A HIDDEN TRADITION

THE JEW AS PARIAH
only too well that they did not enjoy political freedom nor full admission to the life of nations; but that, instead, they had been separated from their own people and lost contact with the simple natural life of the common man, these men yet achieved liberty and popularity by the sheer force of imagination. As individuals they started an emancipation of their own, of their own hearts and brains. Such a conception was, of course, a gross misconstruction of what emancipation had been intended to be; but it was also a vision, and out of the impassioned intensity with which it was evinced and expressed, provided the fostering soil on which Jewish creative genius could grow and contribute its products to the general spiritual life of the Western world.

That the status of the Jews in Europe has been not only that of an oppressed people but also of what Max Weber has called a "pariah people" is a fact most clearly appreciated by those who have had practical experience of just how ambiguous is the freedom which emancipation has ensured, and how treacherous the promise of equality which assimilation has held out. In their own position as social outcasts such men reflect the political status of their entire people. It is therefore not surprising that out of their personal experience Jewish poets, writers, and artists should have been able to evolve the concept of the pariah as a human type—a concept of supreme importance for the evaluation of mankind in our day and one which has exerted upon the gentle world an influence in strange contrast to the spiritual and political ineffectiveness which has been the fate of these men among their own brethren. Indeed, the concept of the pariah has become traditional, even though the tradition be but tacit and latent, and its continuance automatic and unconscious. Nor need we wonder why: for over a hundred years the same basic conditions have obtained and evoked the same basic reactions.

However slender the basis out of which the concept was created and out of which it was progressively developed, it has nevertheless loomed larger in thinking of assimilated Jews than might be inferred from standard Jewish histories. It has endured, in fact, from Salomon Maimon in the eighteenth century to Franz Kafka in the early twentieth. But out of the variety of forms which it has assumed we shall here select four, in each of which it expresses an alternative portrayal of the Jewish people. Our first type will be Heinrich Heine's schlemiel and "lord of dreams" (Trauemweltheerscher); our second, Bernard Lazare's "conscious pariah"; our third, Charlie Chaplin's grotesque portrayal of the suspect; and our fourth, Franz Kafka's poetic vision of the fate of the man of goodwill. Between these four types there is a significant connection—a link which in fact unites all genuine concepts and sound ideas when once they achieve historical actuality.

I. Heinrich Heine: The Schlemiel and Lord of Dreams

In his poem "Princess Sabbath," the first of his Hebrew Melodies, Heinrich Heine depicts for us the national background from which he sprang and which inspired his verses. He portrays his people as a fairy prince turned by witchcraft into a dog. A figure of ridicule throughout the week, every Friday night he suddenly regains his mortal shape, and freed from the preoccupations of his canine existence (von haustihis Genibeken), goes forth like a prince to welcome the sabbath bride and to greet her with the traditional hymn, "Lecha Dodi."

This poem, we are informed by Heine, was especially composed for the purpose by the people's poet—the poet who, by a stroke of fortune, escapes the grueling weekly transformation of his people and who continually leads the sabbathlike existence which is to Heine the only positive mark of Jewish life.

Poets are characterized in greater detail in Part IV of the poem, where Heine speaks of Yehudah Halevi. They are said to be descended from "Herr Schlemihl ben Zurisheadai"—a name taken from Shelumiel ben Zurisheadai mentioned in the biblical Book of Numbers as the leader of the tribe of Simeon. Heine relates his name to the word "schlemiel" by the humorous supposition that by standing too close to his brother chieftain Zimri, he got himself killed accidentally when Zimri was beheaded by the priest Phinehas for dallying with a Midianite woman (Numbers 25: 6–15). But if they may claim Shelumiel as their ancestor, they must also claim Phinehas—the ruthless Phinehas whose

... spear is with us,
And above our heads unpaking
We can hear its fatal whirring
And the noblest hearts it pierces.
[Trans. Leland]
If the problem is the assurance, from this viewpoint, of the
more involved phenomena of formal indices.

...
part of the pariah, from this attitude of denying the reality of the social order and of confronging it, instead, with a higher reality, that Heine's spirit of mockery really stems. It is this too which makes his scorn so pointed. Because he gauges things so consistently by the criterion of what is really and manifestly natural, he is able at once to detect the weak spot in his opponent's armor, the vulnerable point in any particular stupidity which it happens to be exposing. And it is this aloofness of the pariah from all the works of man that Heine regards as the essence of freedom. It is this aloofness that accounts for the divine laughter and the absence of bitterness in his verses.

He was the first Jew to whom freedom meant more than mere "liberation from the house of bondage" and in whom it was combined, in equal measure, with the traditional Jewish passion for justice. To Heine, freedom had little to do with liberation from a just or unjust yoke. A man is born free, and he can lose his freedom only by selling himself into bondage. In line with this idea, both in his political poems and in his prose writings Heine vents his anger not only on tyrants but equally on those who put up with them.

The concept of natural freedom (conceived, be it noted, by an outcast able to live beyond the struggle between bondage and tyranny) turns both slaves and tyrants into equally unnatural and therefore ludicrous figures of fun. The poet's cheerful insouciance could hardly be expected from the more respectable citizen, caught as he was in the toils of practical affairs and himself partly responsible for the order of things. Even Heine, when confronted with the only social reality from which his pariah existence had not detached him—the rich Jews of his family—loses his serenity and becomes bitter and sarcastic.

To be sure, when measured by the standard of political realities, Heine's attitude of amused indifference seems remote and unreal. When one comes down to earth, one has to admit that laughter does not kill and that neither slaves nor tyrants are extinguished by mere amusement. From this standpoint, however, the pariah is always remote and unreal; whether as schemer or as "lord of dreams" he stands outside the real world and attacks it from without. Indeed, the Jewish tendency toward utopianism—a propensity most clearly in evidence in the very countries of emancipation—seems, in the last analysis, from just this lack of social roots. The only thing which saved Heine from succumbing to it, and which made him transform the political nonexistence and unreality of the pariah into the effective basis of a world of art, was his creativity. Because he sought nothing more than to hold up a mirror to the political world, he was able to avoid becoming a doctrinaire and to keep his passion for freedom unharnessed by fetters of dogma. Similarly, because he viewed life through a long-range telescope, and not through the prism of an ideology, he was able to see further and clearer than others, and takes his place today among the shrewdest political observers of his time. The basic philosophy of this "prodigal son" who, after "herding the Hegelian swine for many years," at last became even bold enough to embrace a personal god, could always have been epitomized in his own lines:

Beat on the drum and blow the fife
And kiss the vivandière, my boy.
Fear nothing—that's the whole of life,
Its deepest truth, its soundest joy.
Beat reveille, and with a blast
Arouse all men to valiant strife.
Waken the world; and then, at last
March on.... That is the whole of life.

[Trans. Untermeyer]

By fearlessness and divine impudence Heine finally achieved that for which his contemporaries had vainly striven with fear and trembling, now furtively and now ostentatiously, now by preening and vaunting, and now by conspicuous sycophancy. Heine is the only German Jew who could truthfully describe himself as both a German and a Jew. He is the only outstanding example of a really happy assimilation in the entire history of that process. By seeing Phoebus Apollo in Rabbi Falbush, by boldly introducing Yiddish expressions in the German language, he in fact put into practice that true blending of cultures of which others merely talked. One has only to remember how zealously assimilated Jews avoid the mention of a Hebrew word before gentiles, how strenuously they pretend not to understand it if they hear one, to appreciate the full measure of Heine's accomplishment when he wrote, as pure German verse, lines like the following, praising a distinctly Jewish dish:

Schalet, ray of light immortal
Schalet, daughter of Elysium!
The View from a Hidden Position

II. Demand Theory: The Composition of Profit

Some of the economists often considered the demand for a good to depend on the supply of other goods. If there is a large supply of goods, the demand for a particular good will be less. However, if there is a small supply of goods, the demand for a particular good will be greater. This is because the demand for a good is inversely proportional to the supply of other goods.

It may seem strange that the supply of goods should affect the demand for a good. However, it is important to remember that the demand for a good is influenced by the supply of other goods. In general, the demand for a good will be greater if there is a small supply of goods, and less if there is a large supply of goods. This is because the consumers will have more of the goods they want, and less of the goods they do not want. This will lead to a higher demand for the goods they want, and a lower demand for the goods they do not want.

In this way, the supply of goods is an important factor in determining the demand for a good. If the supply of goods is small, the demand for the good will be greater. If the supply of goods is large, the demand for the good will be less. This is because the demand for a good is inversely proportional to the supply of other goods.

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flesh which served but to expose them to the hatred of other faiths." He said that what was necessary was to arouse the Jewish pariah to a fight against the Jewish parvenu. There was no other way to save him from the latter's own fate—inevitable destruction. Not only, he contended, has the pariah nothing but suffering to expect from the domination of the parvenu, but it is he who is destined sooner or later to pay the price of the whole wretched system. "I want no longer," he says in a telling passage, "to have against me not only the wealthy of my people, who exploit me and sell me, but also the rich and poor of other peoples who oppress and torture me in the name of my rich." And in these words he puts his finger squarely on that phenomenon of Jewish life which the historian Jost had so aptly characterized as "double slavery"—dependence, on the one hand, upon the hostile elements of his environment and, on the other, on his own "highly placed brethren" who are somehow in league with them. Lazare was the first Jew to perceive the connection between these two elements, both equally disastrous to the pariah. His experience of French politics had taught him that whenever the enemy seeks control, he makes a point of using some oppressed element of the population as his lackeys and henchmen, rewarding them with special privileges, as a kind of sop. It was thus that he construed the mechanism which made the rich Jews seek protection behind the notorious general Jewish poverty, to which they referred whenever their own position was jeopardized. This, he divined, was the real basis of their precarious relationship with their poorer brethren—on whom they would be able, at any time it suited them, to turn their backs.

As soon as the pariah enters the arena of politics and translates his status into political terms, he becomes perfecr a rebel. Lazare's idea was, therefore, that the Jew should come out openly as the representative of the pariah, "since it is the duty of every human being to resist oppression." He demanded, that is, that the pariah relinquish once and for all the prerogative of the schlemiel, cut loose from the world of fancy and illusion, renounce the comfortable protection of nature, and come to grips with the world of men and women. In other words, he wanted him to feel that he was himself responsible for what society had done to him. He wanted him to stop seeking release in an attitude of superior indifference or in lofty and rarefied cogitation about the nature of man per se. However much the Jewish pariah might be, from the historical viewpoint, the product of an unjust dispensation

("look what you have made of the people, ye Christians and ye princes of the Jews"); politically speaking, every pariah who refused to be a rebel was partly responsible for his own position and therewith for the blot on mankind which it represented. From such shame there was no escape, either in art or in nature. For insofar as a man is more than a mere creature of nature, more than a mere product of divine creativity, insofar will he be called to account for the things which men do to men in the world which they themselves condition.

Superficially, it might appear as though Lazare failed because of the organized opposition of the rich, privileged Jews, the nabobs and philanthropists whose leadership he had ventured to challenge and whose lust for power he had dared to denounce. Were this the case, it would be but the beginning of a tradition which might have outlived his own premature death and determined, if not the fate, at least the effective vocation of the Jewish people. But it was not the case; and Lazare himself knew—to his own sorrow—the real cause of his failure. The decisive factor was not the parvenu, neither was it the existence of a ruling caste which—whatever complexion it might choose to assume—was still very much the same as that of any other people. Irreversibly more serious and decisive was the fact that the pariah simply refused to become a rebel. True to type, he preferred to "play the revolutionary in the society of others, but not in his own," or else to assume the role of schnorrer feeding on the crumbs from the rich man's table, like an ancient Roman commoner ready to be fobbed off with the merest trifle that the patriarch might toss at him. In either case, he mortgaged himself to the parvenu, protecting the latter's position in society and in turn protected by him.

However bitterly they may have attacked him, it was not the hostility of the Jewish nabobs that ruined Lazare. It was the fact that when he tried to stop the pariah from being a schlemiel, when he sought to give him a political significance, he encountered only the schnorrer. And once the pariah becomes a schnorrer, he is worth nothing, not because he is poor and begs, but because he begs from those whom he ought to fight, and because he appraises his poverty by the standards of those who have caused it. Once he adopts the role of schnorrer, the pariah becomes automatically one of the props which hold up a social order from which he is himself excluded. For just as he cannot live without his benefactors, so they cannot live without him. Indeed, it is just by this system of organized charity and almngiving that the parvenus of
The Clearing of Hidden Traumas

III. Charlie Chaplin: The Suspect

Nothing new remains the moment the facts
become known. The illusion of the people
into a vital and significant political factor
this year, the issue's success—indicated in May
among several thousand respondents that a
violent race of the people expressed opinion
in favor of the government, which, in turn, the
population was set to stand, if the case, the
response. For the people have continued to
survive the world over to determine its

The 1940s
can cheerfully cock a snook at them, because one has learned to duck them, as men duck a shower by creeping into holes or under a shelter. And the smaller one is the easier it becomes. Basically, the impudence of Chaplin’s suspect is of the same kind as charm as so much in Heine’s schlemiel; but no longer is it carefree and unperturbed, no longer the divine effrontery of the poet who consorts with heavenly things and can therefore afford to thumb noses at earthly society. On the contrary, it is a worried, careworn impudence—the kind so familiar to generations of Jews, the effrontery of the poor “little Yid” who does not recognize the class order of the world because he sees no other order but justice for himself.

It was in this “little Yid,” poor in worldly goods but rich in human experience, that the little man of all peoples most clearly discerned his own image. After all, had he not too grapple with the problem of circumventing a law which, in its sublime indifference, forbade “rich and poor to sleep under bridges or steal bread?” For a long time he could laugh good-humoredly at himself in the role of a schlemiel-laugh at his misfortunes and his comic methods of escape. But then came unemployment, and the thing was not funny anymore. He knew he had been caught by a fate which no amount of cunning and smartness could evade. Then came the change. Chaplin’s popularity began rapidly to wane, not because of any mounting antisemitism, but because his underlying humanity had lost its meaning. Men had stopped seeking release in laughter; the little had decided to be a big one.

Today it is not Chaplin, but Superman. When, in The Great Dictator, the comedian tried, by the ingenious device of doubling his role, to point up the contrast between the “little man” and the “big shot,” and to show the almost brutal character of the Superman ideal, he was barely understood. And when, at the end of that film, he stepped out of character, and sought, in his own name, to reaffirm and vindicate the simple wisdom and philosophy of the “little man,” his moving and impassioned plea fell, for the most part, upon unresponsive audiences. This was not the idol of the thirties.

IV. Franz Kafka: The Man of Goodwill

Both Heine’s schlemiel and Lazare’s “conscious pariah” were conceived essentially as Jews, while even Chaplin’s suspect betrays what are clearly Jewish traits. Quite different, however, is the case of the last and most recent typification of the pariah—that represented in the work of Franz Kafka. He appears on two occasions, once in the poet’s earliest story, “Description of a Fight,” and again in one of his latest novels, entitled The Castle.

“Description of a Fight” is concerned, in a general way, with the problem of social interrelations, and advances the thesis that within the confines of society the effects of genuine or even friendly relations are invariably adverse. Society, we are told, is composed of “nobodies”—“I did wrong to nobody, nobody did wrong to me; but nobody will help me, nothing but nobodies”—and has therefore no real existence. Nevertheless, even the pariah, who is excluded from it, cannot account himself lucky, since society keeps up the pretense that it is somebody and he nobody, that it is “real” and he “unreal.” His conflict with it has therefore nothing to do with the question whether society treats him properly or not; the point at issue is simply whether it or he has real existence. And the greatest injury which society can and does inflict on him is to make him doubt the reality and validity of his own existence, to reduce him in his own eyes to a status of nonentity.

The reality of his existence thus assailed, the pariah of the nineteenth century had found escape in two ways, but neither could any longer commend itself to Kafka. The first way led to a society of pariahs, of people in the same situation and—so far as their opposition to society was concerned—of the same outlook. But to take this way was to end in utter detachment from reality—in a bohemian divorce from the actual world. The second way, chosen by many of the better Jews whom society had ostracized, led to an overwhelming preoccupation with the world of beauty, be it the world of nature in which all men were equal beneath an eternal sun, or the realm of art where everyone was welcome who could appreciate eternal genius. Nature and art had, in fact, long been regarded as departments of life which were proof against social or political assault; and the pariah therefore retreated to them as to a world where he might dwell unmolested. Old cities, reared in beauty and hallowed by tradition, began to attract him with their imposing buildings and spacious plazas. Projected, as it were, from the past into the present, aloof from contemporary rages and passions, they seemed in their timelessness to extend a universal welcome. The gates of the old palaces, built by kings for their own courts, seemed now to be flung open to all, and even unbelievers might pace the great cathedrals of Christ. In such a setting the
The term "hidden" is used to describe a phenomenon that is not immediately apparent or easily accessible. In the context of this document, the hidden process is a complex series of steps that occur in order to achieve the desired outcome. The hidden process is not always visible on the surface, and it requires a deep understanding of the underlying mechanisms to fully comprehend its nature.

The hidden process is a critical component of any successful project. It involves a series of steps that are not immediately obvious, but are essential for achieving the desired outcome. In order to understand the hidden process, it is important to look beyond the surface and consider the underlying factors that contribute to the overall success of the project.

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show clearly how the experiment in fact works out. To make a thorough success of it, it is, of course, necessary also that a man should renounce all distinctive Jewish traits. In Kafka's treatment, however, this renunciation assumes a significance for the whole problem of mankind, and not merely for the Jewish question. K., in his effort to become "indistinguishable," is interested only in universals, in things which are common to all mankind. His desires are directed only toward those things to which all men have a natural right. He is, in a word, the typical man of goodwill. He demands no more than that which constitutes every man's right, and he will be satisfied with no less. His entire ambition is to have "a home, a position, real work to do," to marry and "to become a member of the community." Because, as a stranger, he is not permitted to enjoy these obvious prerequisites of human existence, he cannot afford to be ambitious. He alone, he thinks (at least at the beginning of the story), must fight for the minimum—for simple human rights, as if it were something which embraced the sum total of all possible demands. And just because he seeks nothing more than his minimum human rights, he cannot consent to obtain his demands—as might otherwise have been possible—in the form of "an act of favor from the Castle." He must perform stand on his rights.

As soon as the villagers discover that the stranger who has chanced to come into their midst really enjoys the protection of the castle, their original mood of contemptuous indifference turns to one of respectful hostility. From then on their one desire is to cast him back upon the castle as soon as possible; they want no truck with the "upper crust." And when K. refuses, on the grounds that he wants to be free, when he explains that he would rather be a simple but genuine villager than an ostensible one really living under the protection of the castle, their attitude changes in turn to one of suspicion mingled with anxiety—an attitude which, for all his efforts, haunts him continually. The villagers feel uneasy not because he is a stranger, but because he refuses to accept favors. They try constantly to persuade him that his attitude is "dumb," that he lacks acquaintance with conditions as they are. They tell him all kinds of tales concerning the relations of the castle to the villagers, and seek thereby to impart to him something of that knowledge of the world which he so obviously lacks. But all they succeed in doing is to show him, to his increasing alarm, that such things as human instinct, human rights, and

plain normal life—things which he himself has taken for granted as the indisputable property of all normal human beings—have as little existence for the villagers as for the stranger.

What K. experiences in his efforts to become indistinguishable from the villagers is told in a series of grim and ghastly tales, all of them redolent of human perversity and the slow attrition of human instincts. There is the tale of the innkeeper's wife, who had the "honor" as a girl to be the short-lived mistress of some underling at the castle, and who so far never forgets it as to turn her marriage into the merest sham. Then there is K.'s own young fiancée, who had the same experience but who, though she is able to forget it long enough to fall genuinely in love with him, still cannot endure indefinitely a simple life without "high connections" and who absconds in the end with the aid of the "assistants"—two minor officials of the castle. Last but not least, there is the weird, uncanny story of the Barnabases living under a curse, treated as lepers till they feel themselves such, merely because one of their pretty daughters once dared to reject the indecent advances of an important courtier. The plain villagers, controlled to the last detail by the ruling class, and slaves even in their thoughts to the whims of their all-powerful officials, have long since come to realize that to be in the right or to be in the wrong is for them a matter of pure "fate" which they cannot alter. It is not, as K. naively assumes, the sender of an obscene letter who is exposed, but the recipient who becomes branded and tainted. This is what the villagers mean when they speak of their "fate." In K.'s view, "it's unjust and monstrous"; but he is "the only one in the village of that opinion."

It is the story of the Barnabases that finally makes K. see conditions as they really are. At long last he comes to understand that the realization of his designs, the achievement of basic human rights—the right to work, the right to be useful, the right to found a home and become a member of society—are in no way dependent on complete assimilation to one's milieu, on being "indistinguishable." The normal existence which he desires has become something exceptional, no longer to be realized by simple, natural methods. Everything natural and normal in life has been wrested out of men's hands by the prevalent regime of the village, to become a present endowed from without—or, as Kafka puts it, from "above." Whether as fate, as blessing, or as curse, it is something dark and mysterious, something which a man
The page contains a discussion on the concept of human nature and the role of education. It mentions the importance of education in shaping human behavior and the idea that education can help individuals reach their full potential.

The text discusses the idea that education is a means of social control and can be used to shape human behavior. It highlights the role of education in promoting certain values and attitudes, and the importance of critical thinking in understanding the world.

The page also contains a reference to a study or research, which is not fully visible in the image. The study seems to be related to the effects of education on cognitive development and the role of education in promoting social and economic progress.

Overall, the page seems to be a part of a larger text discussing the role of education in society and the impact of education on individual and collective development.
resolve the anomaly of the Jewish people and the problem of the Jewish individual by becoming "indistinguishable" from their neighbors, if they had made equality with others their ultimate objective, they would only have found in the end that they were faced with inequality and that society was slowly but surely disintegrating into a vast complex of inhuman cross-currents. They would have found, in short, the same kind of situation as Kafka portrayed in dealing with the relations of the stranger to the established patterns of village life.

So long as the Jews of Western Europe were pariahs only in a social sense, they could find salvation, to a large extent, by becoming parvenus. Insecure as their position may have been, they could nevertheless achieve a modus vivendi by combining what Abad Haam described as "inner slavery" with "outward freedom." Moreover, those who deemed the price too high could still remain mere pariahs, calmly enjoying the freedom and untouchability of outcasts. Excluded from the world of political realities, they could still retreat into their quiet corners there to preserve the illusion of liberty and unchallenged humanity. The life of the pariah, though shorn of political significance, was by no means senseless.

But today it is. Today the bottom has dropped out of the old ideology. The pariah Jew and the parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in the same angry sea. Both are branded with the same mark; both alike are outlaws. Today the truth has come home: there is no protection in heaven or earth against hate murder, and a man can be driven at any moment from the streets and broad places once open to all. At long last, it has become clear that the "senseless freedom" of the individual merely paves the way for the senseless suffering of his entire people.

Social isolation is no longer possible. You cannot stand aloof from society, whether as a schlemiel or as a lord of dreams. The old escape mechanisms have broken down, and a man can no longer come to terms with a world in which the Jew cannot be a human being either as a parvenu using his elbows or as a pariah voluntarily spurning its gifts. Both the realism of the one and the idealism of the other are today utopian.

There is, however, a third course—the one that Kafka suggests, in which a man may forgo all claims to individual freedom and inviolability and modestly content himself with trying to lead a simple, decent life. But—as Kafka himself points out—this is impossible within the framework of contemporary society. For while the individual might still be allowed to make a career, he is no longer strong enough to fulfill the basic demands of human life. The man of goodwill is driven today into isolation, like the Jew-stranger at the castle. He gets lost—or dies from exhaustion. For only within the framework of a people can a man live as a man among men, without exhausting himself. And only when a people lives and functions in consort with other peoples can it contribute to the establishment upon earth of a commonly conditioned and commonly controlled humanity.

Notes

1. Czaplinski has recently declared that he is of Irish and Gypsy descent, but he has been selected for discussion because, even if not himself a Jew, he has epitomized in an artistic form a character born of the Jewish pariah mentality.

2. "Lecha Dodi": "Come, my beloved, to meet the bride; Let us greet the Sabbath-dole"—a Hebrew song chanted in the synagogue on Friday night.

3. Yet of all who have dealt with this age-long conflict Kafka is the first to have started from the basic truth that "society is a nobody in a dress-suit." In a certain sense, he was fortunate to have been born in an epoch when it was already proven and manifest that the wearers of the dress-suit were indeed nobodies. Fifteen years later, when Marcel Proust wanted to characterize French society, he was obliged to use a far grimmer metaphor. He depicted it as a masquerade with a death's-head grinning behind every mask.
THE JEWISH WRITINGS

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WE REFUGEES

In the first place, we don’t like to be called “refugees.” We ourselves call each other “newcomers” or “immigrants.” Our newspapers are papers for “Americans of German language”; and, as far as I know, there is not and never was any club founded by Hitler-persecuted people whose name indicated that its members were refugees.

A refugee used to be a person driven to seek refuge because of some act committed or some political opinion held. Well, it is true we have had to seek refuge; but we committed no acts and most of us never dreamt of having any radical political opinion. With us the meaning of the term “refugee” has changed. Now “refugees” are those of us who have been so unfortunate as to arrive in a new country without means and have to be helped by refugee committees.

Before this war broke out we were even more sensitive about being called refugees. We did our best to prove to other people that we were just ordinary immigrants. We declared that we had departed of our own free will to countries of our choice, and we denied that our situation had anything to do with “so-called Jewish problems.” Yes, we were “immigrants” or “newcomers” who had left our country because, one fine day, it no longer suited us to stay, or for purely economic reasons. We wanted to rebuild our lives, that was all. In order to rebuild one’s life one has to be strong and an optimist. So we are very optimistic.

Our optimism, indeed, is admirable, even if we say so ourselves. The story of our struggle has finally become known. We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish ghettos and our best friends have been killed in concentration camps, and that means the rupture of our private lives.

Nevertheless, as soon as we were saved—and most of us had to be saved several times—we started our new lives and tried to follow as closely as possible all the good advice our saviors passed on to us. We were told to forget; and we forgot quicker than anybody ever could imagine. In a friendly way we were reminded that the new country would become a new home; and after four weeks in France or six weeks in America, we pretended to be Frenchmen or Americans. The more optimistic among us would even add that their whole former life had been passed in a kind of unconscious exile and only their new country now taught them what a home really looks like. It is true we sometimes raise objections when we are told to forget about our former work; and our former ideals are usually hard to throw over if our social standard is at stake. With the language, however, we find no difficulties: after a single year optimists are convinced they speak English as well as their mother tongue; and after two years they swear solemnly that they speak English better than any other language—their German is a language they hardly remember.

In order to forget more efficiently we rather avoid any allusion to concentration or internment camps we experienced in nearly all European countries—it might be interpreted as pessimism or lack of confidence in the new homeland. Besides, how often have we been told that nobody likes to listen to all that; hell is no longer a religious belief or a fantasy, but something as real as houses and stones and trees. Apparently nobody wants to know that contemporary history has created a new kind of human beings—the kind that are put in concentration camps by their foes and in internment camps by their friends.

Even among ourselves we don’t speak about this past. Instead, we have found our own way of mastering an uncertain future. Since everybody plans and wishes and hopes, so do we. Apart from these general human attitudes, however, we try to clear up the future more scientifically. After so much bad luck we want a course as sure as a gun. Therefore, we leave the earth with all its uncertainties behind and we cast our eyes up to the sky. The stars tell us—rather than the newspapers—when Hitler will be defeated and when we shall become American citizens. We think the stars more reliable advisers than all
could be saved some trouble, and feel lucky.

There was something about the way....
some time, I heard only once about suicide, and that was the suggestion of a collective action, apparently a kind of protest in order to vex the French. When some of us remarked that we had been shipped there "pour crever" in any case, the general mood turned suddenly into a violent courage to live. The general opinion held that one had to be abnormally asocial and unconcerned about general events if one was still able to interpret the whole accident as personal and individual bad luck and, accordingly, ended one's life personally and individually. But the same people, as soon as they returned to their own individual lives, being faced with seemingly individual problems, changed once more to this insane optimism which is next door to despair.

We are the first nonreligious Jews persecuted—and we are the first ones who, not only in extremes, answer with suicide. Perhaps the philosophers are right who teach that suicide is the best and supreme guarantee of human freedom: not being free to create our lives or the world in which we live, we nevertheless are free to throw life away and to leave the world. Pious Jews, certainly, cannot realize this negative liberty; they perceive murder in suicide, that is, destruction of what man never is able to make, interference with the rights of the Creator. Adonai nathan veodonai lakach ("The Lord hath given and the Lord hath taken away"); and they would add: baruch shem adonai ("blessed be the name of the Lord"). For them suicide, like murder, means a blasphemous attack on creation as a whole. The man who kills himself asserts that life is not worth living and the world not worth sheltering him.

Yet our suicides are no mad rebels who hurl defiance at life and the world, who try to kill in themselves the whole universe. Theirs is a quiet and modest way of vanishing: they seem to apologize for the violent solution they have found for their personal problems. In their opinion, generally, political events had nothing to do with their individual fate; in good or bad times they would believe solely in their personality. Now they find some mysterious shortcomings in themselves which prevent them from getting along. Having felt entitled from their earliest childhood to a certain social standard, they are failures in their own eyes if this standard cannot be kept any longer. Their optimism is the vain attempt to keep head above water. Behind this front of cheerfulness, they constantly struggle with despair of themselves. Finally, they die of a kind of selfishness.

If we are saved we feel humiliated, and if we are helped we feel degraded.

We Refugees

We fight like madmen for private existences with individual destinies, since we are afraid of becoming part of that miserable lot of schnorrers whom we, many of us former philanthropists, remember only too well. Just as once we failed to understand that the so-called schnorrer was a symbol of Jewish desity and not a schemer, so today we don’t feel entitled to Jewish solidarity; we cannot realize that we by ourselves are not so much concerned as the whole Jewish people. Sometimes this lack of comprehension has been strongly supported by our protectors. Thus, I remember a director of a great charity concern in Paris who, whenever he received the card of a German-Jewish intellectual with the inevitable “Dr.” on it, used to exclaim at the top of his voice, “Herr Doktor, Herr Doktor, Herr Schnorrer, Herr Schnorrer!”

The conclusion we drew from such unpleasant experiences was simple enough. To be a doctor of philosophy no longer satisfied us; and we learned that in order to build a new life, one has to improve on the old one. A nice little fairy tale has been invented to describe our behavior; a forlorn émigré dachshund, in his grief, begins to speak: “Once, when I was a St. Bernard...”

Our new friends, rather overwhelmed by so many stars and famous men, hardly understand that at the basis of all our descriptions of past splendors lies one human truth: once we were somebody about whom people cared, we were loved by friends, and even known by landlords as paying our rent regularly. Once we could buy our food and ride on the subway without being told we were undesirable. We have become a little hysterical since newspapermen started detecting us and telling us publicly to stop being disagreeable when shopping for milk and bread. We wonder how it can be done; we are so damnably careful in every moment of our daily lives to avoid anybody guessing who we are, what kind of passport we have, where our birth certificates were filled out—and that Hitler didn’t like us. We try the best we can to fit into a world where you have to be sort of politically minded when you buy your food.

Under such circumstances, the St. Bernard grows bigger and bigger. I never can forget that young man who, when expected to accept a certain kind of work, sighed out, “You don’t know to whom you speak; I was Section-manager in Karstadt’s [a great department store in Berlin].” But there is also the deep despair of that middle-aged man who, going through countless shifts of different committees in order to be saved, finally exclaimed, “And
but our minds, despite the challenges, are not to be feared. All our emotions are
bared by the words we speak. We are not alone in the world. Women are
not the ones to be feared. Men are not the ones to admire. We are all
human beings, each with our own unique perspectives. The world is
not black or white, good or evil. It is a complex tapestry of colors and
dimensions. We are all part of it, and we must work together to
create a better world for all.

We must not be afraid to express our thoughts and feelings. We must
be open to new ideas and perspectives. We must be willing to
listen and learn from one another. Only then can we truly make
progress towards a better future.
are directed to attain this aim: we don’t want to be refugees, since we don’t want to be Jews; we pretend to be English-speaking people, since German-speaking immigrants of recent years are marked as Jews; we don’t call ourselves stateless, since the majority of stateless people in the world are Jews; we are willing to become loyal Hottentots, only to hide the fact that we are Jews. We don’t succeed and we can’t succeed; under the cover of our “optimism” you can easily detect the hopeless sadness of assimilationists.

With us from Germany the word “assimilation” received a “deep” philosophical meaning. You can hardly realize how serious we were about it. Assimilation did not mean the necessary adjustment to the country where we happened to be born and to the people whose language we happened to speak. We adjust in principle to everything and everybody. This attitude became quite clear to me once by the words of one of my compatriots who, apparently, knew how to express his feelings. Having just arrived in France, he founded one of these societies of adjustment in which German Jews asserted to each other that they were already Frenchmen. In his first speech he said: “We have been good Germans in Germany and therefore we shall be good Frenchmen in France.” The public applauded enthusiastically and nobody laughed; we were happy to have learned how to prove our loyalty.

If patriotism were a matter of routine or practice, we should be the most patriotic people in the world. Let us go back to our Mr. Cohn; he certainly has beaten all records. He is that ideal immigrant who always, and in every country into which a terrible fate has driven him, promptly sees and loves the native mountains. But since patriotism is not yet believed to be a matter of practice, it is hard to convince people of the sincerity of our repeated transformations. This struggle makes our own society so intolerant; we demand full affirmation without our own group because we are not in the position to obtain it from the natives. The natives, confronted with such strange beings as we are, become suspicious; from their point of view, as a rule, only a loyalty to our old countries is understandable. That makes life very bitter for us. We might overcome this suspicion if we would explain that, being Jews, our patriotism in our original countries had rather a peculiar aspect. Though it was indeed sincere and deep-rooted. We wrote big volumes to prove it; paid an entire bureaucracy to explore its antiquity and to explain it statistically. We had scholars write philosophical dissertations on the predestined har-

mony between Jews and Frenchmen, Jews and Germans, Jews and Hungarians, Jews and... Our so frequently suspected loyalty of today has a long history. It is the history of 150 years of assimilated Jewry who performed an unprecedented feat: though proving all the time their non-Jewishness, they succeeded in remaining Jews all the same.

The desperate confusion of these Ulysses—wanderers who, unlike their great prototype, don’t know who they are is easily explained by their perfect mania for refusing to keep their identity. This mania is much older than the last ten years, which revealed the profound absurdity of our existence. We are like people with a fixed idea who can’t help trying continually to disguise an imaginary stigma. Thus we are enthusiastically fond of every new possibility which, being new, seems able to work miracles. We are fascinated by every new nationality in the same way as a woman of tidy size is delighted with every new dress which promises to give her the desired waistline. But she likes the new dress only as long as she believes in its miraculous qualities, and she will throw it away as soon as she discovers that it does not change her stature—or, for that matter, her status.

One may be surprised that the apparent uselessness of all our odd disguises has not yet been able to discourage us. If it is true that men seldom learn from history, it is also true that they may learn from personal experiences which, as in our case, are repeated time and again. But before you cast the first stone at us, remember: that being a Jew does not give any legal status in this world. If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean that we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected by any specific law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine an attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings as such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered discrimination as the great social weapon by which one may kill men without any bloodshed; since passports or birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters of social distinction. It is true that most of us depend entirely upon social standards; we lose confidence in ourselves if society does not approve us; we are—and always were—ready to pay any price in order to be accepted by society. But it is equally true that the very few among us who have tried to get along without all these tricks and jokes of
A HIDDEN TRADITION:
THE JEW AS PARIAH
The Social Question

CHAPTER TWO

Le social question

L'Empereur sonnac de la terre - Saint Joes
underlies and pervades the organic and social theories of history, which all have in common that they see a multitude – the factual plurality of a nation or a people or society – in the image of one supernatural body driven by one superhuman, irresistible ‘general will’.

The reality which corresponds to this modern imagery is what, since the eighteenth century, we have come to call the social question and what we may better and more simply call the existence of poverty. Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of necessity as all men know it from their most intimate experience and outside all speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for this was the multitude of the poor. When they appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them, and the result was that the power of the old regime became impotent and the new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life process itself. When Robespierre declared that ‘everything which is necessary to maintain life must be common good and only the surplus can be recognized as private property’, he was not only reversing premodern political theory, which held that it was precisely the citizens’ surplus in time and goods that must be given and shared in common; he was, again in his own words, finally subjecting revolutionary government to ‘the most sacred of all laws, the welfare of the people, the most irrefragable of all titles, necessity’. In other words, he had abandoned his own ‘despotism of liberty’, his dictatorship for the sake of the foundation of freedom, to the ‘rights of the Sans-Culottes’, which were ‘dress, food and the reproduction of their species’. It was necessity, the urgent needs of the people, that unleashed the terror and sent the Revolution to its doom. Robespierre, finally, knew well enough what had happened though he formulated it (in his last speech) in the form of prophecy: ‘We shall perish because, in the history of mankind, we missed the moment to found freedom.’ Not the conspiracy of kings and tyrants but the much more powerful conspiracy of necessity and poverty distracted them long enough to miss the ‘historical moment’. Meanwhile, the revolution had changed its direction; it aimed no longer at freedom, the goal of the revolution had become the happiness of the people.

The transformation of the Rights of Man into the rights of Sans-Culottes was the turning point not only of the French Revolution but of all revolutions that were to follow. This is due in no small measure to the fact that Karl Marx, the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had, was so much more interested in history than in politics and therefore neglected, almost entirely, the original intentions of the men of the revolutions, the foundation of freedom, and concentrated his attention, almost exclusively, on the seemingly objective course of revolutionary events. In other words, it took more than half a century before the transformation of the Rights of Man into the rights of Sans-Culottes, the abdication of freedom before the dictate of necessity, had found its theorist. When this happened in the work of Karl Marx, the history of modern revolutions seemed to have reached a point of no return: since nothing even remotely comparable in quality on the level of thought resulted from the course of the American Revolution, revolutions had definitely come under the sway of the French Revolution in general and under the predominance of the social question in particular. (This is even true for Tocqueville, whose main concern was to study in America the consequences of that long and inevitable revolution of which the events of 1789 were only the first stage. In the American Revolution itself and the theories of the founders, he remained curiously uninterested.) The enormous impact of Marx’s articulations and concepts upon the course of revolution is undeniable, and while it may be tempting, in view of the absurd scholasticism of twentieth-century Marxism, to ascribe this influence to the ideological elements in Marx’s work, it may be more accurate to argue the other way round and to ascribe the pernicious influence of Marxism to the many authentic and original discoveries made by Marx. Be that as it may, there is no doubt
The Social Question

The Social Question

On Revolution

The Social Question

On Revolution
he later saw the iron laws of historical necessity lurking behind every violence, transgression, and violation. And since he, unlike his predecessors in the modern age but very much like his teachers in antiquity, equated necessity with the compelling urges of the life process, he finally strengthened more than anybody else the politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern age, namely that life is the highest good, and that the life process of society is the very centre of human endeavour. Thus the role of revolution was no longer to liberate men from the oppression of their fellow men, let alone to found freedom, but to liberate the life process of society from the fetters of scarcity so that it could swell into a stream of abundance. Not freedom but abundance became now the aim of revolution.

It would, however, be unjust to blame this well-known difference between the early and the later writings of Marx upon psychological or biographical causes and to see it as a real change of heart. Even as an old man, in 1871, Marx was still revolutionary enough to welcome enthusiastically the Parisian Commune, although this outbreak contradicted all his theories and all his predictions. It is much more likely that the trouble was of a theoretical nature. After he had denounced economic and social conditions in political terms, it very soon must have dawned upon him that his categories were reversible and that theoretically it was just as possible to interpret politics in economic terms as vice versa. (This reversibility of concepts is inherent in all strictly Hegelian categories of thought.) Once an actually existing relation between violence and necessity was established, there was no reason why he should not think of violence in terms of necessity and understand oppression as caused by economic factors, even though originally this relationship had been discovered the other way round, namely by unmasking necessity as man-made violence. This interpretation must have appealed very strongly to his theoretical sense because the reduction of violence to necessity offers the undeniable theoretical advantage that it is much more elegant; it simplifies matters to the point where an actual distinction between violence and necessity has become superfluous. For violence can indeed be easily understood as a function or a surface phenomenon of an underlying and overruling necessity, but necessity, which we invariably carry with us in the very existence of our bodies and their needs, can never be simply reduced to and completely absorbed by violence and violation. It was the scientist in Marx, and the ambition to raise his 'science' to the rank of natural science, whose chief category was still necessity, that tempted him into the reversal of his own categories. Politically, this development led Marx into an actual surrender of freedom to necessity. He did what his teacher in revolution, Robespierre, had done before him and what his greatest disciple, Lenin, was to do after him in the most momentous revolution his teachings have yet inspired.

It has become customary to view all these surrenders, and especially the last one through Lenin, as foregone conclusions, chiefly because we find it difficult to judge any of these men, and again most of all Lenin, in their own right, and not as mere forerunners. (It is perhaps noteworthy that Lenin, unlike Hitler and Stalin, has not yet found his definitive biographer, although he was not merely a 'better' but an incomparably simpler man; it may be because his role in twentieth-century history is so much more equivocal and difficult to understand.) Yet even Lenin, despite his dogmatic Marxism, might perhaps have been capable of avoiding this surrender; it was after all the same man who once, when asked to state in one sentence the essence and the aims of the October Revolution, gave the curious and long-forgotten formula: 'Electrification plus soviets.' This answer is remarkable first for what it omits: the role of the party, on one side, the building of socialism on the other. In their stead, we are given an entirely un-Marxist separation of economics and politics, a differentiation between electrification as the solution of Russia's social question, and the soviet system as her new body politic that had emerged during the revolution outside all parties. What is perhaps even more surprising in a Marxist is the suggestion that the problem of poverty is not to be solved through socialization and socialism, but through technical means; for technology, in contrast to socialization, is of course politically neutral; it neither prescribes nor precludes any specific form of government. In other words, the liberation
The Social Question

The Social Question

On Reeducation
be over elephants, lions, tigers, panthers, wolves, and bears, in the royal menagerie at Versailles. And when, some twenty-five years later, events to an extent had proved him right, and Jefferson thought back to 'the canaille of the cities of Europe' in whose hands any degree of freedom 'would be instantly perverted to the demolition and destruction of everything private and public', he had in mind both the rich and the poor, corruption and misery.

Nothing could be less fair than to take the success of the American Revolution for granted and to sit in judgement over the failure of the men of the French Revolution. The success was not due merely to the wisdom of the founders of the republic, although this wisdom was of a very high calibre indeed. The point to remember is that the American Revolution succeeded, and still did not usher in the *novus ordo saeclorum*, that the Constitution could be established 'in fact', as 'a real existence . . ., in a visible form', and still did not become 'to Liberty what grammar is to language'. The reason for success and failure was that the predicament of poverty was absent from the American scene but present everywhere else in the world. This is a sweeping statement and stands in need of a twofold qualification.

What were absent from the American scene were misery and want rather than poverty, for 'the controversy between the rich and the poor, the laborious and the idle, the learned and the ignorant' was still very much present on the American scene and preoccupied the minds of the founders, who, despite the prosperity of their country, were convinced that these distinctions - 'as old as the creation and as extensive as the globe' - were eternal. Yet, since the laborious in America were poor but not miserable - the observations of English and Continental travellers are unanimous and unanimously amazed: 'In a course of 2,000 miles I did not see a single object that solicited charity' (Andrew Burnaby) - they were not driven by want, and the revolution was not overwhelmed by them. The problem they posed was not social but political, it concerned not the order of society but the form of government. The point was that the 'continual toil' and want of leisure of the majority of the popu-

lation would automatically exclude them from active participation in government - though, of course, not from being represented and from choosing their representatives. But representation is no more than a matter of 'self-preservation' or self-interest, necessary to protect the lives of the labourers and to shield them against the encroachment of government; these essentially negative safeguards by no means open the political realm to the many, nor can they arouse in them that 'passion for distinction' - the 'desire not only to equal or resemble, but to excel' - which, according to John Adams, 'next to self-preservation will forever be the great spring of human actions'. Hence the predicament of the poor after their self-preservation has been assured is that their lives are without consequence, and that they remain excluded from the light of the public realm where excellence can shine; they stand in darkness wherever they go. As John Adams saw it: 'The poor man's conscience is clear; yet he is ashamed . . . He feels himself out of the sight of others, grooping in the dark. Mankind takes no notice of him. He rambles and wanders unheeded. In the midst of a crowd, at church, in the market . . . he is in as much obscurity as he would be in a garret or a cellar. He is not disapproved, censured, or reproached; he is only not seen . . . To be wholly overlooked, and to know it, are intolerable. If Cruseon on his island had the library of Alexandria, and a certainty that he should never again see the face of man, would he ever open a volume?'

I have quoted these words at some length because the feeling of injustice they express, the conviction that darkness rather than want is the curse of poverty, is extremely rare in the literature of the modern age, although one may suspect that Marx's effort to rewrite history in terms of class struggle was partially at least inspired by the desire to rehabilitate posthumously those to whose injured lives history had added the insult of oblivion. Obviously, it was the absence of misery which enabled John Adams to discover the political predicament of the poor, but his insight into the crippling consequences of obscurity, in contrast to the more obvious ruin which want brought to human life, could hardly be shared by the poor themselves; and since it remained a privileged knowledge it had hardly any influence
The Social Question

On Revolution
in the absence of that abject state which condemns [a part of the human race] to ignorance and poverty. Slavery was no more part of the social question for Europeans than it was for Americans, so that the social question, whether genuinely absent or only hidden in darkness, was non-existent for all practical purposes, and with it, the most powerful and perhaps the most devastating passion motivating revolutionaries, the passion of compassion.

In order to avoid misunderstandings: the social question with which we are concerned here because of its role in revolution must not be equated with the lack of equality of opportunity or the problem of social status which in the last few decades has become a major topic of the social sciences. The game of status-seeking is common enough in certain strata of our society, but it was entirely absent from the society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and no revolutionary ever thought it his task to introduce mankind to it or to teach the underprivileged the rules of the game. How alien these present-day categories would have been to the minds of the founders of the republic can perhaps best be seen in their attitude to the question of education, which was of great importance to them, not, however, in order to enable every citizen to rise on the social ladder, but because the welfare of the country and the functioning of its political institutions hinged upon education of all citizens. They demanded that every citizen should receive an education proportioned to the condition and pursuits of his life, whereby it was understood that for the purpose of education the citizens would be divided into two classes—the labouring and the learned—since it would be expedient for promoting the public happiness that those persons, whom nature hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered ... able to guard the sacred deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens ... without regard to wealth, birth, or other accidental condition and circumstance. Even the nineteenth-century liberals' concern with the individual's right to full development of all his gifts was clearly absent from these considerations, as was their special sensitivity to the injustice inherent in the frustration of talent, closely connected with their worship of genius, let alone the present-day notion that everybody has a right to social advancement and hence to education, not because he is gifted but because society owes him the development of skills with which to improve his status.

The realistic views of the Founding Fathers with regard to the shortcomings of human nature are notorious, but the new assumptions of social scientists that those who belong to the lower classes of society have, as it were, a right to burst with resentment, greed, and envy would have astounded them, not only because they would have held that envy and greed are vices no matter where we find them, but perhaps also because their very realism might have told them that such vices are much more frequent in the upper than in the lower social strata. Social mobility was of course relatively high even in eighteenth-century America, but it was not promoted by the Revolution; and if the French Revolution opened careers to talent, and very forcefully indeed, this did not occur until after the Directory and Napoleon Bonaparte, when it was no longer freedom and the foundation of a republic which were at stake but the liquidation of the Revolution and the rise of the bourgeoisie. In our context, the point of the matter is that only the predicament of poverty, and not either individual frustration or social ambitions, can arouse compassion. And with the role of compassion in revolutions, that is, in all except the American Revolution, we must now concern ourselves.

To avert one's eyes from the misery and unhappiness of the mass of humankind was no more possible in eighteenth-century Paris, or in nineteenth-century London, where Marx and Engels were to ponder the lessons of the French Revolution, than it is today in some European, most Latin American, and nearly all Asian and African countries. To be sure, the men of the French Revolution had been inspired by hatred of tyranny, and they had no less risen in rebellion against oppression than the men who, in the admiring words of Daniel Webster, 'went to war for a
The Social Question

The French Revolution was quickly followed by social unrest and the rise of the working class. The revolutionaries believed that the Revolution had failed to address the social and economic problems of the common people. The workers, who had sacrificed so much for the Revolution, were now being ignored and exploited by the bourgeoisie. The Revolution had failed to create a just and equitable society.

The workers and poor demanded better living conditions and equal rights. They were tired of working long hours for low pay and living in cramped, unsanitary conditions. They wanted to be able to afford basic necessities like food and clothing. They also wanted political rights and representation in the government.

In France, the workers took to the streets, demanding change. They formed workers' clubs and organizations to unite and fight for their rights. The government responded with repression and violence, leading to the Reign of Terror. However, the workers continued to press for change, eventually leading to the establishment of the First French Republic in 1792.

The French Revolution had shown that the working class was a force to be reckoned with. It had demonstrated the importance of social justice and the need for a society that prioritized the well-being of all its citizens. The Revolution had also shown that revolution was not enough; it was necessary to create a new system that addressed the root causes of social inequality.
This shift of emphasis was caused not by any theory but by the course of the Revolution. However, it is obvious that under these circumstances ancient theory, with its emphasis on popular consent as a prerequisite of lawful government, could no longer be adequate, and to the wisdom of hindsight it appears almost as a matter of course that Rousseau's volonté générale should have replaced the ancient notion of consent which, in Rousseau's theory, may be found as the volonté de tous. The latter, the will of all, or consent, was not only not dynamic or revolutionary enough for the constitution of a new body politic, or the establishment of government, it obviously presupposed the very existence of government and hence could be deemed sufficient only for particular decisions and the settling of problems as they arose within a given body politic. These formalistic considerations, however, are of secondary importance. It was of greater relevance that the very word 'consent', with its overtones of deliberate choice and considered opinion, was replaced by the word 'will', which essentially excludes all processes of exchange of opinions and an eventual agreement between them. The will, if it is to function at all, must indeed be one and indivisible, 'a divided will would be inconceivable'; there is no possible mediation between wills as there is between opinions. The shift from the republic to the people meant that the enduring unity of the future political body was guaranteed not in the worldly institutions which this people had in common, but in the will of the people themselves. The outstanding quality of this popular will as volonté générale was its unanimity, and when Robespierre constantly referred to 'public opinion', he meant by it the unanimity of the general will; he did not think of an opinion upon which many publicly were in agreement.

This enduring unity of a people inspired by one will must not be mistaken for stability. Rousseau took his metaphor of a general will seriously and literally enough to conceive of the nation as a body driven by one will, like an individual, which also can change direction at any time without losing its identity. It was precisely in this sense that Robespierre demanded: 'Il faut une volonté UNE ... Il faut qu'elle soit républicaine ou royaliste.' Rousseau therefore insisted that it would 'be absurd for the will to bind itself for the future', thus anticipating the fateful instability and faithlessness of revolutionary governments as well as justifying the old fateful conviction of the nation-state that treaties are binding only so long as they serve the so-called national interest. This notion of raison d'état is older than the French Revolution for the simple reason that the concept of one will, presiding over the destinies and representing the interests of the nation as a whole, was the current interpretation of the national role to be played by an enlightened monarch whom the revolution had abolished. The problem was indeed how 'to bring twenty-five millions of Frenchmen who had never known or thought of any law but the King's will to rally round any free constitution at all', as John Adams once remarked. Hence, the very attraction of Rousseau's theory for the men of the French Revolution was that he apparently had found a highly ingenious means to put a multitude into the place of a single person; for the general will was nothing more or less than what bound the many into one.

For his construction of such a many-headed one, Rousseau relied on a deceptively simple and plausible example. He took his cue from the common experience that two conflicting interests will bind themselves together when they are confronted by a third that equally opposes them both. Politically speaking, he presupposed the existence and relied upon the unifying power of the common national enemy. Only in the presence of the enemy can such a thing as la nation une et indivisible, the ideal of Freach and of all other nationalism, come to pass. Hence, national unity can assert itself only in foreign affairs, under circumstances of, at least, potential hostility. This conclusion has been the seldom-admitted stock-in-trade of national politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; it is so obviously a consequence of the general-will theory that Saint-Just was already quite familiar with it: only foreign affairs, he insisted, can properly be called 'political', while human relations as such constitute 'the social'. ('Seules les affaires étrangères relevaient de la "politique" tandis que les rapports humains formaient "le social".)

Rousseau himself, however, went one step further. He wished
The Social Question

The origin of interest is not to be found in the division of labour, but in the natural condition of man. The social state is not an invention of man, but the necessary result of his natural condition. The state is not a thing which is imposed upon man from without, but it is a thing which man brings into being for himself. The state is not an external thing, but it is an internal thing, which man brings into being for himself.

The state is not the result of the division of labour, but it is the result of the natural condition of man. The state is not an invention of man, but it is a thing which man brings into being for himself. The state is not an external thing, but it is an internal thing, which man brings into being for himself.

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found compassion to be the most natural human reaction to the suffering of others, and therefore the very foundation of all authentic 'natural' human intercourse. Not that Rousseau, or Robespierre for that matter, had ever experienced the innate goodness of natural man outside society; they deduced his existence from the corruption of society, much as one who has intimate knowledge of rotten apples may account for their rottenness by assuming the original existence of healthy ones. What they knew from inner experience was the eternal play between reason and the passions, on one side, the inner dialogue of thought in which man converses with himself, on the other. And since they identified thought with reason, they concluded that reason interfered with passion and compassion alike, that it 'turns man's mind back upon itself, and divides him from everything that could disturb or afflict him'. Reason makes man selfish; it prevents nature 'from identifying itself with the unfortunate sufferer'; or, in the words of Saint-Just: 'Il faut ramener toutes les définitions à la conscience; l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit toutes les vertus à l'échafaud. 26

We are so used to ascribing the rebellion against reason to the early romanticism of the nineteenth century and to understanding, in contrast, the eighteenth century in terms of an 'enlightened' rationalism, with the Temple of Reason as its somewhat grotesque symbol, that we are likely to overlook or to underestimate the strength of these early pleas for passion, for the heart, for the soul, and especially for the soul torn into two, for Rousseau's âme déchirée. It is as though Rousseau, in his rebellion against reason, had put a soul, torn into two, into the place of the two-in-one that manifests itself in the silent dialogue of the mind with itself which we call thinking. And since the two-in-one of the soul is a conflict and not a dialogue, it engenders passion in its twofold sense of intense suffering and of intense passionateness. It was this capacity for suffering that Rousseau had pitted against the selfishness of society on one side, against the undisturbed solitude of the mind, engaged in a dialogue with itself, on the other. And it was to this emphasis on suffering, more than to any other part of his teachings, that he owed the enormous, predominant influence over the minds of the men who were to make the Revolution and who found themselves confronted with the overwhelming sufferings of the poor to whom they had opened the doors to the public realm and its light for the first time in history. What counted here, in this great effort of a general human solidarization, was selflessness, the capacity to lose oneself in the sufferings of others, rather than active goodness, and what appeared most odious and even most dangerous was selfishness rather than wickedness. These men, moreover, were much better acquainted with vice than they were with evil; they had seen the vices of the rich and their incredible selfishness, and they concluded that virtue must be 'the appanage of misfortune and the patrimony' of the poor. They had watched how 'the charms of pleasure were escorted by crime', and they argued that the torments of misery must engender goodness. 27 The magic of compassion was that it opened the heart of the sufferer to the sufferings of others, whereby it established and confirmed the 'natural' bond between men which only the rich had lost. Where passion, the capacity for suffering, and compassion, the capacity for suffering with others, ended, vice began. Selfishness was a kind of 'natural' depravity. If Rousseau had introduced compassion into political theory, it was Robespierre who brought it on to the market-place with the vehemence of his great revolutionary oratory.

It was perhaps unavoidable that the problem of good and evil, of their impact upon the course of human destinies, in its stark, unsophisticated simplicity should have haunted the minds of men at the very moment when they were asserting or reasserting human dignity without any resort to institutionalized religion. But the depth of this problem could hardly be sounded by those who mistook for goodness the natural, 'innate repugnance of man to see his fellow creatures suffer' (Rousseau), and who thought that selfishness and hypocrisy were the epitome of wickedness. More importantly even, the terrifying question of good and evil could not even be posed, at least not in the framework of Western traditions, without taking into account the only completely valid, completely convincing experience Western mankind had ever had with active love of goodness as the inspiring principle of all actions, that is, without considera-
could be exceptions to the rule.

The Social Question.

The Second Question.

The Third Question.

The Fourth Question.

The Fifth Question.

The Sixth Question.

The Seventh Question.

The Eighth Question.

The Ninth Question.

The Tenth Question.

The Eleventh Question.

The Twelfth Question.

The Thirteenth Question.

The Fourteenth Question.

The Fifteenth Question.

The Sixteenth Question.

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The Eighteenth Question.

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The Fiftieth Question.
not lose his innocence, that he remained ‘an angel of God’. It is at this point that ‘virtue’ in the person of Captain Vere is introduced into the conflict between absolute good and absolute evil, and here the tragedy begins. Virtue – which perhaps is less than goodness but still alone is capable of embodiment in lasting institutions – must prevail at the expense of the good man as well; absolute, natural innocence, because it can only act violently, is ‘at war with the peace of the world and the true welfare of mankind’, so that virtue finally interferes not to prevent the crime of evil but to punish the violence of absolute innocence. Caggart was ‘struck by an angel of God! Yet the angel must hang!’ The tragedy is that the law is made for men, and neither for angels nor for devils. Laws and all ‘lasting institutions’ break down not only under the onslaught of elemental evil but under the impact of absolute innocence as well. The law, moving between crime and virtue, cannot recognize what is beyond it, and while it has no punishment to mete out to elemental evil, it cannot but punish elemental goodness even if the virtuous man, Captain Vere, recognizes that only the violence of this goodness is adequate to the depraved power of evil. The absolute – and to Melville an absolute was incorporated in the Rights of Man – spells doom to everyone when it is introduced into the political realm.

We noted before that the passion of compassion was singularly absent from the minds and hearts of the men who made the American Revolution. Who would doubt that John Adams was right when he wrote: ‘The envy and ranor of the multitude against the rich is universal and restrained only by fear or necessity. A beggar can never comprehend the reason why another should ride in a coach while he has no bread;’ and still no one familiar with misery can fail to be shocked by the peculiar coldness and indifferent ‘objectivity’ of his judgement. Because he was an American, Melville knew better how to talk back to the theorectical proposition of the men of the French Revolution – that man is good by nature – than how to take into account the crucial passionate concern which lay behind their theories, the concern with the suffering multitude. Envy in Billy Budd, characteristically, is not envy of the poor for the rich but of ‘depraved nature’ for natural integrity – it is Caggart who is envious of Billy Budd – and compassion is not the suffering of the one who is spared with the man who is stricken in the flesh; on the contrary, it is Billy Budd, the victim, who feels compassion for Captain Vere, for the man who sends him to his doom.

The classical story of the other, non-theoretical side of the French Revolution, the story of the motivation behind the words and deeds of its main actors, is ‘The Grand Inquisitor’, in which Dostoievski contrasts the mute compassion of Jesus with the eloquent pity of the Inquisitor. For compassion, to be stricken with the suffering of someone else as though it were contagious, and pity, to be sorry without being touched in the flesh, are not only not the same, they may not even be related. Compassion, by its very nature, cannot be touched off by the sufferings of a whole class or a people, or, least of all, mankind as a whole. It cannot reach out farther than what is suffered by one person and still remain what it is supposed to be, co-suffering. Its strength hinges on the strength of passion itself, which, in contrast to reason, can comprehend only the particular, but has no notion of the general and no capacity for generalization. The sin of the Grand Inquisitor was that he, like Robespierre, was ‘attracted toward les hommes faibles’, not only because such attraction was indistinguishable from lust for power, but also because he had depersonalized the sufferers, lumped them together into an aggregate – the people toujours malheureux, the suffering masses, et cetera. To Dostoievski, the sign of Jesus’s divinity clearly was his ability to have compassion with all men in their singularity, that is, without lumping them together into some such entity as one suffering mankind. The greatness of the story, apart from its theological implications, lies in that we are made to feel how false the idealistic, high-flown phrases of the most exquisite pity sound the moment they are confronted with compassion.

Closely connected with this inability to generalize is the curious muteness or, at least, awkwardness with words that, in contrast to the eloquence of virtue, is the sign of goodness, as it is the sign of compassion in contrast to the loquacity of pity.
Don't you see that from this deed of violence the same chain of
civilization, from one point of view we will see the rise of a nation,
if it is thought to be said: no improvements from now on the
surgical, medical, economic, and general welfare in all
countries extend the civilization you're important in. But in our
goodness with goodness and willingness in the good - the goodness is
simply - without being one with the common good.
... and the common good is the greater. The common good is
... without one more oppressor than the subject. The common good is
the greater... without one more oppressor than the subject. And of course,
have as far as the special with the special. And the common good is
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have as far as the special with the special. And the common good is
... without one more oppressor than the subject. The common good is
the greater... without one more oppressor than the subject. And of course,
wrongdoing will follow, only that now mankind will not even have the consolation that the violence it must call crime is indeed characteristic of evil men only?

4

It is more than doubtful that Rousseau discovered compassion out of suffering with others, and it is more than probable that in this, as in nearly all other respects, he was guided by his rebellion against high society, especially against its glaring indifference towards the suffering of those who surrounded it. He had summoned up the resources of the heart against the indifference of the salon and against the 'heartlessness' of reason, both of which will say 'at the sight of the misfortunes of others: Perish if you wish, I am secure'. Yet while the plight of others aroused his heart, he became involved in his heart rather than in the sufferings of others, and he was enchanted with its moods and caprices as they disclosed themselves in the sweet delight of intimacy which Rousseau was one of the first to discover and which from then on began playing its important role in the formation of modern sensibility. In this sphere of intimacy, compassion became talkative, as it were, since it came to serve, together with the passions and with suffering, as stimulus for the vitality of the newly discovered range of emotions. Compassion, in other words, was discovered and understood as an emotion or a sentiment, and the sentiment which corresponds to the passion of compassion is, of course, pity.

Pity may be the perversion of compassion, but its alternative is solidarity. It is out of pity that men are 'attracted toward les hommes faibles', but it is out of solidarity that they establish deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited. The common interest would then be 'the grandeur of man', or 'the honour of the human race', or the dignity of man. For solidarity, because it partakes of reason, and hence of generality, is able to comprehend a multitude conceptually, not only the multitude of a class or a nation or a people, but eventually all mankind. But this solid-

arity, though it may be aroused by suffering, is not guided by it, and it comprehends the strong and the rich no less than the weak and the poor; compared with the sentiment of pity, it may appear cold and abstract, for it remains committed to 'ideas' - to greatness, or honour, or dignity - rather than to any 'love' of men. Pity, because it is not stung in the flesh and keeps its sentimental distance, can succeed where compassion always will fail; it can reach out to the multitude and therefore, like solidarity, enter the market-place. But pity, in contrast to solidarity, does not look upon both fortune and misfortune, the strong and the weak, with an equal eye; without the presence of misfortune, pity could not exist, and it therefore has just as much vested interest in the existence of the unhappy as thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence of the weak. Moreover, by virtue of being a sentiment, pity can be enjoyed for its own sake, and this will almost automatically lead to a glorification of its cause, which is the suffering of others. Terminologically speaking, solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide action, compassion is one of the passions, and pity is a sentiment. Robespierre's glorification of the poor, at any rate, his praise of suffering as the spring of virtue were sentimental in the strict sense of the word, and as such dangerous enough, even if they were not, as we are inclined to suspect, a mere pretext for lust for power.

Pity, taken as the spring of virtue, has proved to possess a greater capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself. 'Par pitié, par amour pour l'humanité, soyez inhumains!' - these words, taken almost at random from a petition of one of the sections of the Parisian Commune to the National Convention, are neither accidental nor extreme; they are the authentic language of pity. They are followed by a crude but nevertheless precise and very common rationalization of pity's cruelty: 'Thus, the clever and helpful surgeon with his cruel and benevolent knife cuts off the gangrened limb in order to save the body of the sick man.' Moreover, sentiments, as distinguished from passion and principle, are boundless, and even if Robespierre had been motivated by the passion of compassion, his compassion would have become pity when he brought it out into the open where he could
since the revolution has opened the gates of the political realm, does it mean under the bridge of freedom was how a century, the art of the people, the improvement of the state, and the avenue on which to the noblest part of the political order, now and then, now and then, now and then. If the decision of the law of government was to be done, if the power of the people was to be the power of the people, then, too, must the power of the people, now and then, now and then, now and then. The people's power, perhaps, was the power of the people, now and then, now and then, now and then.

In the political order of the Revolution, the decision of the law of government was to be done, if the power of the people was to be the power of the people, then, too, must the power of the people, now and then, now and then, now and then. The people's power, perhaps, was the power of the people, now and then, now and then, now and then.

The Social Question

On Resolution
On Revolution

more than an everyday observation, for then it followed indeed that all must be permitted to those who act in the revolutionary direction. 20

It would be difficult to find, in the whole body of revolutionary oratory, a sentence that pointed with greater precision to the issues about which the founders and the liberators, the men of the American Revolution and the men in France, parted company. The direction of the American Revolution remained committed to the foundation of freedom and the establishment of lasting institutions, and to those who acted in this direction nothing was permitted that would have been outside the range of civil law. The direction of the French Revolution was deflected almost from its beginning from this course of foundation through the immediacy of suffering; it was determined by the exigencies of liberation not from tyranny but from necessity, and it was actuated by the limitless immensity of both the people's misery and the pity this misery inspired. The lawlessness of the 'all is permitted' sprang here still from the sentiments of the heart whose very boundlessness helped in the unleashing of a stream of boundless violence.

Not that the men of the American Revolution could have been ignorant of the great force which violence, the purposeful violation of all laws of civil society, could release. On the contrary, the fact that the horror and repulsion at the news of the reign of terror in France were clearly greater and more unanimous in the United States than in Europe can best be explained by the greater familiarity with violence and lawlessness in a colonial country. The first paths through the 'unstoried wilderness' of the continent had been opened then, as they were to be opened for a hundred more years, 'in general by the most vicious elements', as though 'the first steps [could not be] trod, ... [the] first trees [not be] felled' without 'shocking violations' and 'sudden devastations'. 21 But although those who, for whatever reasons, rushed out into society into the wilderness acted as if all was permitted to them who had left the range of enforceable law, neither they themselves nor those who watched them, and not even those who admired them, ever thought that a new law and a new world could spring from such conduct.

The Social Question

However criminal and even beastly the deeds might have been that helped colonize the American continent, they remained acts of single men, and if they gave cause for generalization and reflection, these reflections were perhaps upon some beastly potentialities inherent in man's nature, but hardly upon the political behaviour of organized groups, and certainly not upon a historical necessity that could progress only via crimes and criminals.

To be sure, the men living on the American frontier also belonged to the people for whom the new body politic was devised and constituted, but neither they nor those who were populating the settled regions ever became a singular to the founders. The word 'people' retained for them the meaning of manyness, of the endless variety of a multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality. Opposition to public opinion, namely to the potential unanimity of all, was therefore one of the many things upon which the men of the American Revolution were in complete agreement; they knew that the public realm in a republic was constituted by an exchange of opinion between equals, and that this realm would simply disappear the very moment an exchange became superfluous because all equals happened to be of the same opinion. They never referred to public opinion in their argument, as Robespierre and the men of the French Revolution invariably did to add force to their own opinions; in their eyes, the rule of public opinion was a form of tyranny. To such an extent indeed was the American concept of people identified with a multitude of voices and interests that Jefferson could establish it as a principle 'to make us one nation as to foreign concerns, and keep us distinct in domestic ones', 22 just as Madison could assert that their regulation 'forms the principal task of ... legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the operations of the government'. The positive accent here on faction is noteworthy, since it stands in flagrant contradiction to classical tradition, to which the Founding Fathers otherwise paid the closest attention. Madison must have been conscious of his deviation on so important a point, and he was explicit in stating its cause, which was his insight into the nature of human reason rather than any.
connection with thought and reason, creating the passion and emotions that may be found in the heart. The love of one's country is thus a natural consequence of this passion.

The Social Question

The support of the American people is heavy...
in the human heart. And not only is the human heart a place of darkness which, with certainty, no human eye can penetrate; the qualities of the heart need darkness and protection against the light of the public to grow and to remain what they are meant to be, innermost motives which are not for public display. However deeply heartfelt a motive may be, once it is brought out and exposed for public inspection it becomes an object of suspicion rather than insight; when the light of the public falls upon it, it appears and even shines, but, unlike deeds and words which are meant to appear, whose very existence hinges on appearance, the motives behind such deeds and words are destroyed in their essence through appearance; when they appear they become ‘mere appearances’ behind which again other, ulterior motives may lurk, such as hypocrisy and deceit. The same sad logic of the human heart, which has almost automatically caused modern ‘motivational research’ to develop into an eerie sort of filing cabinet for human vices, into a veritable science of misanthropy, made Robespierre and his followers, once they had equated virtue with the qualities of the heart, see intrigue and calumny, treachery and hypocrisy everywhere. The fateful mood of suspicion, so glaringly omnipresent through the French Revolution even before a Law of Suspects spelled out its frightful implications, and so conspicuously absent from even the most bitter disagreements between the men of the American Revolution, arose directly out of this misplaced emphasis on the heart as the source of political virtue, on le cœur, une âme droite, un caractère moral.

The heart, moreover – as the great French moralists from Montaigne to Pascal knew well enough even before the great psychologists of the nineteenth century, Kierkegaard, Dostoevski, Nietzsche – keeps its resources alive through a constant struggle that goes on in its darkness and because of its darkness. When we say that nobody but God can see (and, perhaps, can bear to see) the nakedness of a human heart, ‘nobody’ includes one’s own self – if only because our sense of unequivocal reality is so bound up with the presence of others that we can never be sure of anything that only we ourselves know and no one else. The consequence of this hiddenness is that our entire psycho-

logical life, the process of moods in our souls, is cursed with a suspicion we constantly feel we must raise against ourselves, against our innermost motives. Robespierre’s insane lack of trust in others, even in his close friends, sprang ultimately from his not so insane but quite normal suspicion of himself. Since his very credo forced him to play the ‘incomparable’ in public every day and to display his virtue, to open his heart as he understood it, at least once a week, how could he be sure that he was not the one thing he probably feared most in his life, a hypocrite? The heart knows many such intimate struggles, and it knows too that what was straight when it was hidden must appear crooked when it is displayed. It knows how to deal with these problems of darkness according to its own ‘logic’, although it has no solution for them, since a solution demands light, and it is precisely the light of the world that distorts the life of the heart. The truth of Rousseau’s âme déchirée, apart from its function in the formation of the volonté générale, is that the heart begins to beat properly only when it has been broken or is being torn in conflict, but this is a truth which cannot prevail outside the life of the soul and within the realm of human affairs.

Robespierre carried the conflicts of the soul, Rousseau’s âme déchirée, into politics, where they became murderous because they were insoluble. ‘The hunt for hypocrites is boundless and can produce nothing but demoralization.’ If, in the words of Robespierre, ‘patriotism was a thing of the heart’, then the reign of virtue was bound to be at worst the rule of hypocrisy, and at best the never-ending fight to ferret out the hypocrites, a fight which could only end in defeat because of the simple fact that it was impossible to distinguish between true and false patriots. When his heartfelt patriotism or his ever-suspicious virtue were displayed in public, they were no longer principles upon which to act or motives by which to be inspired; they had degenerated into mere appearances and had become part of a show in which Tartuffe was bound to play the principal part. It was as though the Cartesian doubt – je doute donc je suis – had become the principle of the political realm, and the reason was that Robespierre had performed the same introversion upon the deeds of action that Descartes had performed upon the
The Social Question

One Revolution
French Revolution; no revolution, so it might have seemed to
the men of the October Revolution, was complete without self-
purges in the party that had risen to power. Even the language
in which the hideous process was conducted bore out the simi-
larity; it was always a question of uncovering what had been
hidden, of unmasking the disguises, of exposing duplicity and
mendacity. Yet the difference is marked. The eighteenth-century
terror was still enacted in good faith, and if it became boundless
it did so only because the hunt for hypocrites is boundless by
nature. The purges in the Bolshevik party, prior to its rise to
power, were motivated chiefly by ideological differences; in this
respect the interconnection between terror and ideology was
manifest from the very beginning. After its rise to power, and
still under the guidance of Lenin, the party then institutional-
ized purges as a means of checking abuses and incompetence in
the ruling bureaucracy. These two types of purges were different
and yet they had one thing in common; they were both guided
by the concept of historical necessity whose course was deter-
mined by movement and counter-movement, by revolution and
counter-revolution, so that certain ‘crimes’ against the revolu-
tion had to be detected even if there were no known criminals
who could have committed them. The concept of ‘objective
enemies’, so all-important for purges and show-trials in the
Bolshevik world, was entirely absent from the French Revolu-
tion, and so was the concept of historical necessity, which, as
we have seen, did not so much spring from the experiences and
thoughts of those who made the Revolution as it arose from the
efforts of those who desired to understand and to come to terms
with a chain of events they had watched as a spectacle from the
outside. Robespierre’s ‘terror of virtue’ was terrible enough;
but it remained directed against a hidden enemy and a hidden
vice. It was not directed against people who, even from the
viewpoint of the revolutionary ruler, were innocent. It was a
question of stripping the mask off the disguised traitor, not of
putting the mask of the traitor on arbitrarily selected people in
order to create the required impersonators in the bloody mas-
quarade of a dialectical movement.

It must seem strange that hypocrisy – one of the minor vices,
we are inclined to think – should have been hated more than
all the other vices taken together. Was not hypocrisy, since it
paid its compliment to virtue, almost the vice to undo the vices,
at least to prevent them from appearing and to shame them into
hiding? Why should the vice that covered up vices become the
vice of vices? Is hypocrisy then such a monster? we are tempted
to ask (as Miville asked, ‘Is envy then such a monster?’).
Theoretically, the answers to these questions may ultimately lie
within the range of one of the oldest metaphysical problems in
our tradition, the problem of the relationship between being and
appearance, whose implications and perplexities with respect to
the political realm have been manifest and caused reflection at
least from Socrates to Machiavelli. The core of the problem can
be stated briefly and, for our purpose, exhaustively by recalling
the two diametrically opposed positions which we connect with
these two thinkers.

Socrates, in the tradition of Greek thought, took his point of
departure from an unquestioned belief in the truth of appear-
ance, and taught: ‘Be as you would wish to appear to others’,
by which he means: ‘Appear to yourself as you wish to appear
to others.’ Machiavelli, on the contrary, and in the tradition
of Christian thought, took for granted the existence of a transcen-
dent Being behind and beyond the world of appearances, and
therefore taught: ‘Appear as you may wish to be’, by which
he meant: ‘Never mind how you are, this is of no relevance in
the world and in politics, where only appearances, not “true”
being, count; if you can manage to appear to others as you
would wish to be, that is all that can possibly be required by the
judges of this world.’ His advice sounds to our ears like the
counsel of hypocrisy, and the hypocrisy on which Robespierre
declared his futile and pernicious war indeed involves the prob-
lems of Machiavelli’s teaching. Robespierre was modern enough
to go hunting for truth, though he did not yet believe, as some
of his late disciples did, that he could fabricate it. He no longer
thought, as Machiavelli did, that truth appeared of its own ac-
cord either in this world or in a world to come. And without a
faith in the revelatory capacity of truth, lying and make-believe
in all their forms change their character; they had not been
The hypothesis is relatively simple to the core.

If you proceed we will write once this book
do not think twice.

On Reversion
We may now understand why even Machiavelli's counsel, 'Appear as you may wish to be', has little if any bearing upon the problem of hypocrisy. Machiavelli knew corruption well enough, especially the corruption of the Church, on which he tended to blame the corruption of the people in Italy. But this corruption he saw in the role the Church had assumed in worldly, secular affairs, that is, in the domain of appearances, whose rules were incompatible with the teachings of Christianity. For Machiavelli, the one-who-is and the one-who-appears remain separated, albeit not in the Socratic sense of the two-in-one of conscience and consciousness, but in the sense that the one-who-is can appear in his true being only before God; if he tries to appear before men in the sphere of worldly appearances, he has already corrupted his being. If, on the scene which is the world, he appears in the disguise of virtue, he is no hypocrite and does not corrupt the world, because his integrity remains safe before the watchful eye of an omnipresent God, while the virtues he displays have their meaningfulness not in hiding but only in being displayed in public. No matter how God might judge him, his virtues will have improved the world while his vices remain hidden, and he will have known how to hide them not because of any pretence to virtue but because he felt they were not fit to be seen.

Hypocrisy is the vice through which corruption becomes manifest. Its inherent duplicity, to shine with something that is not, had shed its glittering specious light upon French society ever since the kings of France had decided to assemble the nobles of the kingdom at their court in order to engage and entertain and corrupt them by a most elaborate play of follies and intrigues, of vanities and humiliations and plain indecency. Whatever we may wish to know about these origins of modern society, of the high society of the eighteenth century, of genteel society in the nineteenth, and, finally, mass society in our own century, is written large in the chronicle of the Court of France with its 'majestic hypocrisy' (Lord Acton) and reported only too faithfully in the Memoirs of Saint-Simon, whereas the 'eternal' and quintessential wisdom of this kind of worldliness has survived in the maxims of La Rochefoucauld, which to this day are unsurpassed. There, indeed, gratitude was 'like business credit', promises were made 'to the extent that [men] hoped and kept to the extent that they feared', each story was an intrigue and every purpose became a cabal. Robespierre knew what he was talking about when he spoke of 'vices surrounded with riches', or exclaimed - still in the style of the earlier French narrators of the customs and mores of society whom we call the moralists - 'La reine du monde c'est l'intrigue!'

The Reign of Terror, we should remember, followed upon the period when all political developments had fallen under the influence of Louis XVI's ill-fated cabals and intrigues. The violence of terror, at least to a certain extent, was the reaction to a series of broken oaths and unkept promises that were the perfect political equivalent of the customary intrigues of Court society, except that these wilfully corrupted manners, which Louis XIV still knew how to keep apart from the style in which he conducted affairs of state, had by now reached the monarch as well. Promises and oaths were nothing but a rather awkwardly construed frontage with which to cover up, and win time for, an even more inept intrigue contrived towards the breaking of all promises and all oaths. And though in this instance the king promised to the extent that he feared, and broke his promises to the extent that he hoped, one cannot but marvel at the precise appositeness of La Rochefoucauld's aphorism. The widespread opinion that the most successful modes of political action are intrigue, falsehood, and machination, if they are not outright violence, goes back to these experiences, and it is therefore no accident that we find this sort of Realpolitik today chiefly among those who rose to statesmanship out of the revolutionary tradition. Wherever society was permitted to invade, to overgrow, and eventually to absorb the political realm, it imposed its own mores and 'moral' standards, the intrigues and perfidies of high society, to which the lower strata responded by violence and brutality.

War upon hypocrisy was war declared upon society as the eighteenth century knew it, and this meant first of all war upon the Court at Versailles as the centre of French society. Looked at from without, from the viewpoint of misery and wretched-
The Social Question

on Revolution

...
social realm whose corruption he represented and, as it were, enacted, was that he instinctively could help himself to every ‘mask’ in the political theatre, that he could assume every role among its *dramatis personae*, but that he would not use this mask, as the rules of the political game demand, as a sounding board for the truth but, on the contrary, as a contraption for deception.

However, the men of the French Revolution had no conception of the *persona*, and no respect for the legal personality which is given and guaranteed by the body politic. When the predicament of mass poverty had put itself into the road of the Revolution that had started with the strictly political rebellion of the Third Estate — its claim to be admitted to and even to rule the political realm — the men of the Revolution were no longer concerned with the emancipation of citizens, or with equality in the sense that everybody should be equally entitled to his legal personality, to be protected by it and, at the same time, to act almost literally ‘through’ it. They believed that they had emancipated nature herself, as it were, liberated the natural man in all men, and given him the Rights of Man to which each was entitled, not by virtue of the body politic to which he belonged but by virtue of being born. In other words, by the unending hunt for hypocrites and through the passion for unmasking society, they had, albeit unknowingly, torn away the mask of the *persona* as well, so that the Reign of Terror eventually spelled the exact opposite of true liberation and true equality: it equalized because it left all inhabitants equally without the protecting mask of a legal personality.

The perplexities of the Rights of Man are manifold, and Burke’s famous argument against them is neither obsolete nor ‘reactionary’. In distinction from the American Bills of Rights, upon which the Declaration of the Rights of Man was modelled, they were meant to spell out primary positive rights, inherent in man’s nature, as distinguished from his political status, and as such they tried indeed to reduce politics to nature. The Bills of Rights, on the contrary, were meant to institute permanent restraining controls upon all political power, and hence presupposed the existence of a body politic and the functioning of political power. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man, as the Revolution came to understand it, was meant to constitute the source of all political power, to establish not the control but the foundation-stone of the body politic. The new body politic was supposed to rest upon man’s natural rights, upon his rights in so far as he is nothing but a natural being, upon his right to ‘food, dress, and the reproduction of the species’, that is, upon his right to the necessities of life. And these rights were not understood as prepolitical rights that no government and no political power has the right to touch and to violate, but as the very content as well as the ultimate end of government and power. The *ancien régime* stood accused of having deprived its subjects of these rights — the rights of life and nature rather than the rights of freedom and citizenship.

6

When the *malheureux* appeared on the streets of Paris it must have seemed as if Rousseau’s ‘natural man’ with his ‘real wants’ in his ‘original state’ had suddenly materialized, and as though the Revolution had in fact been nothing but that ‘experiment [which] would have to be made to discover’ him.44 For the people who now appeared were not ‘artificially’ hidden behind any mask, since they stood just as much outside the body politic as they stood outside society. No hypocrisy distorted their faces and no legal personality protected them. Seen from their standpoint, the social and the political were equally ‘artificial’, spurious devices with which to hide ‘original men’ either in the nakedness of their selfish interests or in the nakedness of their unbearable misery. From then on, the ‘real wants’ determined the course of the Revolution, with the result — as Lord Acton so rightly observed — that in all the transactions, which determined the future of France, the [Constituent] Assembly had no share, that power was passing from them to the disciplined people of Paris, and beyond them and their commanders to the men who managed the masses.45 For the masses, once they had discovered that a constitution was not a panacea
The Social Question

On Revolution

The Social Question

The Revolution was not an event but a process, a transformation of society. The Revolution was not a sudden event, but a slow and steady development of human ideas and conditions. The Revolution was not a single act, but a series of acts, each contributing to the overall change. The Revolution was not completed in one day, but took many years, and even centuries, to be fully realized. The Revolution was not a simple act of rebellion, but a complex and multifaceted process, involving the struggles of many different people and groups. The Revolution was not a single cause, but a combination of many factors, including economic, social, and political. The Revolution was not a single event, but a series of events, each building on the previous one. The Revolution was not a single outcome, but a range of outcomes, each with its own implications. The Revolution was not a single method, but a combination of many methods, each suited to different situations. The Revolution was not a single goal, but a range of goals, each with its own importance. The Revolution was not a single interpretation, but a range of interpretations, each with its own validity. The Revolution was not a single story, but a range of stories, each with its own truth. The Revolution was not a single perspective, but a range of perspectives, each with its own merit. The Revolution was not a single theory, but a range of theories, each with its own significance. The Revolution was not a single practice, but a range of practices, each with its own effectiveness. The Revolution was not a single approach, but a range of approaches, each with its own applicability. The Revolution was not a single field, but a range of fields, each with its own relevance. The Revolution was not a single subject, but a range of subjects, each with its own importance. The Revolution was not a single area, but a range of areas, each with its own significance. The Revolution was not a single aspect, but a range of aspects, each with its own impact. The Revolution was not a single focus, but a range of focuses, each with its own priority. The Revolution was not a single problem, but a range of problems, each with its own challenge. The Revolution was not a single solution, but a range of solutions, each with its own feasibility. The Revolution was not a single barrier, but a range of barriers, each with its own difficulty. The Revolution was not a single opportunity, but a range of opportunities, each with its own significance. The Revolution was not a single limitation, but a range of limitations, each with its own constraint. The Revolution was not a single constraint, but a range of constraints, each with its own restriction. The Revolution was not a single condition, but a range of conditions, each with its own necessity. The Revolution was not a single context, but a range of contexts, each with its own contextuality. The Revolution was not a single situation, but a range of situations, each with its own situationality. The Revolution was not a single environment, but a range of environments, each with its own environmentality. The Revolution was not a single process, but a range of processes, each with its own processuality. The Revolution was not a single mechanism, but a range of mechanisms, each with its own mechanality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality. The Revolution was not a single mechanismality, but a range of mechanismalities, each with its own mechanismality.
broke down the barriers of endurance and liberated, as it were, the devastating forces of misfortune and misery instead.

Human life has been stricken with poverty since times immemorial, and mankind continues to labour under this curse in all countries outside the Western Hemisphere. No revolution has ever solved the ‘social question’ and liberated men from the predication of want, but all revolutions, with the exception of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, have followed the example of the French Revolution and made and misused the mighty forces of misery and destitution in their struggle against tyranny or oppression. And although the whole record of past revolutions demonstrates beyond doubt that every attempt to solve the social question with political means leads into terror, and that it is terror which sends revolutions to their doom, it can hardly be denied that to avoid this fatal mistake is almost impossible when a revolution breaks out under conditions of mass poverty. What has always made it so terribly tempting to follow the French Revolution on its foredoomed path is not only the fact that liberation from necessity, because of its urgency, will always take precedence over the building of freedom, but the even more important and more dangerous fact that the uprising of the poor against the rich carries with it an altogether different and much greater momentum of force than the rebellion of the oppressed against their oppressors. This raging force may well nigh appear irresistible because it lives from and is nourished by the necessity of biological life itself. (The rebellions of the belly are the worst, as Francis Bacon put it, discussing ‘discontentment’ and ‘poverty’ as causes for sedition.) No doubt the women on their march to Versailles ‘played the genuine part of mothers whose children were starving in squalid homes, and they thereby afforded to motives which they neither shared nor understood the aid of a diamond point that nothing could withstand.’ And when Saint-Just out of these experiences exclaimed, ‘Les malheureux sont la puissance de la terre’, we might as well hear these grand and prophetic words in their literal meaning. It is indeed as though the forces of the earth were allied in benevolent conspiracy with this uprising, whose end is impotence, whose principle is rage, and whose conscious

aim is not freedom but life and happiness. Where the breakdown of traditional authority set the poor of the earth on the march, where they left the obscenity of their misfortunes and streamed upon the market-place, their furor seemed as irresistible as the motion of the stars, a torrent rushing forward with elemental force and engulfing a whole world.

Tocqueville (in a famous passage, written decades before Marx and probably without knowledge of Hegel’s philosophy of history) was the first to wonder why ‘the doctrine of necessity ... is so attractive to those who write history in democratic ages’. The reason, he believed, lay in the anonymity of an egalitarian society, where ‘the traces of individual action upon nations are lost’, so that ‘men are led to believe that ... some superior force [is] ruling over them’. Suggestive as this theory may appear, it will be found wanting upon closer reflection. The powerlessness of the individual in an egalitarian society may explain the experience of a superior force determining his destiny; it hardly accounts for the element of motion inherent in the doctrine of necessity, and without it the doctrine would have been useless to historians. Necessity in motion, the ‘close enormous chain which girds and binds the human race’ and can be traced back to ‘the origin of the world’, was entirely absent from the range of experiences of either the American Revolution or American egalitarian society. Here Tocqueville read something into American society which he knew from the French Revolution, where already Robespierre had substituted an irresistible and anonymous stream of violence for the free and deliberate actions of men, although he still believed – in contrast to Hegel’s interpretation of the French Revolution – that this free-flowing stream could be directed by the strength of human virtue. But the image behind Robespierre’s belief in the irresistibility of violence as well as behind Hegel’s belief in the irresistibility of necessity – both violence and necessity being in motion and dragging everything and everybody into their streaming movements – was the familiar view of the streets of Paris during the Revolution, the view of the poor who came streaming out into the street.

In this stream of the poor, the element of irresistibility, which
The Pursuit of Happiness

CHAPTER THREE

On Revolution

First, let's consider the historical context of revolution. Throughout history, revolutions have been driven by various factors, including economic, social, and political dissatisfaction. When the people feel that the government has failed to address their needs or when there is a desire for change, revolution becomes the only viable option. This is evident in the French Revolution, where the Parisian citizens, led by the Jacobins, rose up against the corrupt and tyrannical regime of King Louis XVI. Their goal was to establish a more just and equitable society, one that would ensure the rights and freedoms of all its citizens.

The French Revolution was not just about overthrowing a king; it was about creating a new system of government that would be based on the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The revolutionaries sought to create a society where everyone would have equal opportunities to succeed and where the government would be accountable to the people. This was a radical departure from the old order, where power was concentrated in the hands of the monarch and the aristocracy.

The revolutionaries believed that the masses of the people were the true owners of the country and that they should have a voice in how their affairs were managed. They believed that the government should be representative of the people and that it should be responsive to their needs. This was a radical idea at the time, and it was one that would have far-reaching consequences for the development of modern democracy.

The French Revolution also had a profound impact on the intellectual and cultural landscape of Europe. It sparked a wave of political and social reform that would sweep across the continent, leading to the rise of new ideas and movements that would shape the course of modern history.

In conclusion, the French Revolution was a turning point in the history of Europe. It showed that the people have the power to bring about change, and that change can be achieved through the force of collective action. The revolutionaries of France showed that the oppressed can rise up and demand their rights, and that the old order can be overthrown and a new one can be established. This is a lesson that remains relevant today, as we face the challenges of an ever-changing world.

The reader is encouraged to explore further the ideas of the French Revolution and to consider how they continue to shape our world today.
RESPONSIBILITY
AND
JUDGMENT

Hannah Arendt

Edited and with an Introduction
by Jerome Kohn

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Reflections on Little Rock

Introduction

The point of departure of my reflections was a picture in the newspapers showing a Negro girl on her way home from a newly integrated school: she was persecuted by a mob of white children, protected by a white friend of her father, and her face bore eloquent witness to the obvious fact that she was not precisely happy. The picture showed the situation in a nutshell because those who appeared in it were directly affected by the Federal court order, the children themselves. My first question was, what would I do if I were a Negro mother? The answer: under no circumstances would I expose my child to conditions which made it appear as though it wanted to push its way into a group where it was not wanted. Psychologically, the situation of being unwanted (a typically social predicament) is more difficult to bear than outright persecution (a political predicament) because personal pride is involved. By pride, I do not mean anything like being “proud of being a Negro,” or a Jew, or a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, etc., but that taught and natural feeling of identity with whatever we happen to be by the accident of birth. Pride, which does not compare and knows neither inferiority nor superiority complexes, is indispensable for personal integrity, and it is lost not so much by persecution as by pushing, or rather being pushed into pushing,
education and organized themselves and even succeeded in parting with their own property. The people at the center of the conflict were the parents, students, and school officials. Their goal was to prevent the integration of schools and to maintain the separation between their own and the black communities.

The parents, who were mostly middle-class, feared that their children would be exposed to a dangerous environment. They believed that the schools were not equipped to handle the needs of a diverse student body. The students, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with their education and their future. They wanted to attend a school that offered them the same opportunities as their white counterparts.

The government's role in this conflict was to enforce the Brown v. Board of Education decision. However, the decision was not always implemented fairly. In some cases, the government failed to provide adequate resources for the new integrated schools. This led to a cycle of underfunding and neglect, which only exacerbated the problems.

Moreover, the push for integration was not universally accepted. Some communities, particularly white communities, resisted the changes. They saw integration as a threat to their way of life and to the values they held dear.

In conclusion, the conflict over education in Little Rock was a complex issue that involved not only the struggle for civil rights but also the challenges of education reform. The struggle continues to this day, as communities across the country grapple with the implications of integration and the need for equitable education.
suading the state authorities to prevent the opening and functioning of the school. This would be the precise moment when, in my opinion, the federal government should be called upon to intervene. For here we would have again a clear case of segregation enforced by governmental authority.

This now brings us to my third question. I asked myself: what exactly distinguishes the so-called Southern way of life from the American way of life with respect to the color question? And the answer, of course, is simply that while discrimination and segregation are the rule in the whole country, they are enforced by legislation only in the Southern states. Hence, whoever wishes to change the situation in the South can hardly avoid abolishing the marriage laws and intervening to effect free exercise of the franchise. This is by no means an academic question. It is partly a matter of constitutional principle which by definition is beyond majority decisions and practicality; and it also involves, of course, the rights of citizens, as, for instance, the rights of those twenty-five or so Negro men from Texas who, while in the Army, had married European women and therefore could not go home because in the eyes of Texas legislation they were guilty of a crime.

The reluctance of American liberals to touch the issue of the marriage laws, their readiness to invoke practicality and shift the ground of the argument by insisting that the Negroes themselves have no interest in this matter, their embarrassment when they are reminded of what the whole world knows to be the most outrageous piece of legislation in the whole Western Hemisphere, all this recalls to mind the earlier reluctance of the founders of the Republic to follow Jefferson's advice and abolish the crime of slavery. Jefferson, too, yielded for practical reasons, but he, at least, still had enough political sense to say after the fight was lost: "I tremble when I think that God is just." He trembled not for the Negroes, not even for the whites, but for the destiny of the Republic because he knew that one of its vital principles had been violated right at the beginning. Not discrimination and social segregation, in whatever forms, but racial legislation constitutes the perpetuation of the original crime in this country's history.

One last word about education and politics. The idea that one can change the world by educating the children in the spirit of the future has been one of the hallmarks of political utopias since antiquity. The trouble with this idea has always been the same: it can succeed only if the children are really separated from their parents and brought up in state institutions, or are indoctrinated in school so that they will turn against their own parents. This is what happens in tyrannies. If, on the other hand, public authorities are unwilling to draw the consequences of their own vague hopes and premises, the whole educational experiment remains at best without result, while, at worst, it irritates and antagonizes both parents and children who feel that they are deprived of some essential rights. The series of events in the South that followed the Supreme Court ruling, after which this administration committed itself to fight its battle for civil rights on the grounds of education and public schools, impresses one with a sense of futility and needless embitterment as though all parties concerned knew very well that nothing was being achieved under the pretext that something was being done.

I

It is unfortunate and even unjust (though hardly unjustified) that the events at Little Rock should have had such an enormous echo in public opinion throughout the world and have become a major
The American Republic is based on the equality of all citizens. In practice, it is far from equal. The number of Negroes in each state, and consequently in the country, varies greatly. The number of Negroes in each state is determined by the census, which is taken every ten years. The United States is not a nation-state in the European sense and never was. The principle of political structure is the same in all countries. The American Republic is based on the equality of all citizens.

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principle of all modern constitutional government, equality as such is of greater importance in the political life of a republic than in any other form of government. The point at stake, therefore, is not the well-being of the Negro population alone, but, at least in the long run, the survival of the Republic. Tocqueville saw over a century ago that equality of opportunity and condition, as well as equality of rights, constituted the basic "law" of American democracy, and he predicted that the dilemmas and perplexities inherent in the principle of equality might one day become the most dangerous challenge to the American way of life. In its all-comprehensive, typically American form, equality possesses an enormous power to equalize what by nature and origin is different—and it is only due to this power that the country has been able to retain its fundamental identity against the waves of immigrants who have always flooded its shores. But the principle of equality, even in its American form, is not omnipotent; it cannot equalize natural, physical characteristics. This limit is reached only when inequalities of economic and educational condition have been ironed out, but at that juncture a danger point, well known to students of history, invariably emerges: the more equal people have become in every respect, and the more equality permeates the whole texture of society, the more will differences be resented, the more conspicuous will those become who are visibly and by nature unlike the others.

It is therefore quite possible that the achievement of social, economic, and educational equality for the Negro may sharpen the color problem in this country instead of assuaging it. This, of course, does not have to happen, but it would be only natural if it did, and it would be very surprising if it did not. We have not yet reached the danger point, but we shall reach it in the foreseeable future, and a number of developments have already taken place which clearly point toward it. Awareness of future trouble does not commit one to advocating a reversal of the trend which happily for more than fifteen years now has been greatly in favor of the Negroes. But it does commit one to advocating that government intervention be guided by caution and moderation rather than by impatience and ill-advised measures. Since the Supreme Court decision to enforce desegregation in public schools, the general situation in the South has deteriorated. And while recent events indicate that it will not be possible to avoid Federal enforcement of Negro civil rights in the South altogether, conditions demand that such intervention be restricted to the few instances in which the law of the land and the principle of the Republic are at stake. The question therefore is where this is the case in general, and whether it is the case in public education in particular.

The administration's Civil Rights program covers two altogether different points. It reaffirms the franchise of the Negro population, a matter of course in the North, but not at all in the South. And it also takes up the issue of segregation, which is a matter of fact in the whole country and a matter of discriminatory legislation only in Southern states. The present massive resistance throughout the South is an outcome of enforced segregation, and not of legal enforcement of the Negroes' right to vote. The results of a public opinion poll in Virginia showing that 92 percent of the citizens were totally opposed to school integration, that 65 percent were willing to forgo public education under these conditions, and that 79 percent denied any obligation to accept the Supreme Court decision as binding, illustrate how serious the situation is. What is frightening here is not the 92 percent opposed to integration, for the dividing line in the South was never between those who favored and those who opposed segregation—practically speaking, no such opponents existed—
The issue appears to be a discussion on a legal matter, potentially related to the Eighth Amendment. The text mentions the importance of habeas corpus and the rights of individuals under the law. It seems to be discussing a case or situation involving legal proceedings and the legal protections afforded to individuals. The text is fragmented, making it difficult to extract specific details or a coherent narrative. The overall context suggests a legal analysis or argument.
tion which, by abolishing the authority of adults, implicitly denies their responsibility for the world into which they have borne their children and refuses the duty of guiding them into it. Have we now come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?

Segregation is discrimination enforced by law, and desegregation can do no more than abolish the laws enforcing discrimination; it cannot abolish the laws enforcing discrimination and force equality upon society, but it can, and indeed must, enforce equality within the body politic. For equality not only has its origin in the body politic; its validity is clearly restricted to the political realm. Only there are we all equals. Under modern conditions, this equality has its most important embodiment in the right to vote, according to which the judgment and opinion of the most exalted citizen are on a par with the judgment and opinion of the hardly literate. Eligibility, the right to be voted into office, is also an inalienable right of every citizen; but here equality is already restricted, and though the necessity for personal distinction in an election arises out of the numerical equality, in which everybody is literally reduced to being one, it is distinction and qualities which count in the winning of votes and not sheer equality.

Yet unlike other differences (for example, professional specialization, occupational qualification, or social and intellectual distinction) the political qualities needed for winning office are so closely connected with being an equal among equals, that one may say that, far from being specialties, they are precisely those distinctions to which all voters equally aspire—not necessarily as human beings, but as citizens and political beings. Thus the qualities of officials in a democracy always depend upon the qualities of the electorate. Eligibility, therefore, is a necessary corollary of the right to vote; it means that everyone is given the opportunity to distinguish himself in those things in which all are equals to begin with. Strictly speaking, the franchise and eligibility for office are the only political rights, and they constitute in a modern democracy the very quintessence of citizenship. In contrast to all other rights, civil or human, they cannot be granted to resident aliens.

What equality is to the body politic—its innermost principle—discrimination is to society. Society is that curious, somewhat hybrid realm between the political and the private in which, since the beginning of the modern age, most men have spent the greater part of their lives. For each time we leave the protective four walls of our private homes and cross over the threshold into the public world, we enter first, not the political realm of equality, but the social sphere. We are driven into this sphere by the need to earn a living or attracted by the desire to follow our vocation or intrigued by the pleasure of company, and once we have entered it, we become subject to the old adage of “like attracts like” which controls the whole realm of society in the innumerable variety of its groups and associations. What matters here is not personal distinction but the differences by which people belong to certain groups whose very identifiability demands that they discriminate against other groups in the same domain. In American society, people group together, and therefore discriminate against each other, along lines of profession, income, and ethnic origin, while in Europe the lines run along class origin, education, and manners. From the viewpoint of the human person, none of these discriminatory practices makes sense; but then it is doubtful whether the human person as such ever appears in the social realm. At any rate, without discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear.
choose those with whom we wish to spend our lives. Persons
enjoy every right by seclusion, but by enjoyment alone, we
may not choose to associate with them.

And yet, the right to choose is not absolute. It is limited by
certain considerations, such as the need to maintain
the social order and the protection of the rights of others.

In any society, there is a balance to be struck between
the individual's right to freedom of association and the need
for social order and stability.

Reflections on Life's Work

Individual rights and freedoms are not without limits. The
right to choose who we associate with is balanced against
the need to maintain a cohesive society.

The interaction of these two forces shapes the social
fabric, and it is within this framework that we must
navigate our personal and societal choices.
friends and those we love; and our choice is guided not by likeness or qualities shared by a group of people—it is not guided, indeed, by any objective standards or rules—but strikes, inexplicably and unerringly, at one person in his uniqueness, his unlikeness to all other people we know. The rules of uniqueness and exclusiveness are, and always will be, in conflict with the standards of society precisely because social discrimination violates the principle, and lacks validity for the conduct, of private life. Thus every mixed marriage constitutes a challenge to society and means that the partners to such a marriage have so far preferred personal happiness to social adjustment that they are willing to bear the burden of discrimination. This is and must remain their private business. The scandal begins only when their challenge to society and prevailing customs, to which every citizen has a right, is interpreted as a criminal offense so that by stepping outside the social realm they find themselves in conflict with the law as well. Social standards are not legal standards and if legislature follows social prejudice, society has become tyrannical.

For reasons too complicated to discuss here, the power of society in our time is greater than it ever was before, and not many people are left who know the rules of and live a private life. But this provides the body politic with no excuse for forgetting the rights of privacy, for failing to understand that the rights of privacy are grossly violated whenever legislation begins to enforce social discrimination. While the government has no right to interfere with the prejudices and discriminatory practices of society, it has not only the right but the duty to make sure that these practices are not legally enforced.

Just as the government has to ensure that social discrimination never curtails political equality, it must also safeguard the rights of every person to do as he pleases within the four walls of his own home. The moment social discrimination is legally enforced, it becomes persecution, and of this crime many Southern states have been guilty. The moment social discrimination is legally abolished, the freedom of society is violated, and the danger is that thoughtless handling of the Civil Rights issue by the Federal government will result in such a violation. The government can legitimately take no steps against social discrimination because government can act only in the name of equality—a principle which does not obtain in the social sphere. The only public force that can fight social prejudice is the churches, and they can do so in the name of the uniqueness of the person, for it is on the principle of the uniqueness of souls that religion (and especially the Christian faith) is based. The churches are indeed the only communal and public place where appearances do not count, and if discrimination creeps into the houses of worship, this is an infallible sign of their religious failing. They then have become social and are no longer religious institutions.

Another issue involved in the present conflict between Washington and the South is the matter of states’ rights. For some time it has been customary among liberals to maintain that no such issue exists at all but is only a ready-made subterfuge of Southern reactionaries who have nothing in their hands except “abstruse arguments and constitutional history.” In my opinion, this is a dangerous error. In contradistinction to the classical principle of the European nation-state that power, like sovereignty, is indivisible, the power structure of this country rests on the principle of division of power and on the conviction that the body politic as a whole is strengthened by the division of power. To be sure, this principle is embodied in the system of checks and balances between the three branches of government; but it is no less rooted in the government’s Federal structure which demands that there
Education and beyond. The focus is not only on providing education but also on developing values and fostering character development.

However, the problem lies in the implementation of these policies. The government's efforts are often hindered by strict regulations and bureaucratic red tape. The lack of coordination between different levels of government also contributes to the inefficiency in education.

In recent years, there has been a growing concern over the quality of education in public schools. The government has taken steps to improve this, such as investing more in infrastructure and teacher training. But there is still a long way to go.

The ultimate goal is to ensure that every child has access to quality education, regardless of their background. This requires a collaborative effort from all stakeholders, including the government, schools, parents, and the community. Only then can we truly say that education is for all.
subjects and professions which are felt to be desirable and necessary to the nation as a whole. All this involves, however, only the content of the child’s education, not the context of association and social life which invariably develops out of his attendance at school; otherwise one would have to challenge the right of private schools to exist. For the child himself, school is the first place away from home where he establishes contact with the public world that surrounds him and his family. This public world is not political but social, and the school is to the child what a job is to an adult. The only difference is that the element of free choice which, in a free society, exists at least in principle in the choosing of jobs and the associations connected with them, is not yet at the disposal of the child but rests with his parents.

To force parents to send their children to an integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which clearly belong to them in all free societies—the private right over their children and the social right to free association. As for the children, forced integration means a very serious conflict between home and school, between their private and their social life, and while such conflicts are common in adult life, children cannot be expected to handle them and therefore should not be exposed to them. It has often been remarked that man is never so much of a conformer—that is, a purely social being—as in childhood. The reason is that every child instinctively seeks authorities to guide him into the world in which he is still a stranger, in which he cannot orient himself by his own judgment. To the extent that parents and teachers fail him as authorities, the child will conform more strongly to his own group, and under certain conditions the peer group will become his supreme authority. The result can only be a rise of mob and gang rule, as the news photograph we mentioned above so eloquently demonstrates. The conflict between a segregated home and a desegregated school, between family prejudice and school demands, abolishes at one stroke both the teachers’ and the parents’ authority, replacing it with the rule of public opinion among children who have neither the ability nor the right to establish a public opinion of their own.

Because the many different factors involved in public education can quickly be set to work at cross purposes, government intervention, even at its best, will always be rather controversial. Hence it seems highly questionable whether it was wise to begin enforcement of civil rights in a domain where no basic human and no basic political right is at stake, and where other rights—social and private—whose protection is no less vital, can so easily be hurt.

1959
WHO SPEAKS FOR THE NEGRO?

Robert Penn Warren

With an Introduction by David W. Blight

INTERVIEW WITH RALPH ELLISON THAT GETS TO ARENDT ON LITTLE ROCK

1965

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come across a perfectly well-meaning person saying of the present struggle, "Well, the Negro has suddenly discovered courage."

* * *

In all of Ellison's conversation and writing there is the impulse re-inspect, to break through, some of the standard formulations of the Revolution, which are in constant danger of becoming mere stereotypes. One is that the Negro has been deprived of a sense of identity and is a "self-hater." When James Baldwin says that "for the first time in American Negro history, the American black man is not at the mercy of the American white man's image of him," he is referring to the question of identity; as he is when he goes on to say that, though it is "very romantic," the American Negro finds it a "necessary step" to think of "himself as an African." Martin Luther King says that he recognizes "the psychic split" as a "real issue," and Wyatt Tee Walker says that only now the "Negro really accepts his identity." Izell Blair says that the young Negro, in facing the dominant values of white society, says: "Well, what am I?" And then: "You feel rubbed out, as if you never existed." The question arises in a number of case histories; for instance, in one of the persons studied by Kardiner and Ovesey: "I know I don't want to be identified with Negroes, but I am identified regardless of how I feel." And, as we have seen, the Black Muslims, including the defector Malcolm X, take the recognition of the problem of identity and self-hate as the beginning of redemption.

In the past, in the essay "Harlem Is Nowhere," written in 1948, Ellison accepted the notion of self-hate among Negroes in connection with what Dr. Frederick Wertham calls the "free-floating hostility" which the Negro senses, and sometimes takes as a punishment for some racial or personal guilt. Ellison is quite specific: "Negro Americans are in a desperate search for identity . . . their whole lives have become a search for answers to the questions: Who am I? What am I? Why am I? and, Where?" But later (as in the present interview), Ellison insists, over and over again, on the Negro's will, even under slavery, to develop discipline and achieve individuality. For instance, in a review of Blues People (1964), by Le Roi Jones, he writes:

"A slave," writes Le Roi Jones, "cannot be a man." But what, might one ask, of those moments when he feels his metabolism aroused by the rising of the sap in the spring? What of his identity among other slaves? With his wife? And isn't it closer to the truth that far from considering themselves only in terms of that abstraction, "a slave," the enslaved really thought of themselves as men who had been unjustly enslaved?

What are we to make of these apparent contradictions? In the first place, we have to grant that a man is the final authority about his own feelings. If Izell Blair says that, at a certain time, he felt "rubbed out," he ought to know. By the same token, Ralph Ellison ought to know what he felt, or how he feels. There is an obvious problem when one generalizes, and attributes a certain feeling to that abstraction "the Negro"—that is, to all Negroes—and creates a stereotype. But, of course, we would be nearer the truth if we thought not of "the Negro" but of pressures and tendencies implicit in the situation of oppression and of an enormous variety of persons upon whom they act.

Ellison, in thinking of those Negroes who set models for resistance, puts his emphasis on the individual, on the achieving of personal identity. On this point, some psychologists, in discussing the situation of the Negro under slavery, will distinguish between the personal ego and the social ego. For instance, Kardiner and Ovesey say that there were "among the slaves powerful and resourceful leaders," that slavery was not accepted with docility, and that "individual protests were many." But they distinguish such protests from group action, organized action. The fact that rebellions were so few and so promptly failed they attribute to the destruction by slavery of "the fabric out of which social cohesion is made." Under slavery the individual might have "enormous self-confidence," but such confidence would not be available for common use; its reference would remain almost strictly individual.

The explanation for this they would take to be complex. There would be, of course, the breakup of cultural bonds, the inability to form permanent and dignified family ties, the spy system, the use of Negro "drivers" and pace-setters, the system of special privilege for house-servants and "pets." Furthermore, Kardiner and Ovesey emphasize the nature of work under slavery: "No slave can take pride in his work, except perhaps in that it may serve another form
of self-interest through ingratiating—and this would be a bid for discrimination in favor of oneself, to the implied disadvantage of everyone else. The slave—except among favored craftsmen—did not plan work and had no opportunity to cooperate in work, and this fact would also have had a deep psychological effect. And, always, there would have been the pressure to accept the master’s values. Under such pressures individuals might, and clearly did, achieve “identity,” but with a special struggle—and a struggle that might have emphasized the special personal nature of that identity, an identity that might be expressed in individual acts of resistance or by flight.

As we have said earlier in discussing Samboism, we must think in terms not of absolutes, but of pressures inherent in the situation. And in this instance, common sense would dictate that the distinction between the personal self and the social self cannot be taken as absolute. Certainly, the example of resistance or flight would fire something in those who to that moment had not resisted or fled; and such examples, entering the local folklore, might have continuing effect. And on this point Ellison was continuing, telling of a man who, long after slavery, had entered folklore as the intransigent, individual discoverer of the self:

ELLISON: I remember that when I was riding freight trains through Alabama to get to Tuskegee Institute, there was a well-known figure of Birmingham, called Ice Cream Charlie, whose story was also told over and over again whenever we evoked the unwritten history of the group. Ice Cream Charlie was an ice cream maker and his product must have been very good (Negro folklore has it, by the way, and erroneously, I'm afraid, that a Negro slave woman invented ice cream) because the demand for it led to his death. His white competitors ordered him to stop selling his product to white people, but the white people wanted it and, believing in free enterprise, he ignored the warning. This led to his competitors’ sending the police after Charlie, and it ended with his killing twelve policemen before they burned him out and killed him. Now there are many, many such stories which Negroes keep alive among themselves, and they form part of our image of Negro experience—nonviolence notwithstanding.

Many people don’t even bother to know or care about this part of Negro history. They project their own notions—or prefabricated stereotypes—upon Negroes—they make a slow and arduous development seem a dramatic event.*

The freedom movement, such a person assumes, exists simply because he is looking at it. Thus it becomes an accident or an artistic contrivance, or a conspiracy, instead of the slow development in time, in history, and in group discipline and organizational technique which it actually is.

I shouldn’t be annoyed, of course, since Americans know very little of their history and we tend to act as though we believed that by refusing to look at history there’ll be no necessity to confront its consequences. And we have so many facile ways of disguising the issues, of rendering them banal.

Sometime back I saw a revival of an old Al Jolson movie on television. This was about the time of the summer riots in Harlem, and in one of the big scenes Jolson appears in blackface singing a refrain which goes, “I don’t want to make your laws, I just want to sing my songs and be happy!” Well, whatever the reality of the Negro attitudes or whatever the stage of the Negro freedom struggle at the time the picture was originally released—yes, and no matter how many white people were lured into believing that Jolson’s “passing for black” granted him the authority to express authentic Negro attitudes—this piece of popular culture tells us more about Jolson, about Hollywood, and about American techniques for converting serious moral issues into sentimental and banal entertainment than about Negroes. Anyone who bothers to consult history would know that not only were Negroes anxious to change the laws but were trying even then to do so. By 1954 they had helped to discover how—with Charles S. Houston’s mock supreme court cases held at Howard University Law School.

Viewed from this perspective of Al Jolson, America has

*In this connection we may remark that Ellison’s great admiration for Faulkner stems, in part, from the impulse that made Faulkner more willing perhaps than any other artist to start with the stereotype of the Negro, accept it as true, and then seek out the human truth which it hides.” See “Twentieth Century Fiction and the Black Mask of Humanity,” in Shadow and Act.
been terribly damaged by bad art. Perhaps those Negro writers who wish to be praised for shoddy work, and who regard serious literary criticism as a form of racial prejudice, should remember that bad art which toys with serious issues is ultimately destructive and the entertainment which it provides is poisonous, regardless of the racial background of the artist.

WARREN: What do you think of the suggestion that part of the Southern resistance is not based on the question of race as such but on the impulse to maintain identity? A white Southerner feeling that his identity is involved may defend a lot of things in one package as being Southern, and one of those things is segregation. He feels he has to have the whole package to define his culture and his identity. Does that make any sense to you?

ELLISON: It makes a lot of sense to me, because one of the areas that I feel, and which I think I see when I look at the Southerner who has these feelings, is that he has been imprisoned by them, and that he has been prevented from achieving his individuality, perhaps more than Negroes have. And very often this is a tough one for Northerners to understand—that is, Northern whites, and sometimes even for Northern Negroes.

WARREN: I think it is too—some of the people I know.

ELLISON: Yes, it is very difficult to get that across and I wish it could be spelled out. I wish that we could break this thing down so that it could be seen that desegregation isn’t going to stop people from being Southern, that freedom for Negroes isn’t going to destroy the main current of that way of life, which becomes, like most ways of life when we talk about them, more real on the level of myth, memory and dream than on the level of actuality anyway. The climate will remain the same, and that has a lot to do with it, the heroes of Southern history will remain, and so on. The economy will probably expand, and a hell of a lot of energy which has gone into keeping the Negro “in his place” will be released for more creative pursuits. And the dictionary will become more accurate, the language a bit purer, and the singing in the schools will sound better. I suspect that...

what is valuable and worth preserving in the white Southern way of life is no more exclusively dependent upon the existence of segregation than what is valuable in Southern Negro life depends upon its being recognized by white people—or for that matter, by Northern Negroes. Besides, from what I’ve seen of the South, as a musician and as a waiter and so on, some of the people who are most afraid of Negroes’ invading them will never be bothered, because their way of life is structured in a manner which isn’t particularly attractive to Negroes.

WARREN: There’s an interlocking structure, I sometimes think, supported by just one thing—segregation.

ELLISON: Yes, and their fear is so unreal, actually, when you can see the whole political structure being changed anyway. And when the political structure changes and desegregation is achieved, it will be easily seen where Negroes were stopped by the law and where they would have been stopped anyway, because of income and by their own preference—a matter of taste. There is, after all, a tiny bit of Negro truth in the story which Southern whites love to tell, to the effect that if a white man could be a Negro on Saturday night he’d never wish to be white again.

That bit of consolation aside, however, I don’t think it sufficiently appreciated that over and over again Negroes of certain backgrounds take on aristocratic values. They are rural and Southern and not drawn to business because business was not part of the general pattern. This is one reason—over and beyond the realities of discrimination by banks, suppliers, poor training opportunities, and even individual lack of initiative—that we’ve developed no powerful middle class. Here again a cultural factor cuts across the racial and political appearance of things. Southern whites were also slow to take to business.

WARREN: That’s been one of the things that have been commented on by observers from the eighteenth century on.

ELLISON: But over and over again, my intellectual friends—they have no conception of this. They can’t understand—I mean, it appears ludicrous to them when I say that so-and-so is aristocratic in his image of himself and in the values which
he has taken over from the white South. Nevertheless it's true, and some of the biggest snobs that you could run into are some of these poor Negroes—well, they might not be poor actually, they might be living very well—but there are just certain things, certain codes, certain values which they express and they will die by them. And there's quite a lot of that.

WARREN: In Washington I was talking to a Miss Lucy Thornton, in the Howard University Law School, and she's been through the demonstrations, she's been in jail and so forth. She said, "I'm optimistic about the way things are probably going to go here—or may go here—about getting a human settlement after the troubles are over." I asked, "Why?" She said, "Well, because we have been on the land together. We have a common history which is some basis for communication for living together afterwards."

ELLISON: Well, it is true that when you share a common background, you don't have to spell out so many things, even though you might be fighting over recognizing the common identity, and I think that's part of the South's struggle. For instance, it's just very hard for Governor Wallace to recognize that he has got to share not only the background but the power of looking after the State of Alabama with Negroes who probably know as much about it as he does. Now, here in New York I know many, many people with many, many backgrounds—and I have very often found people who think that they know me as an individual reveal that they have no sense of the experience behind me, the extent of it and the complexity of it. What they have instead is good will and a passion for abstraction.

WARREN: That's a human problem, of course, all the way. It can be special in a case like this, I presume.

ELLISON: It can be special because suddenly something comes up and I realize, "Well, my gosh, all the pieces aren't here." That is, I've won my individuality in relation to those friends at the cost of that great part of me which is really representative of a group experience. I'm sometimes viewed as "different" or a "special instance"—when in fact I'm special only to the extent that I'm a fairly conscious example,

and in some ways a lucky instance, of the general run of American Negroes.

WARREN: I encounter the same thing, I suppose, in a way. I've been congratulated by well-meaning friends who say, "It's so nice to meet a reconstructed Southerner." I don't feel reconstructed, you see. And I don't feel liberal. I feel logical, and I resent the word—I resent the word reconstructed.

ELLISON: It's like this notion of the culturally deprived child—one of those phrases which I don't like—as I have taught white middle-class young people who are what I would call "culturally deprived." They are culturally deprived because they are not oriented within the society in such a way that they are prepared to deal with its problems.

WARREN: It's a different kind of cultural deprivation, isn't it? And actually a more radical one.

ELLISON: That's right, but they don't even realize it. These people can be much more troubled than the child who lives in the slum and knows how to exist in the slum.

WARREN: It's more mysterious, what's happening to him—the middle-class child?

ELLISON: Yes, it's quite mysterious, because he has everything, all of the opportunities, but he can make nothing of the society or of his obligations. And often he has no clear idea of his own goals.

WARREN: It's twice as difficult to remedy because you can't see how to remedy it.

ELLISON: He can't see how to remedy it, and he doesn't know to what extent he has given up his past. He thinks he has a history, but every time you really talk to him seriously you discover that, well, it's kind of floating out there, and the distance between the parent and the child—the parents might have had it, they might have had it in the old country, they might have had it from the farm, and so on, but something happens with the young ones.

WARREN: Do you think there's a real crisis of values in the American middle class, then?

ELLISON: I think so. Perhaps that is what I am trying to say.

WARREN: I think there is, too.
ELLISON: I think there's a terrific crisis, and one of the events by which the middle class is being tested, and one of the forms in which the crisis expresses itself is the necessity of dealing with the Negro freedom movement.

WARREN: Is this why there are some young white people who move into it—because it is their personal salvation to find a cause to identify with, something outside themselves, outside the flatness of their middle-class American spiritual ghetto? Several people, including Robert Moses in Mississippi, have remarked on the resistance of Negroes there to white well-wishers or even courageous fellow workers. One thing, some whites try to absorb arbitrarily the Negro culture, Negro speech, Negro musical terms, Negro musical tastes—move in and grab, as it were, the other man's soul.

ELLISON: Yes, and the resentment has existed for a long time now. But what is new today is that it is being stated, articulated. It is important to recognize, however, that the resentment arises not from simple jealousy over others' admiring certain aspects of our life style and expression and seeking to share them, but because all too often that idiom, that style, that expressiveness for which we've suffered and struggled and which is a product of our effort to make meaning of our experience—is taken over by those who would distort it and reduce it to banality. This happened with jazz, resulting in great reputations and millions of dollars for certain white musicians while their artistic superiors barely got along. Worse, the standards of the art were corrupted. But another aspect of Negro resentment arises because all too often whites approach us with an unconscious assumption of racial superiority. And this leads to the naive, and implicitly arrogant, assumption that a characteristic cultural expression can, because it is Negro (it's American too, but that's a very complex matter), simply be picked up, appropriated, without bothering to learn its subtleties, its inner complexity, or its human cost, its source in tradition, its idiomatic allusiveness, its rooting in the density of lived life.

WARREN: Grab an apple off the cart and run—

ELLISON: It's like Christopher Newman, in James's The American, going over and trying to move into French society and finding a dense complexity of values and attitudes. But to get back to the other point, I'm sure that there must have been quite a lot of resentment even among the Negroes who encountered certain Abolitionists, because they displayed a tendency to use other people for their own convenience.

WARREN: It's awful human, isn't it?

ELLISON: It is, it's awful human.

WARREN: Let's turn to something else. Here in the midst of what has been an expanding economy you have a contracting economy for the unprepared, for the Negro.

ELLISON: That's the paradox. And this particularly explains something new which has come into the picture; that is, a determination by the Negro no longer to be the scapegoat, no longer to pay, to be sacrificed to—the inadequacies of other Americans. We want to socialize the cost. A cost has been exacted in terms of character, in terms of courage, and determination, and in terms of self-knowledge and self-discovery. Worse, it has led to social, economic, political, and intellectual disadvantages and to a contempt even for our lives. And one motive for our rejection of the old traditional role of national scapegoat is an intensified awareness that not only are we being destroyed by the sacrifice, but that the nation has been rotting at its moral core. Thus we are determined to bring America's conduct into line with its professed ideals. The obligation is dual, in fact mixed, to ourselves and to the nation. Negroes are forcing the confrontation between the nation's conduct and its ideal, and they are most American in that they are doing so. Other Americans are going to have to do the same thing. Well, I say "have to"—I don't mean that we're in a position to force anything, except the exertion of—

WARREN: Well, let's say force.

ELLISON: Yes—a matter of pressuring—keeping this country stirred up. Because we have desperately to keep it stirred up.

WARREN: What has been historically proved—not just in America but elsewhere—social change doesn't happen automatically—something has to happen.

ELLISON: One can only hope about these things. We've had the luxury of evading moral necessities from the Reconstruc-
tion on. Much of the moral looseness from which we suffer can be dated back to that period. It just seems to follow that you have to learn how to be morally correct and when you have so much mobility, as Americans have, and so much natural wealth, then you come to believe that you can eternally postpone the moment of historical truth. But I think that as a result of becoming the major power in the world, we are being disciplined in the experience of frustration, and the experience of being found inadequate. We're slowly learning that the wealth does us little good, that something more is needed. We're in trouble simply because we've compromised so damned much with events and with ourselves. Something is wrong and it isn't the presence of Negroes. It isn't even the presence of the civil rights problem, although this is an aspect of it.

WARREN: I agree with you immediately that that is not the central fact. But it flows into an American national situation and aggravates it.

ELLISON: The national values have become so confused that you can't even depend upon your writers for some sense of the realism of character. There is a basic strength in this country, but so much of it is being sapped away and no one seems to be too much interested in it.

WARREN: Let me switch the topic, if you will. You know Dr. Kenneth Clark's view of Martin Luther King's philosophy—this will lead us back to the whole question of the nature of violence and nonviolence.

ELLISON: Well, Dr. Clark misses the heroic side of this thing—perhaps because he has an interest in negative propaganda as a means of raising funds with which to correct some of the injustices common to Negro slums. But he seems so intent upon describing the negative that he forgets that there is another side, and in doing so he reveals how much he doesn't know about Southern Negroes. Where Negroes are concerned, the open sesame to many of the money vaults in this country seems to be a description, replete with graphs, statistics, and footnotes, of Negro life as so depraved, hopeless, and semi-human that the best service that money could perform would be to stuff the mouths of the describers so that

the details of horror could stop. I'm reminded of the Black Guinea disguise in which Melville's Confidence Man blackened his face and twisted his limbs and then crawled about the ship deck whimpering like a dog begging and catching coins in his mouth.

Getting back to King and Clark, I think this—and it might sound mystical, but I don't think so because it is being acted out every day: there is a great power in humility. Dostoevski has made us aware—in fact, Jesus Christ has made us aware. It can be terribly ambiguous and it can contain many, many contradictory forces, and most of all, it can be a form of courage. Martin Luther King isn't working out of yesterday nor the day before yesterday. He is working out of a long history of Negro tradition and wisdom, and he certainly knows more about the psychology of his followers than Dr. Clark. He knows that these people have been conditioned to contain not only the physical pressures involved in their struggle, but that they are capable, through this same tradition, of mastering the psychological pressures of which Clark speaks.

WARREN: Do you mean conditioned by their training or by their history?

ELLISON: I'm talking about the old necessity of having to stay alive during periods when violence was loose in the land and when many were being casually killed. Violence has been so ever-present and so often unleashed through incidents of such pettiness and capriciousness, that for us personal courage had either to take another form or be negated, become meaningless.

Often the individual's personal courage had to be held in check, since not only could his exaction of personal satisfaction from a white man lead to the destruction of other innocent Negroes, his self-evaluation could be called into question by the smallest things and the most inconsequential gesture could become imbued with power over life or death. Thus in situations in which courage appeared the normal response, he had to determine with whom he was involved and whether the issue was as important as his white opponent wished to make it. In other words, he has always to determine
at what point and over which specific issue he will pay the ultimate price of his life.

This has certainly been part of my own experience. There have been situations where in facing hostile whites I had to determine not what they thought was at issue, because in any case they were bent upon violence, but what I wanted it to be. "This guy wants me to fight, most likely he wants an excuse to kill me—what do I have to gain? And am I going to let him impose his values upon my life?"

WARRREN: To let him determine your worth to you, is that it?

ELLISON: Yes. So, Dr. King notwithstanding, if I couldn't love my would-be provocateur as Dr. King advises, I could dismiss him as childish and, perhaps, even forgive him. This, even though at the time I ached to meet him on neutral ground and on equal terms.

One thing that Dr. Clark overlooks is that Southern Negroes learned about violence in a very tough school. They have known for a long time that they can take a lot of head-whipping and survive and go on working toward their own goals. We learned about forbearance and forgiveness in that same school, and about hope too. So today we sacrifice, as we sacrificed yesterday, the pleasure of personal retaliation in the interest of the common good. And where violence was once a matter of national political significance, Clark regards the necessary psychological complexity of Southern Negroes as intolerable, but I'm afraid that he would impose a psychological norm upon Negro life which is not only inadequate to deal with its complexity, but implicitly negative.

WARRREN: Let's go back to what you said a moment ago—you said he lacked a conception of the basic heroism involved in the Negro struggle.

ELLISON: Yes, I'm referring to the basic, implicit heroism of people who must live within a society without recognition, real status, but who are involved in the ideals of that society and who are trying to make their way, trying to determine their true position and their rightful position within it. Such people learn more about the real nature of that society, more about the true character of its values than those who can

afford to take their own place in society for granted. They might not be able to spell it out philosophically but they act it out. And as against the white man's indictments of the conduct, folkways, and values which express their sense of social reality, their actions say, "But you are being dishonest. You know that our view of things is true. We live and act out the truth of American reality, while to the extent that you refuse to take these aspects of reality, these inconsistencies, into consideration—you do not live the truth." Such a position raises a people above a simple position of social and political inferiority and it imposes upon them the necessity of understanding the other man and, while still pressing for their freedom, they have the obligation to themselves of giving up some of their need for revenge. Clark would probably reply that this is too much to ask of any people, and my answer would be: "There are no abstract rules. And although the human goal of a higher humanity is the same for all, each group must play the cards as history deals them." This requires understanding.

WARRREN: Understanding themselves, too?

ELLISON: Understanding themselves, too—yes—in terms of their own live definition of value, and of understanding themselves in relationship to other Americans. This places a big moral strain upon the individual, and it requires self-confidence, self-consciousness, self-mastery, insight, and compassion. In the broader sense it requires an alertness to human complexity. Men in our situation simply cannot afford to ignore the nuances of human relationships. And although action is necessary, forthright action, it must be guided—tempered by insight and compassion. Nevertheless, isn't this what civilization is all about? And isn't this what tragedy has always sought to teach us?

At any rate, this too has been part of the American Negro experience, and I believe that one of the important clues to the meaning of that experience lies in the idea, the ideal of sacrifice. Hannah Arendt's failure to grasp the importance of this ideal among Southern Negroes caused her to fly way off into left field in her "Reflections on Little Rock," in which she charged Negro parents with exploiting their
children during the struggle to integrate the schools. But she has absolutely no conception of what goes on in the minds of Negro parents when they send their kids through those lines of hostile people. Yet they are aware of the overtones of a rite of initiation which such events actually constitute for the child, a confrontation of the terrors of social life with all the mysteries stripped away. And in the outlook of many of these parents (who wish that the problem didn’t exist), the child is expected to face the terror and contain his fear and anger precisely because he is a Negro American. Thus he’s required to master the inner tensions created by his racial situation, and if he gets hurt—then his is one more sacrifice. It is a harsh requirement, but if he fails this basic test, his life will be even harsher.

Warren: White Southerners have been imprisoned by a loyalty to being Southern. Now, there’s a remark often made about Negroes, that they are frequently imprisoned, or the genius of the Negro is imprisoned, in the race problem. I am concerned with a kind of parallelism here between these two things.

Ellison: Well, I think that the parallel is very real. We’re often so imprisoned in the problem that we don’t stop to analyze our assets, and our leaders are often so preoccupied with an effort to interpret Negro life in terms which sociology has laid down that they not only fail to question the validity of such limited and limiting terms, they seem unaware that there are any others. One reason seems to be that they exclude themselves from the limitations of the definitions.

Now, we know that there is an area in Southern experience wherein Negroes and whites achieve a sort of human communication, and even social intercourse, which is not always possible in the North. I mean, that there is an implacably human side to race relationships. But at certain moments a reality which is political and social and ideological asserts itself, and the human relationship breaks up and both groups of people fall into their abstract roles. Thus a great loss of human energy goes into maintaining our stylized identities. In fact, much of the energy of the imagination—much of the psychic energy of the South, among both whites and blacks, has gone, I think, into this particular negative art form. If I may speak of it in such terms.

Warren: Just from the strain of maintaining this stance?

Ellison: I think so. Because in the end, when the barriers are down, there are human assertions to be made, whatever one’s race, in terms of one’s own taste and one’s own affirmations of one’s own self, one’s own way and one’s own group’s sense of life. But this makes a big problem for Negroes because there’s always the dominance of white standards—which we influence and partially share—imposed upon us. Nevertheless, there is much about Negro life which Negroes like, just as we like certain kinds of food. One of our problems is going to be that of affirming those things which we love about Negro life when there is no longer pressure upon us from outside. Then the time will come when our old ways of life will say, “Well, all right, you’re no longer kept within a Jim Crow community, what are you going to do about your life now? Do you think there is going to be a way of enjoying yourself which is absolutely better, more human than what you’ve known?” You see, it’s a question of recognizing the human core, the universality of our experience. It’s a matter of defining value as one has actually lived reality. And I think that this will hold true for white people. It certainly shows up in the white Southerners who turn up in the North, as with the hill people who are now clinging to their own folkways in the city of Chicago.

Warren: You are thinking simply of a pluralistic society, without—

Ellison: Yes, without any racial judgments, negative or positive, being placed upon it. I watch other people enjoying themselves, I watch their customs, and I think it one of my greatest privileges as an American, as a human being living in this particular time in the world’s history, to be able to project myself into various backgrounds, into various cultural patterns, not because I want to cease being a Negro or because I think that these are automatically better ways of realizing oneself, but because it is one of the great glories of being an American. You can be somebody else while still being yourself, and you don’t have to take an ocean voyage
to do it. In fact, one of the advantages of being a Negro is that we have always had the freedom to choose or to select and to affirm those traits, those values, those cultural forms, which we have taken from any and everybody. And with our own cultural expressions we have been quite generous. It's like the story they tell about Louis Armstrong teaching Bix Beiderbecke certain things about jazz. It was a joyful exchange and that was the way in which Negro jazzmen acted when I was a kid. They were delighted when anyone liked their music—especially white Americans—and their response was, "You like this? Well, this is a celebration of something we feel about life and art. You feel it too? Well, all right, we're all here together; let the good times roll!"

I think their attitude reveals much about Negro life generally which isn't recognized by sociologists and journalists who consider Negroes powerless to make choices. We probably have more freedom than anyone; we only need to become more conscious of it and use it to protect ourselves from some of the more tawdry American values. Besides, it's always a good thing to remember why it was that Br'er Rabbit loved his brier patch, and it wasn't simply for protection.

warren: I know some people, Ralph, white people and Negroes, who would say that what you are saying is an apology for a segregated society. I know it's not. How would you answer such a charge?

ELLISON: There's no real answer to such a charge, but I left the South in 1936. My writing speaks for itself. I've never pretended for one minute that the injustices and limitations of Negro life do not exist. On the other hand I think it important to recognize that Negroes have achieved a very rich humanity despite these restrictive conditions. I wish to be free not to be less Negro American but so that I can make the term mean something even richer. Now, if I can't recognize this, or if recognizing this makes me an Uncle Tom, then heaven help us all.

warren: How do you relate this, either positively or negatively, to the notion that the Negro Movement of our time invokes a discovery of identity?

ELLISON: I don't think it's a discovery of identity. I think rather that it is an affirmation and assertion of identification. And it's an assertion of a pluralistic identity. The assertion, in political terms, is that of the old American tradition. In terms of group identity and the current agitation it's revealing the real identity of a people who have been here for a hell of a long time. Negroes were Americans even before there was a United States, and if we're going to talk at all about what we are, this historical and cultural fact has to be recognized. And if we're going to accept this as true, then the identity of Negroes is bound up intrinsically, irrevocably, with the identities of white Americans, and especially is this true in the South.

warren: It is, indeed.

ELLISON: There's no Southerner who hasn't been touched by the presence of Negroes. There's no Negro who hasn't been touched by the presence of white Southerners. And of course this extends beyond the region. It gets—the moment you start touching culture you touch music, you touch dance attitudes, you touch movies,—touch the structure anywhere—and the Negro is right in there helping to shape it.

* * *

In the Introduction to his collection of essays *Shadow and Act*, Ralph Ellison says of his struggle to become a writer:

... I found the greatest difficulty for a Negro writer was the problem of revealing what he truly felt, rather than serving up what Negroes were supposed to feel, and were encouraged to feel. And linked to this was the difficulty, based upon our long habit of deception and evasion, of depicting what really happened within our areas of American life, and putting down with honesty and without bowing to ideological expediences the attitudes and values which give Negro American life its sense of wholeness and which renders it bearable and human and, when measured by our own terms, desirable.

In other words, the moral effort to see and recognize the truth of the self and of the world, and the artistic effort to say the truth
Black Lives Matter and the Paradoxes of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic Repair

Juliet Hooker

Abstract

This essay seeks to understand the complex response to the current Black Lives Matter protests against police violence, which pose deeper questions about the forms of politics that black citizens—who are experiencing a defining moment of racial terror in the United States in the twenty-first century—can and should pursue. When other citizens and state institutions bemoan the lack of care and concern for black suffering, which in turn makes it impossible for those wronged to be repressed, is it fair to ask blacks to enact “appropriate” democratic politics? These questions are explored via a reading of Danielle Allen and Hannah Arendt’s critique of school desegregation battles in the 1960s. I suggest that there is a conceptual trap in romantic historical narratives of black activism (especially the civil rights movement), that recast peaceful acquiescence to loss as a form of democratic exemplarity.

Keywords

Black Politics, Democratic Theory, Sacrifice, Racial Solidarity, Black Lives Matter
question is yes, should we think about the meaning of democracy, understanding freedom, the answer to this question is no, the meaning of democracy is not freedom, but the power of the state and the collective will. The idea of democracy is the power of the people, not the power of the state. If we want to think about democracy, we need to think about the power of the people, not the power of the state.

Black lives matter, not only in the United States, but around the world. The killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, the killing of Breonna Taylor in Kentucky, and the killing of Daunte Wright in Minnesota, all highlight the systemic racism and police violence that Black people face on a daily basis. These incidents are not isolated events, but part of a larger pattern of police brutality and systemic racism.

The police force is not the only institution that needs to be reformed. Schools, hospitals, and workplaces are also systems that need to be changed to ensure that everyone has equal opportunities. We need to work together to create a world where everyone is treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their race or background.

Since August 2014, when the protests sparked by the killing of Michael Brown began, there have been many attempts to reform the police system. These efforts are necessary, but they are not enough. We need a fundamental change in the way we think about and approach policing. This requires not only changes in policy, but also a shift in our culture and attitudes.

In conclusion, while the killing of George Floyd has sparked important conversations and actions, we must continue to work towards a world where everyone is treated with dignity and respect. This requires a fundamental change in the way we think about and approach policing, and it requires us to work together to create a world where everyone has equal opportunities.
I engage the logical, documentary, and ethical implications of the U.S. constitution to reveal a problem in the political process. On one hand, the electoral system for selecting the President and the House of Representatives is not representative of the people. On the other hand, the Constitution and the political process as it exists today are not representative of the people. This is a paradox.

I explore these questions by examining the nature of the problem of democracy in the United States. I argue that democracy is inherently flawed and that we must find ways to overcome these flaws.

The problem of democracy is a problem of representation, not of participation. Democratic societies are built on the idea of representation, but the representation of the people in our society is not adequate. The system of representation is based on the idea that one person represents another, but in reality, this is not the case. The system of representation is based on the idea that one person represents another, but in reality, this is not the case. The system of representation is based on the idea that one person represents another, but in reality, this is not the case. The system of representation is based on the idea that one person represents another, but in reality, this is not the case.

This is a problem because it means that the government cannot truly represent the will of the people. The government is not able to make decisions that are in the best interest of the people. The government is not able to make decisions that are in the best interest of the people. The government is not able to make decisions that are in the best interest of the people. The government is not able to make decisions that are in the best interest of the people.

One solution to this problem is to change the way we elect our representatives. We need a system that is more representative of the people. One possible solution is to have a system of proportional representation. In this system, each person gets one vote, and each vote is equal. This means that every person has a say in the government, and the government is more likely to represent the will of the people. This means that every person has a say in the government, and the government is more likely to represent the will of the people. This means that every person has a say in the government, and the government is more likely to represent the will of the people.

Another solution to this problem is to make the government more accountable. We need a system that makes the government more accountable to the people. One possible solution is to have term limits for politicians. In this system, politicians do not serve for life, but for a limited period of time. This means that the government is more likely to represent the will of the people. This means that the government is more likely to represent the will of the people. This means that the government is more likely to represent the will of the people.
From Democratic Loss to Black Sacrifice
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sentence. In the U.S., policy, the "paradoxical fact that most democratic citizens
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understanding their losses as democratic experiments can also become a
nuisance. In the case of superimposed groups facing racial terror and violence, policies that affect all citizens are not always open to make meaningful change.

Johnson ends his essay with a call for equal voiceability, that the problem is grounded in the face of a Frankensteinian police force they did, though not always the way it is presented. Whether it is fair to ask some citizens to make such a call, Johnson believes that all citizens can and should be included in the conversation. However, Johnson argues that the conversation needs to be self-referential. At best, no official can with a clear conscience dismiss the concerns of citizens who believe that their voices can be "democratically represented" in the conversation. Johnson presses them to continue to demand representation and to report political losses. In this way, he believes that it is important to consider whether citizens are being considered in the conversation. The more citizens demand to be heard, the more likely it is that the conversation will be meaningful. But it is important to recognize that the conversation is not just about the voices of those who are affected by the police force. It is also about the voices of those who are not affected but who have already been impacted by the police force. Johnson argues that this is the price of such a conversation. The burden of democratic scrutiny lies with the people who have experienced the police force. Johnson believes that this is the only way to ensure that the conversation is meaningful and that it is truly democratic.
explained that her critique was prompted by one of the widely circulated questions of political science: In her essay on school desegregation, Arendt articulated an idea that has been widely discussed in democratic theory and the field of political science. She argued that questions about the democratic ideal are crucial to understanding the nature of citizenship and the role of the citizen in a democratic society.

Arendt also forcefully developed a sense of white privilege. Her analysis of the dominant white power structure revealed the systemic nature of inequality and the ways in which it is perpetuated. She argued that the democratic ideal is threatened by the persistence of white supremacy and the ways in which it fundamentally undermines the democratic process.

The tension between the desire for equality and the reality of inequality is acute, and it is precisely because of this tension that democracy is threatened. The democratic ideal is threatened when the power structure is not truly representative of the people it claims to serve. This is particularly evident in the way that white supremacy is perpetuated, and the ways in which it is embedded in the fabric of society.

The question of democracy and its relationship with political power is at the heart of this discussion. Arendt argued that the democratic ideal is threatened when the power structure is not truly representative of the people it claims to serve. This is particularly evident in the way that white supremacy is perpetuated, and the ways in which it is embedded in the fabric of society.

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Feminist Theory 4(4)
This narrow conception of the civil rights movement functions to foreclose issues of politics and legal protection versus economic rediscrimination, etc. In best to pursue racial justice, the efficacy of non-violence, the primary of a significant discrimination among black strategies at the time about how radical aspects of the civil rights movement and to create the real that there romanize manner of the civil rights movement. Thus, against the work of the "Town of Civil Rights Movement". Tony had drawn on the former racism as a phenomenon to U.S. democracy. Drawing on the that racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil racism toward a host of goals (in this case, unity). They argued that to compel the civil
According to the dominant structural perspective of democratic social science, the empirical facts are that black citizens are systematically and effectively excluded from the political process. This exclusion is manifested in the low levels of voter turnout and the lack of political representation. Moreover, the dominant interpretation of these facts is that black citizens are not sufficiently engaged in the political process. However, this interpretation is based on a flawed understanding of the democratic ideal. The democratic ideal is based on the assumption that all citizens have equal access to the political process. When this equality is not achieved, the democratic ideal is not realized. The exclusion of black citizens undermines the democratic ideal and undermines the legitimacy of the political system.
Academy’s response to comprehensive criticisms of “Reformations on Little Rock” was identical as block in the accompanying article (and by letter) to plans of the family (who named presented was white, despite the fact that he lived on the Rivier) with whom James Watson of block parents (photograph above) upon which Andrew based her criticism of block parents by self-interested richer than as a service on behalf of the common good. Indeed, several voices attuned to see its heroic character, and impressed it as nothing more than20 groups in a racial policy,” in Andrew’s “Reformation on Little Rock” essay is open by [the numbers of] dominant (white) and subordinate (non-white) race and historically impeded the reproduction of the dominant opposition that fellow citizens who are racial others deserve the same care, can never in radically different ways, race has historically impeded the race. Moreover, it echoes the fact that observers might read the racialized scholarship, however, if echoes the fact that observers might read the victories of the 1960s were achieved prior to race into account the decades of black suffering among while observers, this account of how the civil rights
ever specific instance of influence becomes a discussion of whether or not a
black presence, thus the possibilities for racial influence contained in this
become responsible for their own deaths. The problem is that it is not
influenced by society.

Of course, even if black sensitiveness produce chances in which moral
to a particular account of the moral psychology that fails is to take the effects
will in turn produce a re-orientation to racial justice in this context; this
assumption that black sensitiveness will induce some amount among other
black sensitiveness that non-violence was supposed to evoke. The common
black sensitiveness that non-violence could be disproved by evidence
so someone whose ethical judgement could not possibly be discredited by
European model supported to the United States on the basis of racism
friends and should be appreciated. If the reader did the homework,

I should like to make it clear that in my sympathy for the
understanding, the common publics of American I have difficulty in
understanding: like most people of European origin I have difficulty in
and because they would have brought me into bondage. I have never
and never have I exist in the South and have ever avoided occasional trips to Southern

suggested should have absoluted her of any possible changes of racism:
social history is a lower European immigrant to the United States, among
impressions one with a sense of humility and need.

Political Theory 44(4)
Some of this certainty seems to be at work in Attorney General's recent pronouncement that the submissiveness and docility of African Americans are a result of their past abuse and witnessing to this submissiveness. This view, however, does not take into account the historical context in which African Americans have been forced to live. The experiences of African Americans in the United States have been marked by violence, oppression, and discrimination. These experiences have led to a sense of helplessness and despair, which has been expressed in the submissiveness and docility of African Americans.

This view also fails to recognize the power dynamics that exist in our society. The power held by those in positions of authority, such as police officers, can lead to a sense of submissiveness in those who are subject to their power. This is not to say that African Americans are not submissives, but rather that the power dynamics at play need to be acknowledged.

Lack of provocation is also cited as a reason for the different way in which African Americans respond to police actions. However, this is not a valid reason. African Americans are not more likely to provoke violence, but rather are more likely to be violent when provoked.

Finally, the characterization of African Americans as passive and submissive is based on a false dichotomy. African Americans are not either passive or aggressive, but rather exist on a spectrum. This spectrum includes both passive and aggressive behavior, with the exact balance depending on a variety of factors.

Thus, the characterization of African Americans as passive and submissive is a simplification that does not account for the complexity of their experiences and behaviors. It is important to recognize the power dynamics that exist in our society and to acknowledge the historical context in which African Americans have lived. This will help us to better understand the behavior of African Americans and to work towards creating a more just and equitable society.
Democratic Repair

Black Policies for Deadly Post-Racial Times: Rights as

...
certs will not solve the economic shortages that have led to and other
election of more black office-holders or inaction of more black police of-
administrative apparatus right over a predominantly black citizenry, the
problems clearly stem from a predominantly white political structure and
zeal. This is because while supernumery police produce a verbal state that is
has not transformed the racialized character of the state, just as the presence
address racial justice. Descriptive black political representation, for example,
important questions about the limited ability of liberal democracy to undo
enfranchisement, structural disparities in wealth and the criminal justice system
in race the布莱特 of the victoria's gladly by the civil rights movement to
such a context.

come to democratic loss appears both immediate and counter-productive in
policies that emphasize better service in the form of resident agencies-
locale by combining elements of the state, & a conception of equal black
questions to specific and consequences of these policy and in the criminal-
induration more difficult to sustain. "Liberal" describes for block the structures
which ignorance about how the enfranchisement of block the police prior to
where ignorance about how the enfranchisement of block the police prior to
Liberals blacker processes have to a certain extent, extended community will
as another and trap is to be a menace to society. The black
were already viewed as criminals, described criminals in this system and "classical",
encounters between the state and "law-abiding" citizens. Democratic
mass incarceration, the dynamic that governs interactions between the police/
understanding of the formal procedures of citizens in a society defined by
mostly black were already viewed as criminals and criminal justice system and "classical",
their constitutional rights could be criminalized is that by virtue of being
so from repression or punishment, one of the reasons for repressing criminal
the disproportion of states to be associated with severity in "crime". Davis concludes that the state
ion that can be wrested back to slavery? Given contemporaneous forms of mas-
Hoover 463
The U.S. founding as an anti-colonial, revolutionary event in which the role of black citizens was fundamental. However, the legacy of that revolution has been a mixed one, with varying levels of racial progress and inequality. This is particularly true in the context of African American thought, which has been shaped by a complex interplay of political, social, and economic forces.

In contrast to notions of democratic equality, certain strands of black political thought allow us to begin to develop such a diversity of thought. In this context, political thought about race has developed in a variety of ways. For example, the idea of a "non-violent" approach to political participation is one that has been particularly influential. This approach emphasizes the importance of non-violent methods of achieving political ends, which can be seen as a form of democratic participation.

However, this approach has been criticized by some for being too passive and not expressing the anger and grief of racial injustice. It is clear that black citizens have a right to express their anger and grief in a meaningful way. This is not to say that all expressions of anger are appropriate or productive, but it is important to recognize the complexity of these emotions. In the words of one political thinker, "anger is not the same as violence."

Furthermore, the idea of political participation as a form of democratic equality is also complex. While some argue that all citizens should be able to participate in the political process, others have pointed out that this is not always the case. For example, some argue that certain groups may be excluded from the political process, either intentionally or by default.

In conclusion, the role of black citizens in American democracy is a complex one, with many different perspectives and approaches. It is important to recognize the diversity of thought on this issue and to continue to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the role of black citizens in American society.
sentence is no longer enough.

black politics must move beyond peculiar aggregation to lose democratic
where it has become necessary to affirm that black lives matter, even in death,
where of erosion, bitterness, and the existential other inances
have already suffered the lion's share of losses inflicted by racism. In the
that responsibility to social justice does not the primacy which those who
idea of the soul as a form of democratic ideal for black citizens means recogniz-
serious trouble the
chain of social issues and the rhetoric, even if different democratic ideals require
within the bounds of liberal democracy might be absolutely crucial to socie-
instead how operating in a politics of active resistance that does not easily
other, certain strands of historical black political thought can help us to imagine
these from the beginning begins the black lives matter process in the inter-
mental, an essay in naive expressions of democratic hope. Indeed, one crucial
responses to the black lives matter process, make it difficult, if not impossible-
Jamal Washington, Before Jones, and on and on—and coupled with hostile
mourned, and remembered—James Clark, Samuel DuBois, Walter Scott,
the seminary makes history of dead black bodies mean to be named,
always already criminalized black "thugs" in urban fiction.
always already criminalized black "thugs" in urban fiction.
and resolves the distinction between law-abiding middle-class black citizens and
for example, point toward a more radical critique of the current state that
and insistence that "black lives matter" by the Black Lives Matter Project-
the reproduction of mass incarceration and the bodies of black communities
in suggesting that the law can and does set to in the expressive authority of the law, because the law can and does set to
from which white supremacy and humiliation go, black politics must also actively resist
how does the law mean, black liberation must entail "ways of contesting"
from which white supremacy and humiliation go, black politics must also actively resist
how does the law mean, black liberation must entail "ways of contesting"
from which white supremacy and humiliation go, black politics must also actively resist
how does the law mean, black liberation must entail "ways of contesting"
Observers who favor both the movement's aims and tactics.

Discussion: The Future of Liberalism
In the age of postmodernism, the liberal ideal has been replaced by a variety of other ideas, including participatory democracy, multiculturalism, and identity politics. These ideas have emerged in response to the perceived failures of liberalism, such as its inability to address the needs of marginalized groups.

Notes

1. The author(s) declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, findings, and/or publication of this article.

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Political Theory 44(4)

Poor Incarceration, Poor Country, and the Struggle of Family Resources

The evidence suggests that incarceration is a strong predictor of future poverty and that families of incarcerated poor are at a disadvantage. For example, in the case of some children of incarcerated fathers, the situation is even worse. The combination of some closure of the prison, the increased chances of incarceration, and the high and growing rates of mass incarceration, for example, blacks are over-represented among the poor in the United States. There is a need to address the issue of racial injustice, but does not address

4.1. Where are we today in the United States 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, 2010s?

4.2. The question of who gains and loses from incarceration is a strong predictor of future poverty and that families of incarcerated poor are at a disadvantage. For example, in the case of some children of incarcerated fathers, the situation is even worse. The combination of some closure of the prison, the increased chances of incarceration, and the high and growing rates of mass incarceration, for example, blacks are over-represented among the poor in the United States. There is a need to address the issue of racial injustice, but does not address

3.5. I use the term sociality rather than community because there is a difference between empathy and solidarity...
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