Charles Holcombe

The Genesis of East Asia
221 B.C.–A.D. 907

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The already troublesome frontier garrisons were consequently neglected and, feeling further alienated and impoverished, erupted in rebellion.\textsuperscript{107}

The curious position of the Northern Wei dynasty within Chinese history is that it was simultaneously an alien nomadic conquest empire and one of the greater Chinese dynasties. Such ambiguity, and contradiction, is fundamental to the Northern Wei, and, whether or not the Northern Wei should be considered part of the direct orthodox line of sole imperial legitimacy in Chinese history, the only slightly less mixed Sino-barbarian northern dynasty known as Sui certainly stands foursquare in the line of legitimate succession. The Chinese empire was reunified in 589 by people who were at least partially foreigners.

The Sui dynasty reunified China, and when Sui was soon replaced by Tang in 618—the great Chinese dynasty that would serve as the immediate template for the emergence of independent states in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam—the coup was accomplished by yet another, very possibly Xianbei-language-speaking, northwestern frontier general from Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, the area that had served as the springboard for so many of China’s culturally mixed Northern dynasties, including the Tuoba Xianbei Northern Wei.\textsuperscript{108}

\section*{Before Vietnam}

\textbf{SOUTHERN YUE}

The present configuration of the country we call Vietnam would have been unimaginable to anyone living during the time period covered in this book. Not only was the entire southern half of what is now Vietnam incorporated into the country only later, but neither the name Vietnam nor any recognizable Vietnamese identity referred to by some other name would have been discernable to people of this era. Vietnam simply did not exist yet. Instead, what is today northern Vietnam—the region centering around the Red River valley—was part of the Chinese empire. It was a peripheral part, to be sure, but there was no obvious ethnic or cultural frontier dividing what is now Vietnam from other parts of the southeastern-most administrative region of the empire, Lingnan—a region that included the modern Chinese provinces of Guangdong (Canton) and Guangxi as well as northern Vietnam.\textsuperscript{1}

Lingnan (which means “south of the ridges”), on the other hand, was physically detached from the rest of the Chinese empire by an arc of low mountains. Long before Lingnan had ever been incorporated into China, it had been home to prehistoric communities of some sophistication who had mastered rice farming beginning no later than 2000 B.C. and the production of bronzes from as early as 1500 B.C. By the time of the so-called Dong Son archaeological phase, which flourished from approximately 500 to 300 B.C., people in the vicinity of modern northern Vietnam were familiar with iron technology and were producing a most remarkably characteristic type of bronze drum. This magnificent Dong Son culture was unique, but
it had obvious cultural affiliations with a wide swath of what we now call Southeast Asia. Many of the new breakthrough technologies, including rice cultivation, seem to have filtered into the region from Yue or, in some cases, possibly Central Plain Chinese peoples living farther north.²

The earliest native Vietnamese histories, which date from the fourteenth century, speak of an independent Van-lang kingdom founded in the general area of Vietnam during the seventh century B.C. and surviving through eighteen generations of monarchs. This legendary account may be said to roughly coincide, furthermore, with the archaeologically discovered Dong Son culture. Modern Vietnamese scholars have been quick to identify this Van-lang with the origins of a Vietnamese “nation.”³

As the archaeological record clearly attests, there undoubtedly was a vibrant and independent local culture in the region during this period, but these sketchy ancient Vietnamese legends were culled from somewhat hazy older Chinese sources, compiled mostly during the sixth and seventh centuries, and may not be very reliable. It is probably fairest to say that this archaeologically identified Dong Son culture was not exactly either Chinese or Vietnamese in the modern nationalist sense but rather a prehistoric local Yue (V: Viet) society that was becoming progressively more sophisticated through interaction with the earlier-blooming Yue and Central Plain states farther north.⁴

The earliest legends also go on to insist, in any case, that this Van-lang kingdom was “expelled” and replaced by an invading prince from (a place name usually associated with) what is now Sichuan Province in 257 B.C. who founded a new kingdom there called Au Lac. The huge “spiral city” attributed to this prince at Co-loa is thought to have been the first great city in all of Lingnan and the entire Indochinese peninsula as well. Although this legendary event should not be imagined in terms of any sweeping elimination and replacement of the previously existing population, both the legend and the archaeological evidence from the remains of the city are suggestive of some discontinuity in the local culture and a new level of northern influence on the area of present-day northern Vietnam.⁵ This is in keeping with our general picture of many different local prehistoric cultures being gradually transformed through interaction with the Central Plain core civilization.

We might add that while the genetic or “racial” composition of these societies probably often did exhibit a fairly high degree of local continuity over extended periods of time, the racial or genetic contribution to culture or civilization is presumed to be rather minimal. Physical attributes such as skin pigmentation are not considered to be culturally very significant, except where racial prejudice itself becomes a factor, which generally was not the case in ancient East Asia (although isolated examples of bigotry can undoubtedly be adduced).

In high antiquity, the entire Lingnan region, Guangdong and Guangxi as well as Vietnam, was completely beyond the pale of Bronze Age Chinese civilization. The First Emperor of Qin, however, motivated by a desire for the region's valuable exotic products, ordered a massive invasion of Lingnan in 214 B.C., allegedly conscripting a half million merchants and other “useless” fellows to garrison the newly conquered territory and digging canals to provision them. Within the area of present-day Vietnam, in particular, some degree of local self-rule seems to have long continued to be the norm. However, Lingnan was now, rather suddenly, part of the Chinese empire.⁶

Qin achieved an early pinnacle of imperial geographic expansion. However, Qin's rise and fall was meteoric. The centralized Qin imperial administration in what is now Yunnan Province, in the southwest, lasted scarcely a decade. In the southeast, three separate Yue kingdoms were resurrected amidst the ruins of the shattered Qin empire: Eastern Ou in what is now southern Zhejiang Province, Min-Yue in Fujian Province, and Southern Yue in Guangdong, Guangxi, and northern Vietnam.⁷

The kings of Min-Yue claimed descent from the old native Yue royalty. Under Qin rule, these native potentates had been reduced to the status of commandary administrators, but because of their support for the successful founder of the Han dynasty during the subsequent civil wars, they were reenfeoffed by Han as autonomous princes in 201 B.C. In 138 B.C., Min-Yue attacked its northern neighbor, Eastern Ou, prompting an appeal for aid from Eastern Ou to the Han Son of Heaven. The Han defender-in-chief counseled that since their abandonment after the Qin dynasty, these kingdoms had never been subject to the empire and that, since it was only normal for the Yue people to engage in frequent internecine warfare, this should not be of concern to the Han Middle Kingdom. However, a counter-argument prevailed that if the Son of Heaven did not come to the aid of
small dependencies in their hours of need, "how could we treat the myriad kingdoms as our children?" A Han imperial army was sent by sea, dispatched from the region of modern Shaoxing in northern Zhejiang, and the Min-Yue troops withdrew.\(^8\)

Despite this temporary reprieve, the independent Eastern Ou kingdom was utterly liquidated in 110 B.C., and the Han emperor allegedly transported the entire Yue population of Eastern Ou north to the lands between the Huai and Yangzi Rivers, leaving the former Eastern Ou lands vacant.\(^9\) Their old territory in modern Zhejiang Province has subsequently become economically and demographically central to modern China, though it once was very foreign.

In 135 B.C., meanwhile, the expansionistic Min-Yue kingdom turned its attention south and invaded Southern Yue. A semi-independent Han prince in what is now Anhui Province wrote to (his nephew) the Han emperor, vigorously trying to dissuade the empire from military intervention in this war by offering the argument that "Yue is a land beyond this world, with a people who shear their hair and tattoo their bodies. It cannot be regulated by the laws of civilized countries."\(^10\) Although the author of this epistle had ulterior motives—to prevent Han imperial military interference in his own domain—it is clear that the erstwhile Qin imperial territories in what is now southeastern China were still regarded as quite alien lands in the early Han dynasty. Yet the southernmost of these independent Yue kingdoms, Southern Yue, with its capital at modern Guangzhou (Canton), was actually not a "native" kingdom at all. The Southern Yue kingdom had been founded by an ex-Qin official who personally was of Central Plain extraction.

As the Qin world empire unraveled toward the end of the third century B.C., the desperately ill Qin commandant at Guangzhou (Canton, then called Panyu) confided to his subordinate Zhao Tuo (d. 137 B.C.) that

> the Middle Kingdom is in turmoil and we do not know from where peace will come. Heroes, rebelling against Qin, establish each other. Nanhai [the region whose capital Panyu was] is remote, but I fear that bandit soldiers will raid this far. I wish to raise troops and block up the new roads, in preparation. . . . Moreover, Panyu [Canton] occupies a strategic mountainous location. Relying upon Nanhai, east and west for several thou-

sand \(\dot{\text{b}}\) we have the support of many people from the Middle Kingdom. This [place] is also the lord of a region, and can be used to establish an [independent] kingdom.\(^{11}\)

Zhao Tuo took this advice and, following his mentor’s death, in 208 B.C., established the independent kingdom of Southern Yue (C: Nan Yue; V: Nam-Viet), which survived for almost a century, though often as at least nominal vassals of the Han empire. Zhao Tuo was a native of the Central Plain, and he supposedly tempted his subjects with the attractions of Chinese higher culture. At the same time, he was also "transformed by the customs of the southern barbarians" and to some extent "went native," as they used to say.

The histories record a dramatic confrontation between Zhao Tuo and the Han imperial emissary Lu Jia (himself a man of Chu, once a somewhat marginal southern Chinese kingdom) in 196 B.C. in which Zhao greeted Lu like a Yue native, with his hair in a bun and squatting on the ground. Lu protested that Zhao had been born in the Middle Kingdom, with a family graveyard in what is now Hebei Province (near modern Beijing), and yet here he had unnaturally cast aside his civilized raiment to contend with the imperial Son of Heaven from "insignificant Yue." Sitting up abruptly, the story goes, Zhao apologized, explaining that long residence among barbarians had made him neglectful of courtesy. Needless to say, the conversation recorded in these histories cannot possibly be presumed to be scrupulously accurate, but the flavor of the dialogue may indeed be suggestive of roughly contemporary Chinese attitudes.\(^{12}\)

The new king’s subjects were described disparagingly as consisting of "no more than a few tens of thousands, all barbarians, precariously perched between the mountains and the sea, comparable to a single Han commandery." Former imperial administrators who had been in place at the time of the Qin disintegration formed the nucleus of this new Southern Yue government, but it is clear that the Sinified stratum of local society still constituted only a very thin layer. Archaeology confirms that Dong Son material culture survived in Vietnam for some time after the Qin conquest. Southern Yue cemeteries excavated by archaeologists in Canton reveal mixed Chinese- and Yue-style interments, sometimes with mixed furnishings in a single tomb, while (to date) no entirely native Yue graveyards have been found dating from the period of Southern Yue independence.
Despite its cultural pluralism, Southern Yue society was thus evidently rather integrated and cohesive.\textsuperscript{15}

Southern Yue was a marginal state with a still largely un-Sinified indigenous population, leavened only by a scattering of settlers and former officials from the Central Plain proper; but it was nonetheless organized broadly along the lines of other Chinese states farther north. The third king of Southern Yue personally attended the Han imperial court and took a northern woman (from the Hebei area) as his concubine. After their son subsequently ascended the throne as the fourth king, amid growing popular disaffection, this woman pushed for a closer relationship with the Han empire, including a triennial audience with the Han emperor and the elimination of the need for passes at the border.

A Yue official who had served three Southern Yue kings in succession and who was reportedly personally even more popular than the current king was appalled at the prospect of this increased level of subordination to the Han empire, and in 113 B.C. he rose up in rebellion and killed the king, the king’s mother, and the Han ambassadors. In the following year, the Han empire responded by dispatching 100,000 troops, crushing the rebellion, and in 111–110 B.C. reincorporating Lingnan directly into the empire for the first time since the Qin dynasty’s fragmentation almost a century earlier. Thereafter, the lands that once constituted Southern Yue would always remain part of the Chinese empire, except for the far southernmost section, which achieved permanent independence in 939 and in 1802 finally came to be known as Vietnam (C: Yuenan, “south of Yue”).\textsuperscript{14}

Included in the vast Lingnan region that was brought under direct Han imperial administration in 110 B.C. was an island, nestled in the South China Sea between Guangzhou and modern Vietnam, which is known today as Hainan. In antiquity, Hainan island was sparsely inhabited by a mixed aboriginal population who reportedly “did not follow the virtuous teachings,” carved decorative patterns into their cheeks, and passed pearls through their ears until their earlobes hung down to their shoulders. Although Hainan was now part of the Chinese empire, it suffered from continuous friction between Han dynasty officials and the natives.

One early Han governor of the southern portion of Hainan assessed a wide strip of cloth in tribute from the natives, provoking an uprising in which he was killed. His son returned with 10,000 men and subdued these natives, but the rare products that he continued to extract from them as imperial tribute kept the rebellion simmering, and in 46 B.C. the southern portion of the island had to be abandoned altogether—although an imperial foothold may have been retained on the northwestern shore.

Thereafter, Hainan island’s position within the empire remained precarious. Around the year 460, for example, a great tribal chieftain in the Guangxi-Guangdong area surrendered to the then-current Southern dynasty and requested command of an imperial army to subjugate recalcitrant unsubmitive neighboring tribes. The officers whom he dispatched to conquer southern Hainan failed to do so, however, and revolted, killing him instead.

Even during the high Tang period, when Chinese imperial military power was possibly at its zenith, the imperial grip on Hainan continued to be rather tenuous. Tang dynasty Yai Prefecture, in the northeast of the island, had a registered population of only 819 households but held an imperial garrison and produced tribute for the empire in gold, silver, pearls, tortoishell, and other rarities. Neighboring Qiong Prefecture, which was detached from Yai in 631, had a registered population of only 6,49 households and relapsed under the control of rebellious tribesman from 667 to 789. Even today, Hainan is still something of a rough frontier province, described as recently as 1983 by the then-premier of the People’s Republic of China as “the most underdeveloped region in the world.”\textsuperscript{15}

On the mainland to the west of Hainan, in the region of present-day Vietnam, fragmentary evidence suggests that as a reward for the alacrity with which they surrendered to Han forces, local chieftains were largely reconfirmed in their positions by the Han empire, and a degree of local Yue self-rule continued, as before, in that region. However, Lingnan, rather than Vietnam, was the key geographic region. The famous “native Vietnamese” rebellion of the Trung sisters in A.D. 40–42, for example, was not confined to what is now Vietnam but instead straddled the modern Sino-Vietnamese border—quite naturally since the pre-Chinese “natives” lived on both sides of a modern national border that simply did not exist at that time.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Imperial Entrepôt}

The Trung sisters’ rebellion was dealt with harshly. They were suppressed, and the bronze drums that were so characteristic of Dong Son culture and that had evidently symbolized the power of the na-
tive elite were confiscated and melted down. The old indigenous local chieftains disappear altogether thereafter, perhaps merging with new arrivals from the north to generate a mixed new local elite. Henri Maspero concludes that what is now Vietnam was transformed by this military campaign from a Han imperial protectorate, with distinctive native institutions and culture, into a part of the Chinese empire proper.17

Beginning in the first century A.D., there seems to have been a considerable influx of Han settlers coming into the Red River valley region, some drawn by economic opportunity and others apparently exiled criminals who were deliberately transported there by the imperial government. The cultural integration of the region into the empire was accordingly accelerated.18 By this time, a city on the Red River known as Jiaozi (later often called Jiaozhou), near present-day Hanoi, had also emerged as possibly the Han empire’s foremost maritime trading port.

In the third century A.D., Zhang Hua (232–300) reported that there was no break in the traffic coming across the South Seas to Jiaozi. Together with Canton (originally called Panyu, also known as Nanhai, and eventually Guangzhou), Jiaozhi was one of the two great cities of early imperial Lingnan, both of which were famous as places where mercantile fortunes were easily made. However, precisely because early imperial interest in the region was so exhaustively focused on the South Sea trade, the ultimate markets for the distribution of whose commodities lay farther north, these two great cities in Lingnan served as little more than transshipment centers, having relatively little cultural or economic impact on the population of their own hinterlands. The great cities were therefore enclaves of sophisticated Chinese civilization on the shores of a coastline whose interior jungles remained largely tribal.19

The native customs and languages spoken in Lingnan were described as being highly diverse. Even after four centuries of imperial rule, in 231 one official could still report that on Hainan island, outside the urban imperial administrative centers, men and women coupled (to the horror of Confucian moralists) without regard for their parents’ wishes at a festival in the eighth month, while in certain parts of what is now Vietnam a custom like the levirate was practiced, and in the extreme south men and women went about naked without shame.20 In other words, it would be possible to argue that 400 years of Chinese rule in Lingnan had achieved little progress toward the Sinification of the population and that Vietnam in particular was still very “uncivilized.”

It may be useful here to compare the experience of Vietnam under the Chinese empire, as of around 231, to Britain under Roman imperial rule, which had also lasted some four centuries, from the Claudian invasion of A.D. 43 to the British revolt and end of Roman rule in 409. Throughout the British islands, some version of Celtic seems to have remained the language of daily conversation for much of the population, and the conditions of rural life for many people seem to have been little changed from pre-Roman times even after four centuries of Roman occupation. Yet, on the other hand, many Britons did adopt the toga, Latin was widely spoken by those with some education, and Peter Salway believes that after the expulsion of Roman administration “there is no sign of pre-Roman tribal survival . . . Britain had become so fundamentally integrated into the late Roman state that separation was fatal . . . Its degree of Romanization had been too great, not too little.”21 The old, pre-Roman order could never be revived or probably even remembered clearly.

Despite much local continuity, Britain had been profoundly changed by four centuries of Roman presence. It is possible that Britain was regarded as strategically more important to the Roman empire than Vietnam had been to China, and more Roman troops may have been stationed there, but Jiaozhi was commercially more significant than London within the two respective empires. The most glaring difference between Roman Britain and Chinese Vietnam is that Chinese occupation of Vietnam was destined to continue for another 700 years (until 939), and, when it finally came, Vietnamese independence was not followed by catastrophic barbarian invasions like those of the Angles and Saxons, which utterly transformed post-Roman Britain along different lines and gave it, in a real sense, an entirely new beginning.22 The Chinese imperial imprint on Vietnam was, in other words, both much longer in duration and less thoroughly erased afterward than the Roman mark on England.

Not only was the Red River valley area of modern Vietnam an integral part of imperial Lingnan, but it was initially the centerpiece of the imperial presence in Lingnan. As was the pattern in Roman Britain, the Chinese empire concentrated on developing the more fertile lowland portions of Lingnan while gradually squeezing the remaining
defiantly independent native tribes up into inaccessible mountain areas (although low-lying marshes were also favorite tribal haunts). While the city of Canton had been the capital of Zhao Tuo’s Southern Yue kingdom, that city was burnt and abandoned following Southern Yue’s absorption into the Han empire. Afterward—possibly to escape the memory of Southern Yue independence but also because in Han times the Red River delta in what is now Vietnam was “much more thickly populated” than the Pearl River area near Canton—the Han dynasty chose a site near modern Hanoi for its administrative capital of Lingnan. For the remaining three centuries of the Han dynasty, at least, a city in what is now Vietnam was the most important metropolis in all of southeastern China.

Within Lingnan, pre-Chinese tribal remnants were widespread, but they were at least as prominent in what is now Guangxi and Guangdong as they were in Vietnam. Shortly after the brief Western Jin reunification of the empire in 280, a general demobilization of local military forces throughout the empire was planned, but an imperial official based near modern Hanoi objected that there were still over 50,000 households of “unsubmitting” persons along the southern coast of Guangdong and another 10,000 in what is now Guangxi, while those who did submit to official regulation were scarcely 5,000 families. During the Southern dynasties period, Li and Liao aboriginal tribes reportedly proliferated amid the mountains of Guangdong, posing a perennial threat to the empire.

In the hills of modern Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces, south of Canton City, Li tribesmen lived in widely scattered independent villages, referred to by imperial officials as “bandits.” Along the modern Sino-Vietnamese border to the west, the cannibalistic Wuhu people prowled, allegedly attacking and eating solitary travelers whom they came upon. Between modern Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces lived the “wild Wenlang” (whose name in kanji is interestingly identical to the legendary Van-lang kingdom of Dong Son–era Vietnam, except they are now described here as “wild”), who slept in the forest without permanent homes, ate raw meat, and gathered incense for trade. In coastal Guangdong Province, there also seems to have been a lively slave trade in “natives” lasting into late Tang times.

Unassimilated or partially assimilated tribespeople were obviously quite numerous in Lingnan throughout the period covered in this book, but there is no particular association between these native tribes and the territory that eventually became Vietnam. Instead, the Red River valley area of modern Vietnam at one time formed something of an oasis of Chinese civility.

**Orphan Empire**

Jiaozhi and the Red River valley area were a haven for displaced Chinese refugees during the troubled final years of the Han dynasty. As an island of stability amid the general collapse, however, the region had little alternative but to assume the initiative in maintaining local self-government since there was soon effectively no empire to which to remain loyally subordinate.

The governor of Jiaozhi, from 187 to his death in 226, was named Shi Xie (137–226). His ancestors supposedly were natives of Shandong Province who had fled south to Lingnan during the interregnum between Former and Later Han (A.D. 9–25). Such claims to Central Plain ancestry are typical for southern notables, so the attribution should not be taken as necessarily accurate—but neither is it inherently improbable. In fact, it is quite possibly true. In any case, Shi Xie personally regarded Cangwu, near the border between modern Guangxi and Guangdong Provinces, to be his home, and his father had served a term as governor of Ri’nan in modern central Vietnam, so Shi Xie is probably best considered simply as a native of Lingnan, which at that point was still officially a single unified region of the empire, theoretically administered from Jiaozhi by a regional inspector. Shi Xie had studied the classics as a child at the Han imperial capital, and he was a thoroughly Chinese-style figure.

The word “king” has even been applied to Shi Xie’s tenure in Jiaozhi. He was certainly effectively autonomous. His brothers and a cousin served as governors in Guangxi and Guangdong, and the Shi family came to exercise essentially independent dynastic rule throughout Lingnan. As has already been remarked, the parallel with the Gongsun family’s position in contemporary Liaodong is striking. Like the Gongsuns, who are known to have continued submitting annual reports to the Three Kingdoms Wei dynasty even while remaining effectively autonomous, Shi Xie also cautiously maintained an appearance of tributary submission to the rising power of the Three Kingdoms Wu dynasty headquartered to his north.

After the news of Shi Xie’s death reached the Three Kingdoms
Wu court in 226, Jiaozhou—the enormous Han imperial administrative “Jiao region” embracing all of Lingnan—was for the first time officially split, at approximately the modern Sino-Vietnamese border, into two smaller (though still quite large) regions, which were renamed Jiaozhou and Guangzhou. Since it was common practice in imperial China to designate both administrative areas and their capital cities by the same name, this was the historical origin of the Chinese name that is still used today for the city known in English as Canton: Guangzhou. The label Jiaozhou, then, referred (somewhat confusingly) to either or both the entire region of modern northern Vietnam and its administrative seat near modern Hanoi. Although Jiaozhou and Guangzhou were soon (briefly) reunited, after 264 the division was revived and made permanent.27

Jiaozhou, in the far south, was already proving intractable, distancing itself from Three Kingdoms Wu by proclaiming its allegiance instead to rival Chinese imperial dynasties farther north. During the lengthy period of division in China, the governments of the Southern dynasties tended to be dominated by émigré great families from the north who had fled the “barbarian” conquests of the Central Plain in the fourth century. Native southern Chinese of local importance tended to be deeply resentful of this émigré domination. In Jiaozhou, however, the situation was different. There, Shi Xie’s forty-year period of quasi-independence at the end of Han had established a pattern of local great family self-rule.28 This regional autonomy became gradually more pronounced and culminated in 541 when a local magnate named Ly Bi (d. 548) went into open rebellion against the Southern imperial Liang dynasty.

Ly’s ancestors had supposedly moved to Lingnan from the Central Plain at the end of Former Han and over the centuries had been transformed into “native” southerners. Encouraged by some early military triumphs, Ly proclaimed himself “emperor of Southern Yue” (reviving the name of Zhao Tuo’s old Southern Yue kingdom) in 544 and began to organize a Chinese-style imperial government. This proved premature, however, because Ly Bi was disastrously defeated by a Liang imperial army in 545–546 and died soon afterward. Ly’s relatives and generals continued to fight a protracted guerrilla war from bases in remote and inaccessible locations until 550, when the Liang army was recalled to deal with more urgent military concerns farther north. The Liang dynasty was rapidly failing, and it would be replaced by the even weaker Chen dynasty in 557. For the remainder of the century, Jiaozhou stood apart from imperial rule under independent Ly family domination. In 602, however, an army from the newly reunified Sui dynasty smashed through to the Ly emperor’s camp and compelled the resubmission of Jiaozhou.29

Since the end of the Han dynasty, the Red River valley area had thus enjoyed a lengthy tradition of imperial inattention, with only rarely active bursts of intervention from the empires of the north. This was capped by half a century of formal independence in name as well as a sovereign empire in its own right; and, although the Sui dynasty violently reestablished northern imperial authority in Jiaozhou in 602, Sui itself was soon overthrown by the Tang dynasty in 618, an event that presented fresh opportunities for local strongmen to assert their independence.

The Sui official who had been sent from the Central Plain around 616 to serve as governor of Jiaozhou was able to maintain firm local control there, but after the Sui dynasty collapsed, he inevitably did so on his own authority, until such time as the new Tang regime had reconstituted centralized imperial power sufficiently to be able to direct serious attention toward the remote regions of the extreme south. The Tang court eventually did dispatch a viceroy to supervise the region, but Tang also reconfirmed the former Sui governor of Jiaozhou as Tang grand area commander-in-chief. This man seems to have continued effectively dominating Jiaozhou until his death in 637. Yet, while Jiaozhou certainly enjoyed substantial autonomy throughout his tenure, it is noteworthy that he was not in any sense a local but rather a recent arrival from the Central Plain.30 Vietnamese independence in this period took the form of strongman rule over a fragment of the Chinese empire.

Nor was this situation unique to Vietnam. Just north of Jiaozhou, in modern Guangxi Province, a tribal leader had been appointed governor at the end of the last Southern dynasty. He was succeeded by his son, and, with the aid of the tropical diseases that decimated invading Sui armies, they successfully resisted Sui attack. Instead of being directly subjugated by Sui, they were merely recruited as allied auxiliaries. In this capacity, they assisted Sui in its campaigns against Champa in the far south and Liaodong in the northeast. After Tang replaced Sui, they surrendered to Tang and were rewarded with renewed confirmation as local Tang dynasty commanders-in-chief.31 These
strongmen were no less independent than the one in Vietnam (Jiao-zhou) at this time and a lot more truly “native.”

The situation in Canton was even more interesting. The outstanding figure there was Feng Ang (d. 649). Feng claimed descent from the rulers of the short-lived Northern Yan dynasty (408–437) in the far northeast who had supposedly fled to Koguryo, and from there a generation later returned to China by sea with 300 followers, establishing themselves in the far south at Canton. Feng Ang’s grandmother, known as the “lady of Qiao” (Qiao guo fu ren), sprang from a family of hereditary Yue chieftains who had intermarried with the Fungs. She played a decisive role in bringing Lingnan into the Sui dynasty with little resistance at the end of the sixth century, as a reward for which her grandson Feng Ang was appointed as a Sui official.32

During the interval between effective assertions of Sui and Tang imperial power, Feng Ang grabbed military control over much of what is now Guangdong Province, Hainan Island, and a portion of Guangxi. At the time, it was proposed to Feng that he should reclaim Zhao Tuo’s old title as “king of Southern Yue,” but instead he more cautiously submitted to Tang in 622. His submission must have been fairly nominal, however, for Tang then “enfeoffed him as duke of the state of Yue,” and he was able to maintain a fair degree of de facto autonomy from his power base in Guangdong. Feng cultivated the personal style of a warrior chieftain—more like a Japanese samurai or a European knight than a Chinese-style mandarin—and he was said to possess over 10,000 servants and immense treasure. In the second quarter of the seventh century, one of his kinsmen reportedly came to the Tang imperial court followed by a barge filled with gold.33

The widespread phenomenon of hereditary local great family domination in Lingnan was not suppressed until the last half of the seventh century and the first half of the eighth; Feng family fortunes, for example, seem to have suffered a nearly fatal blow only in 698.34 Compared to the wild Feng family enclave in Guangdong, Jiaozhou, in what is now Vietnam, was a relatively sedate and Sinified part of the Tang empire. It was also, however, increasingly something of an economic backwater.

Jiaozhi, in the Red River valley, had been the foremost city of Han dynasty Lingnan, but its old rival, Canton city (Guangzhou), had been resurrected after 226. Maritime trade, which increasingly involved the eastward-lying islands of Southeast Asia, was also increas-

ingly capable of navigating boldly across the sea directly to Canton rather than crawling timidly up the coast past Jiaozhou. Overland trade routes, which during the Han dynasty had passed more or less due north from Jiaozhi to the northwestern Han imperial capitals, shifted east to pass through Canton on their way to the new Southern dynastic capital near the site of modern Nanjing (Nanking). Canton was becoming relatively more important as a trading center than Jiao-
zhou. One modern scholar estimates that Canton surpassed Jiaozhou as a hub of international maritime trade in the seventh and eighth centuries. The Red River valley area, under any name, would never again regain its former commercial glory.35

Population movement into Lingnan from the northern imperial heartland during the Tang dynasty also tended to favor population growth in northern Guangdong over the extreme southernmost Red River valley area. By the time of the Sui dynasty (unified 589–618), the commandery containing Canton city already had a larger registered population than the one containing Jiaozhou—a reversal of the old Han dynasty relative balance.36

In addition, Jiaozhou was becoming something of an isolated salient of imperial power, surrounded by aggressive foreign enemies. The heavily Indianized Southeast Asian kingdom of Champa, on the southern border of Jiaozhou in what is now central Vietnam, had been a frequent military threat beginning especially in the fourth and fifth centuries. The Tang fortress at Jiaozhou was repeatedly sacked; in 767, for example, it fell to seaborne raiders from Java. From the mid-ninth century, Jiaozhou was also seriously menaced by the rise of the Nanzhao kingdom, located just to its northwest in modern Yunnan Province. Two Nanzhao seizures of Tang Jiaozhou reportedly resulted in 150,000 casualties.37

Jiaozhou was, furthermore, geographically cut off from the rest of the empire, accessible by land only through the bottleneck represented by the so-called Ghost Gate Pass (gui men guan) in modern Guangxi near the Guangdong border, where a pair of opposing rocks formed a kind of natural gateway. Because of Jiaozhou’s insalubrious tropical climate, popular wisdom held it that those who ventured through the pass into the deep south “seldom returned alive.” When Tang imperial attention was distracted by a disastrous rebellion in northern China during the mid-eighth century (that of An Lushan), tribal strongmen seized control over much of modern Guangxi Prov-
ince, established several petty principalities, and severed land communication between the Tang urban centers at Canton and Jiaozhou from approximately 756 to 771.²⁸

Jiaozhou also remained vulnerable to internal tribal rebellions, although not necessarily more so than other parts of Lingnan. In 687, for example, a protector-general was killed when his plan to impose the full Chinese tax rate on the Li tribesmen of Lingnan backfired and provoked a rebellion. He was besieged in Jiaozhou city with insufficient troops for his own defense and perished when the Feng family strongman at Canton maliciously withheld reinforcements.³⁰

In recognition of the unique frontier conditions in Jiaozhou, in 679 Jiaozhou was separately made the seat of a Tang “protectorate of the peaceful south.” This initiative was paralleled by the establishment of similar protectorates on each of the other principal imperial borders. The new protector-general of the “peaceful south” (C: Annan; V: Annam, which thus enters our vocabulary to become the standard pre-nineteenth-century name for Vietnam) was commissioned, in particular, to supervise “the pacification, subjugation, and patrol” of the non-Chinese tribes under his jurisdiction.⁴⁰

However, late Tang dynasty Jiaozhou (or Annan) was threatened almost as much by mutinous imperial armies as it was by tribal unrest or foreign enemies. In 803, for example, imperial troops employed in improving the city’s fortifications rebelled, expelling the protector-general. In 843, when the military commissioner of Annan put his troops to work restoring the walls, they mutinied again, burnt the city, plundered its treasury, and drove the commissioner back to Guangzhou. In 877, a garrison of Annan troops stationed in what is now Guangxi Province mutinied, driving out their surveillance commissioner. In 880, the army in the Jiaozhou capital mutinied once more, causing the military commissioner to flee from the city.⁴¹

Tang dynasty Jiaozhou was an unpopular posting. In 628, one great gentleman flatly refused a direct imperial appointment to govern Jiaozhou on the grounds that the climate there was so unhealthy that he could never return alive. Lingnan, in general, was still regarded as an exotic and forbidding place of exile. Isolated and surrounded by significant foreign military threats, with a reputation for often-fatal tropical diseases and increasingly overshadowed by the rise of Guangzhou (Canton), Jiaozhou was a growing imperial problem. Yet by the late eighth century, the Tang empire had many troubles in many places. As late as 792, at least, one top imperial adviser could still argue against policies favoring Canton over Annan (Jiaozhou), arguing that both were equally “the king’s land.”⁴²

From the second half of the eighth century, many of the Tang regional commands became effectively independent strongholds. In 904, a man named Liu Yin (d. 911) secured appointment as military commissioner of Lingnan, with his base in the city of Canton. After his death and the final demise of the Tang dynasty in 907, his younger brother proclaimed the establishment of an independent new empire based at Canton in 917 that he called “Great Yue” (or “Great Viet”), resurrecting the memory of Zhao Tuo’s old independent Cantonese Southern Yue kingdom. A year later, however, he changed his new empire’s name to “(Southern) Han,” obviously hoping to capitalize on memories of the much greater splendor and imperial legitimacy of the original Han dynasty, whose royal family’s surname happened to be the same as his own.⁴³

As Liu family power in Canton began to coalesce, the military commissioner of Jiaozhou, Khuc Hao (d. 908), sent his son north to Canton to reconnoiter. Succeeding to his father’s position, this son adroitly played off Cantonese (Southern) Han imperial power against the various other upstart rival imperial dynasties of the north until 950, when (Southern) Han finally dispatched an army to crush this Jiaozhou impertinence. The outcome was a bloody power struggle in Jiaozhou that ended only in 938, when Ngo Quyen (d. 944) seized local power, lured a (Southern) Han invasion fleet onto iron-tipped stakes, annihilated it, and proclaimed himself king.⁴⁴ Vietnam (though it was not yet known as Vietnam) was finally independent, this time, as it turns out, permanently (almost).

During the course of more than a millennium of imperial rule, the Red River valley area had already long enjoyed much de facto autonomy and occasionally openly proclaimed independence. Local self-rule, however, in this case invariably meant not that all local people governed themselves in some democratic fashion but merely that they were ruled by families of local strongmen rather than remote northern emperors. That Vietnam was eventually able to become what we think of today as an entirely separate “nation,” while descendants of the originally very similar Yue (Viet) peoples of modern Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi Provinces became “Chinese” instead, was determined largely by factors of geography:
the Empire found it difficult and increasingly not worthwhile to project continuous effective administrative power into this awkward and remote salient.\textsuperscript{45}

Both the ambition and the political tools to create an independent empire in Vietnam were provided by the experience of having long been part of the Chinese empire. Much as Western imperialism in modern times provoked a reaction in the form of worldwide anti-colonial independence movements, the legacy of premodern imperial “Chinese rule . . . promoted Vietnamese nationalism,”\textsuperscript{46} except that “nationalism” is not yet the right word for the tenth century. The rulers of newly independent Vietnam remained Chinese-style local great families, still scarcely any less “Chinese” than their counterparts in Canton but determined now to create their own All-under-Heaven in the south. The modern “nation” of Vietnam had yet to be imagined.

After Ngo Quyen seized control over the region in 938–939, he lived only five more years. Ngo family rule was challenged after Ngo Quyen’s death by as many as a dozen local strongmen at a time, and it was not until the rise of Dinh Bo Linh (923–979) around 965 that a degree of unity was restored to the Red River valley. When the reunified Song dynasty (960–1279) in the north finally extended its newly centralize Chinese imperial power as far south as Canton, in 971 Dinh Bo Linh’s son, in Vietnam, was confirmed as Song military commissioner and protector-general, and in 975 Dinh Bo Linh himself was enfeoffed as “king of Jiaozhi commandery.” Vietnamese autonomy was thus conceptualized, by the Chinese court at least, as still falling within the normal framework of the Sinocentric investiture system as an imperial vassal kingdom.\textsuperscript{47}

This may have initially been intended simply as a temporary stopgap until such time as Song military power was strong enough to directly recapture Jiaozhi. Invasion was, in fact, contemplated by the second Song emperor, but he was dissuaded by an official’s recommendation that “Jiaozhi is burning hot and pestilential; twenty to thirty percent of our troops will die before seeing combat. Even if we get it, we will be unable to hold it.” In the end, the Song empire rested content with the nominal tributary submission of Vietnam, and, except for a brief interval of renewed military occupation during the early Ming, which proved to be extremely un-cost-effective, this would become the final Chinese imperial disposition toward Vietnam.\textsuperscript{48}

The newly independent Vietnamese government replicated key features of the Chinese order, establishing its own subvassals, bureaucratic network, and triennial Confucian examination system. After independence, Vietnam long maintained many of the old Chinese imperial standards of weights and measures and in commerce continued to employ Tang and Song money. Confucian culture flourished in Vietnam, it could almost be said, especially after its consolidation of political independence, and in the early centuries the two monarchies were interchangeable enough that it was apparently not uncommon for southern Chinese to emigrate to Vietnam and enter government service there.\textsuperscript{49}

At the same time, of course, this newly independent Vietnam was in direct continuous contact with Southeast as well as East Asia. As Vietnam gradually expanded its own imperial territory to the south, occupying approximately the entire southern half of what is now Vietnam between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, its population mix was also greatly enriched by the addition of Cham and Khmer and various other non-Chinese and un-Sinified elements. This greatly enlarged Vietnamese empire itself was politically divided internally almost continually from 1527 to 1802. When, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the great emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–1820) unified the entire region, with much foreign aid, from his southern base at Saigon, he was in some senses “assembling a kingdom . . . that had never before existed.”\textsuperscript{50}

The quite conscious attempts of this new nineteenth-century empire (which now for the first time finally begins to actually be known by the name “Vietnam”) to duplicate Chinese institutional models have been pointedly contrasted to the simultaneous persistence there of quite different popular native views. For example, the standard Chinese title “emperor” (Hoang-de in Vietnamese pronunciation but written with identical kanji) was officially employed in nineteenth-century Vietnam alongside the native designation Vua, which has no Chinese equivalent.\textsuperscript{51}

However, such a distinction between elite high culture and local popular culture was normal—indeed, a fundamental expectation of the premodern East Asian world—even within the Chinese empire itself, although presumably to a somewhat lesser extent. In both Korea and Japan, there had also been a notably similar interplay between older native and newly introduced Chinese royal titles, at least in early periods. Even in China proper, the ancient southern state of
Chu may also have observed a similar “parallel usage of indigenous and northern titles” for several centuries.32

Circumstances in nineteenth-century Vietnam were undeniably unique, but every place in East Asia was unique. It would be a misreading of the evidence (from a modern nationalist perspective that assumes the naturalness and immutability of ethnic nations) to conclude simply that such cultural layers are proof of the alien quality of Chinese influences, violating some eternal Vietnamese national essence, and therefore doomed to be rejected someday as unwelcome foreign impositions. In truth everything, everywhere, must have been either new or foreign once. Ho Chi Minh’s modern Western-style title of “president,” after 1945, was no less alien than the older Chinese-style title “emperor.” Indeed, by the twentieth century, “emperors” had become part of Vietnamese tradition.

SEVEN

The Birth of Korea

CHINESE COLONIES

Documented Korean history begins in very much the same way that the written history of Vietnam began, with Chinese-language records of a newly dislodged fragment of the vast Qin world empire. Even before this time, the northeastern Warring States kingdom known as Yan had apparently already occupied and fortified a section of territory within what we now think of as Korea. When Qin conquered Yan and unified All-under-Heaven, Qin incorporated Yan’s Korean territory as well. For logistical reasons, however, once the Han dynasty had reestablished centralized imperial administration following the disintegration of Qin, it pulled the northeastern imperial frontier back to the line formed by the Liao River. A dependent client state named Yan was resurrected beyond the river in Liaodong (“Liao East”).

A close personal friend of the first Han emperor and fellow native villager was selected to be the first monarch of this revived Yan kingdom. However, when the emperor died in 195 B.C., this new king of Yan, fearing the empress dowager’s intentions, fled amid the Xiongnu to become a Xiongnu prince. One of his ex-subordinates in Yan, named Wiman, together with some 1,000 followers, sought refuge elsewhere among the old Qin fortifications in what is now Korea. Dressing native style, with his hair up in a bun, he presided as king there over a growing population of mixed local tribespeople and Chinese refugees.1

Wiman’s new kingdom in Korea was called Chosŏn. The question of whether it should be regarded as ethnically “Korean” or ethnically “Chinese” (or something else altogether) is a natural one and


90. For architectural orthodoxy, see Ma Changshou, p. 67. On the issue of motive, see Holmgren, "Race and Class," pp. 113–114.


94. Han Sheng, "Wubi he cun," p. 103.


96. Ma Changshou, p. 108; Pan Yihong, *Son of Heaven*, pp. 34–35, 98; *Sui shu*, 1.1; Yang Cuivei, p. 70.


98. Ma Changshou, pp. 70, 75; Waldron, pp. 43–44.


100. *Liang shu*, 56.833.


105. Jenner, trans., p. v; Tonami and Takeda, pp. 124–125; *Wei shu*, 14.936; *Zizhi tongjian*, 140.73.


**CHAPTER SIX**

1. The relationships between Vietnam, Lingnan, and early imperial China are explored in Holcombe, "China's Deep South."

5. Dai Viet su ky toan thu, ngoai ky, 1.100; Shu ji jing zhu, 37.694; Viet su luc, 1.1a. For a modern discussion, see Lü Shipeng, p. 14; Hightam, p. 122; Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, pp. 16–17, 21, 23.
6. Shui jing zhu, 37.693–694; Tong dian, 188.1005. On the Qin conquest, see Annam chi luc, 4.93; Huainian zhi, 18.16a; Shi ji, 6.253. It is uncertain how far into modern Vietnam the Qin conquests extended. See Lü Shipeng, pp. 25–26.
7. On Yunnan, see Han shu, 95.3838. For the Yue kingdoms, see Li Donghua, Haiyang fashan, p. 31.
8. Han ji, 10.97–98; Han shu, 95.3859–3860; Tong dian, 186.905.
9. Han shu, 95.3860, 3863. Almost certainly this measure was applied only to the population of the major urban centers in Eastern Oo. See Liu Simian, DU shi zhai, p. 582.
10. Annam chi luc, 5.113. On this writer's motives, see Le Blanc, p. 23.
11. Shi ji, 113.2967. See also Shui jing zhu, 37.708.
12. Annam chi luc, 3.78, 14.324; Han ji, 4.34; Han shu, 95.3848; Lun heng, 2.15a.
13. Han ji, 4.34. The archaeological evidence is assessed in Bellwood, p. 271; Huang and Sun, p. 51.
14. Annam chi luc, 1.17, 11.271–272, 15.341–342; Han ji, 14.137–138; Han shu, 95.3854–3855, 3857, 3859; Viet su luc, 1.3a. The story of how "Vietnam" got its name is related in Anderson, pp. 157–158; Woods, p. 120.
15. For Hainan, see Han shu, 28b.1670; Nan shi, 78.1951; Shui jing zhu, 36.688; Taiping yulan, 172.972; Tong dian, 188.1006; Tin gong shu, 3.66, 43a.1100. The premier is quoted in Kemenade, p. 186. For Hainan today, see also Feng Chengyu.
17. Dong guan Han ji, 12.3a; Holmgren, Chinese Colonization, pp. 16–21; Maspero, “Ma Yuan,” pp. 18–19, 27.
22. Aside from place names (and Latin borrowings), for example, the modern English language retains scarcely fifteen or sixteen British words that pre-date the Germanic invasions. See Musset, p. 104.
25. For the Li “bandits,” see “Nanzhou yiwu zhi,” in Taiping yulan, 785.3509. For cannibals, see “Nanzhou yiwu zhi,” in Taiping yulan, 786.3711. Tong dian, 188.1005, places the land of the cannibals to the west of modern Vietnam. For the “wild Wenlan,” see “Linyi ji” (Champa Chronicle), in Taiping yulan, 172.971. On the Guangdong slave trade, see Han Changli quanjie, 33.416; Liang shu, 33.470; Xin Tang shu, 169.5009.
26. Annam chi luc, 7.171–172; Viet su luc, 1.4b–5a. For the parallel with Laos, see Oba Osamu, Nitchii kankeishi, pp. 49, 63, 94. Wu suspicion was not assuaged by Shi Xie’s offerings of exotic tribute or even by a Shi son sent as hostage. Since an independent Lingnan was intolerable to the Wu regime, it dispatched one of its own officers to act as a superior inspector for the region. In 217, this man moved the official capital of Lingnan from Shi Xie’s family stronghold at Jiaozhi back to the site of Zhao Tuo’s old city at Canton, constructed a new walled city there, and began to pacify and assemble the “Hundred Yue” people. Shui jing zhu, 37.708.
27. Annam chi luc, 7.173; Dai Viet su ky toan thu, ngoai ky, 4.137–139.
28. On émigré domination, see Wu Xianqing, “Nancho dao,” p. 4; Zou Yiliang, pp. 55–56, 58. For local resentment of these émigrés, see Han Guopan, Wei-fen nanbeichao, p. 176; Okawa Fujio, p. 534. For Jiaozhou’s relative autonomy, see Holmgren, Chinese Colonization, pp. 115, 119, 129–130; Lü Shipeng, pp. 58, 62.
29. Dai viet su ky toan thu, ngoai ky, 4.147–153. For the Sui reconquest, see also Sui shu, 53.1357–1358.
31. Xin Tang shu, 222c.6326.
32. Sui shu, 80.1800–1803.
35. Li Donghua, Haiyang fashan, pp. 150–154; Lü Shipeng, pp. 109, 119.
36. On population movement, see Li Qingxin, p. 80. For relative population, compare Sui shu, 31.880 with 31.885.
37. Annam chi luc, 10.265–266; Dai viet su ky toan thu, ngoai ky, 5.158–160, 165; Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, pp. 198–199. For Cham raids, see Jin shu, 8.193; Lian shu, 54.785; Nan shi, 78.1949; Tong dian, 188.1008.
40. Tong dian, 32.186; Xin Tang shu, 43a.1111.
42. Annam chi luoc, 9.208–209; Dai viet su ky toan thu, ngoai ky, 5.158–159. For exile to Lingnan, see, for example, Xin Tang shu, 4.88, 5.133. On the policy advice of 792, see Zichi tongqian, 234.556.
43. Zichi tongqian, 270.242, 263. On Tang regional commands, see Xin Tang shu, 64.1759.
44. Annam chi luoc, 4.99–100; Dai viet su ky toan thu, ngoai ky, 5.169–171; Viet su luoc, 1.13b–14b. See also Lü Shipeng, pp. 140, 142.
45. See Lü Shipeng, p. 3.
46. Sar Desai, p. 17.
47. Annam chi luoc, 11.1.1, 82; Viet su luoc, 1.15b–16a. See also Sar Desai, p. 20; Taylor, Birth of Vietnam, pp. 275–295.

CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Han ji, 14.1.393; Han shu, 95.3863–3864; Samguk yusa, 1; T. 49.962a; Shi ji, 93.2.637–2639, 115.2985.
3. On this so-called northern Yan language, see Hsu and Linduff, p. 201; Ma Changshou, pp. 11, 34–35; Yan Gengwang, “Yang Xiong,” map, p. 85.
4. Han ji, 14.1393; Han shu, 95.3864–3867; Samguk yusa, 1; T. 49.962a–b.
San guo zhi, 30.848.
10. Li Donghua, Huiyang fashan, pp. 10–12, 79.
13. Kim Tal-su, p. 44; Lewin, Aya und Hata, p. 6; Ma Changshou, pp. 37–38; San guo zhi, 30.848; Xia Yingyuan, pp. 94–97.
17. Puyó was located in former Yemaek territory, according to Jin shu, 97.2538; Shan hai jing, 6.293, note. On the Yemaek, see Lin Yun. Quotations are from San guo zhi, 30.841; Pulleyblank, “The Chinese and Their Neighbors,” pp. 443–444.
19. For Puyó’s fate, see Hong Soon-chang, p. 46; Hou Han shu, 85.2810; Yao Weiyuan, pp. 269–270. Regarding the origins of Parhae, see Kim Tal-su, pp. 56–57; Samguk yusa, 1; T. 49.963a. Note for the dissolution of Parhae, see Crossley, p. 15.
21. Han yuans, transcript, p. 29, note; San guo zhi, 30.851–852. For the homes of Tungusic-speaking peoples, see Crossley, p. 19.
24. For the vicissitudes and gradual consolidation of the Koguryó state, see Han yuans, transcript, p. 36, note; Liang shu, 54.803; Oba Osamu, Nitchi kankeishi, p. 72; Samguk sagi, vol. 1, p. 345 (Koguryó Basic Annals 6); Shiliu guo changju, 23.401, 2.415.
25. Jin shu, 124.3108; Samguk sagi, vol. 1, p. 348 (Koguryó Basic Annals 6); Shiliu guo changju, 47.570. On intermarriage between the Tuoba and Murong Xianbei leaders, see Wan Shengnan, pp. 253–254. On the rising Tuoba threat to the Murong, see Liu Xueyao, pp. 142–143.
27. San guo zhi, 30.849–851. For refugee settlement, see Samguk yusa, 1; T. 49.962b.