo that consisted of cadets studying in Japan. Finally, Zhang Feng, a Lujun officer in Shaanxi Province and member of Sun Yat-sen’s Tokio-based, anti-Qing Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenhui), founded the Army Learned Society (Lujun xuehui), which published a military journal, the Military Monthly (Lujun xuehui junshi yuebao).

The military journals dealt with topics related to military culture, such as military organization and administration, technology, military history, general military affairs and wars, tactics, and training. Besides exploring the latest developments in the military field, they had a strong educational orientation targeting both officers and common soldiers. The Beiyang Military Journal, for instance, summarized its main purpose in three points: “instill a martial spirit,” “examine all kinds of military sciences,” and “discuss the military preparedness (junbei) of all countries.” The other journals shared the international orientation and included articles on the military organizations of the major European countries, the United States, Russia, Japan, and, occasionally, on the developments in less influential countries such as Turkey, Spain, or the Netherlands. Reports on the German and Japanese army and navy were most common and the Nanyang Military Journal even employed two full-time translators, one for German and one for Japanese. These journals were modeled on similar journals in Europe and their proclaimed goal was to facilitate the coalescence of the Chinese military and, in some cases, the nation. Moreover, they frequently addressed and discussed the relationship between the state, the military, and civilians as well as the role of “military science.”

The foundation for establishing the New Armies and pursuing societal reorientation toward militaries was the idea of professionalism, including streamlined institutions, academy training, and a new notion of “military learning” or “military science” (bingxue), which replaced the established military examination system and its fixed canon of strategic classics as iconic selection criteria. The emergence of bingxue (today rather rendered as junshi xue) has to be understood in the context of the complex process of appropriating the idea of “science” as a system for obtaining and organizing knowledge in China and the epistemological and political struggles that accompanied this process. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, foreign translators (mostly Jesuits and Protestant missionaries) and Chinese scholars used customary frameworks to mesh the idea of science with Chinese scholarship. The initially common term to describe the European and American concept of scientific knowledge and experimental science was gexu zhizhi (or, in short, gezhizhi), which translates as “investigation of things and extension of knowledge.” The term originally included classical learning and “natural studies” but increasingly referred to natural sciences and sometimes, confusingly, only to physics. Another, less frequently used term was bowu, meaning “broad learning about things.” Using these established terms was a strategy to adapt “modern”/European-American science and render it as concepts and practices of learning with Chinese origins. However, after 1895, Chinese students began to use the Japanese neologism kagaku (kexue, literally meaning “organized fields of learning”) to completely break with the past and emphasize the fundamental methodological and classificationary differences between science and classical learning. This led to massive numbers of translations, the division of science into distinct disciplines such as social sciences (shehui kexue), medicine (yixue), chemistry (huaxue), physics (wuli xue), or agriculture (nongxue), and the implementation of a public school system from 1904 onward, which included, and increasingly was based on, science education.

Eventually, science even became a mystified symbol for national salvation and modernization among Chinese intellectuals, administrators, and politicians. As Bret Hirsch indicated, it became a totem representing masculine rationality and knowledge, which were building on and replacing the customary prestige of Confucian doctrines. Masculinized science became the means for a man to serve the nation and its resurrection, superseding classic learning and civil service examinations as career paths to public office.

Bingxue was a case in point. Although it certainly never developed into a distinct field similar to other scientific disciplines with well-defined content, methods and theories, or a community of academics and scientists, the term developed along the lines of science, and military reformers applied the same claims to authoritative knowledge and truth. Military reformers occasionally used terms such as gezhizhi and bowu in documents and articles but, after
the turn of the century, science/kesue and a concept of bingxue, which was defined accordingly, gained increasing currency: professional military men should be educated according to scientific standards and be prepared for “modern” warfare.

A number of articles in the military journals dealt directly with the question of promoting scientific education and “military science” itself—a term which actually could include everything from military organization, strategy, and tactics to certain areas of the natural sciences, mathematics, technology, construction, and equipment. One article in the Nanyang Military Journal, for instance, authored by Tao Shumao in 1907, highlighted the relevancy of specialized military academies for teaching all kinds of technical military courses (shuke) as well as scientific research in military subjects. According to Tao, “military science,” offered through military academies, and studying and learning in these academies were essential for educating officers of all levels. The “way to victory,” he argued, was founded in “scientifically conducting military science on a large scale” (kesue daxing bingxue). The “spirit of military science in strong countries can even [bridge the gap between] the five continents,” he emphasized euphorically and demanded that even the emperor should attend a military school.102

Military reformers and journal authors regarded the ability to command and lead (zhihuì) as well as a good, scientific education as the essential qualities for high-ranking officers. Li Duo, an officer who later joined the Nationalist army, emphasized that these qualities were complementary and one had to possess both to become an accomplished officer.103 The new military leaders were supposed to be analysts and organizers and, unlike the military strategists (bingjia) of the Song Dynasty, also tacticians with a thorough military school education and real hands-on experience.104 Through military education, and tactical simulations in particular, officers gained the ability to be flexible, adequately judge any situation, and make quick and, if necessary, independent decisions. A contribution in the Nanyang Military Journal by the “Jiangsu military training administration” argued that these competences depended on the individual; however, teaching and transmitting them could be standardized to a certain degree. Besides presenting obscure theories about the influence of the climate on the decisiveness or decision-making mentality of entire nations (guomin zhuan ruaixin), the article underlined that military education was important to counter alleged national deficiencies and inculcate officers with a firm and decisive attitude.105 Similarly, an article by Zhong Haosheng in the Zhejiang Military Journal argued in favor of (scientific) learning. Officers had to be educated in order to suppress superstition and mysticism among the enlisted soldiers. Reason and rationality should be the foundation on which an officer based his decisions.106 Wan Dezun, a Japanese military school graduate, stated that a military commander is “like the brain, which controls all parts of a body (shenti).” And, the “will of a man decides on the movements of the body.” A firm will and quick decision-making, he emphasized, were crucial for leading soldiers.107

Young officers, in particular, were to be trained in both academies and the regiments. An anonymous author, claiming to quote “Western philosophy,” wrote: “when the military power [of the countries of the world] is about the same, the strategy to improve the officers makes the difference.”108 Zhou Yinren, a cadet at the Japanese Army Academy and a future Beiyang brigade commander, complained in an article on the education of officers published in the Japanese-based journal Waxue that China was merely a drill ground for foreigners. Emphasizing the need for officers, he noted: “without science/academic learning (xueshi), the technologies for warfare cannot be used, without knowledge [about warfare], tiger and jaguar cannot be unleashed.”109

The early Republican Military Monthly was particularly concerned with the issue of “scientific” military education and training as well as with teaching and instruction methods. Mao Qianshan, who later became a general under Jiang Jieshi, argued that judging from historical experience, the strength of armies depended on the ability to qualitatively improve military education. According to Mao, unlike elsewhere, many low-ranking officers in China were still uneducated: a dangerous condition anticipating chaos.110 In the same vein, another article in the same journal emphasized the importance of mastering military science, which developed rapidly and offered many innovations for military affairs and warfare.111 Learning was based on the pace and quality of scientific developments, a certain Yu Qing argued in another journal, and the outcome of battle was increasingly dependent on intelligence and the mastery of machines, rather than on courage.112 Likewise, the early Republican military governor of Zhejiang, Zhu Rui, believed that both school education and service in the regiment were complementary. During the convocation ceremony at a provincial officers’ school, he emphasized in a speech that “knowledge” and “experience” were absolutely necessary for a good officer. After all, because they had the better officers, Prussia had defeated France and Japan had overcome Russia, Zhu reminded the graduates.113 The school’s director added that academic attainments (xueshi) and technical skills (jinneng) as well as spirit were the main principles for a military man. Learning never stopped and had to be constantly extended, he concluded.114

THE SPIRIT OF MILITARY MEN

Although training military specialists and professionals was the goal of the new military education program developed by military reformers at the beginning of the twentieth century, the appeal of the German and Japanese
Not only in Germany but also everywhere in Europe and the United States, traits attributed to military masculinity were reinforced and even “eroticized” through the political and social elevation and glorification of military culture and success in battle. According to Paul Higate and John Hopton, masculinity in Victorian Britain, for instance, was ideologically defined in terms of strength, courage, determination, and patriotism. This concept of manhood was “performed bodily, in military parades, imperialist rituals, and patriotic songs, and imaginatively, representations of bodies, in Rudyard Kipling novels, engravings, celebratory verse, and so forth. [...] Uniform dress-ups, military postures, metaphors, militarists, sentiments, and cultural production circulated.”

According to a late nineteenth century German military hygiene manual, military education and training should not only produce “able-bodied and healthy soldiers but also [cultivate] manly defenders of the fatherland, undaunted by death.” This idea of linking home defense with inculcating battle courage as well as a “manly martial spiritedness” became part of the basic training of recruits of the late Qing and early Republican New Armies. Chinese military reformers and army instructors considered bodily discipline the source of spirit and bravery and were well aware of the connection between physical exercise, health, and the cultivation of a martial spirit, which they viewed as the “easiest way to transform the disposition of good soldiers” and turn them into loyal men. An author writing under the pseudonym Jiafei argued that the posture of standing at attention reflects the spirit of military men.

Instilling a vivid martial spirit was essential for governing common soldiers but it was even more important for the cultivation of officers and generals, who would lead the troops if their spirit should fail them. The idea of “martial spirit” was repeated and explained endlessly and, explicitly or implicitly, pervaded texts such as military journal articles and manuals and appeared in songs, poems, stories, legends, and speeches. These “texts” conveyed to officers and soldiers a role model of military heroism as well as a mystical, almost religious, idea of valor, which linked war with sacrifice. The new military man, moreover, was supposed to adhere to comradeship and possess a sense of brotherhood or esprit de corps, which linked martial spirit with professional pride. Military spirit and esprit de corps, eventually, extended to patriotism and faith in the nation, and rendered the willingness to sacrifice one’s physical body for the country.

Military reformers were aware of the importance of texts to circulate their notion of a foreign-style new Chinese army and to influence the behavior and attitude of officers and soldiers. In 1907, the Nanyang Military Journal reported that Tieliang, who, at the time, headed the Army Ministry, planned...
to establish a weekly paper, written in the vernacular, for soldiers. The purpose was to reach even common soldiers with only basic literacy skills and promote military ideas and values in every soldier. Specially appointed officers should read and explain the paper to the gathered soldiers. According to the journal, this would “greatly benefit the task of the military.” Moreover, the army sought to strictly control the quantity of all military books and the army leadership was anxious to keep their contents in accordance with army protocol. Written and spoken texts and textual performance, that is, the interpretation and use of texts as both representations and enactments of social reality, were crucial for the construction and conceptualization of military masculinity. The written word, in particular, counted as the foundation of civilization in China; it was almost synonymous with “culture” and constituted the perception of a civil and pacifist wen essence. Nevertheless, as Joanna Waley-Cohen shows for the Qing in the eighteenth century, texts could be put to the service of wu or military culture and be utilized to produce a concept of military masculinity. Through texts, early twentieth century military reformers, instructors, intellectuals, and army leaders completed the figuration of the military man, literally animating the image of the professional soldier with martial spiritedness and fervent patriotism.

Quoting the Sunzi bingfa and other military classics, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, in a chapter on the Instruction of Generals (Xun jiang yaoyan), emphasized that a general essentially had to possess both wen (cultural) and wu (martial) qualities. These qualities should be used to repay the kindnesses of the dynasty and to serve the nation. Without dwelling much on the wen aspects, merely mentioning the quality of “wisdom” more than once, the manual emphasized that generals should be “valiant martial men” (jiuju wuji) with an “imposing masculinity” (chenxiang), loyal to king and country, and dedicated to resisting foreign aggression. After discussing the issue of leadership, expressed in the relationship of leniency (kuan) and strictness (yan), the manual examined the role of courage. In battle “brave, young, vigorous, and brawny [men], who do not yield to the cowardice of the old and weak,” were needed. The manual introduced various forms of courage, among which the one resulting from loyalty and righteousness (zhongyi zhi yong) was the most profound and unchanging. Courage from “blood and breath” or “vigour” (suezi zhi yong), from “emotions” or “temperament” (yiqi zhi yong) and from “force” (miangqiang zhi yong), on the other hand, were only temporary.

Yuan Shikai, co-author of the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, repeatedly announced, in declarations, correspondence, poems, and speeches, the importance of courage and “bravely engaging the enemy” (feiyong, fenwu) without fearing for one’s own life. He incessantly promoted courage, the ability to face death undauntedly, and even recklessness as the fundamental qualities of any good military man. In a speech delivered to officers and soldiers, which was subsequently published in a collection, he narrated how he himself had faced death many times without being harmed or feeling threatened. He announced that “every soldier must believe firmly: I can kill a person. No one can kill me. That’s a tough guy (haohanzi). Soldiers must engage bravely. If they do not, they are not qualified to be soldiers. That would be a shame.” The “tough guy” was a popular cultural male figuration of an audacious, violent, yet honorable and chummy Robin Hood-like outsider. The new military man, thus, was not just a professional rationalist but also a passionate and spirited fighter, yet someone who acted honorably and comradely.

In the Nanyang Military Journal’s first issue (1906), Jianfei defined spirit as “fealty” (zhongjie), “etiquette” (lizi), “honor” (xinyi), “valor” (wuyong), and “character” (zhihu). According to him, military men must obey and, emulating the loyalty of legendary martial heroes such as the Song Dynasty general Yue Fei, sacrifice their lives for emperor, country, family, and people. The “idea” and “spirit” of patriotism were boundless sources for inspiring a strong, manly (xiangzhuang) will and a firm spirit, leading men to the “way of the warrior” (Washidao, from the Japanese Bushido) and to a “militarist soul” (jiaohun). The Chinese civilization was at its weakest point, he wrote, its martial spirit had vanished completely, and men were sick and “delicate like women” (naxing xianxian). Therefore, starting with the military, courage and valor had to be instilled in men and their weak bodies had to be trained and drilled. At the basis of all valor, steadiness, and spirit, he emphasized, lay “character.” Jianfei’s article was followed by a short piece on Training the Soul (Lianhuangpin) and a longer essay on the education of officers, written by two other authors who both emphasized that technical skills only and the “training of hands, legs, ears, eyes, and the brain” were not enough.

“Spirit education,” implying qualities such as courage and loyalty, was central for training new recruits and essential for cultivating a new class of military leaders. The Nanyang Military Journal consecutively published an entire series called Lectures on Spirit (Jingshen jizhou), based on the argument that “spirit” was a crucial element for the coherent and congruent military education of officers, who passed through very different educational tracks such as provincial and foreign academies or short-term programs. Numerous other articles in various military journals were concerned with the “education of the spirit” (jizhenn jiayou) or what was called the non-technical qualities of officers and common soldiers. In 1907, the Nanyang Military Journal printed an order of Xu Shichang, Yuan Shikai’s close lieutenant and, at the time, imperial military commissioner of Manchuria, to incorporate “lectures on spirit” into the education of low-rank generals. He argued:
Everyone experiences ups and downs, but good and bad depend on what one makes out of it. If something is understood as fortunate, then it will be fortunate even if it is something bitter. If something is understood as bitter, then it will be bitter even if it is something fortunate. [...] The power of lecturing on spirit is that it can change the character and habits of a person.  

Xu’s order included a list of questions that served as the basis for “spirit education” and focused on the inculcation of military men with patriotism, on raising their prestige among society, and the issue of instilling obedience, bravery, and endurance. According to Li Dehua, endurance or perseverance (jianren) was a “key element” in educating soldiers and officers and raising their martial spirit. Yuan Shikai declared that the ability to endure hardships was like an “ultimate magic elixir” (wushang miaoxiao) when training and steeling the body. According to another article, perseverance was a precondition for shaping the physical body of men and preparing them for their roles as soldiers. At the same time, a healthy and strong body was important for maintaining an enduring fighting spirit. Perseverance was a part of educating the spirit of military men. Their very lives depended on their spirit.

“Spirit,” many authors and military reformers agreed, was essential for the New Armies and the new military men and particularly important for generals and other officers. However, the understanding of this term differed widely between texts and included various individual qualities such as bravery, heroism, valor, perseverance, honesty, honor, righteousness, and loyalty. Texts repeated the common practice of the past, and referred to idealized historical and legendary figures such as the heroes from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Yue Fei, or Sun Sike (a Han Bannerman and general under the Kangxi Emperor), to describe the ideal martial qualities a man needed to possess. Manuals and regulations constantly reiterated the bequeathed notion of a general who was not a brute but righteous and combined wén and wǔ aspects. Cai E, an early Republican military governor of Yunnan who supported the Guomindang against Yuan Shikai, strongly promoted the military philosophy of Hu Liyi and Zeng Guofan. Both Zeng and Hu were high Qing officials and successful army generals during the Taiping Rebellion who embodied the ideal combination of civilian and military leaders. They modeled themselves on the Ming general Qi Jiuguang and his ideas, for instance, by implementing a command hierarchy based on personal relationships and obligation. Cai’s book Record of Zeng and Hu on Governing Soldiers (Zeng Hu zhibing yu), which was reprinted many times and also received great attention from Jiang Jieshi and the Communist’s Red Army, concentrated on “spirit” aspects such as “bravery and steadfastness,” “will,” “honesty,” “benevolence,” and “diligence.” According to the book, commanding troops required one to be a great leader, undaunted by death, selfless, and “able to suffer hardships.”

The Nanyang Military Journal included a rubric called Legends of Loyalty and Bravery (Zhongyong meiyan) that was used by authors and translators to elaborate on topics connected to martial spirit and heroic deeds. Other articles in the journal reported on the “soul and spirit” of soldiers in the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895 or introduced “famous generals of the Occident.” The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers similarly published a series entitled Biographical Sketches of Famous Historical Generals, introducing legendary Chinese generals, starting with Zhuge Liang and the Romance of the Three Kingdoms heroes. Chinese and European military history also became part of the newly established military academies’ curricula, following the strong emphasis by the German General Staff on the systematic study of military history and historic battles for practical learning and application. However, academic essays on martial spirit and military leaders were not necessarily the most effective genre to inculcate men with a martial spirit and the respective qualities. Much more memorable and palpable were the many tales and images of legendary role models or heroes from both the Chinese and European past, which military journals presented in poems, songs, and short stories and which aimed at attracting educated men to join the army. Citing and following historical models was an established practice, particularly among the educated elite in imperial China and, with regard to the New Armies, they remained to serve as inspiring exemplars rather than as subjects for tactical analysis. Military journals contained easily accessible pictures of legendary warriors, military leaders, contemporary Chinese and foreign officers, and common soldiers, as individuals or in groups. Photographs and lithographic prints presented an enthusiastic image of fighting and showed ideal-type incarnations of martial spirit, courage, regimental unity, and comradeship (see, for instance, Figure 4.1).

For the same purpose, most military journals featured a “culture” rubric. The Zhejiang Military Journal had an “arts and literature” section, the Beiyang Military Journal, the Wuxue, and the Military Monthly all included a “literary circle” with poems or short prose pieces. Some journals frequently printed “military short stories” (junshi xiaoshuo) with titles such as Company of Heroes, Sacrifice for the Homeland (“a patriotism story”), Record of China’s War Future, The Righteous and Brave Army (about Prussian soldiers defending Prussia against the French), “Long live the Army—Long live the Empire,” Heroes of a Dying Country, or Love and the Hatred for the Enemy (a story about a young officer and a girl). These stories depicted a romantic ideal of soldiering, drawing on both legendary Chinese and adopted foreign notions about martialness and military masculine traits, emphasizing heroism, righteousness, self-sacrifice, loyalty, and patriotism. And more than any other textual source, they directly addressed the male identity and manliness of the reader or audience, frequently referring to them directly as “man.”
(nan’er). One contribution in the Nanyang Military Journal, for instance, announced:

Men I love, listen to me! Men I respect, listen to me! Men, men, do you know the value of being drafted into the army? . . . Those who love the homeland (zugo) quickly enlist! . . . Without martial spirit, it is hard to compete in the world.¹⁰⁸

Moreover, common soldiers were supposed to study songs and poems during their spare time and take them as guidelines for correct behavior and ideological instruction. In order to stir up a martial spirit and “encourage” men, these so-called quanbingge were supposed to teach soldiers how to behave in any possible situation, whether in the barracks or in the field, and exhort them to carefully learn the German (or “foreign-style”) drill exercises, to be courageous, and bravely engage the enemy. From songs, for instance, they learned to take good care of their uniforms as it “protects the body.”¹⁰⁹ Military journals contained lyrics and rhymed texts, as well as discussions of the role of music and songs for the spirit, conduct, and performance of the army. The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers and military journals included simple songs that aimed at disciplining common soldiers and inculcating them with basic rules and routines. While songs (or, if only recited, poems) such as the Gun Learning Song (Qiangxuege), Training Soldiers Poem (Xunbing siyangge), Cultivating Soldiers Song (Jiaoyangge), and the Military Discipline Song (Junjige) had the purpose of drilling men, others, such as the Encouragement to Join the Army Song (Quan congyuge), were intended to advertise and popularize the army.¹¹⁰ An article series on the basic military training of new recruits from 1916 emphasized the significance of singing songs, which should be simple to understand and, most of all, highlight “heroism” (xiangzhuang).¹¹¹

In 1907, Wan Desun, who studied at the Lianghu Academy of Classical Learning (set up by Zhang Zhidong in 1890) and later attended various military schools in Japan and eventually became a secretary of president Li Yuanhong, published an article On the Need of Military Music for the Regiment. Like primary school students, the troops must not be without singing, he wrote. Singing songs was essential for the “spirit education,” “cultivated a sense of beauty,” and increased morale and passion. Singing caused “emotional self-uplifting” and “surging ahead with one’s body.” Accordingly, a “national anthem that startled the world and moved the gods” would be needed to inspire the spirit and arouse the ambition of soldiers, who should “know that one can die but the country cannot be disgraced” and that “the family can be extinguished, but evil cannot be allowed to roam freely.”¹¹²

The link between service in the army, masculine traits such as will, perseverance, diligence, courage, and spirit, as well as patriotism was a frequent
theme in military songs. Zhang Zhidong himself wrote a Military Song (Junge) in 1905 that emphasized loyalty to the dynasty, the unity of the "yellow" peoples, and the protection of the nation-state and "race" (bāo guójia, bāo zhòngzu). Songs such as this one were tools to motivate, discipline, and govern military men by creating a sense of connection and belonging among them. The Love the People Song (Aimin'ge), for instance, urged soldiers to view themselves as representatives and part of the people and behave accordingly. Zeng Guofan, in the mid-nineteenth century had already used similar songs to instill into his mercenaries respect for the lives and goods (and daughters) of the common people, which should be regarded as the soldier's own family. Yet, after the turn of the century, songs and poems (and "texts" in general) emphasized an increasingly abstract idea of "nation," most tangible in the term "patriotism," and the notions of joyful soldiering and glorious sacrifice in the service of the fatherland.

A number of articles dealt with the "joy of military men" in general, arguing that military service should convey a positive self-image. The Nanyang Military Journal published the article On the Joy of Military Men written by Sakata Toranosuke, an academy instructor for the Japanese army who later taught at the Nanyang Officers Preparatory School. Sakata rhetorically asked what anyone would be without experiencing joy (yúle, meaning also amusement, entertainment, and fun) in their actions. He argued that military men were no different from ordinary people in this. However, as they performed very different actions than ordinary people, they needed a different sort of joy: taking pleasure in immersing themselves in the art of war (yànjiù zhǎnshì). According to Sakata, martial men (wǔfā) had been despoiled in the past, but now the people respected them for the brave, grand, and heroic (háozhuàng) manner with which they engaged in battle. Sakata emphasized that, with "joy," military men were able to channel their emotions toward their duties. Generals would be able to command over the life and death of countless men and send them roaring to the battlefield. "Pure military men's joy" was to view soldiering as a vocation and source of happiness. True heroes enjoyed leading armies because, as generals, they were never fed up, never tired, but addicted to learning the arts of war.

In the following issue of the Nanyang Military Journal, Tao Junbao, a graduate of the Jiangnan Officers School who worked in the conscription, policing, and staff sections of the Nanyang military administration (responsible for the provinces Jiangsu and Zhejiang), commented with praise on Sakata's article. Moreover, Tao sought to specify what "joy" of military men actual meant. Directly addressing the reader, he presented two lists, one for officers and one for common soldiers, which asked rhetorically how certain issues connected to soldierly life could not be joyful. How, for instance, could playing the Kriegsspiel or participating in large war games involving two armies not be joyful for officers? And, in the case of common soldiers, how could singing songs during marches not be joyful? Elsewhere, Tao particularly emphasized the importance of singing and dancing for the martial spirit and courage of military men. "In the past, the lyrics of military music had to carry on the warrior's grandeur and heroism (xiōngzhuhuāng), making people beam with joy," he wrote. But at the same time, Tao criticized that singing Chinese military songs was a lost tradition as only European instruments would be used now. If one wanted to promote military music, China's national essence had to be preserved within the current music, he demanded.

Music and songs were only one way to joyfully encourage the martial esteem of military men. Chen Zan argued in an article in the Zhejiang Military Journal that barracks must not be grim places because if they were, they would impede the army's strength. Joining the ranks meant leaving one's old social circles and the barracks became the place where soldiers were "meticulously aggregated into a [new] class and thoroughly disciplined into a unit of able-bodied men (zhùxiāngdīnguān)." But military service, he argued, was only supposed to consist of three fully active years, and in order to keep some sort of connection to their former civilian life and to maintain the morale of the soldiers, elements of joy and distraction should not be left out. "Ways of solacing soldiers" (wéijí shìbìng zhì fāngkuǎi) could include "entertainment rooms" (yúshì), where soldiers played cards and other games, read journals and newspapers, eat snacks, or simply rest. Such rooms would also display orders from the president and portrait pictures of high generals and thus also had an "educational advantage." Other measures included building little parks or gardens within the barracks, as well as organizing martial arts boxing tournaments, which would not only increase strength, coordination, and courage but also represent "China's thousands of years-old national essence of martial bravery.

Finally, two issues of the Nanyang Military Journal of 1909 included a series of "new jokes" (xīn xiàohuà), which seemed to have a similar purpose as songs, poems, or the recreational measures suggested by Chen Zan. Distinct military jokes were shared between military men and could thus help to create a distinct New Armies' military identity, contribute to group cohesion, and raise morale and spirit. The explanation to the jokes in the Nanyang Military Journal stated that scholars and generals were not alike and that martial men (wùrén) had always forsaken learning in the past. The fact that men (dīng) today were expected to be different and could not afford not to be "valiant" (jūjiā) had resulted in many jokes. This explanation probably referred to jokes mocking those who insisted on a strict dichotomy between civilian culture and the military. One of the jokes, called Good New Soldiers (Hào xìnjun), seemed to suggest that discipline did not necessarily make good fighters:
A SPIRITUAL BOND

Telling stories and singing songs about military life, bravery, and loyalty enabled military men to bond and collectively assure themselves of their manliness, as songs with titles such as *Real Men (Nan'er hange)*, which was included in a *Compilation of Military Songs (Junyuegao)* from 1909, demonstrated. Common soldiers and officers perceived military service as a shared experience and military reformers and leaders promoted comradeship and esprit de corps, which virtually became a substantial part of the desired martial spirit. Susan Mann emphasizes that, in imperial China, various male bonds on different social levels were important for defining masculine identity and perpetuating a patriarchal, male homosocial society which confined women to the “inner chambers” and excluded them from public life, at least in terms of full political, social, and economic participation. Male bonds were defined by a common background or organizational connection, as men from “same trade” (tongye), same educational form (tongxue), or same age group (tongnian) were thought to feel particularly close. Before and after the late Qing military reforms, common soldiers were linked to the notion of tongwu, being part of the same unit that, ideally, was composed of men from the same region or at least province. Moreover, common soldiers were linked by a shared inclination toward the masculine figuration of the “tough guy” in popular culture, which emphasized a strong commitment toward brotherhood, camaraderie, and the preference for friendship between men over the (romantic or sexual) relationship with women. Generally, camaraderie, friendship, and male bonding were ascribed more to martial wu types than to intellectual wen men.

Military reformers sought to mold the New Armies into a new homosocial organization in which pride and prestige were not solely dependent on outside views but also on an internal sense of coherence and commonality that went beyond tough guy camaraderie. In particular, they viewed the cohesion of the officer corps (jiangxiaoqie), significant for developing an effective and professional army, as being dependent on the cultivation of spirit. The first issue of the *Zhejiang Military Journal*, which focused on Germany as a role model, particularly dealt with the “spirit” and discipline of the military. Nowadays, the editor Zhu Duan wrote in the opening statement of the journal, there was no difference in “conduct and discipline” (junji fengji) between “Western” and Chinese armies, which were inspired by both ancient Chinese and foreign role models.

The famous generals of the past absolutely respected martial virtue (shangwu). For governing an army there was no one who did not value and examine all the historical records of killing and war. Like the scholars in robes, they conducted themselves in noble ways. In order to create a powerful army, Zhu demanded the merging of all the different “martial ways” (wu zhi dao): the Japanese Yamato spirit (Dahehun), the French “esprits de corps” (sic) (nuandui jingshen), and the German “Corpsgeist” (jundui shensui). Both the French and the German terms were given in their original language and in the Chinese translation, and referred to the self-consciousness and community spirit of military circles. The idea of the Japanese Yamato spirit (or soul, Yamato-damashii) was also mentioned in other military journal articles. It stemmed from the Heian period (794–1185) and was used to signify allegedly essential Japanese cultural values, in contrast to those important from Tang China. From the Edo period onward (1603–1868), politicians, intellectuals, and military people employed the Yamato spirit time and again to endow military-political doctrines with a mythical charging, referring to an essentialist Japanese valor and martial spirit closely linked to Bushido (Way of the Warrior).

Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang army leaders aimed at creating a corporate Lujun, in which comradeship and esprit de corps became an essential part of the male identity of military men. Although Yuan tried to bind both officers and common soldiers to his own person—by resorting to the specific system of personal obligations common in late imperial China or by inculcating filial loyalty to him as a general and father figure—the Lujun and particularly the Beiyang officer corps consisted of men loyal to their profession, the army as organization and, at least as an ideal, to the nation. As Stephen MacKinnon points out, professional relationships were more important in the officer corps than personalized hierarchies, in which men were only loyal to their direct commanders. The idea of military esprit de corps aimed at infusing the New Armies with professional pride independent of any political connections and obligations. The foundation of the concept of esprit de corps was the idea of comradeship. As president of the Republic, Yuan stressed in a speech the importance of comradeship, of helping each other, and of the harmonious affection between comrades and fellow soldiers of one’s unit (tongwu dangbing). “At home,” Yuan explained the value of companions in the army as follows: “we rely on our father and brothers, [but] abroad we rely on our friends.” Yet, what a man found in the army went deeper than normal friendship because comrades in arms were “friends in the most troublesome times” (huan’nan pengyou) and one’s own life depended on this relationship. According to Yuan, this friendship was “not much different from the flesh and blood [connection to the family] (jiazhong gurou).” Furthermore, the
relationship between a military man and his comrades is like sharing the same body.”178 In another speech, Yuan repeatedly emphasized that soldiers must “join forces” (qixin xieyi), evoking the transcendental interpretation of new tactical formation and discipline introduced after 1895, which should make soldiers fight like one man or one body.180

In addition to the tonggu or military comradeship propagated by Yuan Shikai, military journals praised the homosocial bond between military men. An article entitled Soldiers Must Give up Brawling in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers underlined that young soldiers must not misuse their vigor and fight and quarrel in public. A “remarkable man” (yi ge qi nanzi) restrained himself and did not harm the reputation of the army. Among “brothers in the barracks” (yingshe xiongdi), however, brawling was not a problem, implying their special, amicable relationship.181 The idea of a special friendship or connection between military men was picked up by various military journals, dealing, for instance, with accompanying friends home, with the relationship between officers and the ranks, and with the role of noncommissioned officers for the esprit de corps of the New Armies.182 Du Huaiyong, for instance, discussed this issue in his article The Feelings Between Generals and Soldiers.183 In the past, he argued, generals were “beasts in human attire” (guanshou), who viewed common soldiers as cannon fodder, literally as “oxen and horses.” Ten thousand men had ten thousand hearts, he proclaimed, but the strength of the army (and, thus, the country) depended on the bond between officers and common soldiers. With respect to education and training, the relationship between the upper and lower decks should be like the one between father and son. Regarding exhortation and advice, it should be like the one between teachers and friends, Du demanded. The honor of officers depended on treating the soldiers from the ranks well. And cultivating qualified military men and arousing a martial spirit, in turn, depended on this balanced and fair relationship.184 Only then could the country be “washed clean form the shame of the last decades” because only then were the soldiers more than just “monkeys wearing hats” (muhou er guan), he warned.185

SPIRITED AWAY

Martial spirit and esprit de corps were essential for cultivating a new officer class and its military masculine identity. In military texts, the bond between military men, particularly officers, was depicted as a part, or pre-stage, of a yet larger connection between military men and the nation. Eventually, military men came to epitomize true patriotism because they were expected to perform the ultimate heroic act of physically sacrificing themselves for the nation. According to Xu Jianyin, author of the New Book on Military

Science, “German officers exert all their strength for their country, [for which] they give their lives and destroy their bodies (xiuaoming suna).”186 A few years later, in 1906, Huang Shilong, who was a general in a Lujin brigade in Guangdong and later became a member of the Revolutionary Alliance, claimed that the strength of the Prussian and German armies was no coincidence because it was derived from the unity of mind and purpose of the military men. The German emperor/Prussian king, he wrote, embodied this “iron and blood” ideology (tiaoshe zhouyi), which ultimately demanded from everyone a sacrifice (zixing) for the “fatherland” (zgyou).187

In a Christian context, sacrifice is linked to the “joy” and “beatitude” of the martyrdom and redemption of Jesus Christ. According to a study by Timothy Brook and his co-authors, this notion was alien to China and, consequently, the idea of dying for one’s home country, as the ultimate patriotic duty, did not exist.188 Patriotism is linked to nationalism, which was a phenomenon or ideology novel to China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when the idea of an imperial universalism, which had been reinvented by the Qing using a strong military imprint, transformed into a particularistic, militant Han nationalism. This particularistic nationalism was still relatively inclusive and multi-ethnic, because the heritage of the Qing imperial state could not simply be washed away. The terms guojia (country, land, state, nation) or simply guo (originally a walled city), now used to signify the nation-state, both existed and were actively used before they increasingly expressed an abstract concept—a specific historically, geographically, culturally, and ethnically constructed community of people—that was evoked through media, rituals, dress, monuments, myths, and other historical narratives. According to these narratives, the Chinese nation was fundamentally different from other, competing peoples and nations, and a multitude of current, socially relevant issues, such as governance, political structure, state and citizenship, science, the military, and even concepts of body and gender were linked to its fate.189

The idea that men serving in the army should be patriotic and sacrifice themselves for their nation-state became a central idea of the higher military education for officers in China. Li Jishen emphasized, in his academy textbook, that the guojia is formed by iron and blood; with iron it must be protected. Military men must give their lives for their country, they must view dying as returning home […].190 He was also of the opinion that the strong countries in “East and West” had all established a state religion and, therefore, military men could rely on real faith. Indeed, the Japanese military (and civilian) leadership propagated the almost religious faith in the idea of sacrifice pro patria and for the monarchy that originally stemmed from Europe, in particular from the German warrior nobility of the nineteenth century. In Japan, these notions were adapted to reinvent the Samurai “way
of the warrior" and, later, Shinto, the indigenous Japanese spirituality/religion that became a major reference point of Japanese militarism from the 1920s up to the 1940s.194 According to Ernst Preisslein, through Jacob Meckel’s influence, Japanese officers combined the heritage of their alleged Samurai martial spirit (Bushiido) with the alleged ruthlessness and decisiveness of the Prussian officer. This concept of a courageous military man unbound by death, self-sacrificing for king and “fatherland,” in turn, influenced the self-understanding of the Chinese soldiers and, in particular, officers.

Emerging ideas of the nation conflated with ideals of masculinity and femininity and perceptions of male and female bodies, which, from the late Qing period on, reformers and various Chinese governments sought to direct and exploit.195 Military reformers linked military masculinity with the nation-state/home country to give a transcendent element to the mission of the army (the self-definition of its purpose, legitimizing its existence): a higher course, worthy of forfeiting one’s life and committing physical self-sacrifice.196 The male body, which was sacred in Confucian thinking and had to be kept from harm so that it could fulfill its filial duties (similar to the female body), was discursively detached from the family and put to the service of the nation. The home, linked to the lineage, became the home country or fatherland, linked to nation and people. The body was rendered “the shield and wall of the nation,” because a true military masculinity was defined by the willingness to sacrifice for the fatherland. This idea of pro patria mori was central to the conception of patriotism, masculinity, and heroism in an age of nationalism and national competition. It was diametrically opposed to gender conceptions centering on piety and sustaining the family or lineage. Chinese military reformers, ultimately, sought nothing less than to turn the Chinese populace into a European-style “heroic society” whose self-perception rested on real or imagined manly martial heroes.197

In an article on Second World War memory in China, Arthur Waldron points out that martial heroism and martyrdom had a meaning throughout Chinese history that was different from that prevailing in the “West” and expressed a different kind of loyalty. According to Waldron, not the particularistic patria, the home country of a community or group, is central in Chinese thinking, but rather a human relationship, such as the one between emperor and subject, or a universalistic moral principle such as the Confucian “benevolence” (ren). The legendary general Yue Fei, who allegedly had the phrase jinzhong baoqiu (which Waldron translates as “exhausting loyalty in the dynasty’s service”) tattooed on his back, was the ideal typical embodiment of this different conception of loyalty. In the twelfth century, Yue Fei had successfully fought the Jurchen Jin Dynasty to defend the Southern Song Dynasty. However, he was ordered back by the Song emperor who feared an internal strife in case Yue Fei succeeded against the Jurchens. Being aware of a possible civil war, Yue Fei accepted to return to the capital where he was imprisoned and put to death. Established notions such as “loyalty to dynasty/emperor” (zhongjun, zhongguo), “dedication to the country/dynasty” (baoqiu, not to be confused with the more neutral term baoqiu, protecting the country), and “love for the people” (aimin) appeared in abundance in the military reform discourse.198 And the idea of dying for a universal principle rather than for the patria was still widespread in the 1940s, as Waldron demonstrated by referring to the case of General Zhang Zizhong, the highest-ranking Chinese officer to die in the Second World War. At least until the 1990s, Zhang was depicted more as a Yue Fei type of hero, who sacrificed himself for moral ideals and interpersonal values, than as a patriotic national hero.199

On the other hand, at the beginning of the twentieth century, military journals, drill manuals, and army textbooks increasingly depicted the transcendent guojia as the ultimate source of martial spirit and invoked patriotism (aiguo) to protect the country as the essential duty of military men. In the early twentieth century, the construction of national heroes served the purpose of creating a national Chinese identity: partly as an anti-Manchu, Han nationalist identity but, after 1911, as a Chinese identity regardless of ethnic categories. National or rather “state” heroes such as Yue Fei had been used as a figure and source of collective identity (representing loyalty to state and dynasty) much earlier, during the Ming Dynasty and particularly during the eighteenth century. As Waldron indicates, aiguo or patriotism was a neologism coined in Japan that was increasingly used in China at the beginning of the twentieth century and bespoke a new quality regarding nationalism and patria, centering on the nation-people (minzu) and their historic-geographically defined fatherland (zguzuo). In fact, it is hardly possible to distinguish when the term guo changed meaning and what it stood for exactly at a certain time for certain people. After all, patriotism is a concept bound to historical and linguistic circumstances in Europe and difficult to transfer to the Chinese context, where it can only be interpreted through compound words, specific contexts, and medial dissemination. Guojia (jia meaning family) was increasingly used instead of guo, because of its different meaning and the increasing use of disyllabic words in written texts. In the case of military writings, it appears that there was a concomitance of different concepts of nation-state and meanings of guo and guojia. Military reformers attempted to instill into the new military men the “Western” notion of a quasi-religiously exalted death on the battlefield—a notion that according to Waldron had hitherto not existed in China—either in the name of the dynasty or the nation. In both cases, they increasingly emphasized patriotism.200

However obscure the term guo might be, it is most significant that military reformers supported a concept of masculinity that promoted patriotic physical sacrifice rather than universal Confucian virtues. With the metaphor “real
men are wrapped in horsehide after death” (dazhangfu mage guoshi), Li Duo emphasized in an article on *Four Principles for Instructing Soldiers in the Common Language* that real men died on the battlefield.

Furthermore, he stressed that among the four, socially well-established principles: loyalty (zhong), piety (xiao), righteousness (yi), and courage (yong), loyalty was the essential quality of military men, which no one must neglect. Li referred to the loyalty to the nation-state, which military men had to defend with their “blood and flesh” and whose shame they courageously had to avert at any cost. Soldiers should be both “loyal to the emperor and patriotic” (zhongjun aiguo).

Chen Qi repeated that the New Armies had to “avenge the national shame” (xue guoshi). He quoted from Confucius and other eminent sources but the emphasis was on patriotism, the awakening of the “national soul” (guohun), and on “race” (zhongzu): “If there is a guo there is a family, if there is a race there is a clan (qiazu). Without avenging national shame, the race cannot thrive.”

The New Armies were not only supposed to save the dynasty or state but also rescue the nation from being feminized and emasculated. It was the many duty of the new iconic figure of the military man to stand up and prevent the carving-up of the country. “Inner emigration,” the withdrawal to a feeling of cultural and moral superiority despite military inferiority, as it had occurred, for instance, during the Qing conquest of the Ming Empire, was presented as impossible and would only lead to total extinction. According to Cheng Fengzhang, an army of “intrepid soldiers” (pizu baiwan) was necessary to protect the land (tudi) and citizens (guomin) and stop foreigners from “killing our people and raping our women.”

He went on:

> When I grieve for my fatherland, and pity all living creatures, I look to the iron and blood men (tixue nan'er) to form a new troop and prepare for battle without any delay.

The idea of the new military men as national protectors was expressed in the recurring term “shields and walls of the country” (guo zhi gancheng), which stemmed from the *Book of Songs* (Shijing, the oldest collection of Chinese poetry, dating from the eleventh to seventh centuries BC) and referred to dauntless, noble, military men (jiujia wufa) who protected their domain. The expression occurred in the shortened version (gancheng) in the *Instruction for Generals* section of the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, which emphasized the “soothing effect” of reliable “valiant and martial (yiyi huanhuan) shields and walls.” Other examples included articles in journals such as the first issue of the *Nanyang Military Journal* in 1906, artistic calligraphies in the *Military Monthly*, photographic volumes published by the Army Ministry in 1911, or Li Jishen’s book on military education that also used the formulation.

Military reformers sought to establish and underline the fundamental link between (centrally commanded) military (jun), state (guo), and people (min), culminating in the idea of the citizen-soldiers, which is the subject of Chapters 5 and 6 of this book. The idea was that the state and people provided for the military, which in turn protected and kept harm from them. A calligraphy included in Zhu Kegeng’s 1911 photographic volume illustrated this concept:

> The fruits of the people’s labor are used to cultivate soldiers. The military’s strength is used to protect the people. The people cannot do without soldiers. Soldiers cannot do without the people. The mutual dependence, the mutual respect, and the familial relationship between the two make the state system (or “body politic,” guo) firmer, extend state power (guoquan), and raise the martial spirit of military men.

The inculcation of respect and esteem for the people was part of the basic training of common soldiers and many articles in military journals addressed the issue. Drill books and journals often explained that any soldier was part of a family and thus defending China was equal to defending one’s own home and family. For instance, Yang Yaonan argued that “places where people live are not battlegrounds. Men know this.” The presence of the term patriotism (aiguo) and the frequent appeal to defend the patria, however, were omnipresent in military writings after the turn of the century, whether they were anti- or pro-Qing. Frequently, patriotism was mentioned in the same breath as “loyalty to the emperor” (aiguo zhongjun), particularly in official journals such as the *Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers* and the *Nanyang Military Journal*. Other articles sought to explain the idea in more depth, appealing to the “patriotic heart” (aiguxin) of soldiers. “Nowadays,” an article in the *Zhejiang Military Journal on The Patriotic Heart of Military Men* of 1916 proclaimed, “everyone can say the two characters ai and guo,” and explained that the meaning of being patriotic includes love for the land (aixin), love for the language (aiyuanxin), and love for customs and institutions (ai fengsu zhidai). Because of these shared commonalities and one-heartedness (tongxin), it was the responsibility of military men to protect the people (renmin, minzu). Personal loyalties and returning favors (bao de bao en) were “brotherly manly” (nan yu han), but it was also a selfless kindness of an individual person and nothing like the collectively oriented righteousness (gongyi) of the nation-state. Military men should not protect one single person (such as the emperor) but the nation-state. The author, Zhong Zisheng, argued that it was no longer the age of independent individual heroes (yinxiong jieju zhishida) but the age of competing nations (minzu jingcheng zhidai): people were proud of their military. Soldiers drew their strength.
from patriotism, which raised their “valiant spirit” (wuyong zhi qimo), and urged them to train their bodies (duanlian shenti), refine their skills, sharpen their swords, and to be patient and perseverant.213

Another article, entitled Legends of Military Patriotism and published a few years earlier in the Beiyang Military Journal, tried to explain patriotism by narrating the tales of role model patriots. Like many other military writings, it referred to the Prussian-French War of 1870. But instead of praising Prussian military skills and successes, the article reported on a patriotic French town and its garrison resisting its enemy against all odds.214 Patriotism and guojia, other articles also argued, should be the driving forces for the army and the foundation of military education, particularly for the cultivation of officers.215 One article in the Tokyo-based Wuxue stated that the purpose of military education was both cultivating complete soldiers and complete citizens.216 Instilling patriotism and linking military men to the nation and vice versa was a project started in 1904 with the establishment of the Lujian and the burgeoning discussion about universal military conscription and the nurturing of citizen-soldiers. Jiang Baili (also known as Jiang Fangzhen), director of the Baoding Military Academy in 1912 and 1913 and one of the initiators of the citizen-soldiers debate, emphasized patriotism as well as the unity of the nation-state’s citizens and the military when lecturing to the academy’s cadets. He became famous for attempting to commit suicide because of an argument over funds with the Army Ministry, which, if anything, demonstrated to his men the idea of physical sacrifice for the army corps and, ultimately, the nation.217

Similarly, Yuan Shikai who, as president of the Republic, appealed to patriotism and martial spirit to fill the legitimacy void left after the removal of the imperial dynasty, promoted the idea of a patriotic nation able to defend itself—led by military men as patriotic role model citizens. Yuan was a prolific promoter of patriotic military manliness and a martial spirit directed toward the defense of the new republic against internal and external enemies. He pledged to “carry on the republican spirit” and “comply with the wish of the people to strengthen the nation’s security.”218 Shortly after becoming president, he wrote a Soldier’s Song, which appealed to the soldier’s patriotism and the unity of soldiers and civilians: “soldiers and citizens are as one in the nation’s great family.” The song emphasized the link between patriotism, nation, spirit de corps, manhood, and physical sacrifice, announcing that “he who bears arms for his country is a patriot” and “to rob or assail one’s own is against human nature and manhood.” Moreover, with the song, Yuan sought to increase the prestige of military men, who were “honorable, obedient, frugal and brave” heroes dutifully fighting and dying for their home and the reputation of their regiment.219

Intellectuals and politicians increasingly emphasized the idea of defending the nation as the patriotic duty of everyone, helping the New Armies and the newly established military schools to achieve great popularity. The Russo-Japanese War, waged in Northeast China, decisively triggered this new patriotism and the idea of “defending the nation” in journals and newspapers, particularly among Chinese elites.220 Military journals not only strongly promoted patriotism but also attributed prestige deriving from their role as patriotic vanguard and example to military men and the army. The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, for instance, reminded its readers to always keep in mind the reputation of the entire army and act accordingly.221 A series in the form of question-and-answer, published over several issues, examined the standing of the army and military men in Japanese society: “men, women, old, and young all know the duty of soldiers. All the parents and wives of soldiers do not dare to forget the duty of all over their personal relationship. […] In Japan, the common people all have a national consciousness (guojia sixiang).”222 The journal Wuxue published a series of articles titled Today Soldiers Should be Valued, which emphasized the prestige armies enjoyed in foreign countries, concluding that power and wealth for country and people were not possible without appreciating military men.223

A translated Japanese article in the Nanyang Military Journal on The Responsibility of Young Officers was most explicit in emphasizing the responsibility of young officers to observe their reputation and honor, which was based on patriotism and protecting the nation. The guojia should become a place like Mount Taishan: the most sublime and grave thing. According to the article, every soldier had to contribute to this goal but it was false to call this “utmost loyalty” (jinzhang) and “dedication to the dynasty” (baoguo). Like Mount Taishan, which consisted of large amounts of soil (and like a palace made of a large amount of wood), the military rested on its smallest element, the company or regiment (zhongdui). Analog to the regiment was the family, the smallest element of the nation, which was the congregation of brothers, sisters, and parents. Patriotism or “love for the country” was nothing else than the “love for the family” and not possible without the latter. Defending the patria, the article argued, began with forming and strengthening the prestige of the corps, which was the foundation of a respected army. The corps should be understood in terms of familial bonds and consequently be infused with patriotic sentiments. The duty of defending the country-family (or nation) would eventually evoke the respect of the people.224

Yuan Shikai pointedly referred to the aggregation of patriotism, loyalty to the ruler, self-sacrifice, military culture, and military men/New Armies, particularly after becoming president. In a speech, he compared the state to a body of which soldiers were the hands and feet, while the state leader was the head, literally the head of state. Hands and feet protected the body, like soldiers protecting the state. In doing so, both the limbs and soldiers focused on protecting the head, which was not only the most important part
did not have to live anymore, meaning that they would die a glorious and worthwhile death. This was what the term qishansi meant, he concluded.\(^{220}\) Liang’s second essay further illuminated the idea by reflecting on the national souls of Japan (Ribenjung) and China (Zhongguojun). The Japanese were essentially affected by the Bushido, which was the reason for their national renewal. Martial spirit (shangwu zhi feng), Liang argued, came from patriotism and self-respect (zi'ai xin) of the people. What China needed was a national soul similar to Japan’s, constituted by a “soldierly soul” (binghun). If the soldiers had a soul (i.e., were patriotic, had self-respect, and viewed protecting nation and people as their responsibility), then China would have a soul. Liang concluded that martial spirit was thus the very “tool” to “turn the Chinese state into a people’s state [i.e., a nation, remin zhi guojia].”\(^{221}\)

In the final years of the Qing, qishansi and sacrifice (xisheng) or the “Japanese national soul” and Bushido were a frequent and emotional topic in the military reforms discourse.\(^{222}\) Li Duo, for instance, opened his treatise on Qishansi with a rallying cry:

Die! Die in battle! Sacrifice in battle! (si! zhisil qishansi!). Everyone loves life and loathes death but I say Sacrifice in battle. May I ask the military men of our country: who is willing to sacrifice his life (xisheng shengming) and give his body to save the country (yishen jiuguo)?\(^{223}\)

After explaining further details about the idea of qishansi, including wives cheering for their soldier husbands, he vividly described how “great chops (dahao nan'er) [...] resolutely throw their bodies (qi) into the ashes and their blood and fat splashes (gouxue) on smoke and dirt.”\(^{224}\) The “great military men,” absolutely “firm, heroic, and strong,” used their “patriotic thoughts and their martial spirit to cultivate a deep sincerity to the nation against enemies and avenge the great shame.”\(^{225}\) Li’s text, more like a war cry, if anything, employed the full vocabulary that referred to patriotic military men—including the expression “real men die wrapped in horsehide” and terms such as hero (yuxiong) and fatherland (zuo)—and concluded that the idea of qishansi had to be energetically pursued by military men to make the country “became one of the world’s strong countries.”\(^{226}\)

The idea of qishansi was also picked up in non-army or military periodicals. A poem, written by Shaocha in the journal Jingye Xunbao, linked masculinity and sacrifice in a way that was similar to the examples cited above: “dying fast is truly living. Among [all the] sick men, I [i.e., China] count as the most famous. The sword is the only good medicine.” The sick man of China, this effeminate and weak man who lacked martial vigor, would be cured and regain his manhood by fighting undaunted by death. “When he dies, he becomes a man. When a man falls to the ground, his memory ascends
to heaven." Wives and families would be taken care of, Shaocha emphasized, as those would be cherished "who give their bodies like taking off a shoe." The nation was the ultimate reason for this sacrifice: if one compatriot sacrifices on the battlefield, a thousand others will find shelter." The following verses of the poem, finally, referred to father and mother as well as to the ruler and generals, who were the "arms and fingers" of the nation. He concluded that qizhansi would wash China clean from its shame.237

In 1921, about twenty years after Liang Qichao published his essay on "sacrificial death in battle," an article by Han Zhou in the Shanghai-based newspaper Republican Daily (Minguo Ribao) asked: "does qizhansi still need an explanation?"

During the final years of the Qing, many praised the patriotism of the Japanese and how they bid farewell to their family members and friends and went to serve as soldiers, all holding banners saying "Joy of Joining the Army" or "Sacrificial Death in Battle," and wishing them to come back to their funeral wrapped in horsehide. Even wives sending their husbands were like that. Therefore, the Japanese patriotism and martial spirit really included everyone and was at the forefront in the world.238

A conversation with a friend, however, the author Han reported, revealed to him that Japanese women indeed hoped that their men would not return and all the cheering was all faked.239 Although he had but one informant, Han admitted, the whole idea of qizhansi was a real product of militarism. If there was still anyone praising these Japanese slogans and notions in schools or elsewhere, he should see the crippled bodies of Japanese men, after which, becoming a soldier was certainly no longer an option.240 Han’s report was published around five years after Yuan Shikai’s death but it was literally from another time, in which the Japanese were regarded as treacherous enemies and soldiers were not viewed as patriotic heroes but as part of a militaristic system called Warlordism.

CONCLUSION: PROFESSIONAL PATRIOTS

In his Exhortation to Study, Zhang Zhidong stressed that educating loyal, expert military officers was more important than drilling common soldiers. Although his polemic stemmed from the post-1895 military crisis and associated attempts at reform, his ideas about grooming officers for an exclusive career as tactical specialists, war-making practitioners, and rationally acting military leaders exemplify the agenda of the New Armies, particularly after the turn of the century. The new military man or junren combined theoretical, standardized "scientific" knowledge, hands-on technical skills, and the meticulously trained ability and understanding to apply tactical doctrines. Most importantly, the junren was enmeshed in a system of new institutions such as military academies, bureaucratic departments, and strictly hierarchical command structures, which embodied streamlined effectiveness, specialization and professionalism, standardization, and scientification. The new-type professional officers replaced both the customary military official and the hereditary Banner warrior, although not without drawing on certain elements associated with these figurations, such as rationality or the emphasis on martial skill.

Generally speaking, professionalism is a mental attitude expressed and reinforced through appropriate conduct that is performed repeatedly and thus influences the self-perception and conceptualization of military men as men. In late Qing and early Republican China, the creation of a professional military identity depended on the public staging of professionalism and military men through the promotion of military science, widely reported military exercises, as well as photographs and other visual images, which were often published in military journals. Furthermore, professionalism strongly depends on the autonomy of an occupational group with respect to its internal organization, recruitment, and authority over its tricks of the trade. An important example for more independence of the army in China was military jurisdiction, addressed in Chapter 2, which contested the equation of military personnel with civilian officials. Occupational pride and societal acknowledgment are essential for forming a distinct professional identity, which is necessary to attract the most qualified people, claim resources and, in this case, link the military to a higher mission: the defense of state and nation.

In military journal articles, manuals, and other military publications, military reformers depicted defending the nation and, ultimately, sacrificing one’s physical body and life as the patriotic duty of every military man. The quality of being ready to sacrifice made them a symbol, or embodiment, of patriotism. At first glance, fervent patriotism was a highly emotional quality and contradictory to the ideas of rationality and technocracy, which were promoted as the foundation of a new professional military. However, soldiers and particularly officers ideally were both rational experts and spirited patriots.

What happened to men who actually yielded to their martial spirit and sacrificed their life, body, or health? As noted in Chapter 2, the "somatic integrity" or wholeness of the physical body was very important in Chinese cosmology. The battlefield was probably one of the most dangerous places to lose one’s head, placing military service among the rather unattractive occupations, at least from the perspective of folklore. According to the Jade Register (Yuli), a nineteenth century book on the mythological Chinese hell, purgatory overseers could reverse the dismemberment of a soldier’s body,
but only if the damage was not the soldier’s own fault and only if he had not harmed any innocent people. Such cosmological considerations might have only played an indirect role with regard to the actual treatment of war veterans but, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, army statutes included regulations for compensating those who suffered injuries in battle. Wounds were divided into three categories and several subcategories, according to which officers or common soldiers received compensation money. Moreover, families received financial compensation (according to rank) if a man died in battle. Still, disbanding armies and discharging soldiers was a serious problem, because it was very difficult for veterans to reintegrate into civilian society after many years of military service and they often had no other options than being military men their whole life. Qing Bannermen, furthermore, were forbidden to do business and depended on a fixed and thus increasingly inadequate pension.

In the early twentieth century, the Army Ministry introduced a much more detailed and sophisticated compensation system for soldiers who had suffered physical damage or died in action. It designed a consistent preferential treatment system for disbanded and disabled (ex-)servicemen and their family members, which was part of the larger scheme to improve the general condition and attractiveness of military service, including a clearly defined, limited period of service, a standardized retirement procedure (tuiwu), better pay conditions and, at least to a certain degree, legal protection. Similar to the meticulous regulations concerning hygiene and medical care, the Regulation on the Rewards for Invalids or Bereaved Family Members (Xueyin enchang zhangcheng), released in 1910, considered the physical bodies of the soldiers as the most precious resource of the army. According to the regulation, taking care of wounded and invalid soldiers or the families of the dead was the responsibility of the army and a matter of both pity and praise for those who were maimed or died in battle. It stated:

The historical records clearly show that the dynasty has taken military accomplishments to determine greatness and merit. All those who are united by their hatred for the enemy and those who sleep on their shields and spears to maintain combat readiness deserve sympathy for dying in battle, for being slain and meeting their death in the course of duty, or becoming sick due to overexertion. Thus, the maimed and disabled must be relieved by rewards, according to their rank.

According to the regulation, compensations, along with rewards for excellent performance during battle, would cause unanimity (zhongzhi chengcheng) and unity (tongxin yide) among soldiers and strengthen troop morale (jiaxin). It argued that, because of the fierceness of present-day land warfare technology, no country in the world could afford to be ungenerous or ungrateful to its soldiers and their families. Despite the Hague peace conventions, the regulation stated, was there a looming dark threat of an “international war” (guoji zhanzheng), implying that the country not only needed men willing to sacrifice but also that government and army had to take care of those who actually did. Compensating and rewarding those maimed or slain in battle (and, in fact, all veterans), motivated others to risk their lives and indeed sacrifice themselves for the nation.

Combining “practices in East and West” with arrangements existing for the Eight Banners and the Green Standard Army, the regulation listed in great detail the different categories, levels, and modes of compensation for being killed or wounded in battle; for sacrificing one’s life during service, for suffering fatal injuries, and for dying of an illness caused by excessive stress. Possible compensation included hereditary offices or titles, single payment rewards, a lifelong pension, or compensation for the bereaved. Compensation depended on the degree of soldier’s invalidity, the circumstances of injury or death, or the rank of the soldier or officer. Listed battlefield injuries, which were classified into several types, included the complete loss of the ability to see, the loss of both hands or feet, the partial damage of either both hands or both feet to a degree that made them entirely useless, the loss of one hand or one foot (causing the victim to require help from another person to lift objects or to move), and other “similar injuries.” Invalids unable to fight or fulfill other secondary tasks in the army were usually sent home. In the case of death, parents or children were eligible for compensation either in the form of a one-time payment or a perpetual stipend, depending on the time of service of the men or his rank. If he had a—not further specified—criminal record, the pension was cancelled, his widow had to marry again and the children were adopted, if they were under eighteen years old. Special housing for disabled veterans, such as institutions that existed in Europe and the United States, was not provided. In Germany and other countries participating in the First World War, governments only started providing systematically and sustainably for disabled and invalid veterans from 1914 onward. In China, the New Armies were not involved in any major war and did not produce a large number of veterans or invalids. This only became a problem after 1916, but, due to the long period of war, it seems that only from 1949 onward was there a systematic acknowledgment of and provision for veterans.

According to Neil Diamant, there is critical difference between paying lip service to a however imagined and represented nation or patria and the actual actions and practices of commitment, and he even questions the mere claim of willingness to commit and act accordingly. Not arbitrary, highly emotional pledges and sentiments express patriotism but sustained behavior that actually accepts self-sacrifice or at least truly appreciates those who sacrifice their physical bodies for the nation. Based on his unique study on the very
poor societal standing of veterans in the People’s Republic of China since 1949, he argues that twentieth century Chinese society has never been really militarized, in the sense of a deep seated identification with China as a nation linked to a positive perception of the nation’s military and its truly patriotic practice of sacrifice pro patria. Despite multiple efforts and campaigns by various regimes and governments to promote military culture since the late Qing, most segments of the population considered armies and military men as the forces of a political faction and viewed military culture as part of a political ideology, independent of the more profound and transcending patriotism and nationalism.264

To be sure, it is hard to judge whether the proclaimed (or at least demanded) willingness to sacrifice actually translated into actual physical sacrifice. There is evidence that many military men fighting in the Nationalist army or against it actually considered patriotism and sacrificing pro patria as their raison d’être. In any case, the notion of sacrifice was an important component to govern the motivation and conduct of military men, strongly shaping their military masculine identity. As Diamant himself points out, patriotism does not exist per se but is something that can be taught and learned. According to him, the period of Yuan Shikai’s rule offered a rare but wasted chance to inculcate patriotism into both Chinese military men and ordinary citizens and truly militarize society without any ideological (e.g., Guomindang or Communist) deformation. He argues that the Chinese failed to adequately and comprehensively define or translate citizenship and failed to link it to military service in the early twentieth century. While it does not resolve the debate on the nature of Chinese patriotism (which actually indicates an obsolete and conservative focus on the historiography of the nation-state265), the following chapters of this book show that there actually was lively debate as well as reform measures to create citizen-soldiers and introduce universal military service during the late Qing and early Republic military reforms.

NOTES

1. GX, chapter 8: Yinzhi xiangzhen, 55.
3. In his study on the French Army 1800–1808, Michael Hughes identified five sources of motivation for officers: honor, patriotism, a martial spirit, professionalism, devotion to Napoleon, and coercion. Hughes 2012, 1–15. In this study, I argue that honor, patriotism, a martial spirit, professionalism, and other elements became part of the conceptualization of military masculinity.

6. Ibid., 57.
8. Xu 1997, 60–70.
9. For the complex rules and conditions of appointment for both Banner troops and Green Standard Army, see Wade 1851, 391–97.
14. In 1910, for instance, the Army Ministry introduced a Performance Evaluation Form (kōji-bia) to record the individual accomplishments of officers, making it an essential tool for appointments, promotions, and transfers. This record referred exclusively to achievements and performance during service in the army. See XT, chapter 27, 29.
16. See also Schulte 2008b, 12 and Strauss 2003, 834–38.
17. On late Qing military logistics see Gao 2002.
19. NBZ 1907, 8: Ben gonguo xiangguan kaiban wubei xuetang, 6.
20. The missions were part of a commission established by the Qing government to investigate the introduction of a constitution. The members of this Government Reform Commission recommended establishing a constitutional monarchy in China. But, more importantly and less controversially debated, they initiated the seminal restructuring of the bureaucracy. Subsequently, the Qing pressed ahead with the creation of ministries based on foreign models. These ministries possessed full authority in their field and were at the top of a strictly hierarchical structure running from the center all the way down to the regions. They were to replace established central institutions, such as the Six Boards (or Six Ministries), which customarily had to compete with each other and the provincial bureaucracies. The ministries, moreover, were to be staffed with “talented” specialists instead of “virtuous” generalists, who often were in the service of more than one of the Six Boards. They were also expected to have a clear internal hierarchy. Instead of two senior officials, only one minister or departmental director headed one of the new foreign-style ministries and a minister could only occupy this one, single position. See Horowitz 2003.
21. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzheh zhongyao qing ze yao yuafa geguo zhidache, 4–5. Other countries, such as Russia, were also called xiongguo in other texts. See, for instance, NBZ 1908, 15: Junren jingchen jiaoyu jiangyi, 1.
22. NBZ 1907, 8: Zou junzheh zhongyao qing ze yao yuafa geguo zhidache, 1–3, 5.
25. NBZ 1907, 8: Zou junzheh zhongyao qing ze yao yuafa geguo zhidache, 6.
29. For a cross-cultural comparison of iconic warrior figures in Europe and East Asia see the contributions in Deist 2003.
30. For the concepts of martial masculinity in Japan during that period, see Mason 2011.
33. A variation of this saying is used in ZBB 1916, 2: Jin ri zhi zhi bing zhe yi yun. See also NBZ 1907, 6–8: Bingsu jiaoyu laixiao. Helgers 2000. See also Helgers 2008.
37. Zhang (1899) 1998, 9757–761. This passage is discussed and partly translated in Ayers 1971, 166. In the eighteenth century, the term shantu referred to battle paintings.
38. Luo 1999, 18, 41, 97, 103, 107. See also Jinnan zou zhou ni lujuan camu zhe (1909) and Jinnan zou zhujuan xuejuan zu xuan banfashion (1909) in XT, chapter 37, 7–39.
39. NBZ 1909, 41: Ben gongshuo xiang qing gouban xinshi bingqi fenfa ge biaoying lianxiweixi, 4–5.
40. Li [n.y.]. The textbook contains no more than twenty folio pages and presents very few details on the procedure of the game. The first book by Georg Heinrich Rudolf von Reiswitz on the Kriegsspiel (1824) had sixty pages of rules and guidelines only. See Helgers 2000, 59.
41. Li [n.y.]. 2. See also WX 1908, 3: Shuo jiangcei, 1. Besides the Kriegsspiel, military reformers and New Armies leaders attached great importance to surveying, mapping, and cartography (celui or celian). The Detailed and Illustrated Manual, for instance, included a substantial chapter on military maps (celui tsuhan). Yuan et al. (1899) 1992, 991–1022. A central Military Survey and Mapping Academy (Celu xuetang) was officially set up in February 1906, and numerous articles in a variety of military journals discussed the advantages of cartography and reprinted regulations concerning surveying and the gathering of military intelligence. See for instance, NBZ 1906, 1: Ceilu zhi xue, 1–6; Luo 1999, 114–15. See also Elliott 2002, 186. Moreover, after 1904, the New Armies and the Army Ministry produced a wide range of other visual material, such as sketches for military school buildings and military prions, or tables documenting shooting test results of individual soldiers or of tactical formations. See, for instance, Lujian dui zhuangzuentang jiangzhang cheng ce xueusement zhesi zheng ce shita 1905–1908 and Lujian bianju [n.y.]. The latter also contains a number of strategic maps.
42. This was true to what Benjamin Elman calls the “Chinese-origins approach to Western learning” used to create acceptance for the sciences in China. Elman 2014, 27.
43. NBZ 1906, 4: Bingqi, 21–2.
70. Ibid.
72. Huazi huibao 1906 (8), 8: Xiezhi qiusuo xiasuo zhengmi. See also Zhang 1998, 82.
73. Lijun huicoqo ge xiaoai qingdan, in Lai 1988, 577–78. In 1905, the local population was successfully reassured that soldiers would behave well and it seems that subsequent military exercises were rather welcomed. See Fang 1980, 109–10.
74. Lianbingchu 1906, 5 zhang.
75. Shibao 1906, October 27: Dacao zhong zhi Zhangdecheng.
77. Ibid., Lianbing dachen Yuan Shikai deng wei chen xiaoyue lujun huicoqo qingxing shi zouzei, in Lai 1988, 566.
81. Shenbao 1905, November 4: E de zanyang quizaot, 3.
82. NBZ 1907, 14: Nanbei dayansu zhi piping, 1. On the role of the foreign-language press in Qing and Republican China in general, see also Wagner 2012.
83. NBZ 1906, 4: Yuebing dachen Yuan Tie zou chen xiaoyue xiangxi qingxingze, 1–2.
84. Upton 1878, 20–21. Upton’s book on the armies of Japan, India, Persia, China, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and Britain was translated into Chinese by Young John Allen. The translation did not include the report on the Chinese army, at least not in the first print from 1896 (it was reprinted at least once in 1902). See Ouqodeng 1896.
86. See, however, Lujun daxue 1913, which is the record of a smaller military exercise in 1913 of Beiyang Army contingents.
88. See XBB 1905, 2: Quan du Xunbingbaosho. It is unknown to me when it ceased to exist and only issues from 1905 were available for this research. Note that, in almost all the journals examined for this study, individual articles or rubrics start again with the page number one. Another journal, the Junhua, published in 1911, was discovered too late to be included in this study. Moreover, only a few copies of the Junhua seem to have survived the passage of time.
89. See NBZ 1906, 1: Yuansi, 7, 9. Two Japanese editors wrote notes congratulating the journal on its publication but it is not sure whether they were actually part of the editorial staff of the Nanyang Military Journal. See NBZ 1906, 1: Zhu bingshi zahi zhi faxing.
90. See BBZ 1910, 1: Liao Yuchun, Beiyang bingshi zahi fakan zhi; BBZ 1910, 1: Beiyang bingshi zahi fakan zhi; BBZ 1910, 1: Jiaolianchu xiang daxian chuansan bingshi zhazhiwen.
91. Chen indicated that he wrote the foreword for the journal in the barracks of the 27. German Infantry Brigade. JJ 1908, 1: Chen Zongda, Fakanzi. Apparently, he was a cadet at the Berlin School of Artillery, together with six other Chinese graduates from the Jiaoliao Army School. See Hamisch 1999, 90. The length of publication is unknown and only two issues were available. On the Commercial Press, which became famous for publishing textbooks as well as the journal Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zahi) see the references on the printed press above.
92. WX 1908, 1: Li Jiayu, Wuxue fakan zhi yijiana. The Wuxue was first published in 1908 but it is unknown when it ceased publication. See also WX 1908, 1: Li Shihui, Zhi Wuxue chengshi; WX 1908, 1: Li Jiayu, Zhi Wuxue fakan. Li Jiayu was the Chinese ambassador to Japan.
93. LX 1914, 6: Zhang Feng, Zhi junshi yuebao she zhi. The exact publication dates of the journal are unknown and only copies dating from 1912 to 1914 are still available. Zhang Feng was also co-founder of at least one other society dedicated to exploring military science, which was called Junshi yanjia and which was a secret group within the Revolutionary Alliance.
94. Military journals included reports about the training of common soldiers but overall addressed a more educated audience and the general focus was on the cultivation of a new military elite. Still, along with manuals, officers frequently read military journal articles to the less educated rank and file. For a series of texts dealing with the basic training of new recruits, see for instance the serial article Xibing jiaoyu cao’an in NBZ 1909, issues 36, 37, 39, and 41.
95. BBZ 1910, 1: Jiaolianchu xian riding kaibian bingshi zahi zhangcheng bing qiaoqia jingfeiwen, 23. The term junbei refers to military personnel, facilities, and equipment.
96. See NBZ 1907, 6: Ben gongxu xiangxing jiang yinhuasuo ji bingshi zashi beishe gai wei junshi shubao yinhuasuwen, 13.
98. Military journals generally promoted the ideas of the “people in arms” and “citizen-soldier,” and ultimately aimed at propagating a martial spirit and martial orientation among the people. The Nanyang Military Journal, for instance, reprinted an imperial decree in this same spirit in its first issue, as the foreword. See NBZ 1906, 1: Xuan. See also LX 1914, 6: Zhi junshi yuebaohu zhi.
99. Elman 2014. All translations in this paragraph are by Benjamin Elman’s, who also offers a second, alternative literal translation for keixie in the same article: “knowledge organized by field.” Ibid., 23, 24.
100. Hinsch 2013, 143. See also Amelung 2014; Lam 2011, 14.
101. Note that Foucault points out that the conceptual analogy between scientific disciplines and discipline in the sense of drill, training, or punishment is not coincidental. Foucault (1975) 1979, 223.
102. NBZ 1907, 10: Tao Shumao, Jundui jiaoyu yu yuebao jiaoyu, 25.
for an example of how bravery and heroism were connected to discipline, which the author compares to the human nerve-system. See also Li 1912, 3.
128. NBZ 1906, 3: "Bubing zhi xueshi, 1.
129. Li Jishen, for instance, closely linked military spirit and patriotism. See Li 1912, 47–54.
130. NBZ 1907, 7: "Lunjun baixiaobao banfa, 10. The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers already used the vernacular but it apparently only existed in 1905.
131. ZBB 1916, 23: "Dayuanzhai zhi junshi xiaoli. During the Xuantong era, the Army Ministry promulgated regulations concerning the reproduction of army books. XT, chapter 33: "Dayuanzhai zhi junshi xiaoli". The General Staff, furthermore, set up a military guanbao (official bulletin), see XT, chapter 18: "Junzichu zouni the junshi guanbaojuan, 19.
133. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 51–5. Note the term qì was cosmologically associated with men and masculinity, while blood was associated with women and femininity. See Chen 2002 and Furth 1999.
135. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 5. The speech and those cited further below are taken from a collection entitled (Instruction) Speeches by the Generalissimo for Soldiers (Dayuanzhai zhi junshi ci yanhuo), published between 1912 and 1916.
136. NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, "Lun junren zhi jingshen.
137. Ibid., 3, 6–8.
138. NBZ 1906, 1: Chenfei, "Lianhuqian, 9–12; Jiaxinghao jiaoyuan, 12–16 (here 14).
139. NBZ 1906, 3: "Jingshen jianghua, 1 (in yun). See also NBZ 1906, 6–9. The last article in the series was titled Consolidating the Officer Corps (Jiangxiantuan zhi yu jue).
140. For more examples, see NBZ 1906, 5: "Junshe ye yan, ZBB 1914, 2: Shao jingzhong jiaoyu; ZBB 1915, 16: Yi Jingshen jiaoyu xun jingguan.
141. NBZ 1907, 7: "Xu zongzi chi xiaji jingxiao xuanmi jingshen jinghua chengehe, 9.
142. NBZ 1907, 7: "Jingshen jiaoyu wenti, 10–12.
143. NBZ 1907, 7: "Lun juanren we juanren yaosu, 9.
144. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 6.
145. NBZ 1908, 15: "Jianren jingshen jiaoyu jiangyi, 1.
146. Qi Jiguang stressed the need of personal loyalty between an officer and his direct subordinates. As a consequence, every officer chose his junior officer who in turn chose his juniors. This way, formal authority was combined with personal obligation, creating a very delicate command hierarchy in which no one was replaceable. The principle was used by Zeng Guofan, Feng Yuxiang and other warlords as well as Jiang Jieshi. Kiernmann and Fairbank 1974, 25.
148. Ibid., 1175. See also the regulations for the Zhejiang Military Preparatory School set up by Lianyu, which emphasized "rectifying a person's heart" as fundamental task of military education. See Lianyu [n.y.] 2005, 66.
149. See for instance NBZ 1907, 13; 1908, 21, 25 and issues 28–41 (1908 and 1909).


151. XBB 1905, 1, 2, Gu shi mingjiang shili xiaoshuo.

152. For examples of drawings and woodblock prints see for instance BBZ 1910, 2 and 3; NBZ 1909, 36; NBZ 1910, 43 and NBZ 1910, 51 (Zhongxing mingjiangzeta). Note that some journals, the Nanyang and Zhejiang military journals in particular, included pictures of weapons or military technology such as cannons or planes.

153. See for instance ZBB 1915, issue 16 and XBB 1916, issues 22, 26, 27; BZB 1910, issues 1–3; WX 1908, 1 and WX 1910, 12 and 14; LX 1912, 2 and LX 1914, 6. Rubrics were called wenyi, wenyan, wenli, or shili, respectively.

154. WX 1910, 12: Chunhui, Xingxiongshu, 69–76. Chunhui’s story included the British and German struggle for naval power. Chunhui was a pseudonym, the term meaning “parental love” or “spring sun.” The latter meaning also has sexual connotation, with chun standing for the desire of men for women. The story thus might express the idea that men lust for heroic deeds and power as they lust for women.

155. NBZ 1909, 40: Li Duo, Guoshang, 1–6; NBZ 1909, 36; Yang Yuling, Zhongguo zhongzhe weilaiji, 1–5 (see also NBZ 1909, 39 and 41); NBZ 1908, 23 (24); Yang Yuling, “Lujun wansui,” “huangguo wansui,” 1–4 (1–2); NBZ 1909, 34; Yang Yuling, Xingjun, 1–7; XBB 1916, 25: Lu Xianglin, Wangguo zhi ying, 1–10 (see also Zhan zhi qian by the same author in ZBBZ 1916, 24); ZBB 1916, 25, 27; Tang Zhongyong, Ai qing yu dikai, 10–14, (1–3). Particularly the Zhejiang Military Journal included many more similar stories.

156. See also NBZ 1909, 30 (35): Yang Yuling, Wushidao chuanqi, 1–5 (1–4).

157. NBZ 1908, 25: Li Duo, Ying zheng yu huansong, 1.


159. XBB 1905, issues 3–8; XBB 1905, issues 4–8. The “poem” included passages on appearance, character, and conduct, politeness, and responsibility. XBB 1905, 1, 2; XBB 1905, 9. See also XBB 1905, 2, Join the Army Song (Congjunge).


162. See for instance BBZ 1910, 2: Song to Encourage Military Men (Jiaren lizhiige), 121; BBZ 1910, 3: Good Soldiers Song (Hao jurenge), 113. The Nanyang Military Journal had a rubric on poetry (shige), which included songs as well as short and long prose.


164. NBZ 1906, 1: Lun jundui zhi yule, 1–3.


166. NBZ 1907, 13: Lun jundui zhi biaoyu, 9–12.

167. ZBBZ 1914, 2: Chen Zan, Yingnei zhi yule, 9–13.

168. NBZ 1909, 30: Xin xiaohua, 1. Generally, on jokes and “the history of laughter” in late Qing and Republican China, see also Rea 2015.


170. Li 1909.
204. Ibid.
206. NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, Lun junren zhi jingshen, 3–4. Li used guojia zhi gancheng, see Li 1912, 3; Zhu 1911.
207. See GX, chapter 8, 100.
209. See, for instance, XBB 1905, 1: Qiangguoshuo, which instructed soldiers that China was the biggest and most populous country and should therefore be strong. However this would only happen if the commoners (baixing) understood that protecting China was their business and not (only) the duty of the imperial family.
211. See for instance XBB 1906, 6: Quanbing dang cun yao haoxinshuo, 2; and NBZ 1909, 30: Daban dachen Duan xianyu junren jiaoyu daode yiwu jieshi yaoyiwen, 3. The latter was a reprint of a memorial by Duanfang on morale and duty in military education, which emphasized loyalty to the dynasty and patriotism as foundation for military men. See also the Biaolu (Common Language) article/instruction by Feng Fengming, which repeatedly emphasized the phrase zongxiang baoguo (loyal heart and dedication to the country/dynasty) in connection with the imperial family.
212. For instance WX 1908, 1: Fang Rizhong, Dui Zhong Ri ji zhaiyao. ZBB 1916, 27: Zhong Zhisheng, Junren zhi aigouxian, 6-9. The article, with its attacks on individual loyalties, might possibly be directed toward Yuan Shikai and his dictatorship, which ended with his death in June of the same year.
213. BBZ 1910, 3: Li Heng, Junshi aigou xiaodian, 105.
219. XBB 1905, 9: Junren yao gu quan mingyushuo, 2.
220. XBB 1905, 4: Ribiao zhashi zhaiyao, 2. The series ran from XBB 1905, issues 3 to 5.
the veterans, the military in general, and patriotism in China, it might go too far and be a strongly biased US-American perception to use this as foundation (as Diamant suggests) to doubt China's status as "modern nation-state" and debate whether "older terms such as realm, ritual, subject, and empire [...] are more relevant to understanding Chinese contemporary (not modern) Chinese politics." Diamant 2010, 419.

Chapter 5

All Men Are Soldiers

*Citizenship and Military Service*

Everyone says serving as a soldier is hard but I say: it is not. I say: soldiers represent military citizenship. They must serve patriotically. They must be loyal to the emperor. They must sacrifice their body, for the peace of their compatriots. They must be the tooth and claw of the state, take soldiering as a blessing and dying in battle as an honor. They bear responsibility for all citizens.¹

—Lu Tong, *The Pleasure of Soldiers*, 1910

The question of how to govern soldiers and create a better and more efficient army led Chinese military reformers to target society as a whole and take into consideration the military potential of the entire nation, particularly the male population. Together with a broad coalition of politicians, intellectuals, and educators, military reformers transferred ideas of physical exercising and discipline, masculinity, and self-conduct from the governance of military men to the governance of citizens. Virtually every male member of the population, reformers reasoned, could theoretically serve in the military and should thus, physically and psychologically, be prepared to take up arms and go to war and, ultimately, sacrifice for the sake of the greater good: the state. Consistently, military reformers particularly debated the German and Japan models regarding universal conscription and military training, as well as the link between nationalism, citizenship, state, physical education, and military service. Late Qing reformers adopted the European figuration of the "citizen-soldier" and the concept of military citizenship (*jinguomin*), making the defense and protection of the nation-state the responsibility of every male adult. The idea of "citizen-soldiers" stemmed from the "people in arms"-concept of the French Revolution but Chinese reformers and intellectuals particularly viewed Germany as a country in which "everyone is a soldier"